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ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 

OF  THE 

Great  Lakes -St.  Lawrence 
Ship  Channel 


BY 

ROY  S.  MacELWEE 

■Author  of  "Ports  and  Terminal  Facilities" 

ALFRED  H.  RITTER 

specialist  in  Transportation 
and  Port  Development 


NEW  YORK 

THE  RONALD  PRESS  COMPANY 

1921 


Copyright,  1921,  by 
The  Ronald  Press  Company 


All  Rights  Reserved 


NATIONAL  OAriTAl  PRtSt,  INC.,  WAIMINOTON,  D.  (3 


FOREWORD 

In  this  analysis  of  the  economic  aspects  of  the  Great  Lakes-St. 
Lawrence  Ship  Channel,  the  authors  have  endeavored  to  present 
conservatively  the  more  important  local  and  national  advantages 
to  be  gained  from  opening  the  Great  Lakes  to  ocean  traffic. 

Prior  to  making  this  investigation,  they,  like  many  others,  had 
formed  an  immature  judgment  that  ocean  vessels  on  this  route 
could  not  compete  with  existing  routes  serving  the  Northwest.  A 
study  of  the  factors  affecting  the  costs  and  advantages  of  the 
various  available  routes  and  methods  of  transportation  has 
served  to  dispel  the  impressions  derived  largely  from  reports 
submitted  many  years  ago  when  the  conditions  and  costs  of 
transportation,  as  well  as  the  needs  of  the  vast  territory  served 
by  the  Great  Lakes,  were  very  different  from  what  they  are  at 
the  present  time. 

The  authors  desire  to  give  credit  for  valuable  information 
regarding  various  phases  of  the  proposition,  contained  in  public 
utterances  and  in  special  papers  by  Herbert  Hoover,  Julius  H. 
Barnes,  William  C.  Redfield,  George  F.  Roberts,  Senator  Irvine 
L.  Lenroot,  Senator  Chas.  E.  Townsend,  Congressman  A.  P. 
Nelson,  and  many  others  whose  names  appear  in  this  report  and 
in  the  record  of  hearings  before  the  International  Joint 
Commission. 

Roy  S.  MacElv^ee, 
Alfred  H.  Ritter. 

January  3,  192L 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Chapter.  Page. 

I.  Scope  of  the  investigation 7 

II.  Relation  of  transportation  to  the  economic  life  of  the  nation.  .  12 

III.  The  transportation  shortage 16 

IV.  The  remedy  for  the  defects  in  our  transportation  system 31 

V.  The  handicap  of  inadequate  terminal  facilities 35 

VI.  Character  of  water  transportation  needed  for  the  commerce 

of  the  Northwest 54 

VII.  Cost  of  transportation  between  upper  lake  ports  and  Liverpool.  65 
VIII.  The  areas  commercially  tributary  to  the   Great   Lakes-St. 

Lawrence  waterway 81 

IX.  Production  of  the  tributary  area 113 

X.  Brief  history  of  improvements  for  navigation  on  the  Great  Lakes  1 50 

XI.  Benefits  from  navigation  improvements  on  the  Great  Lakes.  .  .  157 
XII.  Comparison  of  navigation  facilities  on  the  Great  Lakes  with 

those  of  ocean  ports 162 

XIII.  Character  of  navigation  to  be  provided  on  the  St.  Lawrence  River  166 

XIV.  Comparison  of  the  St.  Lawrence  with  other  ocean  routes 173 

XV.  Navigation  conditions  on  the  St.  Lawrence  route 177 

XVI.  Depths  required  for  the  accommodation  of  vessels  engaged  in 

maritime  trade 195 

XVII.  Types  and  sizes  of  vessels  which  carry  the  world's  commerce .  .  .  205 
XVIII.   Study  of  vessels  passing  through  the  Panama  Canal  between 

July  1,  1919,  and  June  30,  1920 224 

XIX.  Will  ocean  vessels  seek  inland  ports? 234 

XX.  The  problem  of  return  loads 237 

XXI.  The  commerce  of  the  Great  Lakes 242 

XXII.  Volume  of  commerce  affected  by  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Law- 

rence waterway 248 

XXIII.  The  grain  movement 253 

XXIV.  Other  commodity  movements 268 

XXV.  Shipbuilding  on  the  Great  Lakes 282 

XXVI.  Water  Power 284 

XXVII.  Conclusions 287 


Chapter    I 
SCOPE  OF  THE  INVESTIGATION 

Study  of  the  engineering  features  of  the  proposed  improvement 
is  in  progress  by  engineers  representing  the  United  States  and 
Canada.  Much  information  relative  to  the  physical  conditions  is 
already  available  as  a  result  of  previous  surveys,  but  a  new  in- 
vestigation of  the  commercial  and  economic  features  is  necessary 
in  view  of  the  magnitude  of  the  agricultural,  mineral  and  indus- 
trial development  in  the  areas  to  be  served  by  the  waterway  and 
the  marked  changes  in  transportation  costs  and  conditions  during 
recent  years. 

The  law  and  the  official  reference. — The  river  and  harbor  act 
approved  March  2,  1919,  contains  the  following  item: 

Sec.  9.  That  the  International  Joint  Commission  created  by 
the  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  relating 
to  boundary  waters  between  the  United  States  and  Canada, 
signed  at  Washington  January  11,  1909,  under  the  provisions  of 
article  9  of  said  treaty,  is  requested  to  investigate  what  further 
improvement  of  the  Saint  Lawrence  River  between  Montreal  and 
Lake  Ontario  is  necessary  to  make  the  same  navigable  for  ocean- 
going vessels,  together  with  the  estimated  cost  thereof,  and 
report  to  the  Government  of  the  Dominion  of  Canada  and  to  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States,  with  its  recommendations  for 
cooperation  by  the  United  States  with  the  Dominion  of  Canada 
in  the  improvement  of  said  river. 

To  formulate  definite  conclusions  upon  the  questions  specified 
in  the  law  necessarily  involves  extensive  study  and  investigation 
of  the  physical,  commercial,  transportation,  industrial,  and  other 
economic  conditions  affecting  or  affected  by  the  proposed  im- 
provement. In  the  letter  of  reference  from  the  Secretary  of 
State,  the  matters  requiring  investigation  are  definitely  stated, 
as  follows : 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.  C,  January  21,  1920. 
International  Joint  Commission, 
IVashington,  D.  C. 

Gentlemen. — I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  the  Governments  of 
the  United  States  of  America  and  of  the  Dominion  of  Canada,  under  the 
provision  of  article  9  of  the  treaty  of  the  11th  of  Januar-.  1909,  between 
the  Governments  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  herewith  refer 
certain  questions,  as  set  forth  below,  "involving  the  beneficial  use  of  the 
waters  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River,  between  Montreal  and  Lake  Ontario,  in 

7 


8  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS   OF    THE 

the  interests  oi  b6th  countries,  and  in  g-eneral  the  rights,  obHgations,  or 
interests  of  either  in  r'clation  to  the  other,  or  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  other 
along  their  common  frontier." 

It  is  desired  that  the  said  questions  be  made  the  basis  of  an  investigation 
to  be  carried  out  by  the  International  Joint  Commission,  to  the  end  that 
th'C  said  commission  may  submit  a  report  to  the  two  countries  covering 
the  subject  matter  of  this  reference,  together  with  such  conclusions  and 
recommendations  as  may  be  considered  pertinent  in  the  premises. 

Question  I. — What  furth'er  improvement  in  the  St.  Lawrence  River, 
between  Montreal  and  Lake  Ontario,  is  necessary  to  make  the  same 
navigable  for  deep  draft  vessels  of  either  the  lake  or  ocean  going  type? 
What  draft  of  water  is  recommended  and  what  is  the  estimated  cost? 

In  answering  this  question  the  commission  is  requ'csted  to  consider : 

(o)  Navigation  interests  alone,  whether  by  the  construction  of  locks 
and  dams  in  the  river;  by  side  canals  with  the  necessary  locks;  or  by  a 
combination  of  the  two. 

(h)  The  combination  of  navigation  and  power  interests  to  obtain  the 
greatest  beneficial  use  of  the  waters  of  tbe  river. 

Question  //.—Which  of  the  schemes  submitted  by  the  Government  or 
other  engineers  is  preferred,  and  why? 

Question  III. — Under  what  general  method  of  procedure  and  in  what 
general  order  shall  the  various  physical  and  administrative  features  of 
the  improvement  be  carried  out? 

Question  IV. — Upon  what  basis  shall  the  capital  cost  of  the  completed 
improvement  be  apportioned  to  each  country? 

Question  V. — Upon  what  basis  shall  the  costs  of  operation  and  mainte- 
nance be  apportioned  to  each  country  ? 

Question  VI. — What  m^ethod  of  control  is  recommended  for  the  opera- 
tion of  the  improved  waterway  to  secure  its  most  beneficial  use? 

Question  I'll. — Will  regulating  Lake  Ontario  increase  the  low-wat'er 
flow  in  the  St.  Lawrence  ship  channel  below  Montreal?  And  if  so,  to 
what  extent  and  at  what  additional  cost? 

Question  VIII. — To  what  extent  will  the  improvement  develop  the 
resources,  commerce,  and  industry  of  each  country? 

Question  IX. — What  traffic,  both  incoming  and  outgoing,  in  kind  and 
quantity,  is  likely  to  be  carried  upon  the  proposed  route  both  at  its  incep- 
tion and  in  the  future,  consideration  to  be  given  not  only  to  present 
conditions  but  to  probable  changes  therein  resulting  from  the  d'cvelopmcnt 
of  industrial  activities  due  to  availability  of  large  (luantities  of  hydraulic 
power  ? 

Pending  the  receipt  of  plans,  estimates,  and  other  engine'ering  data 
necessary  for  the  final  consideration  of  this  reference,  the  commission  is 
requested  to  hold  such  public  hearings  as  may  be  consid'ered  necessary  or 
advisable  in  order  to  obtain  all  information  bearing  directly  or  indirectly 
on  the  physical,  commercial,  and  economic  feasibility  nf  tlic  project  as  k 
whole. 

To  facilitate  the  preparation  of  the  desired  report  each  Government  will, 
from  its  official  engineering  persoiniel,  appoint  an  engineer  with  full 
authority  to  confer  with  a  similar  officer  of  the  other  Government  for 
the  purpose:  First,  of  ac(|uiring,  each  in  his  own  country,  such  data  as  may 
be    found    nt-cessary    to    supplement    the    existing    engineering    data    and 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  \f 

surveys;  and,  second,  of  preparing  complete  outline  plans  for  and  estimates 
of  the  cost  of  the  proposed  improvement,  including  the  value  of  all 
property,  easements,  damages,  and  rights  connected  therewith.  These  plans 
and  estimates  are  to  be  submitted  to  the  commission  as  soon  as  practicable, 
but  not  later  than  one  year  from  the  date  of  appointment,  and  the  com- 
mission is  request'cd  to  forward  to  the  two  Governments  its  linal  report, 
with  recommendation  not  later  than  three  months  tbereafter.  A  copy  of 
the  instructions  furnished  these  engin^eers  is  attached  hereto. 
I  am,  g'entlemen, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

Robert  Lansing. 

Instructions  to  the  engineers. — The  instructions  to  the  en- 
{.jineers  were  as  follows: 

You  are  hereby  designated  to  take  charge  of  the  survey  of  the  St.  Law- 
rence River,  Montreal  to  Lake  Ontario,  for  the  purpose  of  preparing  plans 
and  estimates  for  its  further  improvement  to  make  the  same  navigable 
for  deep-draft  vessels  of  either  the  lake  or  ocean-going  type,  and  to  obtain 
the  greatest  beneficial  use   from  these  waters. 

The  surveys,  plans,  and  estimates  are  to  be  submitted  to  the  International 
Joint  Commission  within  twelve  months,  and  are  to  assist  the  commission 
in  answering  the  questions  of  a  reference  to  the  matter  under  the  provisions 
of  article  9  of  the  treaty  of  the  11th  of  January,  1909,  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain.  (A  copy  of  the  letter  of  reference  is  inclosed 
for  your  information.) 

It  is  desired  to  expedite  the  completion  of  the  duty  confided  to  you 
by  utilizing  all  available  surveys  and  other  reliable  information,  whether 
derived  from  public  or  from  private  sources.  That  a  proper  basis  of  pro- 
cedure may  be  agreed  upon  in  the  first  instance  and  the  field  work  and 
the  preparation  of  plans  and  estimates  promptly  and  efficiently  carried 
on  thereafter,  you  are  requested  to  confer  fully  and  freely  with  (name 
of  individual  to  be  inserted),  who  has  been  designated  to  take  charge 
of  corresponding  duties  on  behalf  of  the  (name  of  country  to  be  in- 
serted), to  arrange  for  the  division  of  the  field  work,  and  for  cooperation 
in  the  preparation  of  the  desired  plans  and  estimates.  While  it  is  clear 
that  the  field  work  necessary  to  complete  existing  information  may  prop- 
erly and  advantageously  be  divided,  cooperation  and  unity  in  the  prepa- 
ration of  plans  and  estimates  seem  preferable. 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  reference  to  the  joint  commission  contemplates 
four  different  general  schemes  or  methods  of  improvements,  as  follows  : 

(a)   By  means  of  locks  and  navigation  dams  in  the  river. 
{h)   By  means  of  locks  and  side  canals, 
(r)   By  a  combination  of  the  two  preceding  methods. 
{d)   By  means  of  locks  and  power  dams. 

The  plans  and  estimates  should  definitely  cover  these  four  general 
schemes  or  methods  of  improvement,  but  other  variations  of  them  may 
be  considered,  and,  if  deemed  desirable,  also  presented  to  the  commission. 

The  channels  to  be  considered  are  to  be  of  25  and  30  feet  depth  at 
low  water,  and  the  plans  and  estimates  should  be  prepared  correspondingly. 
A  choice  between  them  will,  under  the  terms  of  the  reference,  be  made 
by  the  commission. 


10  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS   OF   THE 

As  detailed  plans  can  not  be  prepared  within  the  time  limit  of  one 
year  fixed  for  this  work,  it  is  desired  that  merely  outline  plans  and  lump- 
sum estimates,  based  upon  experience  from  similar  work,  such  as  the 
enlargement  of  the  Welland  Canal  and  the  power  development  at  Niagara 
Falls,  should  be  submitted. 

The  general  schemes  should  be  furnished  to  the  commission  showing : 
First,  the  best  for  navigation  alone ;  and,  second,  for  the  most  efficient 
utilization  of  the  waters  of  the  St.  Lawrence  for  navigation  and  power, 
together  with  the  approximate  costs  thereof. 

As  the  handling  and  disposal  of  ice  is  a  fundamental  difficulty  on  the 
St.  Lawrence  River,  the  arrangements  regarded  as  being  necessary  for 
this  purpose  should  be  discussed  as  well  as  those  recommended  for  ice 
disposal  during  the  construction  period  and  thereafter. 

Regulation  of  the  levels  of  Lake  Ontario  so  as  to  equalize  the  discharge 
of  the  St.  Law^rence  may  be  desirable  in  the  interest  of  navigation,  of 
ice  disposal,  and  of  power  development.  If  the  plans  include  any  pro- 
visions for  such  regulation,  an  explanation  should  be  furnished  to  make 
clear  just  what  is  proposed. 

Finally,  you  are  requested  to  keep  the  International  Joint  Commission 
fully  advised  of  your  progress  and  to  maintain  close  and  sympathetic 
touch  with  it  so  as  to  insure  complete  coordination. 

The  engineers  appointed  to  conduct  the  surveys  are  Coh  \V.  P. 
Wooten,  Corps  of  Engineers,  for  the  United  States,  and  Air. 
W.  A.  Bowden,  for  the  Dominion  of  Canada.  Upon  the  submis- 
sion of  the  report  of  these  officers  the  Commission  will  be  in 
possession  of  complete  and  reliable  data  regarding  the  physical 
features  of  the  improvement,  concerning  which  much  informa- 
tion is  already  available  as  a  result  of  previous  surveys,  both  by 
the  United  States  and  by  the  Dominion  of  Canada. 

New  investigation  of  commerce  and  transportation  essential. — 
The  questions  relating  to  commerce  and  trans])ortation.  however, 
require  a  new  and  independent  study,  in  the  light  of  the  conditions 
now  existing  affecting  the  foreign  and  domestic  commerce  of  the 
country.  So  rapid  has  been  the  industrial  and  commercial  ex- 
pansion of  the  United  States,  and  so  pronounced  have  been  the 
changes  in  transportation  and  terminal  conditions  and  costs  during 
recent  years,  that  the  studies  made  and  conclusions  reached  twenty 
years  or  more  ago,  respecting  the  merits  of  a  deep  waterway 
connecting  the  Great  Lakes  with  the  seaboard,  are  inapplicable  to 
the  problems  now  confronting  our  great  Northwest.  In  view  of 
the  above,  extended  discussion  of  the  engineering  features  of  the 
improvement  will  be  omitted  from  this  report,  and  only  such 
brief  reference  included  as  appears  necessary  to  a  clear  under- 
standing of  the  facilities  available  and  required  for  the  use  of 
commerce  and  navigation. 

The  problem  which  the  International  Joint  Commission  is  now 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  11 

asked  to  solve  is  one  of  the  most  important  projects  of  waterway 
improvement  ever  proposed  in  the  interests  of  the  pubhc.  At  the 
many  hearings  held  by  the  Commission  throughout  the  country, 
a  vast  amount  of  information  has  been  submitted,  setting  forth 
the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  a  deep  waterway  connecting 
the  Great  Lakes  with  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  As  affecting  the 
advisability  of  undertaking  the  improvement,  the  information 
for  each  locality  must  be  coordinated  into  the  general  study,  and 
the  missing  elements  must  be  supplied  from  reliable  sources,  in 
order  that  the  final  results  may  give  a  clear  picture  of  the  problem, 
portraying  the  advantages  in  their  true  proportions.  An  attempt 
has  been  made  in  this  report  to  coordinate  the  information  pre- 
sented at  the  hearings,  and  to  present  as  fully  as  space  will  permit 
the  vital  facts  affecting  the  advisability  of  the  United  States 
undertaking  the  proposed  improvement  in  cooperation  with  the 
Dominion  of  Canada. 


Chapter  II 

RELATION  OF  TRANSPORTATION  TO  THE  ECONOMIC 
LIFE  OF  THE  NATION 

The  future  of  America  will  be  determined  by  the  efforts  made 
to  extend  her  commercial  relations  with  other  countries.  Eco- 
nomical transportation  between  areas  of  production  and  foreign 
markets  is  one  of  the  requisites  of  successful  foreign  trade,  and 
improvements  increasing  the  economy  of  overseas  business  are 
national  in  character  and  contribute  directly  to  the  welfare  of 
every  citizen  of  the  land.  The  surplus  producing  areas  of  the 
United  States  are  in  the  heart  of  the  continent  at  distances  of 
800  to  1,500  miles  from  the  seaboard.  The  cost  of  transportation 
by  rail  has  now  reached  the  point  where  a  thousand-mile  haul 
across  the  country,  with  attendant  expense  of  transfers,  com- 
pletely wipes  out  the  margin  of  profit  on  many  commodities 
entering  largely  into  our  foreign  commercial  relations,  and  serves 
to  lim.it  the  markets  for  many  others.  The  provision  of  econom- 
ical transportation  for  our  surplus  production  is  a  national  duty. 

In  order  to  clearly  appreciate  the  importance  of  efficient  and 
economical  transportation  in  shaping  the  destiny  of  the  nation, 
we  must  first  realize  that  the  progress  of  industry  and  commerce 
has  now  reached  the  era  in  its  development  when  nations  can 
no  longer  live  alone.  The  developments  in  the  physical  means 
of  transportation  during  the  last  century  have  so  extended  the 
limits  of  commercial  intercourse  that  the  interchange  of  prodticts 
around  the  world  is  now  as  freely  accomplished  as  was  the  local 
trade  of  a  limited  territory  when  this  country  was  founded.  The 
wonderful  recent  development  of  manufacturing  throughout  the 
world  rests  upon  transportation.  Our  factories  no  longer  fabri- 
cate only  the  raw  materials  produced  at  their  doors,  but  they  locate 
where  some  one  great  essential  is  available,  drawing  the  remain- 
ing essentials  from  all  quarters  of  the  globe  and  distributing  the 
finished  products  to  every  land.  Raw  jjroducts  are  freriuently 
imported  many  thousand  miles  from  distant  lands,  and  the  fin- 
ished manufactures  returned  inr  consumption  to  the  very  coun- 
tries where  the  raw  material  originated.  Crude  rubber  from 
r>razil  and  long  staj)lc  cotton  from  h'gypt  find  their  wav  to  our 
factories,  where  they  are  manufactured  into  tires,  and  thence 
dnring  1919  were  exported  to  88  different  countries  or  provinces 
throughout  the  world  The  same  situation  applies  to  many  other 
manufactured  articles. 

While  adequate  transj^ortation  of  our  domestic  commerce  is  of 

12 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  13 

vital  importance  to  the  people,  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
that  efficient  and  economical  transportation  be  available  from 
source  to  destination  for  products  entering  into  our  foreign  trade. 
No  nation  ever  became  great  that  did  not  seek  foreign  inter- 
course. The  Phoenicians  became  great  through  seeking  trade 
in  the  Mediterranean  Sea  ;  the  Portuguese  by  exploring  the  coast 
of  Africa;  Venice  by  opening  up  trade  routes  to  the  East; 
Spain  by  her  discoveries  made  in  the  quest  of  commerce ;  and 
Great  Britain  by  her  indefatigable  zeal  in  extending  her  trade  to 
the  four  corners  of  the  world.  The  future  of  America  will  be 
determined  by  the  efforts  made  to  extend  her  commercial  rela- 
tions with  other  countries.  Economical  transportation  between 
the  areas  of  production  and  manufacture  and  the  foreign  markets 
is  one  of  the  requisites  of  successful  foreign  trade,  and  the 
greater  the  efficiency  attained  the  greater  will  be  our  ability  to 
meet  competition  in  the  markets  of  the  world.  Any  improve- 
ment that  will  contribute  to  the  economy  of  overseas  business  is 
national  in  character.  The  benefits  in  such  cases  are  never  con- 
fined to  geographical  limits  of  the  improvement.  Both  directly 
and  indirectly  they  contribute  to  the  welfare  of  every  citizen  of 
the  land. 

During  the  last  few  years  the  world  has  been  begging  for  our 
products  and  was  willing  to  pay  any  price  to  obtain  them. 
During  this  period  the  economic  laws  governing  trade  between 
nations  were  cast  aside.  No  price  was  too  great  to  pay  for  the 
supplies  urgently  demanded  for  the  successfvil  prosecution  of 
war,  nor  for  the  food  required  to  meet  the  necessities  of  lands 
where  production  had  been  brought  to  a  standstill.  During  this 
period  our  manufacturers  were  enabled  to  extend  their  trade  into 
many  new  fields,  and  a  large  business  was  developed  in  South 
America  and  elsewhere  for  manufactured  articles  which  were 
formerly  obtained  almost  exclusively  from  Great  Britain  and 
Germany.  In  return,  we  purchased  large  quantities  of  raw  ma- 
terials from  these  lands,  and  through  this  helpful  intercourse 
have  developed  a  trade  of  vast  proportions  which  we  must  exer- 
cise every  rightful  means  to  retain.  It  is  needless  to  say  that 
we  shall  meet  keen  competition  in  this  endeavor.  Having  in 
mind  the  fact  that  our  labor,  while  the  most  efficient  in  the  world, 
is  more  costly  than  the  labor  of  many  of  our  competitors,  and 
accepting  as  fundamental  to  our  institutions  the  just  and  generous 
treatment  of  those  who  contribute  their  daily  efforts  to  our  indus- 
try, it  behooves  us  to  seek  such  other  means  as  are  attainable  to 


14  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

place  our  goods  in  foreign  markets  as  cheaply  as  our  competitors. 
We  have  it  within  our  power  by  suitable  tariff  legislation  to 
prevent  the  dumping  of  foreign  manufactures  upon  our  shores 
at  prices  with  which  our  factories  can  not  compete,  but  care" 
must  be  taken  lest  we  impose  additional  costs  upon  materials 
required  for  use  in  American  industries.  The  real  problem 
confronting  us  is  the  maintenance  and  extension  of  our  export 
business.  Many  things  can  be  done  to  help  accomplish  this  pur- 
pose, but  the  most  important  in  its  bearing  upon  our  ability  to 
meet  competition  is  economical  transportation. 

The  sixteen  States  which  are  united  in  the  movement  for  a 
deep  waterway  connecting  the  Great  Lakes  with  the  ocean  pro- 
duce 75  per  cent  of  the  wheat,  65  per  cent  of  the  corn.  100 
per  cent  of  the  flax,  85  per  cent  of  the  iron,  39  per  cent  of  the 
copper,  74  per  cent  of  the  zinc,  and  46  per  cent  of  the  lead 
produced  in  the  entire  country.  The  shores  of  these  lakes  are 
lined  with  industries  producing  in  great  volume  a  multitude 
of  manufactured  articles  entering  prominently  into  our  foreign 
trade.  This  great  and  productive  territory  is  situated  in  the 
heart  of  the  continent  at  distances  of  800  to  1,500  miles  from  the 
seaboard,  and  in  order  that  its  commerce  can  be  placed  upon  the 
vessel  by  which  it  is  taken  to  foreign  ports,  it  must  first  proceed 
to  tidewater  by  routes  which  have  grown  to  be  excessively  costly 
and  unreliable.  Herein  lies  a  handicap  to  successful  foreign 
business  that  is  shared  by  few,  if  any  other,  nations  of  the  globe, 
and  it  can  not  be  too  strongly  impressed  upon  those  responsible 
for  our  national  policies  that  this  condition  must  be  alleviated  or 
the  foreign  trade  of  the  United  States  will  be  permanently  im- 
paired. The  cost  of  transportation  by  rail  has  now  reached  the 
point  where  a  thousand-mile  haul  across  the  country,  with  the 
attendant  expense  of  transfers  and  delays  at  the  terminals,  com- 
pletely wipes  out  the  margin  of  profit  on  many  commodities 
entering  largely  into  our  foreign  commercial  relations,  and  it 
serves  tO' limit  the  markets  for  many  others.  Consider  England, 
with  her  short  hauls  to  seaboard  from  important  manufacturing 
districts,  and  consider  Argentina  and  Australia  with  their  short 
distances  to  ship  side  from  surplus  grain  producing  areas.  Our 
competitors  in  foreign  trade  are  already  alive  to  the  necessity  of 
reducing  costs  in  order  to  sujiplant  us  in  the  markets  which  we 
have  so  recently  gained.  It  will  be  only  a  short  time  when  this 
competition  will  once  again  be  upon  the  same  basis  of  keen  rivalry 
that  existed  prior  to  the  war.  Our  duty  is  to  meet  this  competition 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SIIl'P    CHANNEL  15 

by  every  means  which  American  skill  can  devise.  Superior  quality 
of  goods,  improved  machinery,  quantity  production,  cheap  power 
and  economical  transportation  are  some  of  the  means  which  must 
be  employed.  Of  these  means  the  latter  two  will  be  greatly  ad- 
vanced by  the  opening  of  the  Great  Lakes  to  ocean  vessels  and 
by  the  incidental  development  of  the  vast  waterpower  of  the  St. 
Lawrence.  Thus  will  be  provided  a  transportation  route  suit- 
able in  character  and  capacity  for  the  economical  shipment  of  the 
raw  and  manufactured  products  of  the  great  Northwest,  and  fof 
the  importation  of  the  products  of  other  lands  direct  to  this  im- 
portant consuming  area.  On  the  banks  of  this  waterway  new 
industries  will  be  estabHshed  where  all  the  raw  materials  of 
manufacture  can  be  assembled  at  lowest  cost,  and  where  a  never- 
failing  source  of  power  will  turn  the  wheels.  Since  the  dawn 
of  our  country's  history,  no  greater  opportunity  has  been  pre- 
sented for  the  establishment  of  industry  under  such  favorable 
conditions  with  respect  to  economical  production  and  distribution. 
In  the  following  quotation  from  a  recent  speech.  President- 
elect Harding  set  forth  succinctly  and  truly  the  importance  of 
commercial  progress  to  the  life  of  the  nation: 

Here  is  a  vast  continent,  so  favored  by  God  and  so  blessed  by  His 
infinite  bounty  that  the  discoverer,  a  Spaniard,  stood  only  at  the  gateway 
and  marveled,  without  ever  dreaming  of  the  reality.  Ours  are  millions  of 
broad  acres,  eager  to  respond  to  man's  cultivating  touch ;  we  have  an 
empire  in  millions  more  which  are  awaiting  reclamation ;  we  have  not 
half  revealed  the  mines  nor  measured  our  waterpower.  We  are  unmatched 
in  genius  and  unexcelled  in  industry.  We  are  progressive  in  education, 
we  are  free  in  religion  and  mean  to  stay  free,  and  mean  ever  to  be  free 
in  press  and  speech.  We  have  more  than  the  beginning  of  an  adequate 
transport  system.  We  are  awakened  to  the  possibilities  of  inland  water- 
ways and  tardily  alert  to  the  imperative  need  of  a  merchant  marine  to 
widen  commerce,  world  influence,  and  national  safety.  .  .  . 

We  have  ships  now ;  we  have  the  commercial  foundations ;  our  future 
lies  in  policies  and  practices.  We  must  buy  as  well  as  sell,  to  be  sure, 
but  we  need  the  expanding  trade  policy,  its  efficient  agents  in  salesmen 
and  credits,  and  the  simple,  practical  understanding  that  commerce  is  the 
life-blood  of  material  existence,  that  the  barterers  of  commerce  are  the 
ambassadors  of  developing  civilization,  that  the  paths  of  trade  are  the 
avenues  of  exchanging  ideas  in  art  and  education,  and  no  nation  in  the 
world  ever  has  been  or  ever  will  be  eminent  in  influence  until  it  establishes 
its  eminence  in  commerce. 


Chapter  III 


v^: 


THE  TRANSPORTATION  SHORTAGE 

The  railroad  facilities  are  inadequate  to  meet  the  transporta- 
tion requirements  of  the  country  during  periods  of  business  ac- 
tivity. There  is  a  shortage  of  about  700,000  freight  cars,  and  the 
rail  mileage  in  the  eastern  district  where  the  congestion  has  been 
the  greatest  shows  a  continual  decrease  since  1915.  There  has 
been  an  almost  complete  cessation  of  the  construction  of  classi- 
fication yards,  freight  houses  and  stations,  and  all  terminal 
facilities  other  than  those  required  to  repair  and  maintain  the 
motive  power  and  equipment.  The  inability  of  the  railroads  to 
handle  the  traffic  expeditiously  has  resulted  in  enormous  losses 
and  has  discouraged  production. 

Inadequacy  of  railroads  to  meet  the  requirements  of  commerce. 
— It  has  been  estimated  that  the  lack  of  adequate  transportation 
facilities  in  the  United  States  results  in  a  daily  loss  of  $100,- 
000,000.  While  this  figure  seems  large,  careful  reflection  of  the 
far-reaching  effects  of  inadequate  transportation  upon  the  prices 
of  commodities  will  show  that  it  is  within  reason.  Inadequate 
transportation  has  resulted  not  only  in  a  direct  loss  to  the  pro- 
ducer and  manufacturer  on  practically  all  business,  but  it  has 
likewise  resulted  in  an  increase  of  cost  to  the  consumer  on  all 
purchases,  and  this  affects  every  article  required  for  the  daily 
sustenance  of  our  population.  Every  embargo  by  the  Govern- 
ment on  the  shipment  of  given  commodities  in  given  localities 
has  resulted  in  an  increase  in  price  of  that  commodity,  and  has 
enabled  those  in  control  of  the  supply  to  exact  usurious  charges 
from  the  public.  The  failure  of  the  car  supply  has  resulted  in 
the  creation  of  a  hazard  on  all  business.  This  hazard  is  assumed 
by  the  wholesaler  or  middleman  and  is  added  to  the  price  of 
the  goods.  The  inability  to  provide  an  even  flow  of  commodi- 
ties at  all  times  results  in  the  creation  of  monopolistic  conditions 
in  local  trade  which  have  to  be  paid  for  by  the  consumer.  The 
increase  in  the  cost  of  living  in  this  country  was  due  as  much 
to  the  failure  of  transportation  as  to  increase  in  cost  of  produc- 
tion. A  glance  at  the  statistics  will  show  that  the  railroad 
facilities  of  the  United  States  are  hopelessly  deficient,  and  that 
the  cost  of  supplying  equipment  to  care  for  the  peak  loads  during 
crop  moving  periods  will  be  greater  than  can  be  met  from  any 
sources  now  available. 

In  1916  a  committee  of  experts,  after  an  elaborate  investiga- 
tion, reported  that,  if  traffic  should  continue  to  increase  during 

16 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  L 

(he  succeeding  ten  years  at  the  same  rate  as  it  had  during  tlie 
preceding  twenty,  the  railroads  would  be  obliged  to  spend  $1,500.- 
000,000  a  year,  or  $15,000,000,000  in  all.  to  enable  them  to  keep 
up  with  it.  (Testimony  of  Alfred  P.  Thorn,  General  Counsel 
Association  of  American  Railway  Executives,  before  the  New- 
lands  Committee.)  At  the  instance  of  a  group  of  New  York 
bankers,  another  investigation  was  recently  made  by  a  committee 
of  eminent  engineers,  who  reported  that  at  present  prices  it  would 
take  at  least  $18,000,000,000  to  put  the  railroads  into  condition 
to  handle  the  traffic  of  the  country  with  reasonable  promptness 
and  efficiency.  In  October,  1914,  the  late  James  J.  Hill  made 
the  following  statement :  "To  imagine  the  amouht  needed  can 
be  secured  when  there  is  such  a  poverty  of  capital  as  there  will 
be  for  ten,  twenty,  possibly  more  years  to  come,  is  absurd." 

The  normal  growth  of  traffic  in  the  United  States  is  susceptible 
of  reasonably  accurate  determination,  and  a  comparison  of  the 
number  of  freight  cars  constructed  each  year  with  the  normal 
yearly  increase  of  traffic  will  show  the  increase  or  decrease  in 
carrying  capacity.  The  failure  of  the  railroad  facilities  to  meet 
the  expanding  requirements  of  traffic  is  clearly  shown  by  the 
deficiency  in  the  construction  of  new  cars,  as  well  as  by  the  almost 
complete  cessation  of  construction  of  new  lines  and  extensions 
of  old  lines.  Since  1916  there  has  been  an  unprecedented  volume 
of  traffic  accompanied  by  acute  car  shortages,  but  the  roads  have 
purchased  but  little  new  equipment  and  the  situation  is  daily 
becoming  more  serious.  The  railroads  are  unable  to  handle 
the  normal  traffic,  and  no  adequate  preparation  is  being  made 
lo  meet  the  greater  demands  which  the  normal  growth  of  traffic 
will  entail.  The  records  show  that  the  ton  miles  of  freight  car- 
ried increased  from  186,463,109,510  in  1905  to  301.398.752,108 
in  1913,  which  was  the  year  of  heaviest  freight  traffic  in  the  ten- 
vear  period  between  1905  and  1915.  During  this  period  of  ten 
vears  the  number  of  freight  cars  increased  from  1,731,409  to 
2,356,338,  an  increase  of  36  per  cent,  indicating  that  the  increase 
in  the  number  of  freight  cars  was  only  59  per  cent  of  the  increase 
in  traffic.  Between  1915  and  1918  the  freight  traffic  increased 
45  per  cent,  while  the  number  of  freight  cars  in  service  increased 
only  1.6  per  cent. 

The  comparisons  indicated  by  the  above  figures,  however,  are 
somewhat  modified  by  the  increase  in  freight-car  capacity.  The 
normal  traffic  for  each  year  from  1904  to  1926.  and  the  actual 
traffic  between  1904  and  1918  are  shown  by  the  following  table: 


18 


ECONOMIC   ASPECTS    OF    THE 


Freight  traffic  in  ton-miles. {a) 

Actual  Normal 

1904 174,522,000,000  186,105,000,000 

1905 186,463,000,000  194,735,000,000 

1906 215,878,000,000  203,690,000,000 

1907 236,601,000,000  212,990,000,000 

1908 218,382,000,000  222,635,000,000 

1909 218,803,000,000  232,640,000,000 

1910 255,017,000,000  243, 02(1,000, 000 

1911 253,784.000,000  253,784,000,000 

1912 ■ 264,081,000,000  264,945,000,000 

1913 301,399,000,000  276,515,000,000 

1914 288,320,000,000  288,510,000,000 

1915 *276,830,000,000  300,950,000,000 

1916 *343,099,937,805  313,840,000,000 

1916(cal.) *365, 771, 824,741  320,455,000,000 

1917 *397,935,177,017  334,100,000,000 

1918 *401, 946,000,000  348,245,000,000 

1919 ^ **402,000.000,000  362,890,000,000 

1920 **410,000,000,000  378,075,000,000 

1921 **418,000,000,000  393,815,000,000 

1922 **427,000,000,000  410,125,000,000 

1923 427,030,000,000 

1924 444,540,000,000 

1925 462,700,000,000 

1926 481.515,000,000 

*  Classes  I  and  II.  **  Estimated. 

(a)  From  data  contained  in  The  Railway  Age. 


In  order  to  determine  the  number  of  cars  that  will  be  necessary 
to  handle  the  estimated  normal  traffic  for  any  given  future  year, 
it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  normal  rate  of  increase  in  car 
capacity  and  the  average  ton-miles  per  ton  capacity  per  year.  The 
figures  for  recent  years  are  as  follows : 


Freight  car  mileage 

and  average  load. (a) 

Revenue 

car-miles 

per  car 

per   day 

Tons  per 

loaded 

car 

Revenue 

ton-miles 

per  car 

per    day 

Average 

capacity 

of  car 

Ratio, 
average 

load  to 
capacity 
per  cent 

Ton-miles 
per  ton 
capacity 
per  year 

1905 

16.3 
17.0 
16.5 
14.6 
15.0 
16.5 
16.0 
16.1 
16.2 
17.2 
16.1 
15.2 
17.8 
18.5 
18.8 
17.6 
15.2 

18.1 
18.9 
19.7 
19.6 
19.3 
19.8 
19.7 

20.2 
21.1 
21.1 
21.2 
22.4 
22.8 
24.8 
26.6 
27.9 

298 
321 
325 
286 
290 
327 
315 

326 
363 
340 
328 
399 
422 
466 
469 
425 

30.7 
32   1 
33.7 
34.8 
35.3 
35.9 
36.9 

37.5 

38.3 

39.1 

39.8 

40.6 

41.0 

41.5 

41.9(est.) 

42. 2  (est.) 

59.0 
59.0 
58.5 
56.3 
54.7 
55.2 
53.4 

53.9 
55.1 
54.0 
53.2 
55.1 
55.6 
59.8 
63.5 
65.1 

3,500 

1906 

1907 

3,650 
3  520 

1908 

1909 

3,010 
3  000 

1910 

1911 

3.320 
3,120 

1912 

3,180 

1913 

3,460 

1914 

3,180 

1915 

3.000 

1916 

3,690 

1916  (cal.) 

3  760 

1917 

4.130 

1918 

4,090 

1919  (nine  months).  . 

3.670 

1913  to  1916  include  Class  I  and  II  roads  only. 

1918  and  1919  include  Class  I  roads  only. 

(«)   From  data  contained  in  The  Raihcay  Age. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  19 

It  will  be  seen  that  during  the  first  nine  months  of  1919  the 
traffic  was  handled  at  the  rate  of  3,670  ton-miles  per  ton  of 
capacity  per  year,  corresponding  closely  with  the  figure  for  1906. 
The  ton-miles  per  ton  of  capacity  per  year  have  been  in  excess 
of  3.500  whenever  there  has  been  a  car  shortage,  and  below 
this  figure  whenever  there  has  been  an  ample  supply  of  cars.  The 
present  total  capacity  of  all  roads  in  the  United  States  is  estimated 
at  101,100,000  tons,  which  under  normal  conditions  would  be  suffi- 
cient to  handle  an  annual  traffic  of  354,000,000,000  ton-miles. 
The  actual  traffic,  however,  has  now  reached  400,000,000,000 
ton-miles,  indicating  that  a  car  capacity  of  114,200,000  tons,  or 
about  13,100,000  tons  more  than  is  now  available,  would  be  re- 
quired on  the  basis  of  3,500  ton-miles  per  ton  of  capacity  per 
year.  The  average  capacity  of  cars  being  50  tons,  about  262,000 
cars  would  be  required  to  make  up  the  present  shortage.  This 
does  not  take  into  account,  however,  the  increases  in  traffic  or 
surplus  required  at  times  of  unusually  heavy  traffic  movements, 
nor  for  retirement  of  wornout  cars.  The  total  needs  during  the 
next  three  years  are  summarized  by  the  Raihvay  Age  as  follows : 

Cars 

To  make  up  the  present  shortage 262,000 

To  provide  an  adequate  surplus . 100,000 

To  take  care  of  increases  in  traffic 126,000 

To  make  up  for  deferred  retirement 49,500 

To  care  for  normal  retirement 174,900 

Total  cars  needed  in  three  years 712,400 

Annual  requirements 237,500 

Assuming  that  present  prices  will  continue,  the  712,000  cars 
needed  in  the  next  three  years  will  involve  an  expenditure  of 
approximately  $2,000,000,000. 

The  stagnation  in  railroad  development  is  further  indicated 
by  the  decrease  in  the  mileage  of  new  lines  constructed.  During 
1919  a  total  of  685.98  miles  of  new  railway  lines  were  completed 
and  placed  in  service  in  the  United  States.  This  establishes  a 
new  low  record  since  the  Civil  War,  the  lowest  previous  record 
being  722  miles  constructed  in  1918.  A  study  of  the  figures  for 
1919  shows  that  the  greatest  mileage  was  constructed  in  the  States 
of  California,  Mississippi,  Oklahoma,  and  Texas.  Among  the 
States  in  which  there  was  no  new  construction  are  New  Hamp- 
shire, Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island.  Connecticut,  New  York, 
Michigan,  Minnesota,  Wisconsin,  North  Dakota,  South  Dakota, 


20 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


Missouri,  and  Montana.    The  following  table  shows  the  miles  of 
new  line  completed  in  the  United  States  since  1893  : 

Miles  of  New  Line  Completed  in  the  United  Stales  Since  1893 


1894 1,760 

1895 1,420 

1896 1,692 

1897 2,109 

1898 3,265 

1899 4,569 

1900 4,894 

1901 5,368 

1902 6,026 

1903 5,652 

1904 3,832 

1905 4,388 

1906 5,623 


1907 5,212 

1908 3,214 

1909 3,748 

1910 4,122 

1911 3,066 

1912 2,997 

1913 3,071 

1914 1,532 

1915 933 

1916 1,098 

1917 979 

1918 721 

1919 686 


As  great  as  has  been  the  reduction  in  new  mileage  constructed 
during  the  last  few  years,  the  situation  becomes  even  more  serious 
when  an  examination  is  made  of  the  miles  of  line  abandoned 
during  the  same  period.  Thus  a  total  of  689  miles  of  line  are 
reported  as  abandoned  in  1919,  exceeding  by  three  miles  the 
total  track  constructed  during  that  year.  Operation  has  been 
discontinued  on  nearly  1,000  more  miles  of  line  than  have  been 
built  during  the  last  three  years.  During  the  three  years  from 
1917  to  1919,  inclusive,  operation  was  abandoned  on  3,319  miles 
of  line,  and  in  the  same  period  only  2,386  miles  of  extensions, 
branches,  and  other  new  lines  were  completed  and  placed  in 
service.  The  mileage  in  the  eastern  district,  where  the  congestion 
has  been  the  greatest,  shows  a  continual  decrease  since  1915,  as 
will  be  seen  from  the  following-: 


Total  mile- 

age owned 

Eastern 

Southern 

Western 

(Single 

district 

district 

district 

track) 

Miles 

Miles 

Miles 

Miles 

Dec.  31,  1917 

253,626.13 

61,120.98 

51,405.65 

141,009.50 

Dec.  31,  1916 

2.S4,045.83 

61,141.56 

51,572.71 

141,331.56 

June  30,  1916 

2.S4,250.62 

61,243.19 

51.620.39 

141,387.04 

June  30,  1915 

253,788.64 

61,361.34 

51,373.03 

141,054.27 

There  has  also  been  an  almost  complete  cessation  of  the  con- 
struction of  classification  yards,  freight  houses  and  stations,  and 
of  terminal  facilities  other  than  those  required  to  repair  and 
luaintain  the  motive  power  and  equipment. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  21 

To  meet  the  needs  for  adequate  motive  power  a  large  number 
of  locomotives  are  also  urgently  necessary.  A  great  many  loco- 
motives have  been  continued  in  service  during  the  war  that  prob- 
ably would  have  been  retired  under  normal  conditions.  The  loco- 
motive building  program  must  be  expanded  to  provide  13,177 
modern  locomotives  in  three  years,  and  12,000  obsolete  locomo- 
tives should  be  retired  from  service.  The  program  for  the  next 
three  years  for  freight  service,  including  the  power  necessary  to 
meet  present  needs  and  for  increase  of  traffic  as  well  as  for  nor- 
mal and  deferred  retirements,  aggregates  452,490,000  pounds  of 
tractive  power,  or  a  total  of  7,542  units  of  60,000  pounds  of 
average  tractive  effort.  The  cost  of  this  equipment  will  be  ap- 
proximately $618,444,000,  making  a  yearly  average  of  2,514 
freight  locomotives  costing  $206,000,000. 

As  clearly  as  these  figures  show  the  steadily  decreasing  effi- 
ciency of  our  railroads,  they  fail  to  depict  the  real  dangers  of  the 
situation.  During  the  last  year  billions  of  dollars  were  lost 
because  of  the  failure  of  transportation.  In  May,  1920,  due 
largely  to  the  strike  of  railway  switchmen,  it  was  reported  that 
railway  cars,  loaded  and  unloaded,  were  piled  up  by  thousands 
in  yards  from  Chicago  to  Buffalo,  New  York,  Pittsburgh,  Cleve- 
land, and  almost  every  railroad  center  reported  congestion.  Cali- 
fornia complained  that  the  big  citrus  crop  was  piled  high  in 
warehouses  and  that  the  fruit  and  vegetable  crop  of  the  Imperial 
Valley  was  seriously  affected  by  the  shortage  of  refrigerator 
cars  which  had  gone  East  and  failed  to  return.  Many  coal 
mines  in  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  were  obliged  to  close.  Manufac- 
turers throughout  the  great  industrial  region  extending  from 
Chicago  to  Buffalo  were  unable  to  get  raw  material  or  coal. 
Mr.  Edward  D.  McDougal,  of  the  Armour  Grain  Company,  said, 
"The  situation  was  bad  enough  before  the  strike.  Now  things 
are  at  a  standstill.  It's  cars  we  need.  We  have  not  even  moved 
the  old  crop  from  the  farms.  How  are  we  going  to  take  care  of 
the  new  crop?" 

On  May  15,  1920.  the  Department  of  Agriculture  issued  the 
following  statement : 

Failure  of  the  railroads  to  move  grain  in  proportion  to  the  supplies  in 
the  country  and  the  demand,  has  created  a  situation  that  is  without 
precedent  in  the  United  States.  During  the  last  week  the  mark'ets  were 
entirely  under  this  influence,  and  steadily  advancing  prices  and  new  price 
records  on  thie  crop  were  the  results. 

At  a  meeting  of  representatives  of  the  grain  exchanges,  bankers,  and 
farmers'  organization  in  Chicago  on  the  7th  to  discuss  the  resumption  of 


22  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF   THE 

trading  in  wheat  futures,  a  Minneapolis  banker  told  of  the  S'eriousness 
of  the  situation  as  follows : 

"You  can't  have  country  and  terminal  elevators  full  of  old  grain  and 
move  the  new  crop.  In  the  Northwest,  where  dealers  would  normally  be 
liquidating  borrowed  money,  about  $150,000,000  is  tied  up  by  lack 
of  cars.  .  .  ." 

The  representative  of  a  Nebraska  farmers'  organization  said : 

"Th'C  car  shortage  is  the  more  serious  part  of  the  problem.  Fifty  per 
cent  of  the  cars  are  not  fit  to  ship  grain  in,  and  cars  are  in  the  East  which 
should  be  in  the  West  and  Southwest.  From  10  to  20  per  cent  of  the  old 
crop  is  still  on  the  farms,  unable  to  move.  The  new  crop  is  coming  on. 
What  about  the  next  crop?  It  tends  to  discourage  the  planting  of  larg'C 
acreages." 

Exporters  were  after  wheat  all  the  week.  On  the  7th  they  bid  on  a 
basis  of  $3.25  at  Gulf  ports.  It  was  intimated  that  $3.20  would  be  paid, 
track  New  York,  if  wheat  could  be  secured. 

Owing  largely  to  the  difficulties  of  securing  deliveries  of  grain 
at  eastern  ports  during  the  spring  of  1920,  British  buyers  bid  for 
wheat  delivered  at  Gulf  ports. 

It  is  a  matter  of  record  that  the  car  supply  was  insufficient  to 
move  the  grain  which  the  farmers  desired  to  ship  during  the 
spring  and  summer  of  1920,  when  there  was  an  ample  demand  for 
grain  for  export  shipment  and  when  prices  were  such  as  to  yield 
the  farmer  a  fair  return  for  his  labor.  By  reason  of  the  inability 
of  the  railroads  to  move  the  crop,  the  farmer,  who  should  have 
received  $3  or  more  per  bushel  in  July,  was  later  caught  in  the 
general  slump  of  commodity  prices  and  forced  to  decide  between 
the  alternative  of  selling  at  a  loss,  or  of  holding  his  crop  in  the 
perhaps  futile  prospect  of  later  obtaining  a  remunerative  price. 
As  a  result  of  this  condition  we  have  witnessed  the  collapse 
of  some  of  the  banking  institutions  which  have  financed  the  1920 
wheat  crop,  ^rhe  farmer  is  blained  for  wanting  tti  hold  his 
crop  in  order  to  avoid  an  actual  loss,  while  the  real  fault  must 
be  laid  at  the  doors  of  the  inade([uate  transportation  system  of 
the  country  which  made  it  impracticable  for  the  farmer  to 
market  his  crop  at  the  time  when  the  foreign  demand  was  such 
as  to  guarantee  him  a  reasonable  profit. 

In  January,  1918,  there  were  418  vessels  held  in  New  York 
Harbor  becau.se  of  lack  of  fuel  and  cargoes,  due  to  car  shortage. 
In  the  fall  of  1917  the  great  Northwest  suffered  for  lack  of  6,000,- 
000  tons  of  coal,  and  to  supply  the  urgent  deficiency  it  was  neces- 
sary to  use  50  per  cent  of  the  freight  cars  of  47  railroads  for 
many  weeks  and  later  to  utilize  them  to  make  up  an  iron  ore 
shortage.     This  shifting  of  the  car  supply  to  meet  supernormal 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  .    23 

needs  caused  by  deficient  transportation  facilities  has  resulted  in 
complete  disruption  of  the  railroad  systems  of  the  country.  Some 
communities  suffer  for  food,  others  for  fuel,  still  others  for  the 
raw  materials  of  manufacture,  while  the  important  industries 
of  the  country  are  unable  to  make  the  prompt  deliveries  which 
are  essential  to  maintenance  of  trade.  These  conditions  are  not 
temporary.  They  are  the  result  of  constantly  diminishing  trans- 
portation capacity  as  compared  with  constantly  increasing  trans- 
portation requirements.  The  tendency  was  foreseen  many  years 
ago  and  the  warning  given  by  Mr.  James  J.  Hill.  The  trouble 
is  not  alone  with  the  shortage  of  cars,  but  is  to  be  found  also 
in  the  inadequacy  of  terminals,  as  a  result  of  which  cars  can  not 
be  unloaded  promptly.  At  New  York  goods  are  frequently 
held  in  cars  for  two  to  six  weeks  or  more  before  they  can  be 
unloaded,  thus  depriving  the  country  of  the  use  of  these  needed 
transportation  facilities.  A  railroad  car  is  like  a  vessel,  in  that 
it  is  serving  the  people  as  a  transportation  agency  only  when  in 
motion.  Vessels  held  in  port  on  account  of  poor  facilities,  and 
cars  used  for  storage  purposes,  are  not  performing  their  proper 
functions.  The  Government  recently  found  it  necessary  to  insist 
upon  the  unloading  of  grain  which  was  held  in  cars  at  Galveston, 
while  other  grain  could  not  move  to  market  because  no  cars 
were  available. 

Specific  instances  of  losses  due  to  the  failure  of  transportation. 
— While  the  losses  sustained  by  reason  of  inadequate  transporta- 
tion facilities  are  well  known  to  the  people  of  our  country,  it 
seems  desirable  to  present  a  few  specific  instances  which  are 
fairly  representative  of  the  usual  conditions.  Attention  is  invited 
to  the  following  extracts  from  the  address  of  Mr.  Watson  S. 
Moore,  second  vice-president  of  the  U.  S.  Grain  Corporation, 
made  before  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  Tidewater  Congress 
at  Detroit,  Michigan,  on  July  23,  1920 : 

The  first  half  of  Maj^  1920,  bakery  after  bakery  in  New  York  City 
advised  they  would  have  to  shut  down  unless  given  flour.  The  Grain 
Corporation  supplied  the  temporary  needs  of  bakeries  out  of  its  export 
stocks  in  storage  New  York  Citj'  awaiting  transportation.  On  pressure 
from  the  Traffic  Division  of  the  Grain  Corporation,  railroads  gave  special 
attention  to  moving  flour  for  relief  of  th'sse  bakers. 

The  Grain  Corporation,  of  course,  was  not  in  position  to  secure  this  car 
supply,  except  as  it  added  its  supplication  to  that  of  other  shippers,  to 
the  railroads  and  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  to  grant  the  reli'ef 
asked  for.  The  country  did  not  always  understand  that  the  position  of  the 
Grain  Corporation  in  this  particular  was  advisory  only. 

For  instance,  one  grain  dealer  in  the  West,  who  was  facing  bankruptcy, 


24  .  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS   OF    THE 

due  to  th'C  lack  of  cars  to  ship  out  his  grain,  went  into  one  of  the  Grain 
Corporation  offices  and  at  the  point  of  a  pistol  demanded  that  the  Vice- 
President  secure  the  cars.  The  man  was  almost  crazed  with  his  trouble.  The 
Vice-President  was,  as  is  common  with  the  officials  of  the  Grain  Corpora- 
tion, strong  in  persuasive  powers  and  of  steady  nerve  and  not  afraid  to  die, 
was  able  to  get  hold  of  the  pistol  and  quiet  the  man,  and  on  presenting  the 
matter  to  the  railroad  officials  relief  was  secured  and  the  life  of  the  Vice- 
President  saved.  The  shipper  sent  a  bunch  of  roses  to  the  Vice  President 
for  the  service,  but  the  flowers  were  returned,  the  Vice  President  fearing 
they  were  originally  intend'ed  to  adorn  his  remains. 

Ocean  ship  agents,  seaboard,  repeatedly  inquired:  "Where  is  your 
grain?"  Answer:  Chicago,  Minneapolis,  or  Buffalo,  etc.  Agents  asked, 
"Why,  what's  the  trouble?"     Answer,  "No  cars." 

At  Lake  port,  no  trouble  about  transportation  to  Eastern  end  of  Lakes. 
Trouble  only  at  loading  and   unloading  ports,  account  no  cars. 

Demurrage  was  paid  as  high  as  $6,000  a  day  on  ocean  vessels,  one  ship 
collecting  $27,000. 

If  it  had  not  been  for  the  unusual  consideration  shown  shippers  bj^  repre- 
sentatives of  foreign  governments  in  allowing  substitution  of  other  grains 
and  commodities,  I  am  informed  on  good  authority  that  a  large  number 
of  grain  exporters  would  have  been  ruined  by  the  unusual,  extraordinary 
and  long  delays  of  grain  shipments  from  the  West  during  the  last  eight 
months,  due  to  no  cars. 

Now  that  the  grain  shipping  and  export  business  is  going  back  into  the 
liands  of  private  traders,  there  will  have  to  be  an  improvement  in  the  rail 
service.  Otherwise  the  grain  merchants  will  not  be  able  to  meet  their 
ocean  freight  engagements,  and  they  will  pay  very  dearly  if  they  default  on 
any  of  these  engagements.  Consequently,  caution  will  have  to  be  exercised 
and  this  will  be  reflected  in  lower  prices  to  producer. 

The  following  data  will  give  you  an  idea  of  the  difficulties  we  have 
had  in  moving  our  wheat  all-rail  to  seaboard  and  by  canal  from  Buffalo; 
also  experiences  we  have  had  in  moving  some  wheat  from  Buffalo  to  Mon- 
treal by  lake  steamer,  indicating  the  relief  which  might  be  given  to 
shippers;  also  the  pressure  which  might  be  taken  off  the  rail  lines  and 
the  canal,  by  the  building  of  a  deep  waterway  from  the  lakes  to  the  sea. 

On  January  9,  Grain  Corporation  ordered  something  over  1,000.000 
bushels  of  wheat  shipped  by  rail  from  Minneapolis  to  Philadelphia  and 
New  York.  Up  to  .'\pril  9,  only  299,0(X)  bushels  had  been  moved.  The 
balance  we  had  to  divert  to  Duluth  for  lake  shipment,  and  it  took  four 
months  to  move  this  wheat  by  rail  from  Minneapolis  to  Duluth,  only 
150  miles,  which  should  be  moved  within  four  days,  and  when  it  did  get 
to  Duluth,  it  was  carried  prom])t]y  1.000  miles  by  water  in  four  days. 

On  January  9,  1920,  Grain  Corporation  ordered  365,000  bushels  shipped 
by  rail  from  Manitowoc,  Wis.,  to  New  York.  Not  a  carload  of  this  was 
moved  by  rail  and  we  had  to  move  it  by  lake  to  Erie. 

On  January  9,  1920,  Grain  Corporation  ordered  about  100,000  bushels 
from  Chicago  to  Philadelijhja  by  rail.  Up  to  April  9,  only  about  65,000 
bushels  of  this  had  been  moved — no  cars — and  we  liad  to  forward  the 
balance  by  lake.     No  delay. 

On  May  26,  1920,  the  Army  Inland  Canal  Service,  operating  governnient 
boats  on  the  Erie  Canal,  agreed  \n  furnish  canal  boats  for  100,000  bushels. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  25 

Up  to  July   13,   only  one   boat  capable  of   carrying  about    18,000   bushels, 
had  been  furnished  on  this  order. 

On  June  18,  arrangements  were  made  to  move  about  600,000  bushels 
of  wheat  from  Buffalo  to  Montreal  by  lake  boat  down  the  St.  Lawrence 
river.     Up  to  June  30,  about  484,000  bushels  had  been  moved  this  way. 

With  the  close, of  navigation  last  fall,  Grain  Corporation  had  at  Buffalo, 
approximately  14,0T>^,000  bushels  of  wheat.  In  spite  of  all  the  .efforts  we 
could  exert  with  the  Railroad  Administration  while  it  was  in  existence 
and  with  th-  individual  railroads  since  March  1,  1920,  and  with  the  canal 
people,  it  has  taken  to  pVesent  date,  July  21,  to  get  this  15,000,000  bushels 
moved  from  Buffalo  to  the  ^se^oard. 

All  of  this  grain  was  intended  for  export  and  was  so  situated  that  it 
might  have  been  forwarded  by  vessel  direct  from  the  Western  lake  ports 
by  ocean  steamer  overseas,  had  the  deep  waterway  to  the  sea  been  in 
existence.  This  would  have  been  a  very  decided  relief  to  the  inland 
transportation  facilities  at  a  time  when  they  were  sorely  pressed  to  meet  the 
urgent  needs  of  our  domestic  commerce  and  other   foreign  commerce. 

Forty-eight  million  bushels  of  wheat  was  still  in  elevators  and  on 
farms  in  Kansas  alone  on  the  15th  of  May,  within  a  month  of  the  new  crop 
(which  amount  was  half  the  estimated  new  crop  for  this  State),  on  account 
of  no  cars. 

Grain  priority  had  to  be  divided  with  coal.  Coal  must  be  moved  to  the 
northwest  during  the  season  of  navigation,  or  that  section  of  the  country 
will  freeze.  There  is  a  large  number  of  people  in  that,  country  who  are 
unable  to  get  to  Palm  Beach  in  the  winter. 

The  coal  operators  now  claim  that  the  present  coal  shortage  is  due  in  a 
considerable  measure  to  the  failure  of  some  roads  to  obey  the  priority 
order. 

With  priority  given  to  grain  and  to  coal — 

Then  the  automobile  industry  is  checked.  Answer,  no  cars ;  and  Detroit 
says  "Ouch  I" 

The  woolen  mills  must  be  shut  down — no  cars. 

Now  the  steel  industry  is  threatened  with  a  shut-down — no  cars ;  with 
twenty  blast  furnaces  idle  in  the  main  steel-producing  district — no  cars ; 
with  a  million  and  a  half  tons  of  steel  products  piled  up  and  the  country 
crying  for  it,  which  would  take  28,300  cars  to  move — no  cars. 

Three  hundred  miles  of  pipe  bought  from  a  Pittsburgh  concern,  intended 
for  Mexico,  delivery  of  which  would  aid  the  Shipping  Board  in  obtaining 
much-needed  oil  for  their  ships  ;  but  no  cars. 

The  car  shortage  resulting  in  the  delayed  movement  of  the  1919  wheat 
crop  from  the  farms  and  also  from  the  country  and  terminal  elevators 
to  the  mills  the  past  eight  months  was  largely  responsible  for  a  $2  to  $3 
increase  per  barrel  in  the  price  of  flour  since  January  1.     No  cars. 

During  six  months  of  this  period,  when  the  car  shortage  was  most 
acute,  the  consumption  of  flour  in  this  country  was  about  61,000,000 
barrels,,  which,  at  $2.50  per  barrel,  amounts  to  $152,500,000,  which  is  over 
the  first  estimate  of  the  cost  of  the  improvement  of  your  proposed 
waterway. 

To  decrease  the  cost  of  living  in  New  England  and  in  the  congested 
centers  of  population  in  the  East,  and  also  if  this  section  of  the  country 
IS  to  maintain  its  position  as  a  manfacturing  center,  the  great  food-produc- 
ing area  of  the  West  must  be  brought  closer. 


26  ECONOMIC   ASPECTS    OF    THE 

The  East  and  the  West  are  getting  economically  farther  and  farther 
apart,  owing  to  the  advance— the  necessary  advance— of  railroad  freight 
rates.  The  same  thing  is  true  of  the  product  of  eastern  manufacturers 
in  relation  to  the  western  market  for  their  surplus  output.  The  only 
relief  for  this  situation  is  the  further  extension  and  the  development  of 
the  water  routes. 

It  is  estimated  160,000,000  bushels  of  wheat  will  be  carried  over  from 
the  1919  crop  to  the  1920  crop.  This  is  about  100,000,000  bushels  above 
the  normal  carry-over.  There  were  plenty  of  hungry  people  who  needed 
this  wheat  the  past  year,  but  had  to  go  without  because  it  did  not  get  to 
market.     No  cars. 

In  addition  to  the  loss  in  quantity  and  quality  through  normal  deteriora- 
tion, and  from  improper  warehousing  and  vermin,  it  takes  at  least  three 
cents  per  bushel,  per  month,  at  the  present  price,  to  carry  wheat.  Twelve 
months  at  36  cents  on  the  carry-over  of  100,000,000  bushels  is  $36,000,000. 
which  could  take  care  of  the  interest  on  the  cost  of  j-our  waterway 
improvement  for  four  or  fi\'e  years.    This  is  on  wheat  alone. 

At  the  Toledo  hearing-  on  June  10,  1920,  evidence  was  sub- 
mitted showing-  the  extent  to  which  the  congestion  upon  the 
trunk  Hues  has  hampered  the  export  business  of  that  city  and 
surrounding  localities.  A  few  statements  from  the  record  will 
be  introduced. 

Statement  of  Mr.  F.  O.  Paddock,  representing  the   Toledo 
Produce  Exchange 

I  shipped  a  cargo  of  corn  to  Erie,  Pa.,  by  the  New  York  Central  lines, 
and  it  was  sixty  days  in  transit,  and  the  corn  was  red  hot  when  it  got  to 
destination. 

Last  year  we  shipped  something  like  475,000  bushels  of  wheat  for  export 
and  it  was  delayed  at  New  York  and  Philadelphia  anywhere  from  two  to 
five  weeks,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  it  was  subject  to  stealage  and 
leakage  owing  to  the  fact  that  there  were  no  facilities  to  take  care  of  it 
and  unload  it  and  get  it  into  vessels. 

It  has  been  m\-  understanding  that  there  wore  at  that  time  200,000  loaded 
cars  congested  at  New  York,  Philadelphia,  and  Baltimore  alone.  .  .  .  The 
matter  of  interest  on  drafts  alone  where  wheat  was  not  handled  amounted 
to  thousands  upon  thousands  of  dollars,  due  entirely  to  the  congestion.  .  .  . 
We  had  four  cars  of  hot  corn  on  the  sample  tables  today,  and  it  is  bringing 
from  15  to  20  cents  per  bushel  less  than  it  would  have  brought  if  cars  could 
have  l>ecn  obtained  to  ship  it  at  the  time  the  elevator  people  were  ready 
to  ship. 

************ 

The  farmer  is  anxious  and  willing  to  sell.  I  have  known  of  a  dozen 
farmers  within  a  radius  of  50  miles  of  Toledo  who  within  sixty  days 
liavc  hauled  their  corn  to  market  to  the  elevators,  but  the  elevators  have 
been  filled  and  they  could  not  take  it  and  they  had  to  haul  it  back. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHAXXEL  27 

Statement  of  Mr.  C.  S.  Latchaiv,  Secretary  of  the  Fanners'  Grain 
Dealers'  Association  of  Ohio 

WIkii  we  have  no  adequate  transportation  facilities,  when  our  grain 
has  got  to  remain  in  our  bins  and  be  destroyed  by  vermin  and  weevils  for 
the  reason  that  we  can  not  get  it  on  the  market,  there  is  no  incentive  for 
farmers  to  try  to  increase  production.  We  have  one  house  within  35 
miles  of  here  that  has  probably  3,000  or  4,000  bushels  of  corn  heating 
right  this  minute,  sour  corn,  out  of  condition,  corn  that  was  all  right 
when  it  was  put  into  the  house  and  which  we  have  not  been  able  to  move. 

I  do  not  know  of  any  commodity  that  is  as  sensitive  to  transportation 
as  grain  or  live  stock.  A  fluctuation  of  10,  IS,  or  20  cents  a  day  is 
possible  when  such  conditions  arise  that  the  grain  can  not  be  taken  care  of. 

1  do  not  believe  that  there  is  a  large  elevator  in  the  State  but  what  has 
not  from  one  to  fifteen  hundred  unpaid  claims  on  grain  losses  in  transit. 

Statement  of  Mr.  L.  H.  Baughman,  Traffic  Manager  of  the  Toledo 
Scale  Company 

I  have  a  record  here  in  this  report  of  a  certain  car  which  we  loaded  on 
March  29.  I  take  March  29  because  that  was  just  before  our  labor  troubles 
and  just  after  our  heavy  snowstorms.  This  car  contained  six  shipments. 
The  heaviest  shipment  in  the  package  was  11  tons  on  a  measurement  basis 
of  twenty-four  boxes.  That  shipment  was  54  days  from  the  time  it  left 
Toledo  until  it  was  loaded  aboard  the  boat  in  New  York.  The  average 
for  the  car  for  the  shipments  from  the  time  they  left  Toledo  until  they 
were  loaded  on  the  boat  was  about  sixty-five  days.  The  shipments  were 
destined  for  Holland,  Australia,  Spain,  the  Philippine  Islands,  the  Argen- 
tine Republic  and  Brazil. 

A  car  left  Toledo  on  March  31  via  the  New  York  Central.  It  contained 
but  two  shipments,  one  for  Spain  and  one  for  Norway.  Up  to  the  date  of 
the  hearing,  June  10,  this  shipment  had  not  cleared   from  New  York. 

Statement  of  Mr.  H.  C.  IVildesen,  Export  Manager  Champion 
Spark  Plug  Company 

Incidentally,  those  people  in  the  other  countries  suffer  a  great  deal  of 
inconvenience  and  pecuniary  loss  and  sometimes  real  hardship  while  they 
are  waiting  interminable  weeks  and  weeks  and  sometimes  months  for  the 
necessities  which  they  have  a  perfect  right  to  believe  should  reach  them  a 
long  time  before  they  ever  get  them  in  hand ;  and'  it  is  because  of  the 
extraordinary  delays  in  transportation  and  shipping  due  to  being  compelled 
to  depend  upon  New  York  or  some  other  Atlantic  seaport. 

Order  No.  3989  was  shipped  from  here  on  March  29.  It  arrived  at 
New  York  on  May  8  and  left  New  York  May  19.  Therefore  it  was  just 
a  little  less  than  two  months  from  the  time  we  delivered  it  to  the  railroad 
before  it  actually  got  on  its  way  on  the  steamer. 

Our  order  No.  3720  left  here  March  30.  It  reached  New  York  May  2 
and  did  not  get  out  of  New  York  until  June  2.  So  that  shipment  took 
from  March  30,  the  time  we  delivered  it  to  the  railroad  here,  until  June 

2  before  it  actually  got  on  its  way  across  the  water. 


28  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

Our  order  No.  5117  left  here  on  March  29,  arrived  at  New  York  May  2 
and  left  New  York  on  May  15.     It  got  a  streamer  within  a  reasonable  time. 

Our  order  No.  4651  left  h'cre  on  the  24th  of  Alarch,  arrived  in  New 
York  on  the  26th  of  April,  left  New  York  on  the  second  of  May. 

Our  order  No.  3468  left  here  March  19,  arrived  at  New  York  April  21, 
and  is  still  there. 

Our  order  No.  3966  left  here  March  20,  arrived  in  New  York  April  22 
and  did  not  get  out  of  New  York  until  June  4.  You  can  see  how  much 
good  it  has  done  us  to  spend  money  and  time  trying  to  make  prompt 
deliveries. 

Statement  of  Mr.  Mark  X.  Mcnnell,  representing  the  Menncll  Milling 
Company,  Fostoria,  Ohio 

Our  own  business  has  suffered  to  this  extent,  that  on  January  1  we 
entered  the  year  1920  with  100  per  cent  capacity  of  our  plant  sold,  much 
of  it  being  for  export,  but  up  to  June  1  we  have  only  enjoyed  ten  per  cent 
operation.  We  have  had  ninety  per  cent  shutdown  by  reason  of  no  empty 
cars  or  inability  to  secure  permits  for  exports,  the  permits  being  denied 
because  of  congestion  at  seaboard. 

Our  own  company  had  forty-six  carloads  of  flour  shipped  in  November 
on  the  ten  days'  free  storage  bill  of  lading,  and  the  profit  on  a  barrel  of 
flour,  if  liberal,  would  be  25  or  30  cents  a  barrel  on  export  business.  The 
flour  never  cleared  until  charges  approximating  $7,000  accumulated  for 
storage  and  demurrage  at  seaboard.  .  .  .  On  the  $7,000  we  figured  that 
about  $6,000  was  a  pure  loss. 

The  American  exporter  in  order  to  compete,  for  example,  at  Liverpool 
with  exporters  at  Australia,  Argentina  and  the  Balkan  States  must  sell  on 
the  prevailing  terms  which  are  known  as  C.  I.  F.  terms,  which  means 
cost,  insurance  and  freight;  which  means  a  price  named  for  delivery  at 
Liverpool.  To  compute  a  delivered  price  at  Liverpool  a  factor  in  the 
price  is  of  course  the  inland  freight,  the  ocean  freight  and  the  insurance. 
These  are  determinable  factors,  but  if  a  car  shipment  is  to  be  held  at  the 
American  seaboard  longer  than  the  ten  days'  free  time  allowed,  those  im- 
ports are  all  subject  to  storage  and  demurrage,  which  accumulate  at  an 
alarmingly  rapid  rate,  and  which  must  be  studied  by  the  seller,  that  is  the 
shipper.  He  has  named  a  delivered  price  at  Liverpool,  so  he  must  absorb 
all  tho.se  charges.  He  must  name  a  delivered  price  because  that  is  the 
standard  world  term  for  selling  and  he  must  compete  with  his  world 
competitors. 

.    Statement   of  Mr.  Frank  M.  Hurst,  representing  the  American 
Crayon  Co.,  of  Sandusky,  Ohio. 

At  present  we  have  a  warehouse  full  of  export  merchandise,  meaning 
by  export  all  goods  traveling  by  water  from  the  Port  of  New  York  to 
South  American  points  and  European  points.  The  warehouse  there  is  full 
of  paints  and  crayons  for  school  trade.  Some  of  them  have  been  lying 
there   since   last   September.  .  .  .  We   have   some   cars   that   moved    March 

29  that  have  not  been  delivered  in  New  York  City  today.  (June  10,  1920.) 
I  ran  into  the  same  experience  as  Mr.  Mennell  stated  at  Balitmore  on  the 
car  storage,  paying  $500  to  $800  on  a  car  of  crayons  for  storage  there, 
wii)ing  out  all  tlie  profit. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  29 

Additional  statements  of  the  effects  of  the  car  shortage,  at 
the  Marquette,  Michigan,  hearing  on  May  10,  1920,  as  follows: 

Statement  of  Mr.  F.  S.  St.  Peter,  of  Menominee,  Mieli. 

We  are  very  frequently  delayed  in  obtaining  the  raw  material  needed 
for  our  business.  We  have  bought  and  paid  for  cars  of  coffee  in  New 
York  and  then  waited  thirty  days  until  they  were  lightered  out  of  some 
storage  warehouse  and  put  on  the  cars,  and  then  have  had  them  en  route 
for  a  couple  of  weeks  more.  .  .  .  Let  me  say  that  at  the  present  time  we 
feel  that  the  exceedingly  high  cost  of  sugar  is  due  largely  to  the  absolute 
lack  of  ability  upon  the  part  of  the  New  York  peopk  to  handle  the  raw 
sugar  into  New  York  and  the  refined  sugar  out.  ...  I  have  been  told 
that  the  beet  seed,  which  I  think  come  from  Russia,  were  forwarded 
last  fall.  That  seed  has  been  in  New  York  City  since  the  first  of  the 
year.  They  are  compelled  to  pay  heavy  storage  and  insurance  charges 
upon  it.  That  beet  seed  has  not  yet  been  delivered  to  them.  .  .  .  Again, 
last  fall  they  were  compelled  to  pay  $357  per  thousand  for  bags  when 
they  had  bought  them  at  $150.  They  are  imported  from  Calcutta  and 
were  held  up  at  New  York  so  long  that  they  had  to  buy  burlap  bags  which 
must  be  filLed  immediately  and  they  could  not  wait  until  some  other  time 
to  fill  their  bags  and  had  to  buy  at  a  cost  to  themselves  of  $200,000  more. 

Statement  of  Mr.  Geo.  IV.  Roivell,  Publicity  Manager,  Lloyd 
Manufacturing  Co.,  Menominee,  Mich. 

We  are  at  the  present  time  manufacturing  600  baby  carriages  a  day, 
and  I  might  say  that  our  transportation  facilities  to  the  places  of  consump- 
tion, the  largest  of  which  are  in  the  Eastern  States,  have  been  so  poor  that 
we  have  today  6,000  baby  carriages  stored  in  a  factory  which  we  built  last 
summer  at  a  cost  of  $150,000  because  we  could  not  get  enough  cars  to 
ship  the  carriages  East.  .  .  .  Our  money  is  tied  up  in  these  manufactured 
articles  and  we  are  unable  to  use  the  new  factory  in  which  to  broaden 
out  in  our  industry.  .  .  .  We  ship  about  eight  carloads  of  baby  carriages 
every  day,  but  we  have  been  limited  to  one  and  two  cars  and  a  good  many 
days  to  none  at  all. 

A  few  extracts  from  the  record  of  the  hearing  at  Duluth  on 
June  3-4,  1920,  will  be  given. 

Statement  of  Mr.  Mitchel  F.  Jamar,  Representing  F.  A.  Patrick 
&  Company,  of  Duluth,  Minn. 

I  bought  wool  in  Boston  last  February,  and  I  practically  had  the  plant 
shut  down  because  it  took  over  two  and  one-half  months  to  get  the  wool  to 
the  mills. 

Statement  of  Mr.  O.  P.  B.  Jacobson,  Member  Minnesota 
Railroad  and   Warehouse   Commission 

During  the  trying  days  of  1916-17,  when  our  transporation  was  as  badly 
demoralized  as  it  ever  has  been  and  the  country  was  crying  for  cars ; 
when  the  East  was  clamoring  for  flour  and  wheat  and  the  West  was 
full  of  both,  we  had  cars  in  plenty.     At  the  very  time  that  the  prayers 


30  GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL 

for  relief  were  most  persistent  I  saw  in  the  terminal  yards  of  the  Lehigh 
\'alley  and  New  York  Central  Systems  thousands  of  cars  loaded  with  grain 
awaiting  shipment  abroad.  Upon  further  investigation  as  to  why  this  grain 
was  not  being  unloaded,  it  was  learned  that  hundreds  of  those  cars  had 
not  been  moved  for  many  weeks,  and  in  some  instances  not  for  months. 
This  was  an  astounding  revelation,  in  view  of  the  prevailing  distress  all 
over  the  country  for  the  lack  of  box  cars  for  transporting  food  and  other 
commodities.  But  it  could  not  be  helped.  There  was  no  place  that  the 
grain  could  have  been  put  The  few  elevators  in  New  York  Harbor  were 
full  and  had  been  for  months.  Ocean  bottoms  were  not  to  be  had  and  the 
result  was  that  the  grain  remained  in  the  cars.  The  terminal  yards  were 
filled  with  loading  cars  and  the  congestion  began.  It  spread  back  into  the 
interior  until  the  yards  at  Pittsburgh,  Buffalo,  and  other  places  were 
crowded.  Still  farther  west  the  congestion  spread  until  it  reached  Chicago, 
Kansas  City,  Minneapolis,  and  then  everything  was  tied  up. 

Statement  of  Mr.  Chas.  F.  McDonald,  Secretary   and   Treasurer 
of  the  Duluth  Board  of  Trade 

This  car  congestion,  too,  is  a  very  serious  matter  to  the  growers  of  the 
Northwest.  The  demands  of  the  business  in  the  East  are  to  keep  cars 
down  there  and  hold  them  down  there,  so  that  the  Northwest  has  been 
short  of  its  cars  and  has  been  unable  to  market  its  grain.  Grain  has 
remained  in  the  elevators  in  the  West  for  months  and  months  with  large 
amounts  of  money  tied  up  in  its  handling.  In  fact,  I  think  that  1  am  abso- 
lutely correct  in  saying  that  the  volume  of  money  that  has  been  tied  up 
in  the  handling  of  the  grain  crop  of  the  Northwest  and  the  financing' of  it 
this  past  jear  has  been  two  or  three  times  what  it  would  be  in  any 
normal  year.  It  has  been  impossible  to  get  a  release  of  that  volume  of 
money  through  inability  to  get  cars  to  bring  the  grain  to  market.  More- 
over, it  has  had  a  disastrous  effect  upon  the  consumer,  because  with  this 
volume  of  grain  tied  up  in  these  elevators  in  the  country  he  has  had  to 
depend  upon  the  lesser  volume  that  was  flowing  and  obtainable,  and  that 
has  resulted  in  a  revision  in  price. 


Chapter  IV 

THE   REMEDY   FOR   THE   DEFECTS   IN   OUR    TRANS- 
PORTATION SYSTEM 

Increasing  the  number  of  freight  cars  would  not  remedy  the 
transportation  deficiencies.  It  would  not  relieve  the  congestion 
at  the  gateways  and  terminals,  but  would  tend  still  further  to  ag- 
gravate the  difficulties.  The  most  effective  solution  of  the  present 
problems  attending  the  movement  of  peak  loads,  is  the  opening  of 
new  routes  to  relieve  the  existing  routes  and  gateways  of  the 
surplus  traffic.  Products  must  be  transported  promptly  during 
the  periods  of  most  acute  demand  in  the  world's  markets,  but  the 
railroads  can  not  afford  to  provide  the  excess  equipment  and  the 
excess  facilities  at  terminals  to  meet  the  heavy  traffic  burdens 
during  crop  moving  periods.  There  is  a  flexibility  of  operation 
in  water  transportation  that  is  not  shared  by  railroads.  Vessels 
can  be  allocated  to  ports  and  routes  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  trade 
conditions,  and  the  oceans  provide  the  right  of  way  for  an  unlim- 
ited commerce.  Ships  afford  the  cheapest  transportation  in  the 
world.  The  opening  of  the  Great  Lakes  to  ocean  vessels  would 
provide  a  dependable  outlet  for  the  products  of  our  chief  sur- 
plus producing  areas,  and  would  decrease  by  fully  50  per  cent  the 
average  rail  haul  to  and  from  shipside.  It  would  constitute  an 
effective  regulator  of  rail  rates  and  traffic. 

Car  shortage  not  the  only  trouble. — While  it  appears  from  the 
statements  of  railroad  authorities  that  there  is  a  great  shortage 
of  cars,  it  seems  clear  that  the  inability  of  our  railroads  to  handle 
the  traffic  is  due  not  only  to  an  insufficient  number  of  cars,  but 
also  to  the  inability  under  existing  operating  conditions  of 
obtaining  the  fullest  use  of  the  cars  now  available.  If  the  total 
annual  freight  car  capacity  were  equivalent  to  the  total  annual 
traffic,  the  transportation  shortage  would  not  be  entirely  relieved. 
The  greatest  need  is  for  the  expeditious  movement  of  commodi- 
ties in  their  proper  season.  The  traffic  is  not  distributed  evenly 
throughout  the  year,  but  on  the  contrary  is  very  much  greater 
at  certain  times  than  at  others.  For  instance,  with  the  move- 
ment of  the  western  crops  in  July,  the  depletion  of  the  car 
supply  on  western  lines  begins,  lasting  for  six  to  eight  months, 
during  which  the  eastern  lines  are  congested.  Increasing  the 
number  of  cars  without  increasing  the  lines  and  improving  the 
terminals  results  in  blocking  the  traffic.  The  traffic  on  lines 
converging  to  the  export  temiinals  of  the  Atlantic  Coast  has 
passed  the  saturation  point,  and  the  addition  of  the  normal  in- 
crease of  business  during  the  next  few  years  will  heavily  over- 

31 


32 


ECONOMIC   ASPECTS    OF    THE 


load  these  lines.  The  provision  of  new  cars  will  not  relieve 
the  congestion  at  the  gateways  and  terminals,  but  may  tend  to 
still  further  aggravate  the  difficulties.  There  is  only  one  effective 
solution  of  the  difficulties  attending  the  movement  of  the  peak 
loads,  and  that  is  the  opening  of  new  routes  to  relieve  the  existing 
routes  of  the  surplus  traffic. 

The  average  mileage  per  days  of  all  the  cars  in  the  United 
States  is  less  than  20  miles.  In  the  central  western  territory 
it  is  27.5  miles.  Proceeding  eastward  it  becomes  26.8  miles  in 
the  Pocahontas  district,  19.9  miles  in  the  Allegheny  district, 
and  17.2  miles  in  the  New  England  district.  Some  lines  have  an 
efficiency  of  more  than  twice  that  of  the  lines  entering  the  con- 
gested territory  adjacent  to  the  eastern  seaboard.  Car  efficiency 
is  greatly  impaired  by  the  congestion  incident  to  the  continual 
eft"ort  of  the  shippers  of  the  country  to  jam  a  vast  amoimt  of 
freight  through  gateways  and  terminals  which  can  not  handle  it. 
This  results  in  the  use  of  cars  for  storage  purposes,  which  should 
be  used  for  the  movement  of  traffic.  The  present  system  of 
shipping  freight  from  all  parts  of  the  United  States  through  a 
few  ports  on  the,  Atlantic  Coast  not  only  blocks  the  freight  move- 
ment, but  is  economically  unsound  for  other  reasons.  The  ship- 
ment of  a  car  of  freight  for  a  distance  of  1,000  miles  by  rail, 
when  it  could  have  reached  a  suitable  port  with  a  journey  of 
500  miles,  decreases  by  50  per  cent  the  efficiency  of  that  car  as 
a  transportation  unit. 

In  1918  the  freight  carried  on  Class  1  roads  in  the  eastern  dis- 
trict amounted  to  1,317.961.397  tons,  of  which  614,638,737  tons 
originated  on  those  lines  and  703,322,660  tons  were  received 
from  other  lines.    The  figures  are  as  follows  : 

Revenue  Freight,  Class  I  Roads,  1918. 


Total,  all 
districts 


Eastern 
district 


Southern 
district 


Western 
district 


Roads  operated  by  R.  R.  Admin- 
istration   

Roads  not  operated  by  R.  R.  Ad- 
ministration  

Tons 
2.269,861,326 
36.006.919 

Tons 
1.314,179.513 
3.781.884 

Tons 
341,294.735 

Tons 
614,387.078 
.  32.225  035 

Total 

2.305.868.245 
1.263.265,890 

1.317.961.397 
614.638,737 

341.294,7.35 
216.081.819 

646  612  113 

Less  freight  originating  on  road . . . 

432.545.334 

Total   freight   received  from 
other  lines 

1,042.602.355 

703.322,660 

125.212.916 

214.066  779 

The  above  data  show  clearly  the  preponderance  of  freight 
now  moving  into  the  eastern  district.  This  movement  not  only 
causes   the   great   congestion    which    serves    to   block    the    entire 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  33 

transportation  system  of  the  country,  but  it  results  in  an  excessive 
proportion  of  one-way  trat^c,  since  about  50  per  cent  of  the 
cars  returning  from  the  Atlantic  seaboard  are  empty. 

It  is  said  that  commerce  follows  the  lines  of  least  resistance, 
but  in  actual  practice  it  follows  the  lines  which  have  been  laid 
down  by  habit.  The  people  of  the  United  States  now  ship  in  a 
haphazard  manner  without  due  regard  to  the  conditions  exist- 
ing on  traffic  lines  and  at  the  terminals,  and  hence  serious  losses 
constantly  occur  due  to  inability  to  get  the  goods  on  board  vessel 
promptly.  This  situation  has  been  recognized  by  Government 
authorities  and  steps  are  being  taken  to  encourage  shipment  by 
way  of  the  most  logical  routes. 

Increased  utilization  of  waterways  imperative. — A  conserva- 
tive view  of  the  existing  transportation  situation  seems  to  justify 
the  belief  that  the  best  our  railroads  can  do  with  the  expenditure 
of  all  procurable  funds  is  to  meet  the  normal  requirements  of 
traffic.  They  can  not  afTord  to  provide  the  excess  equipment 
and  the  excess  facilities  at  terminals  to  meet  the  heavy  traffic 
burdens  during  the  crop  moving  periods.  The  overhead  charges 
on  this  excess  equipment  will  not  justify  its  purchase  solely  to 
meet  the  requirements  of  periods  of  heavy  traffic,  and  yet  it  is  at 
such  periods  that  the  interest  of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
in  adequate  transportation  is  the  greatest.  We  must  get  our 
crops  to  market  at  the  period  of  most  acute  demand  in  the  markets 
of  the  world.  If,  by  reason  of  inadequate  facilities,  the  crops 
can  not  be  moved  promptly,  great  losses  are  certain  to  result.  The 
evidence  before  the  Commission  fully  sustains  this  assertion. 

There  is  a  flexibility  of  operation  in  water  transportation 
that  is  not  shared  by  the  railroads.  \'essels  can  be  allocated 
to  ports  and  routes  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  trade  conditions. 
The  oceans  provide  the  right  of  way  for  an  unlimited  com- 
merce, but  railroads  can  not  handle  more  than  their  proper 
capacity,  and  an  attempt  to  do  so  results  in  blocking  them  com- 
pletely. We  need  a  greater  utilization  of  waterways,  and  a  com- 
mensurate improvement  of  our  terminal  facilities.  Particu- 
larly do  we  need  abundant  accommodations  for  ships,  which 
provide  the  cheapest  transportation  in  the  world.  The  report  of 
the  Committee  on  Interoceanic  Canals,  rendered  about  1902, 
contained  the  following  statement : 

The  commercial  world  demands  ship  transportation  for  commerce  wher- 
ever it  can  be  had.  Railroads  that,  unfortunately,  sometimes  supersed^e 
interior  canal  lines  can  not  successfully  compete  with  ship  canals  or  supply 
their   place   in    transporting    commerce.      They    can    neither    transport    tlTe 


34  GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL 

quantities  of  freight  that  canals  can  carry  nor  at  as  Httle  cost,  and  they 
necessarily  involve  the  br'eaking  of  bulk  on  the  coast  and  reshipment,  if 
the  cargces  arc  destined  for  an  additional  sea  voyage. 

The  influence  of  the  St.  Lawrence  waterway  in  relieving  the 
transportation  shortage. — For  all  of  the  export  traffic  from  the 
Lake  States  and  the  Northwest,  and  much  of  the  domestic 
traffic  destined  for  the  eastern  seaboard,  the  St.  Lawrence  River 
will  furnish  a  direct  route  with  an  average  saving  of  800  to 
1,500  miles  of  rail  haul,  and  the  elimination  of  the  excessive 
cost  of  transfers  involved  at  Atlantic  ports.  Irrespective  of 
the  actual  saving  in  cost  to  the  shipper,  which  will  be  very  large, 
the  sub.-titution  of  short  rail  hauls  to  the  Great  Lakes  in  place 
of  k)ng  rail  hauls  to  the  Atlantic  seaboard  will  result  in  a  vast 
improvement  in  the  general  transportation  conditions  of  the 
country.  Every  car  utilized  in  carrying  freight  to  lake  ports 
would  be  able  to  make  from  two  to  five  times  as  many  trips  per 
year  as  it  can  make  to  Atlantic  ports.  This  would  be  more 
than  equivalent  to  a  large  increase  in  the  number  of  cars,  because 
it  would  relieve  congestion  instead  of  increasing  it.  The  exten- 
sion of  the  seaboard  to  the  heart  of  the  country  is  the  real 
solution  of  the  transportation  problems  now  confronting  the 
people  of  the  country. 

The  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal  bestowed  the  benefits 
of  deep  water  transportation  upon  the  people  of  the  Pacific 
Coast,  extending  inland  as  far  as  the  Rockies,  the  Gulf  Coast 
extending  northward  as  far  as  St.  Louis,  and  the  Atlantic  Coast 
extending  westward  as  far  as  Indiana,  leaving  the  northerly 
interior  of  the  country  at  a  greater  disadvantage  than  ever 
before.  It  is  the  interior  of  every  country  of  large  size 
that  is  most  difficult  to  develop  because  of  the  handicap  imposed 
by  the  transportation  disadvantages.  We  look  to  these  great 
western  plains,  however,  for  our  food  production  and  for  the 
surplus  which  our  commercial  interests  demand  that  we  should 
lia\c  to  sell  in  foreign  markets.  The  people  of  this  great  ter- 
ritory in  return  have  the  right  to  demand  that  we  provide  them 
with  the  facilities  of  transportation  which  will  enable  them  to 
carry  out  these  worthy  purposes.  It  requires  no  gift  of  prophecy 
to  foresee  that  unless  more  efficient  and  economical  transportation 
is  ])rovided.  the  time  will  shortly  come  when  we  can  no  longer 
compete  with  other  nations  in  the  grain  markets  of  the  world. 

Therefore  it  is  7vitli  prayerful  hope  that  one  turns  to  the  project 
of  the  proposed  St.  Lawrenee  ship  channel  as  affording  the  most 
available  solution  of  the  problem  of  providing  economical  trans- 
portation for  this  great  region. 


Chapter  V 

THE  HANDICAP  OF  INADEQUATE  TERMINAL 
FACILITIES 

A  large  part  of  the  cost  of  transporting  goods  to  and  from 
seaboard  is  terminal  rather  than  line  cost.  The  expense  involved 
between  the  arrival  of  a  car  at  New  York  and  the  placing  of 
goods  on  the  ship  frequently  amounts  to  as  much  as  the  cost  of 
the  haul  from  points  as  far  west  as  Chicago.  Because  of  these 
excessive  terminal  costs,  foreign  trade  is  seriously  handicapped. 
The  terminals  at  Atlantic  ports  were  originally  constructed  in 
the  interests  of  the  railroads,  and  are  not  properly  designed, 
equipped  or  connected  to  secure  economy.  On  the  Great  Lakes, 
terminals  can  be  constructed  which  will  avoid  the  costly  errors 
made  at  Atlantic  ports,  and  will  afford  the  facility  of  movement 
which  is  alike  necessary  in  the  interests  of  the  shipper  and  of 
the  vessel.  While  prompt  and  economical  transfers  are  impor- 
tant where  goods  must  be  transshipped,  the  avoidance  of  trans- 
fers is  more  important.  The  Great  Lakes  route  will  eliminate 
transfers  on  a  vast  amount  of  business  and  will  reduce  the  num- 
ber and  cost  of  transfers  on  an  equal  or  greater  amount.  The 
saving  of  terminal  costs  and  of  losses  resulting  from  delays  in 
delivery  of  goods  will  amount  to  several  hundred  million  dollars 
annually. 

Inadequate  terminals  responsible  for  deficient  transportation. — 

In  the  preceding  discussion  the  conclusion  was  reached  that 
the  difficulty  of  securing  maximum  efficiency  in  our  railroad 
transportation  system  is  due  to  the  impracticability  under  exist- 
ing conditions  of  obtaining  a  quick  turn-around  and  proper  dis- 
tribution of  cars,  rather  than  upon  the  acknowledged  car  short- 
age. The  same  difficulty  of  securing  rapid  turn-around  is  found  in 
the  operation  of  vessels  at  our  principal  ports.  Much  of  the  fault 
for  the  present  inefficiency  of  both  rail  and  water  lines  of  trans- 
portation may  clearly  be  placed  upon  the  lack  of  adequate  facili- 
ties at  the  terminals,  and  a  large  share  of  the  cost  of  transporta- 
tion is  terminal  cost  rather  than  line  cost.  The  authors  concur 
fully  with  the  views  expressed  by  Mr.  Chas.  Whiting  Baker  at 
the  hearing  before  the  International  Joint  Commission  at  New 
York  on  October  20,  1920,  on  this  phase  of  the  subject.  Mr. 
Baker  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  while  the  costs  of  rail 
transportation  have  been  decreasing  for  a  great  many  years,  due 
to  improvement  in  type  and  capacity  of  the  rolling  stock,  the 
expenses  at  the  terminals  have  gone  on  increasing.  A  vast 
amount  of  work  must  be  undertaken  at  the  ports  of  this  coun- 

35 


36  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

try  to  secure  greater  economy  in  all  services  connected  with  a 
transfer  of  freight  between  land  and  water  carriers.  A  greater 
service  than  the  reduction  of  transfer  costs,  however,  will  be 
rendered  by  the  entire  elimination  of  such  costs  wherever  prac- 
ticable. The  necessity  of  making  transfers  from  one  form  of 
transportation  to  another  involves  not  one,  but  many  items  of 
expense,  depending  upon  the  particular  conditions  affecting  the 
shipment.  These  costs  are  not  sut^ciently  uniform  to  be  definitely 
stated,  but  it  may  be  said  in  general  terms  that  the  cost  of  getting 
freight  from  car  to  vessel  at  our  Atlantic  ports  frequently  equals 
or  exceeds  the  cost  of  the  rail  haul  from  points  as  far  distant 
as  Chicago,  or  more  than  $10  per  ton. 

Problems  of  Atlantic  ports. — Terminal  development  in  the  past 
has  been  largely  haphazard,  due  to  the  fact  that  in  the  early 
stages  of  port  development  the  terminal  facilities  were  provided 
by  each  railroad  system  for  the  accommodation  of  its  own  busi- 
ness and  without  regard  to  the  business  of  other  carriers.*  In 
some  ports  we  therefore  find  several  isolated  terminal  develop- 
ments which  can  not  now  be  economically  coordinated  and  inter- 
connected. Due  to  the  lack  of  any  original,  comprehensive  plan, 
the  task  of  introducing  the  most  economical  conditions  becomes 
exceedingly  great.  Frontages  on  deep  water  which  should  have 
been  reserved  for  public  transportation  uses  have  been  monopo- 
lized by  private  interests,  and  it  is  now  impracticable  in  some 
localities  to  provide  a  system  of  belt  line  communication  serv- 
ing all  wharves  and  affording  connection  with  all  rail  lines.  While 
it  is  known  that  the  terminal  charges  are  by  far  the  greatest 
drag  on  commerce,  it  is  little  realized  to  what  extent  these  charges 
have  come  to  rest  upon  the  domestic  an  I  foreign  commerce  of 
the  United  States,  increasing  the  cost  of  living  at  home  and 
limiting  the  markets  for  American  products  abroad.  The  point 
of  diminishing  returns  is  soon  reached  with  an  increase  in  the  size 
of  terminals;  that  is,  beyond  a  certain  size  terminal  costs  increase 
rapidly,  with  a  further  increase  in  the  size  of  the  terminal.  It  is 
therefore  the  natural  conclusion,  unfortunately  borne  out  by 
fact,  that  the  greatest  terminal  in  the  United  States,  New  York, 
is  the  most  expensive  and  the  charges  there  rest  most  heavily 
upon  commerce. 

Character  of  terminal  charges. — Terminal  charges  are  borne 
directly  by  three  groups  of  persons.     (  1  )  There  are  the  terminal 


*See  MacElwee,  "Ports  and  Terminal  Facilities,"  McGraw-Hill,  1918. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  ?i7 

charges  that  fall  to  the  expense  of  operation  of  the  railroad 
company;  (2)  there  are  the  expenses  that  fall  to  the  steam- 
ship company;  and  (3)  there  are  the  expenses  that  fall  to  the 
shipper  himself,  the  merchant  handling  the  goods.  Ultimately, 
the  consumer  pays  it  all  if  the  goods  are  of  such  nature  that 
ihe  price  can  be  increased  without  destroying  the  market,  but 
in  the  case  of  grain  and  some  other  products  prominent  in  our 
export  trade  and  on  which  the  prices  are  fixed  abroad,  the  pro- 
ducer must  stand  these  costs.  As  a  general  knowledge  at  least 
of  these  costs  is  desirable  in  order  to  appreciate  the  savings 
their  elimination  will  effect,  some  data  on  these  costs  will  be 
l)resented.  While  the  information  given  is  based  principally 
upon  conditions  at  the  port  of  New  York,  it  is  not  with  the 
purpose  of  making  this  great  port  the  target  for  special  criti- 
cism, since  many  of  the  items  are  ec^ually  applicable  to  other 
Atlantic  ports,  nor  can  we  pass  to  these  details  without  paying 
tribute  to  the  splendid  achievements  of  Dock  Commissioner 
Hulbert  in  securin*^-  approval  of  i)roiects  of  great  magnitude 
in  the  interests  of  the  port. 

Lighterage. — The  lighterage  cost  at  the  port  of  New  York  is 
one  of  the  most  insidious  drags  upon  the  commerce  of  the  United 
States.  .Much  useful  information  concerning  the  lighterage 
service  at  New  York  is  conta'ned  in  the  record  of  the  New 
York  Harbor  case  before  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 
In  this  case  the  Committee  on  \\'ays  and  Means  to  Prosecute 
the  Case  of  Alleged  Railroad  Rate  and  Service  Discrimination 
at  the  Port  of  New  York,  complained  that  the  transportation 
of  commodities  to  and  from  Manhattan  and  Brooklyn  involves 
an  expensive  lighterage  and  floatage  service  not  performed  on 
trafific  to  and  from  points  in  the  northern  part  of  the  State  of 
New  Jersey;  that  in  view  of  the  more  favorable  location  of  the 
latter  points  the  rates'  between  points  in  the  West  and  Jersey 
City,  Hoboken,  Newark.  Paterson.  and  other  cities  in  northern 
New  Jersey  should  be  lower  than  the  rates  to  and  from  Man- 
hattan and  Brooklyn ;  and  that  the  defendants'  policy  of  em- 
bracing all  of  these  points  in  the  same  zone,  and  their  consequent 
failure  to  recognize  in  the  rate  structure  the  cost  of  the  lighterage 
and  floating  service,  subjects  the  people  and  the  communities  of 
northern  New  Jersey  to  undue  prejudice  and  disadvantage,  and 
operates  to  the  undue  preference  and  advantage  of  Manhattan 
and  Brooklyn.  The  Commission  held  that  the  rates  attacked  are 
not  shown  to  be  unreasonable  or  otherwise  unlawful.     Its  report 


38  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

fully  confirms  the  statements  elsewhere  made  regarding  the  ex- 
istence for  many  years  of  congestion  and  excessive  terminal 
expense  at  New  York,  but  it  shows  that  the  granting  of  lower 
rates  to  New  Jersey  points  because  of  this  excessive  cost  would 
not  remedy  the  situation.  The  rates  to  north  Atlantic  ports 
were  many  years  ago  adjusted  on  a  differential  basis,  by  agree- 
ment among  the  railroads,  and  as  a  result  of  these  differentials 
certain  definite  traffic  relations  and  conditions  have  been  devel- 
oped. To  disturb  these  dift'erentials  might  result  in  an  un- 
usual and  unfair  advantage  to  the  favored  ports,  and  hence  the 
greatest  caution  must  be  exercised  in  any  readjustment  of  rates. 
A  few  quotations  from  the  report  of  the  Commission  will  serve 
to  make  the  situation  clearer. 

Extracts  from   Report   of   the   Interstate   Commerce   Commission, 
in   the   N'ezv   York  Harbor   Case 

It  is  maintained  by  some  experts  on  harbor  development  that  no  port 
is  to  be  regarded  as  ideal  unless  its  facilities  are  so  arrang^ed  as  to  provide 
for  the  direct  and  economical  interchange  of  freight  between  the  rail 
carriers  and  the  boat  lines  S'crving  it.  There  should  be  spacious  piers 
on  the  water  front  adjacent  to  the  terminus  of  the  rail  lines;  the  railroad 
tracks  should  extend  onto  the  piers;  and  freight  should  be  transferred 
directly  between  the  cars  and  the  vessel. 

If  this  principle  is  sound,  the  very  statem'ent  of  it  constitutes  a  serious 
indictment  of  the  prevailing  conditions  at  the  port  of  New  York,  since 
the  terminals  of  nearly  all  the  trunk  lines  at  that  port  are  on  th-e  New 
Jersey  shore,  while  most  of  the  ocean  lines  have  their  piers  either  on 
Manhattan  Island  or  at  South  Brookbti,  distant  from  1  mile  to  4  miles 
from  the  rail  terminus.  To  a  specialist  in  port  development  it  is  "a  sur- 
prising fact  that  not  a  single  steamship  pier  on  Manhattan  Island  has  a 
railroad  track  on  it  connected  to  a  trunk  line  railroad,  or  even  to  a  switch- 
ing railroad  by  which  the  trunk  line  might  be  reached."  With  a  few 
exceptions  there  are  no  facilities  on  the  New  Jersey  shore  for  the 
accommodation  of  large  vessels,  which  are  accordingly  obliged  to  find 
pier  space  elsewhere  in  the  harbor.  In  the  absence  of  bridges  or  freight 
tunnels  connecting  the  N-ew  Jersey  shore  with  Manhattan  and  Brooklyn, 
the  problem  of  providing  facilities  for  the  transfer  of  freight  between 
the  cars  and  the  vessels  is  solved  by  the  use  of  lighters  and  car  floats, 
which  arc  also  employed  in  transferring  freight  between  the  railroad 
terminals  and  the  piers  iti  other  parts  of  the  harbor.  The  conditions  under 
which  freight  is  transported  from  one  side  of  the  harbor  to  the  other 
at    New   York  are   without   an   exact   parallel    anywhere   in    this   country. 


As  long  as  the  railroads  perform  the  expensive  lighterage  and  floatage 
service  without  imposing  an  additional  charge  therefor,  the  freight  rates 
offer  no  inducement  to  the  steamship  companies  to  seek  pier  space  on 
the  New  Jersey  shore  rather  than  in  Manliattan  or  Brooklyn ;  and  the 
maintenance  of  a  common  rate  to  and  from  both  sides  of  the  port  tends 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  39 

to  increase  rather  than  to  diminish  the  congestion  of  freight  on  the  shores 
of  Manhattan  and  Brooklyn.  If  the  freight  rates  to  and  from  the  New- 
Jersey  shore  were  lower,  ocean  shipping  would  be  attracted  to  the  New 
Jersey  side  of  the  harbor  and  more  industries  would  be  induced  to 
locate  there. 


It  is  estimated  that  *10,00O,0(K)  tons  of  freight  annually  would  be 
affected  by  a  change  in  the  rates  here  in  issue,  and  that  of  the  total 
tonnage  coming  to  the  New  Jersey  shore  from  the  West,  from  85  to  90 
per  cent  is  carried  in  lighters  or  on  car  floats  to  the  east  side  of  the  harbor. 
If  it  be  true  that  an  expensive  and  unnecessary  lighterage  service  is 
performed  on  such  an  enormous  tonnage,  it  is  obvious  that  the  present 
method  of  handling  freight  at  the  port  involves  a  huge  economic  loss  which 
is,  in  a  sense,  an  unjustifiable  burden  upon  the  people  of  the  whole  country. 


There  are  91  steamship  lines  engaged  in  the  foreign  trade  sailing  from 
Manhattan,  Brooklyn,  and  Staten  Island.  Only  nine  sail  from  the  New 
Jersey  side  of  the  harbor,  and  three  of  these,  the  North  German  Lloyd 
and  two  of  the  Hamburg-American  lines,  have  suspended  their  sailings 
because  of  the  war.  In  addition  to  the  lines  engaged  in  the  trans- 
Atlantic  service  there  are  15  lines  plying  between  New  York  Harbor  and 
points  on  Long  Island  Sound,  ail  of  them  sailing  from  the  New  York  side 
of   the   harbor. 


Even  prior  to  the  enormous  increase  in  the  volume  of  export  traffic 
which  the  trunk  lines  have  recently  been  called  upon  to  carry  to  the 
seaboard  the  congestion  of  freight  at  the  terminals,  on  the  piers,  and 
in  the  streets  of  the  city  presented  a  problem  which  taxed  the  ingenuity 
of  the  carriers  and  the  city  authorities. 

The  present  dock  commissioner  describes  the  situation  as  follows: 

The  necessity  for  dispatching  the  business  within  very  limited  periods 
of  high  congestion  morning  and  evening,  combined  with  the  cramped 
conditions  under  which  freight  is  handled  over  the  piers  and  through  the 
bulkhead  sheds,  has  produced  a  condition  which  places  a  most  serious 
burden  upon  the  shippers  of  the  city.  West  street  and  the  marginal  way 
are  at  times  crowded  with  trucks  to  a  point  where  it  is  impossible  to  reach 
the  freight  stations  without  intolerable  and  expensive  delays.  Testimony 
which  appears  entirely  reliable  has  been  taken  by  a  number  of  commis- 
sions which  have  investigated  the  subject  to  the  effect  that  several  hours' 
delay  in  waiting  for  a  chance  to  receive  or  deliver  freight  is  no  uncommon 
occurrence,  and  that  the  actual  cost  to  the  New  York  shipper  of  getting 
freight  to  and  from  the  water-side  stations  is  frequently  equal  to  or  in 
excess  of  rail  service  as  far  west  as  Buffalo. 

The  rates  published  by  the  carriers  operating  over  the  ocean-and-rail 
routes,  which  carry  a  large  tonnage  between  New  York  Harbor  and 
points  in  the  West,  are  the  same  from  Jersey  City  and  Hoboken  as  from 
New  York,  although  all  of  the  vessels  engaged  in  this  traffic  sail  from 
the  Manhattan  side,  and  an  additional  lighterage  service  must  be  performed 
therefore   on  traffic   moving  to  or   from  points   in   New  Jersey. 

The  competition  between  carriers  which  resulted  ultimately  in  the 
adoption  of  the  so-called  port  differentials  began  soon  after  the  middle  of 

*The  correct  figure  is  nearer  100,000,000  tons. 


40  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS   OF    THE 

ihc  last  ctntury.  The  New  York  Central  and  its  connections  opened  the 
iirst  through  route  from  New  York  to  Chicago  in  1852,  and  through 
rates  were  first  published  in  1857.  At  that  time  the  New  York  Central 
was  the  only  carrier  reaching  New  York  Harbor  with  its  own  rails,  but 
the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  participated  to  a  certain  extent  in  the  New  York 
traffic  by  means  of  a  boat  line  from  Baltimore.  The  Erie  Railroad 
leached  Jersey  City  in  1862,  the  Pennsylvania  in  1866  or  1867,  and  the 
Delaware,  Lackawanna  &  Western  in  1869.  The  lines  of  the  Pennsyl- 
vania system  were  extended  to  Chicago  in  1858.  thos-e  of  the  Erie  several 
years  later,  and  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  reached  Chicago  for  the  first  time 
in  1874. 

The  establishment  of  through  routes  by  these  carriers  between  New 
York  and  Chicago  marked  the  beginning  of  a  period  of  intense  rivalry 
between  them  which  is  without  a  parallel  in  the  history  of  American 
transportation.  Grain,  which  is  said  to  have  constituted  IZ  per  cent 
of  the  total  tonnage  carried  by  the  trunk  lines  to  the  principal  Atlantic 
ports  in  1881,  was  the  traffic  most  desired  by  each  of  the  carriers.  The 
principal  terminals  of  the  New  York  Central,  the  Lackawanna,  and 
the  Erie  were  at  the  port  of  New  York,  those  of  the  Pennsylvania  at 
Philadelphia,  and  those  of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  at  Baltimore ;  and 
each  carrier  exerted  every  possible  efifort  to  have  the  export  traffic  move 
through  the  port  in  which  it  was  primarily  interested.  Thus,  it  came 
about  that  the  competition  between  carriers  became  in  turn  a  competition 
between  ports.  That  the  rivalry  is  as  yet  unabated  is  abundantly  attested 
by  the  evidence  of  record  in  the  proceeding  now  before  us. 

The  rate  war  resulting  from  the  struggle  between  the  trunk  lines  for 
supremacy  was  so  severe  as  to  make  it  apparent  that  its  continuance  would 
bankrupt  all  of  the  carriers,  and  steps  were  soon  taken  toward  the 
establishment  of  a  rate  adjustment  that  would  be  satisfactory  to  all 
concerned.  In  1877  a  written  agreement  wa*;  signed  by  the  New  York 
Central,  the  Erie,  the  Pennsylvania,  and  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio,  the  preamble 
of  which  stated  that  its  object  was — 

to  avoid  all  future  misunderstandings  in  respect  to  the  geograpliical  ad- 
vantages or  disadvantages  of  the  cities  of  Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  and 
New  York,  as  afifected  by  rail  and  ocean  transportation,  and  with  a  view 
to  effecting  an  equalization  of  the  aggregate  cost  of  rail  and  ocean  trans- 
pr.rtation  between  all  competitive  points  in  the  West  and  Southwest  and 
all  domestic  or  foreign  ports  reached  through  the  above  cities.  The  agree- 
ment provided  that  export  rates  to  Boston  should  be  no  higher  than  those 
to  New  York;  that  the  rates  to  Philadelphia  should  be  2  cents  lower  than 
those  to  New  York;  and  that  the  rates  to  Baltimore  should  be  3  cents 
lower  than  to  New  York. 


.\  difference  of  one-fourth  cent  per  bushel  seems  almost  negligible, 
but  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  movement  of  grain  is  determined 
by  very  slight  differences  in  rates;  and  the  Philadelphia  dealers  remind 
us  that  one- fourth  cent  per  bushel  amounts  to  $300  on  a  cargo  of  200,000 
bushels. 

.approximately  40  per  cent  of  the  grain  exported  through  the  port  of 
New  York  is  handled  in  lighters  or  barges  from  the  terminals  of  the  rail 
lines  to  the  vessels,  floating  elevators  being  employed  to  load  the  cargo 
from  lighter  to  vessel.  This  method  of  "indirect"  loading,  which  is  made 
necessarv   because   of   the    failure  of   some   of   the   trunk   lines   to   provide 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  41 

faciliti'cs  for  the  difcct  transfer  of  grain  from  elevator  to  vessel,  involves 
an  additional  cost  to  the  shipper  of  0.4  of  1  cent  per  busiiel,  th^e  charge 
for  indirect  loading  being  0.9  of  1  cent  per  bushel. 


Several  of  the  trunk  lines  insist  that  connecting  carriers  permit  them 
to  d'cduct  before  prorating  joint  rates  the  sum  of  3  cents  per  100  pounds 
for  the  lighterage  and  floatage  service  when  they  perform  it.  Shipments 
consigned  from  points  in  the  West  to  Manhattan  or  Brooklyn  and 
moving,  for  example,  over  the  New  York  C'entral's  route  through  Wee- 
hawken,  would  be  carried  across  the  harbor  by  the  floating  equipment  of 
that  carrier.  Before  prorating  the  New  York  Central  deducts  3  cents  per 
100  pounds,  which  it  credits  to  itself  for  the  terminal  service.  The 
shipper  pays  no  extra  charge  for  the  service,  the  cost  .of  performing  it 
being  absorbed  by  the  carriers  out  of  the  New  York  rate. 

The  practice  of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  in  this  respect  differs  from 
that  of  some  of  the  other  lines.  That  carrier  deducts  3  cents  per  100 
pounds  before  prorating  on  all  traffic  moving  between  points  in  the  West 
and  points  on  its  lines  in  the  New  York  rate  group,  whether  it  performs 
the  lighterage  service  or  not.  On  shipments  to  Newark,  N.  J.,  for 
example,  where  no  lighterage  is  necessary,  the  terminal  deduction  is  made 
as  well  as  on  shipments  to  Brooklyn. 


Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  fact  that  a  large  part  of  the 
lighterage  and  floatage  of  freight  across  New  York  Harbor  is  performed 
by  private  terminal  companies,  acting  in  that  capacity  as  agents  for  the 
trunk  lines.  These  companies,  whose  terminals  are  on  the  Brooklyn 
shore,  not  only  transport  freight  with  their  own  floating  equipment  be- 
tween their  own  terminals  and  those  of  the  railroads,  but  they  collect 
freight  charges  and  remit  them  to  the  rail  carriers,  and  they  assume  all 
responsibility  for  loss  and  damage  to  the  freight  while  it  is  in  their 
possession. 

On  all  traffic  originating  at  or  consigned  to  points  west  of  the  western 
termini  of  the  eastern  trunk  lines  except  grain  the  auxiliary  terminal 
companies  are  paid  4.4  cents  per  100  pounds  for  the  lighterage  or  floatage 
service  which  they  perform.  On  traffic  originating  at  or  consigned  to 
points  east  of  the  western  termini  the  allowance  is  3.2  cents.  Prior  to 
our  supplemental  decision  in  The  Five  Per  Cent  Case.  32  I.  C.  C,  325, 
the  amounts  paid  to  the  terminal  companies  were  4.2  cents  and  3  cents. 
respectively^  On  grain  the  allowance  is  uniformly  3.2  cents  per  100 
pounds.  These  allowances  are  in  no  instances  paid  by  the  shipper,  the 
carriers  uniformly  absorbing  them  out  of  the  New  York  rate. 


The  complainants'  contention  that  the  methods  of  handling  both  domestic 
and  export  traffic  at  the  port  of  New  York  must  be  thoroughly  revised 
if  the  maximum  of  efficiency  is  to  be  attained  is  abundantly  established  by 
the  evidence  of  record.  Adequate  freight  tunnels  under  the  North  River, 
which  apparently  could  be  constructed  at  a  cost  small  in  comparison  with 
Ihe  resulting  benefits,  would  make  it  possible  to  handle  a  large  portion 
of  Manhattan's  freight  traffic  without  the  use  of  lighters  or  car  floats.  A 
large  part  of  the  valuable  water  front  on  the  New  Jersey  shore,  now 
used  almost  wholly  for  the  transfer  of  freight  between  the  rails  and  the 
floating  equipment,  could  be  released  for  other  and  more  suitable  pur- 
pores;   the  congestion  on  the   west   side  of   Manhattan   Island  caused   by 


42  ECON'OMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

the  assembling  of  countless  vehicles  at  the  crowded  piers  to  receive  and 
discharge  freight  would  be  considerably  relieved ;  and  th'e  pier  stations 
on  the  Manhattan  shore,  now  taxed  to  capacity,  could  be  devoted  in  part 
to  other  uses. 


Although  it  has  been  plainly  suggested  by  certain  parties  in  the  present 
proceeding  that  a  finding  in  favor  of  the  complainants  would  induce  the 
carriers  to  unite  their  efiforts  toward  bettering  terminal  conditions  at  the 
port,  it  is  clear  that  the  authority  to  regulate  rates  was  not  delegated  to 
the  Commission  for  any  such  purpose.  The  methods  of  handling  freight 
at  the  port  can  be  revised  and  improved  without  specially  adjusting  the 
freight  rates  with  that  end  in  view,  and  the  remarkable  growth  and 
progress  of  the  port  can  best  be  continued  by  treating  it  as  an  organic 
whole. 

The  above  quotations  from  the  report  of  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Coinmission  show  that  in  general  the  Hghterage  and  float- 
age costs  are  absorbed  in  the  rate.  They  are  not  paid  directly  by 
the  shipper,  but  are.  nevertheless,  indirectly  paid  by  him,  since 
they  are  included  in  the  rate.  Moreover,  these  charges  are  paid 
on  some  traffic  entering  the  New  York  district  whether  lighter- 
age or  floatage  is  actually  required  or  not.  The  charge  of  about 
3  cents  per  hundred  pounds  deducted  by  the  road  performing  this 
service  may  at  one  time  have  represented  its  true  cost,  but  this 
is  no  longer  the  case,  and  as  stated  by  Commissioner  Woolley, 
the  cost  had  risen  to  $35  a  car  or  more  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war.  It  is  estimated  that  the  present  cost  is  about  $60  a  car,  which 
is  equivalent  to  about  $2.00  a  ton,  or  10  cents  a  hundred  pounds. 

It  seems  clear  that  in  the  past  the  necessity  of  making  the  rate 
to  New  York  sufficient  to  cover  the  lighterage  and  floatage  costs 
has  been  fully  recognized,  and  that  in  observing  the  established 
differentials,  this  practice  has  resulted  in  maintaining  unneces- 
sarily high  rates  to  the  other  north  Atlantic  j)orts.  The  rate 
relationship  is  purely  artificial  and  arbitrary,  and  is  not  based 
on  the  cost  of  service  at  the  present  time.  If  ii  were  so  based, 
the  rates  to  Baltimore  would  be  from  5  to  10  cents  less  per 
100  pounds  than  to  New  York.  The  situation  is  an  unfortunate 
one,  and  the  only  prospect  of  a  remedy  seems  to  lie  in  the  creation 
of  new  outlets  for  ocean  traffic.  The  St.  Lawrence  waterway 
would  exercise  a  powerful  influence  in  bringing  about  the  econo- 
mies so  sorely  needed  at  Atlantic  ports.  Competition  in  trans- 
portation in  just  as  effective  as  it  is  in  industry.  Such  compe- 
tition would  be  aft'orded  by  the  deeper  St.  Lawrence  waterway, 
and  the  influence  of  this  waterway  would  be  seen  not  only  in 
the  development  of  a  vast  traffic  on  its  own  channel.  l)ut  in  the 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


43 


reduction  of  charges  for  handling  traffic  through  all  Atlantic 
ports,  and  on  all  competing  rail  and  water  routes.  The  history 
of  transportation  proves  that  this  result  would  be  inevitable. 

Stevedoring  costs. — The  cost  of  loading  and  unloading  both 
cars  and  vessels  has  increased  with  leaps  and  bounds  during  the 
last  few  years.  Available  data  indicate  a  wide  variation  in  these 
costs,  but  it  may  be  said  in  general  terms  that  the  cost  of  loading 
or  unloading  a  ton  of  general  package  freight  now  amounts  to 
$1.00,  as  compared  with  25  cents  at  the  time  the  construction  of 
the  present  barge  canal  across  the  State  of  New  York  was  recom- 
mended. In  connection  with  the  operation  of  the  Government 
barges  on  the  Mississippi  River,  the  cost  of  loading  and  unloading 
at  St.  Louis  was  found  to  be  about  $1  per  ton.  At  our  principal 
Atlantic  ports  it  is  greater,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  following: 


Results   of   Stevedoring   Study   Made   at    the  Port    of  Xezc    York    by  the 
U.  S.  Shipping  Board 


Loading,  1913;  33 
vessels,  8  of  which 
were  coastwise;  all 
loaded  with  gen- 
eral merchandise 


T      J-         <rno     ,T  Unloading,      1913; 
Loading     1918;   32     33  «      g     f ' 

vessels,  8  of .  which  ^j^-^j^   ^^^^  ^^^^^_ 
wise;     24     carried 


were  coastwise;  all 
loaded  with  gen- 
eral merchandise 


general  merchan- 
dise. 


Unloading,      1918; 
26  vessels,  8  of 

which   were  coast- 
wise;  15  carried 
general  merchan- 
dise. 


Numfcer 
of  vessels 


Cost 
per  ton 


Number      Cost 
of  vessels    per  ton 


Number 
of  vessels 


Cost 
per  ton 


Number      Cost 
of  vessels    per  ton 


Average  cost  of 
loading  or  un- 
loading  

Average  steve- 
doring cost  of 
loading  or  un- 
loading  

Average  tal- 
lying and 
clerking  cost 
of  loading  or 
unloading 

Average  watch- 
ing cost  of 
loading  or  un- 
loading  

Average  d  u  n  - 
nage  cost  of 
loading  or  un- 
loading  

Average  time  of 
loading  or  un- 
loading   

Average  num- 
ber of  tons 
loaded  or  un- 
loaded per 
vessel 


33 

$0,584 

32 

S2.158 

33 

$0,588 

26 

28 

0.458 

31 

1.755 

28 

0.562 

25 

25 

1 

0.080 

28 

0.160 

25 

0.088 

21 

18 

0.025 

27 

0.070 

18 

0.029 

18 

8 

0.011 

10 

0.125 

4 

0.028 

4 

27 

Days 
4.22 

26 

Days 
5.37 

27 

Days 
3.5 

21 

i 

1  33 

Tons 
3732 

32 

Tons 
3596 

33 

Tons 
3064 

26 

$1,591 


1.404 


0.072 


0,022 


Days 
3.03 


Tons 
2088 


Most  of  the  vessels  carried  general  cargo.     The  striking  dis- 
closures made  by  this  table  are:     (I)  The  high  cost  of  loading  in 


44 


ECOXO.MIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


1918,  (2)  the  large  increase  in  costs  since  1913,  and  (3)  the 
difference  of  46.1  cents  between  the  average  costs  of  loading  and 
unloading  in  1918.  If  the  figures  show  the  true  conditions,  as 
they  were  designed  to  do.  the  cost  of  loading  in  Xew  York  in 
1918  was  more  than  $1.00  greater  than  the  contract  stevedore 
prices  in  Philadelphia  a  year  later,  after  further  increases  in 
longshoremen's  wages.  The  cost  was  less  on  the  average  for 
coastwise  vessels  than  for  deep-sea  vessels,  and  there  were  large 
differences  between  the  costs  of  different  companies. 

Cost  per  ton  of  Loading  and  Unloading  Vessels  at  Atlantic  Ports,  1913  and  19 18. 
(From  Data  Obtained  by  the  U.  S.  Shipping  Board.) 


Unloading 

Average  cost 

Average  stevedoring  cost. 
Average     tallying     and 

clerking  cost 

Average  watching  cost. . . 
Average  dunnage  cost. .  . 

Loading 

Average  cost 

Average  stevedoring  cost. 
Average     tallying     and 

clerking  cost 

Average  watching  cost. . . 
Average  dunnage  cost. .  . 


Xew  York 


1913 


1918 


SO. 588 
0.562 

0.088 
0.029 
0.028 


0.584 
0.458 

0.080 
0.025 
0.011 


$1,591 
1.404 

0.159 
0.072 
0.022 


2.158 
1.755 

0.160 
0.070 
0.125 


Boston 


Philadelphia 


Baltimore 


$0,832 

0 

766 

0 

062 

0 

063 

0 

390 

0 

334 

0 

025 

0 

021 

0 

016 

$2,153 
1.989 


0.139 
0.166 


1.317 
1.239 

0.062 
0.068 
0.106 


$0,399 

0 

362 

0 

026 

0 

024 

0 

.■?52 

0 

324 

0 

023 

0 

01 

$I.009|  $0,456 
0.9581     0.418 


0.082 
0.02 


1.044 
0.990 


0.082 
0.02 


0.038 


0,369 
0.342 


0  035 
0.002 


$2,419 
2.352 


1.167 
1.112 


0.084 
0.029 


The  figures  for  each  item  represent  the  averages  for  the  actual  num- 
ber of  loadings  and  unloadings  in  which  the  particular  item  was  involved. 
h'cccnt  rates  in  Effect  by  a  Large  Stevedorinc/  Cfl>nf>aiiy  at  Philadelphia. 


Bombay,  Calcutta  Cargoes  per 
Calcutta  or  Bombay  ton .  .  . 

Bale  Cargo 

China  Clay 

Chalk 

Colombo  Cargo 

General  Cargoes  (per  ton 
weight  or  measurement)  .  .  . 

Iron  (pig) 

Lath 

Ore 

Steel  or  Iron  Scrap 

Skins  (wet),  per  ton  of  2240  lbs. 
C.  or  B.  cargo 

Ammunition    and-or    explo- 
sives  

Dynamite  (50%  extra) 
Automobiles 


Discharging 

Sulphur $  1 .  00  per  ton 

ST.  56  per  ton         Skins,  if  wet,  quoted  above,  if 
1.20     "     "  dry  on  Bombay  or  Calcutta 

.98     "     "  cargo  basis. 

.98     "     "  Wool:     • 

.75     "     "  Compressed 1.80     "     " 

Not  Compressed 60     "  bale 

1.10     '•     "  From  River  Plata  Ports 

1.15     "     "  Maize  and-or  Linseed-In  bags 

1 .  50     "     "  overside 1 .  10  per  ton 

.75     ■'     "  Maize  and  or  Linseed-In  bags 

2.50     "     "  on  dock  (same  rate  plus  labor 

for  trucking  and  piling) 
1.10     "     •'  ' 

Loading 


Billets,  bars  and  pig  iron  .  .  .  . 

Beams  (structural  steel) 

Barrel  and  -or  drums  of  oil, 
or    other    barrel    cargoes: 
Full  cargoes  at  Refinery, 


Iron  Plates $1   80  per  ton 

$3.35  per  ton  Locomotives  and  -or  Ma- 

chinery or  other  hea\;>' 
1.35     "       "  lifts,  including  crane  hire 

measurement.  when  loaded  at  Pier  "G" 

1    51  per  ton  and  -or  Eddystone,    on 

2.85     "       "  the  entire  shipment 4. SO       "     "' 

Lumber 1   -'50 

Meats 1    10       "     •• 

Oilcake 1.10       "     " 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL 


45 


From  dock,  .23  per  bbl 

From  dock  and  lighters 

.27  per  bbl 

Part  cargoes.  .29  per  bbl. .  .  . 

(Out  of  City)  .30  per  bbl 

Barbed  wire 

Case  oil: 

Full  cargoes 

From  lighters 

Coil  wire 

Car  material 

Carbon  black 

Cotton 

Flour  and  other  bagged  cargo. 
General     cargo     (weight     or 

measurement) 

Hay 

Ingots 

ron — Scrap 


Loading 

1.15  per  ton  Oats 7.50  per  1000  bu. 

Oats  (filling  into  and  stow- 
1   35     "       "  ing  in  bags  and  feeders). .19. 00  per  1000 

1  .-15     "       "  bu.  e.\tra. 

1.50  I'       "  Oats  (full  cargo-bagged) . .   24.00  per  1000 
1  63     '■       "  bushels 

Pipe 1.55  per  ton 

.04     "case  Rails-under  40  ft.  long  and 

.05     "       "  rail  equipment 1.55       "     " 

1.31      "    ton  Rails — over  40  ft.  long  and 

1.31     "       "  rail  equipment 2.00       "     " 

measurement.  Staves 1 .  SO       "     " 

1.31  per  ton  Tobacco 1.50       "     " 

measurement.  Wheat  and  -or  all  heav>- 

1 .  50  per  ton  grains 5 .  50  per  1000 

1 .  10  per  ton  bushels 

Filling  and  stowing  in  bags 

1.10     '■       "  and  feeders 16.50  per  1000 

1 .60     "       "  bu.  extra 

1.51  "       "  Other  commodities  by  spe- 
2.45     "       "  cial  arrangements. 


Other  terminal  costs. — There  are  many  charges  assessed 
against  a  vessel  in  connection  with  its  port  operations,  such  as 
pilotage,  towage,  dockage,  etc.,  which  it  will  be  unnecessary  to 
consider  at  length  in  this  report.  They  are  important,  however, 
as  aft'ecting  the  earning  ability  of  the  vessel,  and  some  of  them 
at  least  would  be  smaller  at  Lake  ports  than  at  Atlantic  ports. 
The  wharfage  and  handling  charges  on  freight  from  points  out- 
side of  local  territory  are  usually  absorbed  in  the  rail  rate  for 
the  line  haul.  The  following  table  shows  some  of  the  more 
important  charges : 


Port  and   Terminal   Charges  at  Principal  North  Atlantic  Ports 


Pilotage 


Towage 


Dockage 


Boston 

Vessels  over  2,000  tons 

Sea   to   dock,   $25   per 

At    railroad    piers,    no 

net ,$5  per  foot  draft. 

tug. 

charge. 

or  an  average  of  $120 

Docking   and   undock- 

At     public     piers,     no 

for  a  vessel  drawing 

ing,  $20  per  tug. 

charge. 

24.. 

At  private  piers,  $15 
per  day. 

New  York 

Vessels  of  21'  draft  or 

Sea   to   dock,   $15    per 

Few  vessels  devoted  to 

over,  $4.88  per  foot 

hour  per  tug.     Dock- 

foreign       commerce 

inward      and     $3.56 

ing    and    undocking 

dock      at       railroad 

outward. 

$12.50  per  hour  per 

piers.        At     private 

tug.     Two  tugs  usu- 

piers,  where  tramps 

ally  required. 

and  outside  lines 
dock,  $75  to  $500  per 
day  per  ship. 

Philadelphia 

$120  for  24'  draft. 

At    railroad    piers,    no 

charge.      At    publi« 

and  private  piers,  le 

per     net     registered 

ton  per  day. 

Baltimore 

$5    per   foot   draft,   or 

$120  per  tug  for  5,000 

At    railroad    piers,    no 

$120for  vessel  of  24' 

gr.   ton   vessel  from 

charge.      At    public 

draft. 

sea  to  dock  (usually 

and     private     piers. 

from       quarantine). 

about  $15  per  day. 

Do:;king     and     un- 

docking, included  in 

towage  charge. 

46 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


Wharfage 


Lighterage 


Floatage 


Boston. 


New  York. 


Philadelphia . 


Baltimore . 


At  railroad  and  private 
piers:  Local  traffic, 
through  trafiSc  held 
in  storage  or  trans- 
ferred from  one  ter- 
minal to  another,  40 
to  50  cents  per  ton. 
At  public  piers : 
Same  as  above;  10 
cents  a  ton  is  paid  to 
the  State  and  ab- 
sorbed in  rail  rate. 

Where  assessed,  a- 
mounts  to  about  IS 
,  cents  to  20  cents  per 
ton.  Some  compa- 
nies make  a  higher 
charge  unless  the 
company  is  to  have 
a  large  revenue  from 
storage. 

None — See  Storage. 


At  public  piers,  a 
charge  per  day  vary- 
ing with  the  com- 
modity. 


Overseas  55  lines  use 
no  lighters.  Coast- 
wise lines  operate 
their  own  lighters. 
Rent  of  lighter  S30 
per  day,  plus  labor, 
engineer  and  towing. 


Railroad  freight  for  ex- 
port s  entitled  to 
free  lighterage,  the 
cost  being  absorbed 
in  the  rate.  The 
charge  on  local 
freight  is  3  cents  per 
hundred  pounds. 

Free  on  traffic  paying 
a  line  haul  of  $1.40 
per  ton,  and  freight 
is  delivered  without 
additional  charge 
alongside  vessels  in 
Philadelphia  harbor 
by  lighter,  car  float, 
team  or  otherwise. 
Traffic  paying  less 
than  SI. 40  per  ton 
must  pay  3c  per  100 
lbs.  lighterage. 

Free  on  traffic  paying 
a  line  haul  of  $1.40 
per  ton;  includes 
lighterage  or  float- 
age upon  all  freight 
to  alongside   vessels 

•  or  piers.  On  traffic 
paying  less  than 
SI. 40  a  ton  there 
is  a  charge  of  2c  per 
100  lbs.  for  light- 
erage. 


Not  extensively  used. 
Charge,  about  $7  per 
car. 


Free  for  shipment  of  6 
cars  or  more.  $9  for 
each  car  less  than  6, 
indicating  a  charge 
of  $9  per  car  ab- 
sorbed in  the  rate. 


See  Lighterage. 


See  Lighterage. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


47 


Elevating 


Switching 


Storage 


Boston . 


New  York. 


Philadelphia. 


Baltimore . 


Export  grain  9  10  cent 
per  bushel,  including 
storage  and  insur- 
ance for  20  days  and 
delivery  direct  to 
vessels.  1  /8  cent  per 
bushel  for  storage 
for  each  10  days 
after  free  period. 

Receiving,  weighing 
and  discharging,  ~i 
cent  per  bushel. 
Transportation  to 
elevator,  ■  ;s  cent  per 
bushel.  Trimming, 
$3  per  M.  bushels. 
Floating  elevators 
transfer  grain  from 
railroad  elevators  to 
vessels. 

Receiving,  weighing, 
storing  from  cars,  in- 
cluding storage  for 
20  days,  and  deliv- 
ery to  vessel  ?<t  cent 
per  bushel;  storage 
for  each  succeeding 
period  of  5  days  or 
any  part  thereof,  ^ 
cent  per  bushel. 

Receiving  from  cars 
and  delivering  to 
vessels,  including 
storage  for  20  days, 
%  cent  per  bushel. 
From  vessels  to  cars 
or  other  vessels  Ic 
per  bushel. 


2  cents  to  5J/^  cents  per 
hundred  lbs.  Ab- 
sorbed in  rate  on 
export  freight. 


This  service  accom- 
plished by  lighters  or 
car  floats. 


Absorbed  in  rate  on 
import  and  export 
freight,  if  the  ran  ime 
has  received  a  rate  of 
7c  per  100  lbs.  or 
more. 


No  published  rates. 
Traffic  exchanged  at 
outside  junction 

points  and  subject  to 
local  class  rates. 


All  carload  freight  free 
for  10  days;  after 
which  10c  per  ton  for 
each  10  days  on  ex- 
port freight.  L.C.L. 
export  freight  Ic  per 
100  lbs.  after  first  10 
days;  minimum  25c. 

On  exports  and  imports, 
free  for  a  period  of  10 
days;  thereafter  com- 
modity rates. 


Imports:  free  for  pack- 
age freight  15  days; 
for  bulk  freight  5  days. 
Exports  on  through 
bills  of  lading,  no 
charge. 


Free  storage  for  10  days 
on  export  package 
freight;  on  imports  15 
days,  after  which  Ic 
per  100  lbs.  for  next 
10  days  and  }4  cent 
thereafter.  Free  for 
coastwise,  outbound, 
local  for  5  days; 
through  B  'L  30  days. 


:  Average  charge  at  all  above  points  on  ship's  dunnage,  $800  to  $1,200 


Dunnage 


Costs  borne  directly  by  the  shipper. — These  costs  consist 
chiefly  or  storage  and/or  demurrage  and  cartage.  On  traffic  for 
export  there  is  a  free  Hmit  of  storage  varying  at  the  various  local- 
ities and  with  different  commodities.  At  ports  where  storage  is 
not  available  at  the  pier,  the  goods  must  be  carted  to  warehouses. 
Apparently,  these  charges  are  paid  on  a  large  proportion  of  the 
shipments  through  the  port  of  New  York,  because  of  the  con- 
gested condition  of  the  port  and  the  inability  to  ship  promptly. 
A  number  of  representative  instances  of  this  kind  have  been  given 
in  extracts  from  the  hearings  before  the  International  Joint  Com- 
mission. One  trouble  with  charges  of  this  character  is  that  they 
can  not  be  predetermined  by  the  shipper  and  frequently  result 
in  extinguishing  all  profit  on  business  which  otherwise  would  have 
yielded  a  fair  return.  With  regular  sailings,  plenty  of  cars, 
efficient  service  on  the  railroad,  and  no  congestion  in  the  rail 
line,  it  should  be  possible  for  shippers  to  route  their  goods  for 
export  so  that  they   will  arrive  at  the   seaboard  in   time  to   be 


48  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

lightered  alongside  the  vessel  and  put  aboard  without  undue 
delay  or  expense.  Unfortunately,  these  ideal  conditions  rarely 
occur. 

Under  the  best  of  conditions  certain  inland  freight  can  not  go 
direct  to  ship's  side  by  lighter  or  rail.  Certain  grades  of  export 
freight  must  be  warehoused  at  the  seaboard,  particularly  by  for- 
warding and  merchandising  companies,  to  allow  repacking,  re- 
coopering,  labeling,  consolidating  shipments,  conforming  to  cus- 
tomers' wishes  or  the  delivery  regulations  of  the  country  of 
destination,  "and  for  other  purposes,"  as  the  bills  in  Congress 
say.  Many  commodities  can  not  stand  these  costs  and  conse- 
quently are  excluded  from  our  export  trade.  This  applies  par- 
ticularly to  such  lines  as  the  Woolworth  inventory,  glassware, 
porcelain,  pottery,  enamel  ware,  brushes,  toys,  household  utensils, 
lamps  and  novelties  of  all  kinds ;  in  fact,  all  those  things  which 
Germany  formerly  supplied  the  world.  The  losses  due  to  break- 
age still  further  increase  the  costs  involved  in  these  transfers, 
and  it  is  humanly  impossible  to  pack  some  goods  so  as  to  avoid 
breakage  in  rehandling.  The  remedy  is  to  avoid  the  transfer. 
The  following  are  a  few  instances  of  the  importance  of  these 
charges : 

{Copy  of  invoice  dated  September  11,  1918;  shipment  to  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Brazil.) 
6  Bbls.  Tumblers  &  Vases 
Gross  521  lbs. 
^  Net     129  lbs. 

Value  of  merchandise $25  .92 

Packing  charges 7 .  80 

Freight  to  New  York 4  .  94 

s$38 .  66 

Cartage  to  warehouse $4 .  50 

Cartage  to  steamer 4 .  50 

Overtime  for  delay  of  truck  at  pier.  .         7  .  20  16 .  20 

F.  A.  S.  Vessel  N.  Y $54.86 

No  charge  for  storage  in  warehouse  which  is  owned  by  the  exporter  and 
the  expense  charged  to  general  overhead  and  not  to  individual  shipments. 
Customer  comi)lains  that  expenses  are  far  too  high  in  proportion  to  value 
of  goods. 

(December    9,    1918;    shipment    to    Mexico    City,    Mexico.) 
20  Cases  Crepe  Paper 
Gross  1571  lbs. 
Net      1068  lbs. 

Value  of  merchandise $227 .  50 

Freight  to  New  York 19 .  28       $246 .  78 

Cartage  to  warehouse $15  .  00 

Cartage  to  steamer 15  .00 

Overtime  for  delay  of  truck  at  Pier. .       20 . 00  50  00 

F.  A.  S.  Vessel  N.  Y $296.78 

No  charge  for  storage  in  warehouse. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  49 

{Copy  of  invoice  dated  October  23,  1918;  New  York,  N.   Y.) 

8  Crates  Drums 

Gross  96  lbs. 
Net     81  lbs. 

Value  of  merchandise $35  .  20 

Freight  to  New  York 0 .  96         $36  .  16 

Cartage  to  warehouse $6 .  00 

Cartage  to  steamer 6 .  00  1 2  .  00 

F.  A.  S.  Vessel   N.  Y $48  .  16 

No  storage  charges,  overtime,  or  delay  by  truck  at  pier.  Drums  are 
light  but  bulky. 

{Copy  of  Invoice  doled  September  27,  1918;  shipment  to  San  Juan,  P.  R.) 

Shipment  of  Toys,  as  wagons,  etc. 
156  Pkgs'. 

Value  of  merchandise $272  .  80 

Freight  to  New  York 22.56 

Export  packing 28 .  50       $323 .  86 

Cartage  156  pkgs.  to  warehouse  for 

repacking  at  50c  pkg $78.00 

Cartage  on  19  crates  (goods  re- 
packed) to  steamer  at  75c 14 .  25  92  .  25 

$416.11 

No  storage  charges:  no  truck  delay  charges.  Manufacturer  does  not  pack 
for  export. 

In  the  above  instances,  the  absence  of  storage  charges  was 
ckie  to  the  fact  that  the  merchant  owned  a  warehonse  at  New 
York. 

The  following  are  trucking  rate  schedules  given  in  1920  by 
several  New  York  companies : 

In  New   York 
Below  34th  Street  Sith  St.— 60th  St. 

1-200  lbs $0.50  $0.75 

201-500  lbs 0.75  1.00 

501-1,000  lbs 1.00  1.25 

Over  1,000  lbs 0.13  per  cwt.  0.15 

Machinery 0.15  per  cwt.  0 .  18 

Measurement 0.02}4  per  cubic  foot  0.03 

Brooklyn,  Jersey  City,  Hoboken 

1-200  lbs $0.75  $1.00 

201-500  l:s 1.00  1.25 

501-1,000  lbs 1.25  1.50 

Overl,0001bs O.lSpercwt.  0.18 

Machinery 0.18  per  cwt.  0 . 20 

Measurement 0.03  per  cubic  foot  0 .  05 


50  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

Biish  Docks  from  29th  St. -57th  St. 

1-200  lbs $0.75  SI. 00 

201-500  lbs 1.00  1.25 

501-1,000  lbs 1.50  1.75 

Over  1,000  lbs 0.20  per  cwt.  0.25 

Machinery 0. 25  per  cwt.  0.30 

Measurement 0 .  05  per  cubic  foot  0 .  07 

Stat  en   Island 
From  below  34th  St.  From  60th  St. 

1-200  lbs 1.00  1.25 

201-500  lbs 1.50  1.75 

501-1,000  lbs 2.00  2.50 

Over  1,000  lbs 0.30  per  cwt.  0.40 

Machinery 0.35  per  cwt.  0.45 

Measurement 0.07  per  cubic  foot  0 .  08 

Congestion  and  excessive  costs  at  the  port   of  New   York. — 

Congestion  and  excessive  costs  at  the  port  of  New  York  are 
not  new  conditions,  but  have  prevailed  for  many  years.  In  view 
of  testimony  given  to  the  Commission  to  the  effect  that  the 
congestion  and  excessive  costs  had  their  inception  during  the  war 
period,  the  following  opinions  of  authorities  competent  to  dis- 
cuss this  question  are  given. 

In  the  Philadelphia  Public  Ledger  of  December  31,  1919,  Mr. 
Byron  R.  Newton,  Collector  of  the  Port  of  New  York,  is  quoted 
as  follows : 

The  port  of  New  York,  including  Jersey  Cit}-,  has  a  shore  line  of  986 
miles,  m'casuring  piers  and  shore  line  together.  Of  this  area  there  are 
only  forty-seven  miles  of  public  owned  and  improved  piers.  That  tells 
the  story  of  the  trouble  in  the  port  of  New  York.  It  is  not  a  question 
of  navigable  water  or  shore  line,  but  it  is  a  question  of  making  use  of  the 
water  and  shore  line  and  an  intelligent  workable  connection  of  the  piers 
with  railroad  terminals,  just  as  the  local  transit  lines  of  the  greater  city 
have  been  brought  into  natural  relationship. 

Because  of  the  limited  and  unsatisfactory  pier  facilities  in  New  York 
several  of  the  steamship  lines  now  having  their  terminals  here  are  con- 
templating going  elsewhere,  and  increasing  congestion  and  difficulties 
naturally  will  add  to  this  number.  The  present  dock  commissioner  of 
New  York  stated  last  year  that  between  thirty  and  forty  applications 
were  in  his  files  from  steamship  companies  for  permanent  wharf  facilities 
which  the  city  was  unable  to  furnish.  Aud  this  is  by  no  means  a  nczv 
condition   of  affairs. 

During  the  last  quarter  of  a  century  the  port  of  Nezv  York  has  been 
turning  azvay  business — hanging  out  the  "standing  room   only"  sign. 

E.rtract   from    Report    of    the    Commissioner   of   Corporations    on 
Transportation  by  Water  in  the  United  States,  iQio 

The  terminal  facilities  in  New  York  are  not  commensurate  with  the 
volume  of  business  of  the  port ;  there  is  great  congestion  of  traffic  on 
Manhattan   water   front,   particularly   on  the   lower   Hui^son   River   where 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  51 

the  trucking  is  very  heavy;  in  many  instances  piers  are  used  for  storage 
purposes  instead  of  for  transportation  and  the  transfer  of  freight;  the 
method  of  loading  and  unloading  is  slow  and  expensive.  The  utilization 
of  pi'ers  and  wharves  on  the  N'cw  Jersey  shore  and  on  Long  Island 
has  not  remedied  the  congested  state  of  traffic  on  the  Alanhattan  shore. 

Extract    from    Report    of    Commission    Appointed    by 
Governor  Whitman,  igiS 

Your  Commission  would  fail  to  express  its  deepest  conviction  if  it  did 
not  d'eclare  at  the  outset  that  the  most  imperative  need  of  the  City  of 
New  York  is  a  comprehensive  and  modern   freight  terminal  system.  .  .  . 

The  Commission  found  the  New  York  Central  Railroad,  having  the 
only  all-rail  connection  with  the  west  side  of  Manhattan.  .  .  . 

Its  terminal  facilities  and  trackage  ar-e  inadequate  to  handle  the 
trafific.  They  have  not  been  substantially  changed,  increased  or  improved 
in  more  than  forty  years,  despite  the  tremendous  growth  of  business  in 
Manhattan.  They  are  not  only  inadequate,  but  out  of  date  and  ineffi- 
cient. Hundreds  of  cars  at  a  time  are  kept  waiting  north  of  the  city 
for  an  opportunity  to  be  brought  down  to  the  terminals.  They  sometimes 
have  to  wait  from  five  to  thirty  days  for  unloading. 

Hon.  Robert  W.  Woolley,  Member,  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

I  believe  .  .  .  there  is  going  to  be  a  general  demand  .  .  .  that  either 
New  York  itself  shall  take  over  its  terminals  and  reduce  the  cost  of 
handling  cars  within  terminal  limits  to  a  reasonable  amount,  thereby 
making  possible  the  reduction  of  rates,  both  domestic  and  export,  to 
that  city,  or  that  other  Atlantic  ports  where  terminal  costs  are  not  so 
gr'cat,  shall  get  the  business.  In  other  words.  New  York  is  not,  in  my 
humble  opinion,  going  to  enjoy  forever  the  benefit  of  heavy  indirect 
taxation  upon  inland  shippers  and  the  inland  public  generally. 

In  the  Saturday  Evening  Post  of  November  22,  1919,  the 
following  appears : 

The  whole  Nation  suffers  and  pays  for  the  lack  of  proper  terminal 
facilities  in  New  York.  The  astonishing  thing  is  that  the  people  of  other 
cities  and  States  have  patiently  paid  the  unjust  tax  on  incoming  and  out- 
going commodities,  placed  for  the  benefit  of  a  select  few. 

The  city  of  New  York  is  arranging  to  spend  from  $25,000,000  to 
$100,000,000  for  new  piers  and  harbor  facilities.  Only  two  out  of  twelve 
of  the  new  piers  are  to  exceed  125  feet  in  width,  which  is  the  size  of 
pier  established  in  the  olden  days  of  sailing  ships.  Only  two  of  the  piers 
provide  for  railroad  tracks  on  the  pier  proper.  Ten  of  the  piers  are  to 
be  of  light,  one-story  construction,  precluding  the  installation — now  or 
later — of  overhead  traveling  cranes  and  conveyors.  The  plans  of  these 
piers  call  for  foundations  to  support  a  one-story  building,  so  there  can 
be  no  addition  of  other  stories  in  future  years.  And  this  is  being  done 
in  a  country  that  is  now  producing  wonderful  equipment  for  handling 
cargo  at  terminals — equipment  that  is  being  supplied  in  large  quanti- 
ties to  other  governments  and  foreign  companies  that  are  availing  them- 
selves of  the  benefits  afforded  by  American  engineering  skill. 

On  the  antiquated  piers  in  New  York,  where  manual  labor  is  required, 
it  costs  more  per  ton  to  handle   food  and   merchandise  than   it  costs  to 


52  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

transport  the  sanre  food  and  merchandise  from  Chicago  to  New  York. 
The  citizens  of  New  York  and  of  the  whole  Nation  pay  for  the  extrava- 
gant waste  involved. 

As  a  result  of  an  investigation  of  termmal  conditions  by  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  Commissioner  Robert  W. 
Woolley  made  the  following  statement : 

At  New  York  it  was  found  that  the  expense  of  handling  a  car  from 
the  time  it  landed  within  the  terminal  limits  of  Jersey  City  until  it  was 
delivered  to  destination  in  Brooklyn  or  Manhattan,  including  lighterage, 
was  approximately  $35.  At  Chicago  it  was  found  the  cost  of  handling  the 
same  car  within  the  terminal  limits  was  $10.35.  At  Binghamton,  N.  Y., 
the  cost  was  $1.80.  San  Francisco,  with  a  municipally  controlled  terminal, 
has  a  flat  charge  of  $2.50  per  car  for  handling  within  the  terminal  limits. 

At  New  York,  the  terminal  sore  spot  of  the  Nation,  the  utter  injustice 
of  taking  care  of  $35  per  car  in  the  line-haul  rate— in  other  words,  of 
making  the  innocent  consumer  over  much  of  our  land  stand  a  tax  that 
New  York  may  continue  to  grow  and  monopolize  the  export  and  import 
business  of  the  country,  is  impressing  many  of  the  big-minded  citizens  of 
our   metropolis. 

Importance  of  terminal  costs. — From  the  limited  information 
herein  given  respecting  a  few  of  the  many  costs  involved  in 
putting  freight  through  our  Atlantic  terminals,  it  will  be  readily 
understood  that  these  costs  frequently  exceed  the  cost  of  the 
rail  haul.  While  many  of  them  are  paid  by  the  railroads  and 
steamship  lines,  they  are,  nevertheless,  taken  into  consideration 
in  fixing  the  rates  and  are  eventually  borne  by  the  shipper  or 
the  receiver  of  the  goods.  The  elimination  or  reduction  of  these 
charges  would  permit  lower  rates,  and  in  this  respect  the  ports 
of  the  Great  Lakes  would  have  an  adxantage  over  Atlantic 
ports.  The  knowledge  gained  in  recent  years  in  reference  to 
port  efficiency  is  such  as  to  make  it  poss'ble  now  to  so  plan 
the  de\-elopment  of  lake  ports  as  to  in-iire  the  utmost  economy 
in  the  transfer  of  freight  from  rail  carriers  to  the  vessel,  and 
to  permit  indefinite  expansion  without  undue  congestion.  The 
study  of  the  character  and  extent  of  the  terminal  development 
should  end  rather  than  begin  at  the  water  front.  It  should 
embrace  first  of  all  an  economic  survey  of  the  area  tributary 
to  the  port,  to  develop  information  as  to  the  character  of  traffic 
to  be  served  not  only  at  the  jjresent  time  but  in  the  more  or  less 
distant  future.  It  should  consider  also  the  articles  to  be  con- 
sumed within  the  area  of  econ(~»mical  distribution,  so  that  the 
terminal  as  planned  will  provide  accommodation  for  the  logically 
developable  traffic.  The  plan  should  be  flexible  in  character, 
hunting  the  initial  construction  to  reasonably  immediate  reqin're- 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIT    CHANNEL  53 

ments,  with  opportunity  for  expansion  to  meet  future  growth 
without  necessitating  relocations  of  any  portions  of  the  terminals 
or  their  connections. 

Port  planning  is  a  transportation  and  commercial  question 
rather  than  an  engineering  question,  as  many  of  the  misfit  but 
well  built  terminals  of  the  Atlantic  coast  bear  testimony.  A 
terminal  is  intended  for  the  economical  transaction  of  business 
and  not  as  a  monument  to  local  extravagance.  If  properly 
planned  with  relation  to  the  volume  and  character  of  the  business, 
it  will  result  in  securing  the  utmost  economy  and  dispatch. 
Instances  are  frequent,  however,  wdiere  localities  desiring  to 
develop  water-borne  traffic  have  constructed  expensive  terminals 
wholly  unsuited  to  the  business  to  be  served  and  far  beyond  the 
ability  of  the  community  to  support.  The  most  economical  type 
of  terminal  becomes  uneconomical  if  the  overhead  charges  and 
the  cost  of  operation  are  excessive  when  compared  with  the 
traffic.  Hence,  it  is  essential  that  the  terminal  should  fit  the 
commerce,  with  reasonable  allowance  for  growth  and  with  such 
flexibility  of  plan  as  to  permit  economical  enlargement  and 
extension  to  meet  the  greater  needs  of  the   future. 

All  of  these  requisites  can  be  met  on  the  virgin  soil  of  the  Great 
Lakes  and  economies  secured  which  are  impracticable  at  Atlantic 
ports.  The  absence  of  terminal  facilities  for  package  freight 
on  the  Great  Lakes  instead  of  being  a  detriment  to  the  utilization 
of  the  proposed  deep  waterway,  is  in  reality  a  blessing  in  disguise. 

The  eliiiiiiiation  of  excessive  teriiiinal  costs,  and  the  avoidance 
of  losses  sustained  by  American  shippers  through  inability  to 
carry  out  their  contracts  for  delivery  of  goods,  zvill  alone  result 
in  annual  savings  equal  to  the  total  cost  of  the  Great  Lakes-St. 
Lawrence  JV  at  erica  v. 


Chapter  \'l 

CHARACTER  OF  WATER  TRANSPORTATION  NEEDED 
FOR  THE  COMMERCE  OF  THE  NORTHWEST 

Shallow  inland  waterways  have  always  been  most  successful 
for  the  carriage  of  bulk  materials.  If  the  goods  must  in  the 
first  instance  be  loaded  upon  cars  at  the  mine,  factory  or  ware- 
house, it  will  in  general  not  pay  to  transfer  them  to  an  inland 
water  carrier  unless  the  haul  is  several  hundred  miles  in  length. 
The  average  value  of  freight  carried  upon  our  rivers  and  canals 
is  $19  per  ton  as  compared  with  a  value  of  $118  per  ton  for  for- 
eign imports  and  $107  per  ton  for  exports,  showing  a  most  pro- 
nounced difference  in  the  character  of  cargo  carried  on  inland 
waterways  as  compared  with  that  carried  on  the  ocean.  The 
commerce  of  the  areas  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Law- 
rence waterway  includes  large  quantities  of  high  class  manufac- 
tured articles  received  and  shipped  in  foreign  and  domestic  trade. 
This  is  the  character  of  freight  which  does  not  usually  seek  barge 
transportation,  especially  when  additional  transfers  are  thereby 
involved,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Barge  Canal.  It  will  continue  to 
go  as  heretofore  by  rail  to  the  ocean  carrier,  and  in  case  the 
ocean  carrier  is  able  to  penetrate  into  the  Lakes  great  saving  of 
cost  and  great  facility  in  the  conduct  of  business  will  result. 

Factors  governing  the  routing  of  traffic. — It  is  well  known 
that  waterways  have  exercised  an  important  influence  in  the 
development  of  our  country,  but  this  influence  was  exerted  prior 
to  the  period  in  which  the  railroad  reached  its  maximum  efficiency. 
Many  years  ago  some  of  our  interior  waterways  were  utilized  to 
a  greater  extent  than  they  are  today,  but  in  those  days  the 
waterway  was  the  only  route  available.  It  was  not  uncommon 
for  steamboats  in  ascending  a  river  to  unload  part  of  their 
cargoes  in  order  to  permit  them  to  pass  over  shoal  points  in 
the  stream,  the  cargo  being  again  taken  on  board  above  such 
points.  It  was  not  economy  but  necessity  which  governed  the 
transportation  movements  in  those  days. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  with  the  development  of  the  railroad 
there  was  a  general  decline  in  the  use  of  shallow  inland  water- 
ways. The  railroad  has  certain  definite  advantages  which  cause 
it  to  be  preferred  in  many  cases.  Among  the  important  factors 
influencing  the  routing  of  traffic  are  the  following : 

1.  Accessibility  of  carrier  at  point  of  shipment. 

2.  The  cost  of  the  haul. 

3.  The  cost  of  transfers  and  other  terminal  services. 

54 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  55 

4.  The  time  required  for  the  journey,  including  availabiHty  of 
carriers. 

5.  The  convenience  of  dehvery  at  destination. 

In  connection  with  the  transportation  of  general  merchandise 
for  domestic  consumption,  the  railroads  in  the  average  case  afford 
advantages  over  inland  waterways  with  respect  to  factors  No.  1 
and  5  by  virtue  of  their  ability  to  extend  transportation  by  spurs 
directly  to  the  warehouses  of  the  consignor  and  the  consignee. 
On  short  hauls  these  advantages  will  generally  outweigh  the 
lower  cost  of  haul  on  the  waterway.  For  this  reason  short  inland 
water  routes  rarely  carry  traffic  of  a  general  character  when 
rail  facilities  are  available.  If  the  goods  must  in  the  first 
instance  be  loaded  upon  cars  at  the  mine,  factory,  or  warehouse, 
it  will  in  general  not  pay  to  transfer  these  goods  to  an  inland 
water  carrier  unless  the  haul  be  several  hundred  miles  in  length. 
This  is  especially  true  if  the  goods  must  again  be  transferred 
from  boat  to  rail  in  order  to  reach  their  final  destination.  The 
transfer  of  general  package  freight  has  become  so  expensive 
that  it  must  be  avoided  wherever  possible.  Having  these  facts 
in  mind,  it  is  scarcely  to  be  wondered  that  commerce  of  this 
character  on  our  inland  waterways  declined  steadily  in  propor- 
tion to  the  development  and  extension  of  the  railroad.  The 
waterways  have  always  been  most  successful  for  the  carriage 
of  heavy  bulk  materials  which  can  be  loaded  and  unloaded  by 
machinery. 

The  mission  of  the  shallow  waterway. — ^The  period  of  most 
effective  competition  of  the  railroad  versus  the  waterway  has 
been  passed.  The  heavy  increase  in  the  cost  of  labor  and  ma- 
terial entering  into  the  construction  and  maintenance  of  railroads, 
the  inability  of  the  roads  to  supply  sufficient  equipment  and  to 
continue  the  construction  of  new  lines  and  adequate  terminals 
have  combined  to  bring  about  a  transportation  shortage  and  a 
heavy  increase  in  the  cost  of  shipping  by  rail.  The  gateways 
and  terminals  have  become  so  congested  that  traffic  can  not 
move,  and  at  New  York  delays  of  from  30  to  90  days  frequently 
occur  in  getting  goods  for  export  aboard  the  vessel.  Imports 
generally  require  from  1  to  6  months  for  distribution.  The 
waterway  now  has  a  real  opportunity  to  render  real  service. 
This  service  should  take  the  form  of  relieving  railroads  of 
the  heavy  freight  and  the  longer  hauls  wherever  practicable. 
With  the  steady  increase  in  the  commerce  of  the  country  as 
compared  with  the  railroad  facilities  available,  this  plan  would 


56  ECONOMIC   -ASPECTS   t)F    THE 

increase  rather  than  diminish  the  earning  capacity  of  the  railroads 
and  would  enable  them  to  carry  a  much  greater  volume  of  paying 
freight  than  at  the  present  time. 

During  the  last  twenty-five  years  a  great  deal  has  been  said  and 
written  regarding  the  economy  of  barge  transportation.  In  1900 
the  Board  of  Engineers  on  Deep  Waterways  made  complete 
surveys  of  various  all-American  routes  between  the  Great  Lakes 
and  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  and  reported  in  favor  of  a  ship  canal 
21  feet  deep.  It  is  noted  that  this  report  has  been  erroneously 
credited  with  a  recommendation  in  favor  of  a  barge  canal,  and 
this  erroneous  statement  is  found  not  only  in  the  testimony 
given  at  Bufifalo  but  also  in  the  statement  of  the  Brooklyn 
Chamber  of  Commerce. 

In  the  report  of  the  Committee  on  Canals  of  the  State  of 
New  York,  1899,  the  cost  of  a  fleet  of  one  steamer  and  three 
barges  was  estimated  at  $28,500.  and  the  season's  expenses  for 
wages  and  subsistence  at  $4,000  for  the  fleet.  These  barges 
were  to  have  a  draft  of  10  feet.  In  comparison  with  that 
estimate  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  average  cost  at  the 
present  time  of  the  towboat  used  on  the  Ohio  River  is  $150,000 
to  $200,000,  and  six  steel  barges  of  1,000  tons  capacity  making 
up  the  fleet  are  valued  at  $18,000  each,  making  a  total  cost  of 
$258,000  to  $308,000  for  a  fleet  of  double  the  capacity  of  that 
proposed  for  the  Barge  Canal.  The  wages  of  the  crew  of  thi.s 
fleet  of  one  towboat  and  six  barges  alone  amount  to  $35,000 
per  year,  or  nearly  nine  times  the  estimated  cost  of  wages  and 
subsistence  of  the  barge  canal  fleet.  These  figures  refer  to  actual 
costs  found  in  practice  in  the  transportation  of  coal.  The  fleet 
actually  in  use  costs  about  six  times  as  much  per  cargo  ton  as 
the  theoretical  fleet  proposed  in  the  report  of  the  Committee  on 
Canals.  This  increase  is  much  greater  than  the  increase  in  the 
cost  of  constructing  and  operating  ocean  vessels. 

It  is  not  intended  to  convey  the  thought  that  barge  transporta- 
tion is  not  more  economical  than  rail  transportation  where  condi- 
tions are  favorable  for  its  use.  Each  case  must  be  considered 
independently,  however.  Where  there  are  large  quantities  of 
bulk  commodities  which  may  be  cheaply  loaded  into  barges,  and 
unloaded  directly  at  shipside  or  point  of  consumption,  and  where 
there  is  a  large  volume  of  package  freight  originating  on  or  near 
the  banks  of  the  stream  and  requiring  no  rail  haul  at  either  end  of 
the  movement,  we  have  the  conditions  most  likely  to  develop  suc- 
cessful water  transportation.     Admitting  that  our  trans])ortation 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  57 

requirements  demand  a  more  extensive  use  of  waterways,  we  may 
expect  to  find  some  change  in  the  policies  which  have  heretofore 
influenced  the  location  of  industries  at  points  remote  from  water 
communication,  and  we  may  anticipate  an  increasing  tendency  to 
establish  factories  on  water  sites.  Only  in  this  way  will  our 
shallow  inland  waterways  develop  their  maximum  usefulness. 

Efforts  to  establish  barge  navigation  on  the  Mississippi  River 
up  to  the  present  time  have  not  been  fully  successful,  largely 
because  of  the  inadequacy  of  terminal  facilities ;  but  important 
improvements  of  these  facilities  are  in  progress  by  the  Inland 
and  Coastwise  Waterways  Service,  and  it  is  confidently  expected 
that  traffic  on  this  great  waterway  will  soon  become  established 
upon  a  basis  which  will  insure  steady  growth  in  the  future.  The 
potentialities  of  this  mighty  river,  with  its  unlimited  traffic 
capacity,  and  the  opportunities  which  it  affords  for  direct  move- 
ment of  freight  from  important  production  centers  and  primary 
markets  to  shipside.  must  be  recognized.  While  the  Mississippi 
has  had  an  improved  channel,  it  has  not  had  the  proper  facilities 
for  handling  traffic.  The  dredging  of  a  navigable  channel  is 
comparable  to  the  construction  of  a  railroad  track,  and  is  but  one 
step  in  a  development  capable  of  serving  traffic.  Transportation  is 
a  service  which  must  be  perfected  in  its  entirety  before  it  is  able 
to  function  effectively  in  the  interests  of  the  people,  and  it  is  not 
reasonable  to  expect  the  provision  of  a  channel  alone  to  lead  to 
important  traffic  development.  This  has  been  a  mistake  of  the 
past,  which  must  not  be  repeated  in  the  future.  The  transporta- 
tion needs  of  the  Mississippi  \'alley  must  be  met  by  the  in- 
creased utilization  of  water  routes  to  Gulf  ports,  in  lieu  of  ex- 
pensive rail  hauls  to  the  Atlantic  seaboard. 

The  criticism  against  the  use  of  narrow  artificial  waterways 
applies  to  barge  navigation  as  well  as  to  ship  navigation.  In 
discussing  the  cheapness  of  transportation  on  the  Ohio  River, 
Mr.  Thomas  P.  Roberts,  who  has  had  many  years'  experience 
in  connection  with  the  improvement  of  this  stream,  stated  that 
"The  distinction  between  canals  and  rivers,  on  which  latter 
freight  can  be  moved  in  large  fleets  of  cheaply  constructed  boats, 
is  something  never  considered  by  the  transporta.tion  orators." 
The  speed  attainable  by  a  fleet  of  barges  operating  between  St. 
Louis  and  New  Orleans  is  about  twice  that  which  is  practicable 
on  an  artificial  waterway  with  many  locks. 

Character  of  tralRc  on  inland  waterways. — The  total  freight 
carried   on   the   Erie   Canal   during    1919   was   842,164   tons,   of 


58  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

which  563,030  tons  was  local  freight  and  279,134  tons  was 
through  freight.  Receipts  at  Buffalo  by  way  of  the  canal 
amounted  to  382,842  tons,  and  the  shipments  from  Buffalo  to 
New  York  via  the  canal  amounted  to  200,355  tons,  or  a  total 
of  583,197  tons.  Of  the  total  receipts  via  the  canal  of  382,842 
tons,  318,619  tons  consisted  of  sand  and  gravel.  7,754  tons  of 
clay,  434  tons  of  salt,  and  37,113  tons  of  flaxseed  from  Argentina 
leaving  only  18,922  tons  of  general  merchandise,  or  less  than 
5  per  cent.  Of  the  shipments  from  Buffalo  via  the  canal,  the 
tonnage  was  all  bulk  freight  except  4,474  tons  of  flour,  about 
10,000  tons  of  iron  and  steel  articles,  and  11,555  tons  of  mis- 
cellaneous material. 

This  is  in  line  with  the  tendencies  on  other  canals  and  shallow 
draft  waterways  of  the  world.  Statistics  from  the  1907  number 
of  the  "Statistical  Year  Book  of  the  German  Empire"  show  that 
of  the  commerce  passing  the  Dutch-German  frontier  in  1905, 
products  of  mines,  including  petroleum,  formed  51.1  per  cent  of 
the  upstream  traffic,  grain  and  its  products  28.8  per  cent,  and 
forest  products  6.4  per  cent.  The  aggregate  of  the  crude  products 
of  mines,  fields  and  forests  was  86  per  cent  of  the  total,  while 
of  the  downstream  traffic  similar  crude  products  constituted 
76  per  cent.  There  is  ample  testimony  to  confirm  the  assertion 
that  the  commerce  of  inland  waterways  of  the  world  is  largely 
confined  to  products  of  this  character.  Manufactured  goods 
and  other  high-class  freight  do  not  as  a  rule  seek  this  class  of 
transportation,  especially  when  it  involves  an  additional  transfer. 
These  criticisms,  however,  can  not  be  made  of  the  ocean  vessel 
which  carries  the  commerce  of  the  world  in  its  average  propor- 
tions. Under  the  most  advantageous  conditions  at  the  present 
time  there  is  no  economy  in  barge  transportation  as  compared 
with  ocean  transportation,  and  where  a  transfer  is  involved 
there  is  a  distinct  loss  in  shipping  by  barge  on  inland  waterways 
as  compared  with  direct  shipments  by  ocean  vessels. 

The  Annual  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers  for  1920  shows 
that  the  average  value  of  imports  at  the  harbors  under  improve- 
ment by  the  United  States  is  $118  per  ton,  and  of  the  exports 
$107  per  ton.  The  coastwise  traffic  is  valued  at  about  $82 
per  ton,  while  the  value  of  the  traffic  on  the  rivers  and  canals 
of  the  country  is  $19  per  ton.  In  considering  the  adaptability 
of  any  waterway  for  the  transportation  of  the  commerce  of  the 
Great  Lakes  region,  it  must  be  remembered  that  this  commerce 
consists  in  large  part  of  high  class  manufactured  articles  which 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


59 


are  now  shipped  by  rail  across  the  country  to  the  Atlantic  coast. 
This  traffic  enters  largely  into  our  foreign  trade  and  is  of  the 
class  on  which  the  charges  incident  to  transfers  are  the  heaviest. 
There  is  nothing  to  support  the  view  that  high  class  manufactured 
articles  originating  on  the  Great  Lakes  in  large  volume  will  ever 
seek  the  Barge  Canal  route  to  seaboard.  On  such  articles  for 
export,  the  two  transfers  at  Bufifalo  and  New  York  are  prohibitive 
in  cost,  and  the  same  considerations  apply  to  import  traffic. 

The  province  of  the  Barge  Canal. — The  Erie  Canal  was  en- 
larged by  the  State  of  New  York  to  a  depth  of  12  feet  to 
provide  facilities  for  barge  navigation,  particularly  to  meet  the 
competition  of  the  14-foot  canals  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River. 
That  these  shallow  draft  canals  were  regarded  as  serious  com- 
petitors to  the  Erie  Canal  is  indicated  by  the  following  extract 
from  the  report  of  the  Committee  on  Canals  of  the  State  of 
New  York  in  1899,  which  recommended  the  construction  of 
the  Barge  Canal : 

The  State  of  New  York  must  be  prepared  to  face  from  this  tim'C  on  a 
serious  competition  in  the  export  trade  over  the  St.  Lawrence  route.  *  *  * 
The  distance  from  Lake  Erie  to  Liverpool  by  the  St.  Lawrence  route  is 
about  450  miles  shorter  than  by  any  route  across  the  State  of  New 
York.  *  *  * 

It  is  evident  that  the  water  route  via  the  St.  Lawrence  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  short  rail  lines  to  Gulf  ports  on  the  other,  will  inevitably  prove 
serious  comp'etitors  in  the  future  to  the  export  trade  of  New  York. 

The  history  of  the  Erie  Canal  shows  that  at  no  time  has  it 
carried  any  important  quantity  of  through  general  package  freight. 
In  considering  the  character  of  terminals  required  on  the  new 
Barge  Canal,  the  Barge  Canal  Terminal  Commission  in  1911 
made  a  study  of  the  probable  traffic  on  the  canal,  and  the  follow- 
ing is  quoted  from  the  report  of  that  Commission : 

Table  No.  1 
Showing  amount  of  way  and  through  freight  on  the  State  canals  for  the 
years  1905-6-7-8-9-10  and  their  ratio. 


Year 

Tons 

way 

freight 

Tons 
through 
freight 

Way  freight 

times    through 

freight 

1905 

2,234,484 
2,534,493 
2,568,658 
2,359,811 
2,352,637 
2,668,232 

992,412 
1,006,414 
839,256 
692,006 
763,899 
805,180 

2  25 

1906 

2  52 

1907 

3  05 

1908 

3  41 

1909 

3  08 

1910 

3.31 

60 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


Table  Xo.  1  shows  that  the  tonnage  of  way  freight,  that  is,  freight  to  or 
from  points  on  the  State  canals,  is  from  2.25  to  3.41  times  the  through 
freight. 

This  fact  is  undoubtedly  a  surprise  to  persons  having  only  a  superficial 
knowledge  of  the  matter,  as  most  persons  have  an  idea  that  the  canals  serve 
principally  to  carry  freight  passing  through  the  State  between  the  Great 
Lakes  and  the  Atlantic  ocean. 

The  following  Table  Xo.  4  shows  the  total  tonnage,  total  value  and 
value  per  ton  of  the  freight  carried  on  the  canals  during  the  years  1905 
to  1910  inclusive : 

Table  No.  4 


Tola'  tons 

Total  value           Value  per  ton 

1905 

1906 

1907 

1908 

3,226,896 
3,540,957 
3,407,914 
3,051,877 
3,116,536 
3,073,412 

$57,918,586 
66,501,417 
63,903,970 
54,511,509 
59,081,572 
59,042,178 

§18.00 
19.00 
19.00 
17.80 

1909 

19.00 

1910 

19.30 

Average 

$18.68 

The  average  value  of  about  $19  per  ton  for  all  freight  shows  that  the 
commodities  carried  are  of  low  intrinsic  value,  the  selling  price  of  which 
does  not  warrant  the  payment  of  the  higher  fr^eight  rates  charged  by  the 
railroads. 

In  1897,  a  study  of  the  cost  of  transportation  by  barge  on  a 
canal  similar  to  the  present  Barge  Canal  from  Buffalo  to  New 
York,  as  compared  with  the  cost  of  transportation  by  lake  vessel 
through  a  deep  waterway  over  the  same  route,  was  made  by 
Major  Thomas  W.  Symons,  who  later  became  a  member  of  the 
Committee  on  Canals  of  the  State  of  New  York  and  incorporated 
a  similar  study  in  the  report  of  that  Committee.  Reference 
having  been  made  to  this  study  as  settling  the  relative  economy 
of  barges  and  deep  draft  vessels,  it  seems  advisable  to  call 
attention  to  the  following: 

(o)  The  comparison  was  between  a  lake  vessel  of  7,000  tons 
capacity  transferring  its  cargo  at  New  York  and  a  fleet  of  barges 
and  towboats  operating  with  clock-like  precision  which  is  never 
found  in  practice,  particularly  where  one  terminus  is  a  congested 
port  with  inadequate  terminal  and  transfer  facilities. 

(b)  The  study  showed  a  cost  of  10.80  cents  per  bushel  on 
grain  between  Chicago  and  Liverpool  by  ship  canal,  and  10.5.^ 
cents  per  bushel  bv  barge  canal,  a  difference  of  .27  cent  which 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  61 

in  a  theoretical  study  of  this  character  is  negHgible.  There  is 
an  error  in  the  figures,  however,  wliich  reduces  the  estimated 
saving  to  .18  cent. 

(c)  Major  Symons  anticipated  that  the  capacity  of  the  maxi- 
mum hike  freighter  in  the  future  would  be  7,000  tons,  while 
today  there  are  many  lake  vesels  of  greater  capacity  and  some 
with  a  capacity  more  than  double  this  figure.  In  1896,  the  aver- 
age freight  charge  per  ton-mile  on  the  Great  Lakes  was  .99  mill, 
which  decreased  with  the  increase  in  size  of  lake  carriers  to  .69 
mill  in  1914.  If  the  study  had  contemplated  a  vessel  of  10,000 
tons  capacity  or  more,  the  results  on  the  identical  assumptions 
used  would  have  shown  a  large  saving  in  favor  of  the  lake  vessel. 

(d)  The  study  included  an  allowance  of  only  25  cents  a  ton 
for  the  transfer  of  one-third  cargoes  of  upbound  package  freight 
at  Buffalo.  The  cost  has  since  increased  to  several  times  this 
figure,  and  revision  of  this  item  alone  shows  an  advantage  in 
favor  of  the  lake  vessel.  Charges  on  downbound  freight  were 
restricted  entirely  to  grain.  The  inclusion  of  a  reasonable 
proportion  of  downbound  export  freight  transferring  both  at 
Buffalo  and  New  York  would  show  an  overwhelming  advantage 
in  favor  of  a  ship  canal. 

In  brief,  the  application  of  present  costs  and  conditions  to 
the  identical  comparison  made  by  Major  Symons,  using  actual 
data  found  in  operating  both  classes  of  carriers  throughout  an 
entire  season,  will  show  a  very  large  saving  in  favor  of  a 
waterway  adecjuate  for  the  navigation  of  ships,  but  on  account  of 
the  large  proportion  of  very  greatly  restricted  navigation  in- 
volved and  the  insufficient  capacity  of  any  artificial  route  across 
the  State  of  New  York,  the  savings  and  advantages  would  be 
small  as  compared  with  those  accruing  from  the  improvement 
of  the  St.  Lawrence  River. 

Several  years  ago  a  study  of  the  probable  commerce  on  the 
Barge  Canal  was  made  by  General  W.  W.  Wotherspoon,  Super- 
intendent of  Public  Works  of  the  State  of  New  York,  and  the 
following  is  quoted  from  his  report : 

I.  Population  in  Canal  Ports. — It  is  generally  understood  the  averag'e 
per  capita  freight  tonnage  for  the  entire  country  is  about  18  tons.  The 
territory  traversed  by  the  waterway  is  one  of  the  most  densely  populated 
ill  the  nation  and  the  carriers  serving  it  transport  as  great  a  volume  of 
freight  as  any  other  group  of  lines  in  any  other  part  of  the  country.  The 
18-ton  average,  therefore,  should  appb'. 

In  the  41  cities,  towns,  and  villages  on  the  improved  canals  west  of 
Water  ford,  there  reside,  according  to  the  last  census,  1,276,095  inhabitants. 
On  the  18-ton  per  capita  basis  this  population  would  create  a  tonnage  of 


62  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

22,969,710  tons,  or  more  than  100  p'cr  cent  in  excess  of  the  probable  max- 
imum capacity  of  the  canal. 

II.  Population  in  Tributary  Areas. — We  also  have  the  territory  north 
and  south  of  the  canal  in  th«  State  to  consider,  inasmuch  as  traffic  to  and 
from  this  territory  can  route  via  the  waterway's  east  and  west  of  points 
of  interchange. 

Rail  and  Canal  Routes :  Th'e  canal  makes  connection  with  rail  lines 
serving  points  north  and  south  of  the  waterway  within  the  State  at  th* 
following  points : 

At  Albany  and  Schnectady  with  the  Delaware  &  Hudson  Railroad. 

At  Troy  with  the  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad. 

At  Fonda  with  the  Fonda,  Johnstown  &  Gloversville  Railroad. 

At  Herkimer  with  the  Southern  N'ew  York  Railway  and  Power  Company. 

At  Herkimer  with  the  Adirondack  Division  of  the  New  York  Central 
Railroad. 

At  Utica  with  the  Ontario  Division  of  the  New  York  Central  Railroad. 

At  Utica  with  the  New  York,  Ontario  &  Western  Railroad. 

At  Utica  with  the  Delaware,  Lackawanna  &  Western  Railroad. 

At  Syracuse  with  the  Delaware,  Lackawanna  &  Western  Railroad. 

At  Syracuse  with  the  Ontario  Division  of  the  New  York  Central 
Railroad. 

At  Rochester  with  the  Lehigh  Valley,  Buffalo,  Rochester  &  Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania  and  Erie  Railroads. 

At  Buffalo  with  the  Pennsylvania,  Buffalo,  Rochest";r  &  Pittsburgh, 
Erie,  and  lines  west  from  Buffalo. 

The  following  is  a  summary  of  the  number  of  points  located  on  these 
lines  within  the  State,  in  about  a  100-mile  zone  north  and  south  of  the 
canal,  the  population  and  the  number  of  indutsries :  Towns,  328;  popula- 
tion. 728,965;  industries,  3,118. 

This  total  indicates  that  a  vast  tonnage  may  be  derived  from  the 
territory  in  New  York  State  tributary  to  the  waterway. 

On  this  basis  of  population  at  18  tons  per  capita,  this  area  creates  a 
tonnage  of  over  14,000,000  tons  per  year. 

III.  Industrial  Tonnage  of  Canal  Ports. — There  are  6,303  manufacturing 
concerns  in  the  forty-one  municipalities  on  the  canal  west  of  Waterford, 
according  to  the  1913  census  of  the  New  York  State  Department  of  Labor. 
Since  the  tonnage  consumed  and  produced  by  such  industries  may  not  be 
stated,  we  must  arbitrarily  take  the  probable  minimum.  The  average 
freight  car  load  is  about  20  tons.  Therefore,  if  each  industry  shipped  or 
received  one  carload  by  canal  every  other  day,  on  the  average,  during  the 
225  days  of  navigation,  the  waterway  would  be  given  a  possible  tonnage  of 
14,118,720  tons. 

IV.  Industrial  Tonnage  in  Tributary  Areas. — It  is  impossible  to  say 
what  might  be  expected  from  the  manufacturers  in  the  area  tributary  to 
the  waterway.  If  each  shipped  and  received  but  two  cars  a  week,  on  the 
average,  during  the  season  of  navigation,  say  thirty  weeks,  it  would  yield 
on  basis  of  20  tons  per  car,  over  4,340,000  tons. 

From  the  municipalities  on  the  canal,  and  north  and  south  thereof  in 
New  York  State  west  of  Waterford,  an  analysis  shows  a  tonnage  based 
c>n  population  of  ahc.ut  35,000,000  tons,  and  based  on  probable  traffic  of 
industries  of  over  18,000.000  tons. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL      .  63 

From  the  above  quotations  from  the  report  of  General  Wother- 
spoon  it  will  be  seen  that  the  industries  of  the  State  of  New 
York  alone  within  a  reasonable  time  will  provide  a  tonnage  in 
excess  of  the  capacity  of  the  Barge  Canal  which  is  placed  at 
20,000,000  tons  per  annum,  or  10,000,000  tons  in  each  direction. 
The  value  of  the  Barge  Canal  as  a  transportation  route  is  fully 
recognized,  and  it  is  confidently  believed  that  it  will  before 
many  years  carry  a  traffic  which  will  tax  its  maximum  capacity, 
'i'his  traffic  will  consist  of  some  through  commerce  from  Lake 
ports  to  New  York,  and  vice  versa,  but  it  will  consist  in  greater 
volume  of  local  traffic.  It  will  carry  a  reasonable  proportion 
of  high-class  freight,  but  this  high-class  freight  will  be  largely 
confined  to  the  products  of  industry  located  on  or  near  its  banks 
and  to  articles  to  be  consumed  by  the  population  in  the  immediately 
tributary  area.  There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  traffic  on 
this  canal  will  dififer  materially  from  that  on  other  waterways 
of  similar  characteristics  throughout  the  world.  The  manufac- 
tured products  of  the  Great  Lakes  destined  for  foreign  countries 
will  not  undergo  the  cost  and  risk  of  damage  involved  in  transfer 
from  lake  vessel  to  barge  at  Bufifalo.  They  will  continue  to  go 
as  heretofore  directly  from  point  of  manufacture  to  the  ocean 
carrier,  and  in  case  the  ocean  carrier  is  able  to  penetrate  into 
the  Lakes  great  saving  of  cost  and  great  facility  in  the  conduct 
of  business  will  result..  The  belief  that  the  Barge  Canal  is 
unsuited  to  the  transportation  requirements  of  the  Great  Lakes 
region  is  shared  by  Hon.  Frederick  C.  Stevens,  formerly  Super- 
intendent of  Public  Works  of  the  State  of  New  York,  who 
submitted  the  following  recommendations  in  his  annual  report 
for  1907: 

The  last  ten  years  have  seen  not  one  but  S'cv^ral  revolutions  in  the 
transportation  problem.  In  1880,  it  was  bdieved  a  no-toll  canal  would 
restore  to  New  York  her  commercial  supremacy.  This  restoration  hardly 
outlived  the  accomplishment  of  the  fact.  In  1893,  a  9-foot  canal,  it  was 
thought,  would  serve  as  a  restorer.  In  1903,  a  1,000-ton  barge  canal  with 
locks  28  feet  wide,  it  was  thought,  would  suffice.  Two  years  later  the 
demand  had  so  grown  as  to  require  and  justify  a  4S-foot  lock. 

The  canals  of  Ohio  have  been  abandoned  as  inadequate.  The  Illinois- 
Mississippi  Canal  only  just  completed,  after  15  years  of  construction  work, 
is  found  to  be  practically  obsolete  though  this  structure  has  locks  35  feet 
wide  and  170  feet  in  length.  Fifteen  years  ago  this  project  was  thought 
to  be  ambitious  but  already  the  boats  which  may  be  operated  on  this  canal 
with  profit  are  too  large  to  pass  through  the  locks.  .  .  . 

The  inevitable  conclusion  to  my  mind,  as,  I  believe,  it  will  be  to  the  mind 
of  every  fair  minded  man  who  makes  a  careful  study  of  this  project  and 
eliminates    all    consideration    of    locality,    is    that    your    honorable    body 


64  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

should  without  delay  memorialize  Congress  to  join  with  New  York  in 
making  that  portion  of  the  Barge  Canal  route  from  the  Hudson  River  by 
way  of  the  Mohawk  River,  Oneida  Lake  and  Oswego  River,  a  ship  canal 
of  the  type  contemplated  in  the  governmental  surveys  of  1900,  and  that 
this  memorializing  of  Congress  should  be  followed  by  such  pressure  from 
those  interests  within  our  State  as  may  not  tie  ignored,  to  the  end 
that   the  plans   suggested   may  be  accomplished. 

The  construction  of  a  deep  waterway  to  the  Hudson  River 
is  not  now  under  consideration,  luit  some  of  the  groundless  ob- 
jections urged  against  the  St.  Lawrence  route  apply  with  real 
force  to  an  artificial  waterway  for  ships  across  the  State  of 
New  York.  Such  a  waterway  would  involve  several  times  the 
amount  of  restricted  navigation  which  will  exist  upon  the  im- 
proved St.  Lawrence,  and  its  capacity  would  be  entirely  inade- 
quate to  meet  the  future  requirements  of  commerce. 

In  conclusion,  it  should  be  definitely  asserted  that  the  Barge 
Canal  does  not  provide  the  character  of  water  transportation 
needed  for  the  commerce  of  the  Northwest,  and  will  not  be  used 
to  any  great  extent  for  through  traffic  of  a  general  nature  to  and 
from  the  ports  of  the  Great  Lakes. 

The  improvement  of  the  natural  outlet  to  the  sea  by  way  of  the 
St.  Lazvrence  RiT'cr  is  the  only  solution  of  the  problem  of  pro- 
viding adequate  transportation  faeilities  for  the  vast  territory 
tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes. 


Chapter  VII 

COST  OF  TRANSPORTATION  BETWEEN  UPPER  LAKE 
PORTS  AND  LIVERPOOL 

Studies  made  by  the  United  States  Shipping  Board  of  the  cost 
of  operating  freight  vessels  of  standard  type  have  been  used  as 
a  basis  for  determining  the  additional  cost  of  operating  such 
vessels  to  the  ports  of  the  Great  Lakes.  With  due  allowance  for 
the  additional  time  consumed  in  the  trip  from  Liverpool  to  Lake 
ports  as  compared  with  the  trip  to  Atlantic  ports,  and  with  in- 
surance and  certain  other  items  increased  to  meet  the  new  con- 
ditions, it  is  found  that  rates  far  below  those  now  existing  be- 
tween the  Great  Lakes  and  Europe  could  be  made  and  afford  the 
vessel  a  satisfactory  revenue  on  her  operations.  In  general,  it 
may  be  anticipated  that  vessels  will  be  able  to  make  the  same 
rates  to  Lake  Erie  points  as  to  north  Atlantic  coast  points,  and 
the  same  rates  to  Lake  Michigan  and  Lake  Superior  as  to  Gulf 
ports. 

On  account  of  the  difference  in  the  efficiency  of  vessels  and 
terminals,  and  the  widely  varying  charges  against  both  vessel  and 
cargo  at  dift'erent  ports,  or  even  parts  of  the  same  port,  it  is 
realized  that  determination  of  actual  costs  in  a  selected  case  will 
not  necessarily  furnish  a  reliable  guide  for  estimating  the  cost 
of  transportation  by  other  carriers  of  similar  type  and  capacity. 
A  knowledge  of  costs,  however,  is  essential  to  intelligent  rate 
making,  although  with  this  information  in  hand,  assumptions 
are  still  necessary.  Dr.  Emory  R.  Johnson  states  that  "The 
difficulty  of  fixing  freight  rates  that  correspond  with  costs — 
after  the  expenses  or  costs  of  service  for  vessels  of  dift'erent 
types  have  been  ascertained  with  a  fair  degree  of  accuracy  for 
the  various  trades — is  not  especially  great  when  the  rates  apply 
to  a  full  cargo  consisting  of  one  to  three  or  four  commodities 
offered  and  carried  in  known  and  definite  quantities  or  tonnages. 
The  complications  of  tate  making,  however,  are  intricate  when 
different  rates  are  to  be  made  for  each  of  numerous  commodities, 
and  are  to  apply  to  any  quantity  that  may  be  offered.  The  rela- 
tive costs  of  service  for  transporting  dift'erent  articles  of  dif- 
ferent weights,  densities,  perishability,  strength,  and  fragility, 
value,  etc.,  are  hardly  determinable  with  close  accuracy.  .  .  . 
How  far  the  costs  of  services,  when  determinable,  should  be  con- 
trolling in  making  ocean-freight  rates  is  a  question  the  answer 
to  which  will  depend  upon  the  policy  of  rate  making  or  rate 
regulation  that  may  be  adopted.     In  most  instances,  other  facts 

65 


C6  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

hliould  be  considered  along  with  costs  in  deciding  what  freight 
charges  shall  be  imposed  or  permitted,  but  it  will  seldom  happen 
that  rates  yielding  less  than  cost  are  justifiable.  In  all  cases 
those  responsible  for  making  or  approving  ocean  rates  will  prefer 
to  act  wnth  a  knowledge  of  the  fixed  and  current  expenses  to  be 
met    from   the    revenues    secured    from   the    rates    in    question.'' 

In  order  to  make  intelligent  comparisons  of  the  cost  of  ship- 
ment on  two  or  more  competing  routes,  it  is  necessary  to  separate 
the  cost  into  its  several  factors. 

Investigation  by  the  Shipping  Board  of  operating  costs  of 
three  standard  vessel  types. — In  connection  with  the  operation 
of  the  large  number  of  vessels  under  the  control  of  the 
United  States  Shipping  Board,  it  became  necessary  to  secure 
information  relative  to  the  costs  of  operating  the  several  stand- 
ard types  of  vessels  on  different  routes.  A  report  was  therefore 
prepared  in  collaboration  with  commercial  shij)  owners  and 
operators  for  the  purpose  of  developing  an  index  of  the  relative 
desirability  of  dilTerent  cargo  ships.  Each  of  the  charges  was 
set  up  after  a  careful  investigation  of  actual  ])erformance  costs 
with  the  view  both  to  showing  a  true  comparison  between  the 
same  item  of  expense  for  the  ships  and  to  presenting  the  different 
costs  for  each  ship  in  the  proportion  one  to  the  other,  that  is 
met  with  under  commercial  operating  conditions.  For  each 
type  of  ship  the  cost  was  drawn  on  a  high  basis  of  war-time  value 
and  prices,  and  on  a  lower  basis  of  estimated  peace-time  condi- 
tions. The  determination  of  normal  peace-time  conditions,  how- 
ever, presents  a  problem  which  is  still  difficult  of  solution.  Some 
reduction  in  certain  of  the  assigned  fixed  charges  is  no  d<»ubt 
warranted,  but  operating  costs  have  not  as  yet  fallen  appreciably, 
and  for  the  latter  items  the  results  obtained  are  no  doubt  reason- 
ably applicable  at  the  preseiU  time.  Hence,  the  actual  costs  of 
operation  designated  as  "high"  costs  will  be  used  in  analyzing 
the  results  of  the  investigation,  and  the  study  will  be  confined 
to  three  standard  steel,  coal-burning  \essels  operated  between 
New'  York  and  Liverpool,  which  would  be  suitable  for  use  on 
the  ])ro])ose(l  deep  waterway,  as  follows: 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


67 


5,650 
D.  W.  T. 

Steel  ship 


7,500 
D.  W.  T. 
Steel  ship 


8,800 
D.  W.  T. 
Steel  ship 


Length  over  all 

Molded  breadth. .  . • 

Molded  depth 

Load  draft 

Gross  tonnage 

Net  tonnage 

Indicated  horsepower 

Designed  speed  knots 

Net  operating  days 

Number  of  men,  officers  and  crew. 

Assumed  sea  speed,  knots 

Days    in    port.    New    York    and 
Liverpool 

Turnarounds  per  annum 

Fuel  consumption: 

Per  day  at  sea 

Per  day  in  port 

Maximum  cargo  capacity, 
(long  tons) 

Outbound 

Inbound ' 

Potential  cargo  capacity  per  an- 
num, long  tons 

Cargo— ton  knots  per  annum 


389'0" 

43'9" 

28'0" 

23'0" 

3,820 

3,029 

2,100 

11.0 

325 

40 

9.6 

10  and  10 
7.0 

40.0 
4.5 


4,741 
4,741 

66,374 
202,639,800 


401'0" 

54'0" 

32'0" 

24'0" 

4,860 

3,600 

2,500 

11.5 

330 

45 

10.2 

10  and  10 
7.35 

48.0 
10.0 


6,365 
6,365 


427'0" 

54'0" 

29'9" 

24'2" 

5,898 

4,450 

2,500 

10.5 

330 

48 

9.5 

lOH  and  101^ 
6.904 

48.0 
10.0 


7,604 
7,604 


93,566      I       104,996 
303,246,0001  320,250,000 


Before  proceeding  with  a  study  of  the  cost  figures,  a  brief 
explanation  of  the  bases  of  computation  appears  necessary. 

Capital  ro.s-fjr.— Interest  on  the  investment  is  taken  at  5  per  cent. 

Depreciation. — The  hfe  of  a  steel  ship  is  assumed  to  be  30 
years,  and  therefore  a  flat  charge  of  3  1-3  per  cent  per  annum 
will  liquidate  this  item.  Opinion  as  to  the  proper  charge  for 
depreciation  is  varied.  A  study  of  the  policy  of  operating  com- 
panies indicates  that  it  is  a  custom  to  vary  the  sum  set  aside 
each  year  with  the  profits  earned  during  the  year,  and  that  no 
fixed  allowance  is  made.  To  enable  comparisons  to  be  made,  it 
is  necessary  to  adopt  a  uniform  rate  to  cover  depreciation,  and 
the  rate  assigned  is  considered  a  fair  and  normal  charge. 

Creiv. — The  crew  costs  are  based  upon  the  following  rates 
of  pay : 


68  ECONOMIC    ASl'l-XTS    OF    THE 


Deck  crew 

Pay  per  month 

Engine  room  {Cont'd) 

Pay  per  i 

Master 

$250 

Third  Assistant .  .  . 

120 

Chief  officer 

150 

Deck  Engineer.  .  .  . 

85 

Second  officer .  .  .  . 

l.?5 

Oilers 

80 

Third  officer 

120 

Storekeepers 

80 

Carpenter 

90 

Firemen 

75 

Boatswain 

85 

Coal  passers 

65 

Able  seaman 

75 

Steward's  department: 

Ordinary  seaman . 

55 

Chief  steward 

120 

Deck  boys 

40 

Chief  cook 

100 

Engine  room: 

Second     cook    and 

Chief  Engineer. .  . 

185 

baker 

90 

First  Assistant .  .  . 

150 

Cook's  mate 

60 

Second  Assistant . 

135 

Messmen 

60 

Subsistence. — The  cost  per  man  per  day  i.s  taken  at  86  cents. 

Repairs  and  maintenance. — This  figure  is  taken  as  4  per  cent 
of  the  contract  price  of  the  ships.  In  this  item  is  included  an 
annual  dry  docking  charge  of  50  cents  per  gross  ton  and  painting 
costs  of  $700  to  $1,000.  It  has  been  assumed  that  the  total 
money  spent  per  year  on  upkeep  will  be  the  same  on  whatever 
route  the  ship  is  operating.  Similarly,  for  the  purpose  of  com- 
parison between  ships,  the  increased  repairs  necessary  as  the 
sliip  becomes  older  and  approaches  her  periods  of  resurvey  or 
the  variations  commercially  met  with  in  this  item,  due  to  change 
in  policy  of  owners,  urgency  of  the  repairs,  or  difference  in  care 
in  handling  the  ships,  have  not  been  considered.  All  the  ships 
are  taken  as  "new." 

Insurance  on  hull  and  uiachincry. — Insurance  on  hull  and 
machinery  is  usually  taken  out  under  annual  policies  and  the 
rates  vary  according  to  the  following  conditions : 

1.  The  type  and  classification  of  the  steamer,  horseixnver.  trad- 
ing limits,  and  the  nature  of  cargoes  likely  to  be  carried. 

2.  The  character  and  experience  of  the  owners. 

3.  Whether  the  steamers  are  running  in  a  regular  line  or  are 
simply  tramps. 

The  rates  taken  on  hull  and  machinery  are  regular  commercial 
quotations,  and  conform  to  the  current  American  Hull  Insur- 
ance Association's  form  of  policy. 

Speed. — The  assumed  standard  average  sea  speed  taken  for 
each  ship  is  somewhat  less  than  the  designed  speed,  the  deduction 
being  about  5  per  cent  in  the  case  of  the  larger  steel  ships. 

Fuel  consumption. — The  fuel  consumption  of  the  ships  was 
checked  by  performance  of  tyi)ical  ships  under  actual  service 
conditions.  The  fuel  consumption  in  port  includes  that  re(iuire(l 
to  get  up  steam  when  going  to  sea.  Fuel  reserve  for  trans- 
Atlantic  routes  is  taken  as  22^4  per  cent  of  requirements. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL 


69 


Fuel  costs. — The  fuel  costs  are  based  upon  a  charge  of  $8.50 
per  ton  of  coal  trimmed  in  bunkers  at  both  New  York  and 
Liverpool. 

Net  operating  days. — This  item  represents  the  maximum 
number  of  operating  days  possible  in  a  year  after  deducting  the 
days  lost  on  account  of  bad  weather  and  time  allowed  for  dry 
docking  and  overhauling,  which  has  been  set  at  30  days  in 
the  case  of  each  of  the  ships.  The  delays  lost  on  account  of 
bad  weather  are  as  follows : 


5,650  D.  W.  T.  steel  vessel. 
7,500  D.  W.  T.  steel  vessel. 
8,800  D.  W.  T.  steel  vessel. 


New   York-Liverpool  Route. 

10 

5 

5 


Turnarounds  per  annum. — This  figure  represents  the  number 
of  round  trips  which  can  be  expected  per  year.  It  is  modified  by 
a  variation  in  speed,  days  in  port,  etc. 

Net  cargo-carrying  capacity. — This  is  the  deadweight  tonnage 
less  the  weight  of  fuel,  feed  water,  spare  gear,  crew  and  effects, 
fresh  water,  sanitary  salt  water,  provisions,  galley  and  steward's 
stores,  and  bilgewater.  The  amount  of  cargo  possible  for  various 
routes  will  depend  mainly  on  bunkering  requirements. 

Pilotage  and  harbor  charges. — The  charges  were  taken  from 
the  1917  edition  of  Dues  and  Port  Charges  of  the  World,  re- 
vised according  to  recent  experience  in  respect  to  New  York 
dock  charges.  The  item  covers  compulsory  pilotage,  wharfage, 
custom  fees,  tonnage,  clearance,  dunnage,  petties,  etc. 

New    York-Liverpool  Route   (round  trip  approximately  6,100  nautical  miles) 
Basis  of  Costs  and  Expenses   [assuming  full  cargoes.) 


5,650 
D.W.T.  steel  ship 

7,500 
D.W.T.  steel  ship 

8,800 
D.W.T.  steel  ship 

Cost  per 
annum 

Per  cargo 
ton 

Cost  per 
annum 

Per  cargo 
ton 

Cost  per 
^num 

Per  cargo 

ton 

Fuel 

$  68,432 
43,260 
12,556 
99,579 

49,780 
6,780 

28,441 
4,800 

$1.03 
0.65 
0.19 
1.50 

0.75 
0.10 
0.43 
0.07 

$  87,156 

47,340 

14,439 

127,500 

63,730 
9.000 

34,545 
4,800 

$0.93 
0.51 
0.16 
1.36 

0.68 
0.10 
0.37 
0.05 

$  87,991 

49,680 

15,067 

139,330 

69,940 

10,500 

37,903 

4,800 

$0.84 

0.47 

Subsistence,  officers  and  crew 
Interest  and  depreciation ,  .  . 
Repairs,    maintenance,   and 

0.14 
1.33 

0.67 

Stores  and  supplies 

Pilotage,  harbor  charges,  etc. 

0.10 
0.36 
0.05 

Total,  exclusive  of  insur- 

313,628 

54,134 
155,792 

4.72 

0.82 
2.35 

388,510 

65,230 
219,508 

4.15 

0.70 
2.35 

415,211 

70,224 
246,740 

3.96 

Insurance  on  hull  and  ma- 

0.67 

Insurance  on  cargo  carried .  . 

2.35 

Total  annual  expenditures 

523,554 

7.89 

673,248 

7.20 

732,175 

6.98 

70  ECOXOMIC    .\SPECTS    OF    THE 

Changes  in  Government  cost  figures  required  to  meet  present 
conditions  in  commercial  shipping. — Some  nioditication  of  the 
resuhs  shown  by  the  above  figures  is  necessary  to  make  them 
comparable  with  costs  in  merchant  shipping.  The  item  of  "In- 
surance on  cargo  carried"  should  be  eliminated,  this  being  an 
expense  chargeable  to  the  shipper  and  not  to  the  carrier.  The 
value  of  the  5,650-ton  vessel  was  based  on  a  cost  of  $211  per 
deadweight  ton,  the  7,500-ton  vessel  on  a  cost  of  $202  per  dead- 
weight ton,  and  the  8,800-ton  vessel  on  a  cost  of  $190  per 
deadweight  ton.  These  are  the  high  prices  pertaining  to  the 
period  immediately  following  the  war.  At  the  present  time  we 
are  passing  through  a  period  of  readjustment  in  costs  of  vessel 
construction,  and  there  is  a  wide  variation  in  prices  quoted  by 
various  ship  builders,  but  there  is  a  distinct  recent  downward 
tendency  made  necessary  by  the  loss  of  Government  contracts, 
the  possibility  of  enforced  idleness,  and  the  realization  that  we 
must  again  compete  with  foreign  ship  yards.  The  following 
table  furnished  by  the  United  States  Shipping  Board  gives  some 
interesting  information  on  vessel  costs  : 

Approximate  Average  Price  of  Steel  Cargo  Vessels. 


Year 

United  States  per 
deadweight  ton 

Great  Britain  per 
deadweight  ton 

1910 

1914 

$45.00 
59.00 
90.00 
118.00 
135.00 
193.00 

$26.00 
37.00 

1915 

1916 

1917    

77.00 
114  00 
115.00 

1918 

1X)7.00 

ilie  figurgs  for  1910  are  based  on  contracts  for  ordinary  tram[) 
cargo  vessels  and  are  estimated  average  prices  in  both  countries. 
Information  furnished  by  ship  yards  regarding  the  present  cost 
of  constructing  the  standard  8.800-ton  vessel  indicates  that  a 
fair  figure  will  be  $140  per  deadweight  ton,  making  the  total 
cost  of  this  vessel  $1,232,000.  From  this  figure  the  cost  of  the 
7,500-ton  vessel  may  be  placed  at  $150  and  the  5,650-ton  vessel  at 
$160  per  deadweight  ton.  Some  estimates  are  much  lower  than 
these  figures,  but  it  is  deemed  advisable  for  the  purposes  of 
this  study  to  adopt  figures  that  may  be  regarded  as  fair  averages. 
The  revised  figures  are  as  follows: 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


71 


New    York- Liver  pool  Route   {round  trip  approximately  6,100  nautical  miles). 
Showing  Distribution  of  Costs  for  Commercial  Vessels,  1920. 


5,650  D.W.T. 
Steel  ship 

7,500  D.W.T. 
Steel  ship 

8,800  D.W.T. 
Steel  ship 

Cost  per 
annum 

Cost  per 
annum 

Cost  per 

annum 

Fixed  charges: 

Interest  on  investment  at  5  per 
cent 

$45,200 
30,133 
54,134 

$56,250 
37,500 
65,230 

$61,600 

Depreciation  at  5yi  per  cent..  .  . 
Insurance  on  hull  and  machinery 

41,067 
70,224 

Total  fixed  charges 

$129,467 

$158,980 

$172,881 

Operating  costs: 

Fuel 

Pay  of  officers  and  crew 

Subsistence. 

68,432 
43,260 
12,556 

38,770 
6,780 

28,441 
4,800 

87,156 
47,340 
14,439 

48,130 
9,000 

34,545 
4,800 

87,991 
49,680 
15,067 

Repairs,  Jiiaintenance  and  over- 
hauling  

52,929 

Stores  and  supplies 

Pilotage,  harbor  charges,  ^tc. . .  . 
Husbandrv 

10,500 

37,903 

4,800 

Total  operating  costs 

$203,039 

$245,410 

$258,870 

Total  annual  cost 

332,506 

399 

625 
1,024 
5.01 

404,390 

482 

744 
1,226 
4.32 

431,751 

(325  and  330  days) 

Operating  costs  per  operating  day 

(325  and  330  days) 

Total  cost  per  operating  day 

Cost  per  cargo  ton 

524 

784 
1,308 
4.11 

In  the  work  of  the  Great  Lakes  Department  of  the  Division 
of  Operations  of  the  Shipping  Board,  the  daily  costs  of  opera- 
tion of  ships  of  the  type  built  for  ocean  traffic  has  been  roughly 
estimated  to  be  about  $800.  This  figure  includes  such  items 
as  crew  wages,  crew  subsistence,  port  charges,  fuel,  water,  re- 
pairs, deck*  and  engine  supplies,  overhead  and  maintenance,  etc., 
but  does  not  include  depreciation,  interest  or  loading  and  dis- 
charging costs.  Some  private  operators 'consider  this  figure  too 
high.  A  prominent  firm  in  Boston  reports  that  their  figures 
show  that  the  expense  of  wages,  provisions  and  upkeep,  includ- 
ing insurance  on  hull  on  steamers  of  7,000  tons  capacity,  amounts 
to  about  $16,000  per  month  or  $500  per  day.  As  noted  before, 
there  appears  to  be  no  uniformity  in  costs,  particularly  under 
existing  conditions,   but   it   may  be   accepted   that   private   com- 


72  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS   OF    THE 

panics  are  able  to  operate  their  vessels  more  economically  than 
the  Government. 

The  S.  S.  Mariners  Harbor,  3.535  deadweight  tons,  made  two 
voyages,  one  after  the  other,  in  June  and  July,  1918,  running 
from  New  York  to  Porto  Rico  and  back.  Each  voyage  took 
a  days  for  completion. 

First  voyage,  average  daily  expense  exclusive  of  de- 
preciation and  interest S855  .  34 

Second  voyage,  as  above 678 .  20 

General  average  for  the  two  voyages 766 .77 

Depreciation  and  interest  charges  $287.67  per  day. 

The  above  figures  illustrate  the  diiTterence  that  may  exist  in 
operating  the  same  vessel  over  the  same  route. 

The  S.  S.  Mincola,  3,954  deadweight  tons,  made  a  trip  in 
July  and  August,  1918,  from  Philadelphia  to  Cuba  and  back 
to  New  York,  consuming  37  days  on  the  trip.  Her  expenses 
averaged  per  day,  exclusive  of  depreciation  and  interest,  $1,080.36. 
(  Depreciation  and  interest  %?)?>?).77  per  day. ) 

The  S.  S.  Sacramento,  7,462  deadweight  tons,  made  a  trip 
from  San  Francisco  to  the  west  coast  of  South  America  and 
np  to  Wilmington,  North  Carolina,  in  April  and  May,  1918,  on 
which  trip  the  average  daily  expenses  came  to  $1,159.05.  (De- 
preciation and  interest  $614.06  per  day.) 

The  S.  S.  Anaeortes,  7,478  deadweight  tons,  made  a  trip  from 
Seattle  to  the  west  coast  of  St)Uth  America  and  up  to  lialtimorc 
in  September  and  October,  1918,  averaging  per  day  $1,317.75. 
(Depreciation  and  interest  $587.75  per  day.) 

Effect  of  Stay  in  Port, — Vessels  are  earning  only  when  mov- 
ing, and  all  unnecessary  time  lost  in  port,  from  whatever  cause, 
reduces  the  annual  cargo  capacity  and  increases  the  cost  per 
cargo  ton.  For  the  three  standard  vessels  particularly  studied, 
the  increased  cost  per  cargo  ton  for  each  day's  delay  in  port  is 
a'>  follows: 

&ents. 

5,6.S()  I).  \V.  T.  vessel 12 

7,.S0()  D.  W.  T.  vessoi 10 

8,800  I ).  \V.  T.  vessel 9 

Similailv,  there  is  a  corresponding  saving  for  each  day  by 
which  the  stay  in  jiort  is  shortened,  in  the  case  of  the  8,800-t()n 
vessel  having  a  cargo  capacitv  of  7,600  tons,  each  day  in  j'jort 
is  worth  about  $760.  'i'ime  in  port  is  non-j)roductivc  time.  ;uid 
should   be   reduced   to   the   mininuun.      i*"or   this   vessel    the   time 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIT    CHANNEL  7?) 

allowed  at  each  terminus  is  10^  days.  If  this  time  were  reduced 
to  8  days  at  New  York  and  7  days  at  Liverpool,  there  would 
be  a  saving  of  6  days  per  trip  or  $4,560.  Instead  of  making 
seven  round  trips  per  year  of  47  days  each,  the  vessel  could 
then  make  eight  round  trips  per  year  of  41  days,  increasing 
her  potential  annual  cargo  from  104,996  long  tons  to  121.600 
long  tons. 

Comparison  of  Operating  Costs  of  Ocean  Vessels  on  the  Pro- 
posed Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  Route  with  North  Atlantic 
Routes. — It  may  be  admitted  that  vessels  constructed  solely  for 
service  on  the  lakes  are  not  suitable  for  ocean  navigation,  at  least 
without  strengthening  and  other  expensive  alterations.  Dur- 
ing the  war.  many  lake  vessels,  of  the  package  and  bulk  type, 
were  requisitioned  by  the  Governments  of  Canada  and  the  United 
States,  and  were  placed  on  ocean  routes  after  necessary  altera- 
tion, but  this  method  was  solely  to  meet  an  existing  emergency, 
and  the  questions  of  adaptability  and  economy  could  not  be 
given  weight.  The  question  of  the  inadaptability  of  present  lake 
vessels  for  ocean  service,  however,  is  unimportant.  The  vessels 
which  will  carry  the  commerce  of  the  Great  Lakes  to  foreign 
markets  are  the  vessels  of  average  size  now  engaged  in  ocean 
service.  The  important  port  of  Chicago  alone  is  quite  capable 
of  furnishing  commerce  of  the  general  character  necessary  to 
afford  profitable  cargoes.  With  a  depth  of  25  feet  through 
the  St.  Lawrence  River,  the  standard  steel  vessel  of  8,800  tons 
and  under  could  operate  successfully  on  this  route,  taking  on 
grain  or  other  heavy  cargo  at  upper  lake  ports,  and  completing 
the  load  with  manufactured  articles  at  Lake  Erie  ports.  Other 
advantageous  methods  of  operation  wnll  readily  suggest  them- 
selves to  practical  shipping  men. 

The  distance  from  Duluth  to  Liverpool  is  3,936  nautical  miles, 
as  compared  with  3,050  to  3,105  nautical  miles  from  New  York 
to  Liverpool.  Accepting  the  approximate  figure  used  by  the 
Shipping  Board  of  3,050  nautical  miles,  gives  a  difference  of 
886  miles,  or  1,772  miles  per  round  trip.  The  8,800-ton  steamer 
has  a  designed  speed  of  lO^A  knots,  and  her  cruising  speed  has 
been  assumed  as  about  9^  knots  in  the  cost  statements  of  the 
Shipping  Board.  Her  total  time  per  turnaround  between  New 
York  and  Liverpool  is  47  days,  of  which  21  days  are  spent  in 
port  and  26  days  on  the  sea.  The  additional  distance  of  1,772 
miles  would  require  about  7^^  days  if  the  navigation  were  all 
in  open  waters.     The  improved   route   from   Montreal   to   Lake 


74  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

Superior,  however,  will  involve  a  maximum  of  100  statute  miles 
of  improved  river  channel  and  50  statute  miles  of  canal  naviga- 
tion, the  former  requiring  10  hours  and  the  latter  not  exceeding 
16  hours,  including  delays  incident  to  lockage.  If  these  stretches 
were  open  water  the  time  required  for  their  passage  would  be 
about  13.4  hours,  showing  a  delay  of  12.6  hours  each  way  due  to 
restricted  channel,  or  1  day  on  the  round  trip,  making  a  total  of 
8y2  days  more  required  for  the  lake  trip,  or  say  56  days  per 
turnaround,  with  time  in  port  similar  to  the  New  York-i.iverpool 
route.  On  this  basis  four  trips  would  require  224  days.  The 
average  length  of  the  navigation  season  at  St.  Marys  Falls  Canal, 
the  controlling  point  west  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  is  220  days.  But 
no  time  in  port  has  to  be  taken  into  consideration  on  the  initial 
voyage  of  the  season,  as  the  vessel  would  be  practically  loaded 
and  ready  to  sail  upon  the  opening  of  navigation ;  hence,  four 
round  trips  per  season  are  easily  possible,  even  with  the  exces- 
sive time  in  port  stated  for  the  New  York-Liverpool  route. 
If  the  initial  trip  be  made  from  Liverpool  or  from  the  terminus 
of  some  other  winter  route,  the  vessel  will  be  able  to  make  four 
trips  to  lake  ports  and  be  out  of  the  St.  Lawrence  before  the 
close  of  the  navigation  season.  This  arrangement  would  have 
the  advantage  of  completing  the  season's  work  with  the  vessel  in 
open  waters,  where  she  could  be  placed  on  other  routes  during 
the  winter  to  the  total  limit  of  330  days'  operation.  The  total 
time  required  for  the  four  trips  with  Liverpool  as  the  terminus 
in  all  cases,  224  days,  would  leave  106  days  surplus,  which  would 
be  more  than  sufficient  for  two  round  trips  from  Liverpool  to 
a  chosen  Atlantic  port.  Thus,  the  vessel  would  have  6  round 
trips  per  year,  as  compared  with  7  round  trips  on  the  New  York- 
Liverpool  route.  The  total  mileage  per  year  would  be  43,688, 
as  compared  with  42,700  on  the  New  York  route,  a  difference  of 
988  miles,  and  certain  of  the  costs  affected  by  this  increase  such 
as  fuel  and  supplies,  must  be  increased  accordingly.  It  is  also 
deemed  advisable  to  allow  25  per  cent  additional  for  insurance. 
The  estimate  gives  the  following  results : 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL 


75 


Statement  Showing  Transportation   Costs 

Liverpool-Duluth  Route  (4  trips  per  year,  round  trip  approximately  7,872 
nautical  miles). 

Liverpool-New  York  Route  (2  trips  per  year,  round  trip  approximately 
6,100  nautical  miles). 


5,650  D.W.T.  7,500  D.W.T. 
Steel  ship         Steel  ship 


8,800  D.W.T. 
Steel  ship 


Fixed  charges 

Operating  costs 

Total  annual  cost 

Total  cost  per  operating  day 

Cost  properly  chargeable  to  two 

New  York  trips 

Cost  properly  chargeable  to  four 

Duluth  trips 

Cost  per  cargo  ton.  New  York  trips 
Cost  per  cargo  ton,  Duluth  trips .  . 


$143,010.00 

205,661.00 

348,671.00 

1,073.00 

95,000.00 

253,671.00 
5.01 
6.69 


^175,287. 00 

248,729.00 

424,016.00 

1,284.00 

115,540.00 

308,476.00 
4.32 
6.06 


$190,437.00 

262,353.00 

452,790.00 

1,372.00 

123,358.00 

329,432.00 
4.11 
5.42 


In  the  above  statement  all  costs  of  every  kind,  additional  to 
those  heretofore  determined  as  pertaining  to  the  New  York- 
Liverpool  route,  have  been  charged  against  the  Liverpool-Diiluth 
route. 

The  statements  of  the  Shipping  Board  do  not  cover  general 
and  administrative  expense,  such  as  maintenance  of  main  office, 
traffic  agencies,  etc.,  and  some  distribution  of  such  expense 
against  the  vessel  seems  proper,  inasmuch  as  this  expense  must 
be  borne  out  of  the  freight  receipts.  This  item  would  affect 
both  routes  similarly,  however,  so  its  inclusion  is  not  neces- 
sary to  afford  reasonable  comparisons  of  the  cost  of  transporta- 
tion by  the  two  routes  provided  the  ships  are  operated  through- 
out the  year  in  both  cases.  Moreover,  it  is  a  charge  varying  with 
the  business  policies  of  the  transportation  companies  rather  than 
with  the  characteristics  of  the  route.  In  fixing  rates,  this  item 
would  need  consideration,  as  well  as  the  item  of  profits. 

To  apply  the  figures  given  above,  it  is  desirable  to  consider 
a  typical  trip.  With  a  25-foot  channel  through  the  Welland 
Canal  and  St.  Lawrence  River,  and  without  enlargement  of  the 
present  connecting  channels  of  the  upper  lakes,  the  standard 
8,800-ton  vessel  could  take  on  150,000  bushels  of  grain  at  Duluth, 
proceed  as  far  as  Lake  Erie,  and  take  on  3,000  tons  of  general 
cargo,  after  which  she  would  draw  about  24  feet.  The  grain 
would  w-eigh  about  4,500  tons,  making  a  total  cargo  of  7,500 
tons.     If  a  rate  on  general  cargo  of  $30  per  ton  be  taken,  the 


76  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

gross  revenue  from  such  freight  would  be  $90,000.  At  40  cents 
per  bushel,  the  revenue  from  the  grain  would  amount  to  $60,000, 
or  a  total  of  $150,000.  or  $20.00^ per  ton  actually  carried.  The 
cargo  ton  cost  has  been  found  to  be  $5.42,  based  on  full  car- 
goes both  ways.  The  gross  revenue  from  one  eastbound  trip 
such  as  assumed  above  would  be  nearly  four  times  the  amount 
required  to  meet  expenses,  and  if  the  westward  trip  were  made 
in  ballast,  the  receipts  for  the  round  trip  would  still  be  prac- 
tically double  the  costs.  It  is  fair  to  assume  one-third  return 
cargoes,  however,  consisting  largely  of  high-class  freight.  West- 
bound rates  are  very  much  lower  at  the  present  time  than  east- 
l)ound  rates,  as  steamship  companies  plan  to  at  least  cover  all 
costs  on  the  eastbound  trip,  owing  to  the  existing  uncertainty 
of  obtaining  cargo  abroad.  Recent  consignments  indicate  an 
average  of  about  $18  per  ton  on  such  westbound  freight,  and 
on  2,500  tons  this  rate  would  afford  a  revenue  of  $45,000.  mak- 
ing the  gross  receipts  for  the  round  trip  $195,000. 

On  the  basis  of  a  full  cargo  eastward,  consisting  of  4.500  tons 
of  grain  and  3,000  tons  of  general  cargo,  and  one-tliird  cargo 
westward,  consisting  of  general  cargo,  10,000  tons  would  be 
carried  on  the  round  trip,  at  a  cost  of  $8.13  per  ton.  Assigning 
rates  far  below  those  now  existing  the  ])roposition  might  appear 
as  follows : 

150,000  bushels  of  grain  at  20  cents $30,000 

3,000  tons  general  cargo  at  $25 75,000 

2,000  tons  general  cargo  at  $  15 37,500 

$142,500 

The  results  show  cargo  ton  receipts  of  $14.25  per  ton  or 
$6.00  per  ton  in  excess  of  actual  vessel  costs.  With  substantial 
allowance  for  administrative  expenses,  there  would  still  be  a 
large  surplus  apjilicable  to  profits. 

The  figures  show  that  cargo  can  be  carried  between  lake  ports 
and  Liverpool,  and  other  foreign  ports,  at  rates  which  will  be 
reasonable  and  will  permit  successful  compctiti(Mi  with  Atlantic 
coast  ports.  Reducing  all  cargo  to  grain  for  purposes  of  com- 
parison, it  is  found  that  the  actual  cost  per  liushel.  assuming 
full  cargoes,  on  the  New  York-TJverpool  route  for  the  8.800-ton 
vessel  is  12.5  cents,  and  on  the  Duluth-Liverpool  route  16.4  cents, 
a  difference  of  3.9  cents.  If  this  grain  could  be  taken  fn^ni 
Duluth  to  New  York  and  there  placed  ui:)on  the  ocean  carrier 
for  less  than  3.9  cents  per  bushel,  the  New  York  route  would 
lia\('    the    advantage    so    far    as    grain    is    concerned.      P.ut    this 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  // 

can  not  be  done.  The  cost  of  getting  grain  to  the  Atlantic  sea- 
board ranges  between  15  and  20  cents.  If  actual  costs  conie 
down  on  existing  routes,  they  will  likewise  be  reduced  on  the 
Lake  route  below  the  figures  given. 

It  is  on  general  cargo  that  the  greatest  savings  will  result 
because  of  the  higher  rail  rate  and  the  higher  costs  of  handling 
such  cargo.  With  the  recent  increase  in  rail  rates,  the  average 
ton-mile  rate  is  now  about  1.25  cent.  This  represents  a  charge 
of  $11.40  per  ton  from  Chicago  to  New  York,  and  $5.52  per  ton 
from  Buffalo  to  New  York.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  rates  from 
Chicago  to  New  York  on  freight  of  the  character  referred  to 
are  from  $12.60  to  $30.00  and  more  per  ton.  The  first  case 
involves  one  or  more  transfers  at  New  York,  costing  at  a  low 
estimate  $2.00  per  ton  in  addition  to  charges  absorbed  in  the  rate, 
or  a  total  of  $13.40;  while  the  latter  involves  two  transfers, 
one  at  Buffalo  at  about  $1.20  per  ton,  and  one  at  New  York 
at  $2.00  per  ton,  plus  the  lake  haul  from  Chicago  to  Buffalo, 
costing  about  $2.35  per  ton,  or  a  total  of  $11.07.  The  addi- 
tional cost  of  the  Liverpool-Duluth  all-water  route  over  the 
Liverpool-New  York  route  being  $1.31  per  cargo  ton,  it  appears 
that  the  possible  saving  involved  by  the  use  of  the  latter  route 
amounts  to  $9.76  per  ton  on  general  cargo,  and  from  6  to  12 
cents  per  bushel  on  grain,  or  $2.00  to  $4.00  per  ton.  These 
savings,  or  the  smaller  savings  attainable  from  carrying  less  than 
full  cargoes,  are  so  substantial  as  to  indicate  that  a  deep  water- 
way penetrating  the  Great  Lakes  will  be  not  only  desirable,  but 
indispensable  to  the  future  prosperity  of  the  Northwest. 

There  is  another  factor  that  should  not  be  overlooked.  The 
vessel  expenses  on  both  routes  have  been  based  on  a  stay  in 
port  at  each  end  of  10^^  days,  or  21  days  for  the  round  trip. 
With  cargoes  consisting  of  50  per  cent  of  grain  and  with  properly 
designed  terminals  and  efficient  machinery  for  handling  other 
cargo,  the  time  in  port  should  easily  be  reduced  to  6  days.  This 
is  entirely  feasible  at  Lake  ports  where  there  are  now  in  use 
the  most  efficient  machinery  for  handling  bulk  cargo  to  be  found 
in  the  world,  and  where  modern  terminals  for  general  freight 
can  be  established  which  will  not  be  rendered  ineffective  by  such 
congestion  as  exists  at  our  chief  Atlantic  port.  The  saving  of 
4^  days  in  port  on  this  side  and  a  similar  saving  at  Liverpool 
would  enable  the  vessel  to  increase  her  earning  capacity  and 
place  the  Lake  route  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  New  York 
route^as  regards  the  time  consumed  per  trip. 


/8  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

The  following  gives  an  estimate  for  a  5,500  deadweight  ton 
package  freighter,  on  th(^  route  from  Chicago  to  Liverp(iol,  and 
includes  in  the  fixed  charges  the  items  of  bond  interest,  sinking 
fund,  interest  on  working  capital  and  interest  on  cai)itc[l  stock. 
The  results  show  the  rate  that  should  l)e  charged  per 
ton  to  insure  a  modest  j^rofit,  instead  of  the  cost  per  ton.  The 
calculation  shows  that  a  ship  owner  can  carry  freight  at  the  price 
per  ton  stated  and  earn  out  of  that  freight  a  moderate  profit  on 
his  investment,  after  paying  bond  interest  and  setting  aside 
])roper  amount  for  depreciation  and  a  sinking  fund  for  the 
growth  of  his  business. 

Voyage  Calculation — Package  Freight 
5,500  D.  W.  ton  freighter — Chicago  to  Liverpool  and  return  voyage  7,900 

miles— 54  days  turnaround — value  of  ship  $825,000.00.  Lay-up  30  days  per 

j'ear. 

Fixed  Charges   (including  proportion  lay-up  time). 

Insurance  6  per  cent $7,960.00 

Port  Dues  and  Pilotage 4,500 .  00 

Bond  Interest  Jo  Value  6  per  cent 4,000.00 

Depreciation  5  per  cent  on  Value 6,650.00 

Sinking  Fund  9  per  cent  on  Value 12,100.00 

Int.  on  Capital  Stock  yo  Value,  7  per  cent 4,165.00 

Int.  on  Working  Capital 300.00 


Operation  Expense: 

Maintenance  at    85c  per  D.  W.  ton  per  mo 7,500.00 

Loss  and  damage 600 .  00 

Fuel  oil  at  $10.00-775  tons 7,750.00 

Water 150.00 

Crew  Wages  and  Subsistence: 

Deckcrew 9   $2,575.00 

Engine 13   3,180.00 

Stewards 9   1,380.00 

Subsistence 31   at  90c  per  day  per  man 1,640.00 


$39,675.00 


16,000.00 


8,775.00 


Stores: 

Deck $675 .  00 

Engine 770.00 

Stewards 562 .  00 


2,007.00 
Cargo  handling 5,750.00 

$72,207.00 

Rate  per  ton  cargo  carried — cargo  return  li^'ht $15  .60 

Rate  per  ton  cargo  carried — cargo  return  ;  2  '"^f' 10.92 

Rate  per  ton  cargo  carried — cargo  return  full  load 8.46 

Itinerary  Deadweight    List 

Chicago ' 8  days         Cargo 4,600 

En  Route  Liverpool 19  days         Bunkers 775 

Liverpool 8  days         Water 100 

En  Route  Chicago 1-9  days         Stores 25 

Total 54  da)S 


•      GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  79 

Insurance  rates. — At  the  hearing  held  by  the  International  Joint 
Commission  at  New  York  on  October  19,  1920,  testimony  was 
presented  showing  that  the  insurance  rates  on  cargo  prevailing 
from  spring  until  October  are  27^  cents  per  $100,  as  compared 
with  25  cents  from  New  York.  On  October  16,  the  rate  on  the 
St.  Lawrence  advances  from  27^  to  31  cents,  and  on  November  1 
to  42  cents.  There  is  therefore  a  difference  of  only  2^^  cents  in 
the  rate  during  the  greater  part  of  the  navigation  period.  This 
difference  is  so  small  as  to  be  negligible  when  compared  with 
the  savings  in  freight  charges  and  terminal  costs  which  will  be 
afforded  by  the  improved  waterway.  The  insurance  rate  on 
shipments  by  way  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River  has  been  reduced 
from  time  to  time  as  better  channel  facilities  and  aids  to  navi- 
gation were  provided.  The  opening  of  the  Great  Lakes  to  ocean 
vessels  would  considerably  augment  the  importance  of  the  St. 
Lawrence  River  and  lead  to  still  further  measures  for  the  safety 
and  benefit  of  navigation  which  would  unquestionably  be  re- 
flected in  the  insurance  and  freight  rates. 

Transportation  Costs — Lake  Vessels. — The  cost  of  operating  a 
bulk  lake  freighter  of  10,000  tons  cargo  capacity  is  stated  to 
be  about  $425  a  day,  while  the  cost  of  operating  the  large-sized 
lake  package  freighter,  having  a  capacity  of  about  5,000  tons,  is 
about  $600  per  day,  both  figures  being  exclusive  of  interest,  de- 
preciation, and  insurance.  An  estimate  of  the  present  cost  of  the 
package  freighter  made  by  a  prominent  ship-building  company 
on  the  lakes  is  $150  per  ton,  or  a  total  of  $750,000.  The  large 
bulk  freighter  will  cost  about  $110  per  deadweight  ton,  or  $1,100,- 
000.  The  following  gives  a  comparison  of  the  cost  of  operatin\( 
the  S.  S.  Anacortes  with  a  daily  operating  cost  of  $1,317.75,  as 
compared  with  a  lake  vessel  requiring  transshipment  of  cargo. 
The  comparison  contemplates  a  through  voyage  by  the  Anacortes 
between  Cleveland  and  any  selected  foreign  port : 

Cost  of  operating  Anacortes,  Cleveland  to  Montreal  (5  days)..  .  .      $6,588.75 

Cost  of  operating  lake  freighter,  Cleveland  to  Montreal 2,125  00 

Cost  of  discharging  cargo  into  shed  at  Montreal  at  60c  per  ton .  .  4,200.00 
Charges  for  rent  of  wharf  shed  at  $15,000  a  year,  assuming  that 

cargo  can  be  loaded  in  5  days 208 . 3,S 

Cost  of  reloading  cargo  into  ocean  steamer  at  85c  per  ton 5,950.00 

Total $12,483 . 2,3, 

Excess  cost  of  transshipment  plan $5,894 .  58 

Modifying  the  above  to  provide  for  3  days  between  Cleveland 
and  Montreal,  which  is  nearer  the  correct  time,  the  savin?  would 


80  grp:at  lakes-st.  lawrence  ship  channel 

be  $7,680.08.  These  figures  confirm  the  statement  already  made 
in  these  pages  that  on  account  of  the  high  cost  of  handHng  pack- 
age freight,  transfers  must  be  avoided  whenever  possible,  and 
any  route  involving  such  transfers  should  be  rejected.  The  cost 
of  operating  the  A)iacortcs  appears  large  as  compared  with  the 
lake  vessel,  and  the  average  ocean  freight  vessel  of  similar  ton- 
nage could  be  expected  to  do  better.  It  is  clear  that  lake 
vessels  aflford  some  economies  over  ocean  vessels,  but  the 
length  of  their  haul  is  such  a  small  proportion  of  the  whole 
trip  that  these  economies  are  more  than  oft'set  by  even  one 
transfer.  This  statement  applies  particularly  to  package  freight. 
It  is  possible  that  full  cargoes  of  grain  might  be  economically 
transferred  from  lake  vessels  to  ocean  vessels  at  some  suitable 
point  on  the  lower  St.  Lawrence,  but  a  lower  rate  on  grain 
will  be  possible  when  shipped  in  conjunction  with  high  class 
manufactured  goods  than  when  shipped  in  full  cargoes,  and 
this  fact  should  render  transshipment  inadvisable  in  the  avprage 
case.  The  transfer  of  package  freight  is  out  of  the  question. 
Shippers  will  use  the  route  and  method  which  eliminate  this 
hazard,  irrespecti\-e  of  the  savings  in  freight  costs. 

The  study  shozcs  that  the  additional  cost  of  operating  ocean 
vessels  to  Lake  ports  as  compared  ivith  Atlantic  ports  is  oidy  a 
fraction  of  what  may  be  saved  through  the  elimination  of 
rail  hauls  and  transfer  charges. 


Chapter  VIII 

THE    AREAS    COMMERCIALLY    TRIBUTARY    TO    THE 
GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  WATERWAY 

The  area  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway 
will  differ  with  the  origin  of  the  imports  and  the  destination  of 
the  exports.  The  area  which  will  benefit  directly  from  the  pro- 
posed route  for  commerce  with  the  United  Kingdom  and  western 
Europe,  including  the  Baltic  Sea,  has  a  population  of  about 
41,000,000,  while  the  area  tributary  for  commerce  with  Mediter- 
ranean ports  has  a  population  of  about  36,000,000.  An  area 
having  a  population  of  about  30,000,000  will  benefit  by  water 
communication  with  South  America,  while  20,000,000  people  will 
benefit  from  the  opportunities  for  direct  ocean  trade  with  the 
West  Indies  and  Central  America.  A  territory  having  a  popu- 
lation of  21,000,000  will  likewise  derive  advantage  from  the 
opportunities  of  coastwise  vessel  service  to  and  from  the  ocean 
ports  of  the  United  States.  A  study  of  rates  and  distances  shows 
clearly  the  important  savings  and  advantages  to  be  afforded  by 
the  opening  of  the  Great  Lakes  to  ocean  vessels.  On  some  com- 
modities the  saving  will  amount  to  as  much  as  $10  per  ton  as 
compared  with  the  cost  by  way  of  existing  routes. 

The  Tributary  Area  for  Commerce  with  the  United  Kingdom 
and  Western  Europe 

Estimated  on  the  basis  of  Distance. — In  considering  the  extent 
and  character  of  the  commerce  that  would  naturally  seek  an 
outlet  by  way  of  the  deepened  St.  Lawrence,  it  is  necessary 
first  to  determine  the  geographical  limits  of  territory  which  may 
be  regarded  as  commercially  tributary  to  the  waterway.  These 
limits  are  approximately  fixed  by  the  relative  costs  of  trans- 
portation by  all  available  routes.  It  may  be  readily  understood 
that  this  area  will  difl:"er  for  overseas  commerce  as  compared 
with  purelv  domestic  commerce.  In  the  case  of  commerce 
going  abroad,  the  use  of  the  ocean  carrier  is  essential  and  the 
sooner  the  traffic  can  be  placed  upon  that  carrier  the  better.  For 
foreign  commerce  therefore  the  railroad  is  at  a  disadvantage 
with  a  deep  water  route  comnuniicating  with  the  ocean.  In  cases 
where  the  deep  w^aterway  will  actually  avoid  a  transfer,  its 
utilization  is  clearly  economical.  The  excessive  terminal  costs  at 
some  of  the  Atlantic  ports  and  the  unfavorable  railroad  grades 
through  the  Alleghanies  will  have  the  effect  of  extending  the 
commercially  tributary  area  of  the  St.  Lawrence  route  consider- 
ably more  than  half  the  distance  across  the  intervening  territory. 

81 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


In  this  phase  of  the  study,  however,  terminal  costs  have  been 
disregarded,  and  an  efifort  made  to  ascertain  the  tributary  area  on 
the  basis  of  the  transportation  movement  alone. 


Distances    in    statute    miles  from    Lake    ports    to    Liverpool. 


All  water  via 

Barge 

Rail  and  water  via 

Canal 

New  York 

All  water  via 
St.  Lawrence 

1 

Lakes 

Canal  and        n„„.,„ 
Hudson    River    0"^" 

Total 

Rail 

Ocean 

Total 

Duluth.... 

4,546 

988 

496 

3.578 

5,062 

1,391 

3,578 

4.969 

Chicago .  . . 

4,453 

895 

496 

3,578 

4,969 

912 

3,578 

4.490 

Detroit 

3,819 

261 

496 

3,578 

4.335 

693 

3,578 

4,271 

Toledo 

3,812 

254 

496 

3,578 

4.328 

705 

3,578 

4,283 

Cleveland.. 

3,735 

176 

496 

3,578 

4.250 

584 

3.578 

4,162 

Buffalo 

3.597 

0 

496 

3,578 

4,074 

442 

3,578 

4,020 

The  above  shows  that  the  St.  Lawrence  route  is  477  miles 
shorter  than  the  route  via  the  Barge  Canal,  and  423  to  471  miles 
shorter  than  via  rail  routes  to  New  York,  except  in  the  case  of 
Chicago,  where  the  difference  is  but  Z7  miles. 

CVith  a  practicable  navigation  for  ocean-going  vessels  extending 
into  the  Great  Lakes,  the  proposition  arising  for  determination 
is  whether  the  use  of  this  direct  and  .shorter  route  will  afford 
economies  as  compared  w'ith  existing  longer  routes  requiring 
one  or  more  transfers  of  cargo.  It  can  not  be  seriously  con- 
tended that  the  St.  Lawrence  route  will  not  be  more  economical 
than  any  route  involving  a  rail  haul  from  Lake  ports  to  the  At- 
lantic Ocean.  Lake  Erie  ports  are  practically  upon  an  equal 
footing  with  Atlantic  ports  so  far  as  distance  is  concerned,  and 
with  the  opening  of  deep  water  navigation  on  the  St.  Lawrence 
the  haul  from  these  ports  across  the  country  to  Atlantic  ports 
would  be  an  unjustifiable  expense,  increasing  the  time  and  intro- 
ducing uncertainties  of  delivery,  and  would  involve  the  use  of 
cars  which  could  better  be  employed  elsewhere.  As  explained  in 
another  part  of  this  report,  the  Barge  Canal  is  not  adapted  for 
the  economical  transportation  of  the  commerce  interested  in  the 
improvement  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River  and  is  at  an  even  greater 
disadvantage  than  the  rail  routes  so  far  as  distance  is  concerned. 
Dn  the  basis  of  distance  and  irrespective  of  the  cheaper  trans- 
portation afforded  by  vessels  as  compared  with  railroads,  all 
ports  located  on  the  shores  of  the  Great  Lakes  should  find  it 
advantageous  to  utilize  the  proposed  waterway.  When  consid- 
eration is  given  to  the  lower  cost  of  water  transportation  as  com- 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL 


83 


pared  with  rail,  the  advantages  of  this  route  will  be  found  to 
extend  to  practically  all  destinations  to  which  it  affords  direct 
access,  the  most  important  of  which  will  be  considered  later  in 
this  report. 

Distances  in  statute  miles  from  Ohio  River  points  to  Liverpool,  via  Atlantic 
Coast  ports,  and  via  Lake  Erie  ports* 


Distal 

ice,  statute 

miles 

' 

Rail 

Water 

Total 

Pittsburgh  to  Liverpool,  Via — 

New  York 

444 
353 
334 
135 
124 
147 

757 
666 
593 
668 
263 
211 

871 
780 
703 
731 
377 
325 

3,578 
3,743 
3,907 
3,735 
3,679 
3,640 

3,578 
3,743 
3,907 
3,768 
3,735 
3,812 

3,578 
3,743 
3,907 
3,768 
3,735 
3,812 

4,022 

Philadelphia 

Baltimore 

Cleveland 

Ashtabula 

Erie                        

4,096 
4,241 
3,870 
3,803 
3,787 

Cincinnati  to  Liverpool,  Via — 

New  York 

4,335 

Philadelphia 

Baltimore 

Norfolk 

Cleveland 

4,409 
4,500 
4,436 
3,998 

Toledo 

Louisville  to  Liverpool,  Via — 

New  York 

4,023 
4,449 

Philadelphia 

4,523 

Baltimore 

Norfolk                              

4,610 
4,499 

Cleveland 

4,112 

Toledo 

4,137 

*  Rail  distances  are  taken  from  the  Official  Table  of  Distances,  issued  by 
the  War  Department,  covering  the  shortest  usually  traveled  routes;  ocean 
distances  from  the  Table  of  Distances  between  Ports,  issued  by  the  Navy 
Department,  using  in  all  cases  the  shortest  route;  Lake  distances  from  the 
United  States  Lake  Survey  Bulletin. 

These  figures  show  a  decided  advantage  in  distance  in  favor 
of  the  Lake  route  to  and  from  Ohio  River  points,  irrespective 
of  the  important  advantages  of  avoiding  the  congestion  at  and 
around  Atlantic  ports,  avoiding  the  passage  over  the  AUeghanies, 
and  reducing  the  rail  haul  by  several  hundred  miles.  For  com- 
merce to  and  from  the  United  Kingdom  and  western  Europe,  the 
tributary  area  extends  as  far  as  Connellsville,  Pa.,  56  miles  south- 
east of  Pittsburgh,  and  includes  the  entire  Pittsburgh  manufac- 
turing district.  From  Connellsville  the  line  proceeds  approxi- 
mately to  Charleston,  W.  Va.,  which  is  329  miles  from  Cleveland 


84 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


and  428  miles  from  Baltimore,  the  nearest  Atlantic  coast  port, 
including  a  large  area  of  the  West  Virginia  coal  fields.  From 
Charleston,  W.  Va.,  the  line  extends  approximately  to  Nashville, 
Tenn.,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  following: 


Distance,  statute  miles 


Rail 


Water 


Total 


Nashville  to  Liverpool,  Via — 

New  York 998 

Philadelphia 907 

Baltimore 810 

Norfolk 801 

Charleston,  S.  C 598 

Savannah 583 

Mobile 485 

New  Orleans 626 

Cleveland 563 

Chicago 444 


3,578 
3,743 
3,907 
3,768 
4,076 
4,161 
5,233 
5,312 
3,735 
4,453 


4,576 
4,650 
4,717 
4,569 
4,674 
4,744 
5,718 
5,938 
4,298 
4,897 


These  figures  show  that  the  shortest  route  from  Nashville, 
Tenn.,  to  Liverpool  is  by  way  of  Cleveland  or  Toledo,  and  the 
shortest  rail  haul  is  by  way  of  Chicago.  The  water  haul  from 
Chicago  to  Liverpool  is  859  miles  less  than  from  New  Orleans 
and  1,043  miles  less  than  from  Galveston ;  while  the  tcaier  haul  to 
Liverpool  from  Cleveland  is  1,577  miles  less  thati  from  Nezv  Or- 
leans, and  L761  miles  less  than  from  Galveston.  These  impor- 
tant advantages  indicate  that  the  area  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes 
route  will  extend  considerably  more  than  half  the  distance  between 
the  Lakes  and  the  Gulf,  so  far  as  traffic  to  the  United  Kingdom 
and  western  Europe  is  concerned.  For  meats,  grain  and  other 
commodities  subject  to  deterioration  in  warm  climates,  the  Lake 
route  is  particularly  desirable. 

From  Nashville  the  line  would  proceed  below  the  southern 
boundary  of  Missouri  and  include  all  of  that  State  and  also  all 
of  Kansas,  Colorado.  Iowa,  and  all  States  north.  Traffic  origi- 
nating directly  on  the  Mississippi  River  below  St.  Louis  nu'ght 
be  considered  as  tributary  to  New  Orleans,  but  with  the  opening 
of  the  Illinois  waterway,  which  has  been  definitely  adopted.  Mis- 
sissippi River  traffic  originating  above  the  mouth  of  the  ( )hio 
River  will  be  equally  tributary  to  Chicago. 

Careful   studv   is   necessarv   in   fixinfj  the   western   and   south- 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


85 


western  limits  of  the  area  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes.  On  ac- 
count of  the  long  water  haul  from  the  Pacific  Coast  to  Liverpool, 
it  is  obvious  that  the  western  limit  of  this  area  extends  beyond 
the  point  of  equal  rail  distance  between  Lake  and  Pacific  ports, 
and  the  advantages  of  Galveston  over  Pacific  coast  points  are 
not  to  be  ignored.    The  following  are  the  distances  from  Denver: 


Distance,  statute  miles 


Denver  to  Liverpool,  V^ia 

San  Francisco 

Los  Angeles 

Galveston 

Chicago 

Cleveland 


10,400 

10,018 

6,619 

5,471 

5,114 


*  Via  Panama  Canal. 

The  above  figures  show  clearly  the  great  advantages  of  the 
Lake  route  for  commerce  to  and  from  Denver  and  other  points 
in  Colorado,  including  the  important  iron  and  lead  districts. 

From  the  southwestern  corner  of  Colorado  the  line  proceeds 
approximately  to  Salt  Lake  City,  as  will  be  seen  from  the 
following : 


Distance,  statute 

miles 

Rail 

Water 

Total 

Salt  Lake  City  to  Liverpool,  Via — 

San  Francisco 

Chicago 

Cleveland 

823 
1,530 
1,887 

9,024* 

4,453 

3,735 

9,847 
5,983 
5,622 

*  Via  Panama  Canal. 


While  the  route  by  way  of  the  Great  Lakes  is  approximately 
4.000  miles  shorter  than  by  way  of  the  Pacific  Coast,  it  involves 
a  much  longer  rail  haul,  the  cost  of  which  must  be  given  con- 
sideration in  deciding  whether  the  Lake  route  is  really  the 
more  economical. 


86 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS   OF    THE 


The  average  rail  rate  in  the  United  States  is  now  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  1.25  cent  per  ton  mile.  On  first  class  freight,  rates 
for  distances  of  500  to  2,000  miles  range  between  3  and  4y2 
cents  per  ton  mile.  As  will  be  later  shown,  the  average  freight 
vessel  engaged  in  onr  foreign  trade  has  a  net  tonnage  of  2,414,  a 
deadweight  tonnage  of  5,000  to  6,000  tons,  and  a  loaded  draft 
of  about  21  feet.  The  cost  of  transportation  by  a  vessel  of  this 
size  may  be  placed  at  1.3  mills  per  ton  mile,  based  upon  the  ex- 
perience of  the  Shipping  Board,  and  assuming  full  loads.  In 
practice,  however,  vessels  rarely  carry  full  loads  in  both  directions, 
and  a  more  reasonable  figure  for  the  conditions  actually  prevail- 
ing at  the  present  time  would  be  2  mills  per  ton  mile,  or  one-sixth 
the  cost  of  rail  carriage,  although  the  ratio  in  some  instances 
may  be  as  great  as  1  to  10.  On  the  basis  of  1  to  6,  the  above 
figures  may  be  reduced  to  an  all-water  basis,  as  follows: 

Distance  reduced  to 
all     water    cost     basis 
Salt  Lake  City  to  Liverpool:  Via—  statute   miles. 

San  Francisco 13,962 

Chicago 13,733 

Cleveland 15,157 

The  figures  for  Chicago  and  Cleveland  include  100  miles 
added  to  cover  the  distance  lost  through  10  hours'  delay  in  passing 
through  the  restricted  sections  of  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence 
Waterway.  It  seems  clear  that  Salt  Lake  City  marks  one  limit 
of  the  area  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes,  and  in  all  jirobability 
no  great  movement  from  this  remote  section  can  be  expected  by 
rail  for  export  unless  the  transcontinental  railroads  find  it  profit- 
able to  make  low  rates  to  Chicago.  It  is  believed  that  these 
railroads  will  welcome  the  opening  of  the  deep  waterway  in 
view  of  the  opportunity  it  will  aflford  to  establish  a  combined 
rail  and  water  route  to  Canadian,  North  Atlantic  and  European 
ports,  in  competition  with  the  existing  routes  by  way  of  the 
Panama  Canal. 

From  Salt  Lake  City  the  line  extends  approximately  to  Boi.se, 
Idaho.    The  distances  to  Liverpool  from  this  point  are  as  follows: 


Distance  statute  mil-^s 

Rail 

Water 

Total 

Boise  to  Liverpool,  Via — 

PortK'ind. .  .            

506 
1,662 

9.772 
4.540 

10.278 

Dululh 

6,208 

GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL 


87 


Reducing  the  above   distances   to   tlieir  all-water   ef|uivalents,' 
the  following  results  are  shown : 


Boise  to  Liveroool,  V'ia- 

Portland 

Duluth 


Distance  reduced  to 

all    water    cost    basis 

statute   miles 

12,808 
14,638 


The  distance  via  Duluth  includes  120  miles,  representing  12 
hours"  time  lost  in  passing  through  the  St.  Marys,  St.  Clair  and 
Detroit  Rivers,  and  other  restricted  sections  of  the  waterway. 
These  figures  indicate  that  there  would  not  be  any  pronounced 
movement  from  Boise  to  the  Great  Lakes  for  export  to  the 
United  Kingdom  and  western  Europe.  This  locality  falls  within 
competitive  territory,  however,  and  should  derive  advantage  from 
the  competition  certain  to  'exist  between  the  transcontinental 
roads  and  the  coastwise  vessels.  The  route  to  the  Lakes  has 
the  advantage  of  a  better  grade.  From  Helena,  Mont.,  the  dis- 
tances are  more  favorable  to  the  Great  Lakes  route : 


Distance,  statute  miles 

Rail 

Water 

Total 

Helena  to  Liverpool,  Via — 

Portland 

761 
1,136 

9,772 
4,546 

10,533 

Duluth 

-   5,682 

The  following  are  the  distances  reduced  to  an  all-water  cost 
basis : 

Statute  miles 
Portland 14,338 


Duluth . 


12.618 


Based  on  distances  and  the  relative  average  costs  of  rail  and 
ocean  transportation,  the  area  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes-St. 
Lawrence  deep  waterway  may  be  estimated  to  extend  to  the 
westerly  boundary  of  Montana,  and  all  points  east  of  112 
degrees  west  longitude  and  north  of  Salt  Lake  City  are  clearly 
within  the  territory  which  will  receive  direct  benefits  from  the 
improvement  in  connection  with  traffic  to  and  from  the  United 
Kingdom  and  western  Europe.  The  lines  can  not  be  definitely 
fixed,  because  there  will  be  a  wide  area  of  competitive  territory. 


88  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

aiul  much  will  depend  upon  the  rates  which  the  interested  rail- 
roads are  disposed  to  make  and  which  may  receive  the  approval 
of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission.  Moreover,  the  com- 
parative, cost  of  rail  and  ocean  transportation  varies  within  rather 
wide  limits,  and  the  adoption  of  a  different  ratio  from  that  herein 
assumed  would  change  the  results. 

It  should  be  pointed  out  that  the  outlet  for  the  products  of 
Montana  is  now  eastward,  and  that  the  imports  likewise  come 
form  the  east  with  the  exception  of  fresh  fruits,  canned  fruits, 
vegetables,  and  a  few  other  items,  of  which  the  total  volume  is 
very  small.  Aloreover,  the  wheat  and  flour  which  constitute  the 
most  important  items  of  export  are  injuriously  affected  by  passage 
through  warm  climates,  and  the  Lake  route  is  much  to  be  pre- 
ferred to  the  Panama  Canal  route  for  these  and  similar  products. 
Much  of  the  Montana  w^heat  is  now  shipped  through  Baltimore, 
Md.  Wheat  from  southern  Idaho  likewise  goes  to  the  Atlantic 
Coast,  but  the  wheat  of  northern  Idaho  goes  to  the  Pacific  because 
of  the  cheaper  rate.  The  existing  movement  of  traffic- therefore 
sustains  the  placing  of  the  westerly  limit  of  the  area  tributary 
to  ihe  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway  at  a  line  drawn 
from  F)oise,  Idaho,  to  the  northwesterly  corner  of  the  State  of 
Montana.  The  territory  embraced  in  the  above  discussion  is 
indicated  on  the  accompanying  map. 

Estimated  on  the  basis  of  rates. — An  estimate  of  the  tributary 
area  on  the  basis  of  distance  is  believed  to  be  of  more  permanent 
ajjplicability  than  an  estimate  based  on  rates,  since  rates  are  fre- 
(juently  changed  to  meet  altered  transportation  conditions.  Rail- 
road rates  are  more  stable  than  ocean  rates,  which  are  changed 
according  to  the  demand  for  carriers.  No  reliance  can  there- 
fore be  placed  upon  the  maintenance  of  a  given  rate  by  vessel, 
and  the  ex])ense  of  the  ocean  haul  may  properly  be  assumed  on 
the  basis  of  the  cost  of  oj^erating  a  vessel  of  suitable  type  and 
capacity  o\er  the  particular  route  under  consideration. 

In  general  terms  it  may  be  said  that  the  cost  of  operating 
a  given  vessel  over  one  route  as  compared  with  another  is  ])r(i- 
portional  to  the  time  required  for  the  two  joiu'neys,  although 
some  variation  in  cost  due  to  insurance,  port  charges,  etc..  may 
be  involved.  The  passage  through  restricted  channels  aftects  the 
cost  to  the  extent  that  it  increases  the  time  of  transit.  In  passing 
from  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence  to  Duluth,  it  is  estimated  that 
the  restricted  sections  of  the  waterway  will  cause  a  vessel  to 
consume  12.6  hours  luore  time  than  she  would  consume  for  the 
same  distance  in  open  water. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL 


89 


With  an  allowance  of  25  per  cent  additional  for  insurance,  and 
other  factors  increased  in  proportion  to  the  time  consumed  in 
making  the  trip,  it  has  been  estimated  that  the  cost  per  cargo  ton 
from  Liverpool  to  Duluth  as  compared  with  the  cost  from  Liver- 
pool to  New  York,  would  be  as  follows  for  standard  steel  vessels 
of  suitable  size  and  type : 


5,650  D.W.T. 
steel  ship  cost 
per  cargo  ton 

7,500  D.W.T. 
steel  ship  cost 
per  cargo  ton 

8,800  D.W.T. 

steel  ship  cost 
per  cargo  ton 

Liverpool  to  New  York .... 
Liverpool  to  Duluth 

$5.01 
6.69 

$4.32 
6.06 

$4.11 
5.42 

These  figures  assume  full  cargoes  both  ways.  If  the  return 
trip  were  in  ballast,  the  cost  per  ton  would  be  doubled.  With 
one-third  return  cargoes,  the  cost  on  the  Duluth  route  would 
be  $10.03,  $9.09,  and  $8.13,  respectively,  and  on  the  New  York 
trip  $7.51,  $6.48,  and  $6.16,  respectively,  for  the  vessels  con- 
sidered, making  a  theoretical  difference  in  favor  of  the  New 
York  route  of  $2.52,  $2.61,  and  $1.97,  respectively,  per  cargo  ton. 
New  York  would  also  have  an  advantage  over  Lake  Erie  ports 
of  $1.50  to  $2.00  per  ton,  so  far  as  the  actual  cost  of  the  water 
haul  is  concerned.  This  advantage,  however,  is  entirely  elimi- 
nated by  the  cost  of  the  transfer  and  incidental  charges  at  New 
York  or  other  Atlantic  ports.  The  promptness  with  which  ship- 
ments can  be  dispatched  will  have  a  controlling  influence  upon 
the    routing   of   traffic    from    competitive    territory. 

The  following  shows  1920  rates  from  Atlantic  and  Gulf  ports 
lo  the  United  Kingdom,  in  cents  per  hundred  pounds : 


Nev 


Commodity     Boston     y     , 


Phila- 
delphia 


Balti- 
more 


Norfolk 


Savan- 
nah 


Mobile 


New 
Orleans 


Galves- 
ton 


Agricultural 

implements. 
Clothing.  .  .  . 

Grain 

Meat 

Shoes 

Steel 


100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

107H 

11. S~ 

115 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

107^ 

ll.S 

115 

40 

40 

40 

40 

40 

47J^ 

60 

60 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

107M 

115 

115 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

107  ig 

115 

115 

49 

49 

49 

49 

49 

56V^ 

64 

64 

115 
115 

60 
115 
115 

64 


It  will  be  observed  that  vessels  make  the  same  rate  to  the 
United  Kingdom  from  all  North  Atlantic  ports,  although  the 
distance  from  Baltimore  to  Liverpool  is  535  statute  miles  farther 


90  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

than  from  Boston.  Baltimore  is  172  miles  farther  from  Liver- 
pool than  Cleveland,  which  is  more  than  sufficient  to  offset  the  10 
hours'  time  lost  in  restricted  channels  below  Lake  Erie.  In 
practice,  it  would  not  be  at  all  surprising  to  find  vessels  making 
the  same  rates  to  Lake  Erie  ports  as  to  North  Atlantic  ports. 
Attention  is  invited  to  the  rate  of  $1.15  per  hundred  pounds  on 
agricultural  implements,  clothing,  meat  and  shoes  from  New 
Orleans  and  Galveston  to  United  Kingdom,  as  compared  with 
$1.00  from  North  Atlantic  ports,  an  increase  of  only  15  cents 
a  hundred  for  an  additional  voyage  of  1,800  to  2,000  miles.  If 
cargo  can  be  carried  from  Galveston  to  Liverpool,  a  distance  of 
5.496  statute  miles,  for  $1.15  per  hundred  pounds,  there  is  every 
reason  to  believe  that  it  can  be  carried  from  Duluth  or  Chicago 
to  Liverpool  for  the  same  rate,  since  the  saving  of  approximately 
1.000  miles  in  distance  will  more  than  offset  the  slight  physical 
disadvantages  of  the  Lake  route.  The  time  actually  required 
for  the  trip,  not  counting  time  in  port,  would  be  several  days 
greater  from  Gulf  ports  than  from  Lake  ports,  and  the  cost 
would  therefore  be  heavier.  This  rate  amounts  to  an  increase 
of  $3.00  a  ton  over  the  New  York  rate,  which  is  in  keeping  with 
the  difference  in  the  estimated  cost  per  cargo  ton.  It  is  there- 
fore considered  entirely  reasonable  to  expect  that  rates  to  the 
United  Kingdom  and  Europe  would  be  approximately  the  same 
from  Duluth  and  Chicago  as  from  Gulf  ports. 

To  the  ocean  rates  must  be  added  the  cost  of  the  rail  haul 
where  involved.  The  new  rates,  effective  August  26,  1920,  are 
as  follows: 

Rail  rates  from  Chicago  to  specificed  North  Atlantic  Ports,  effective  Aug.  26,  1920 
{in  cents  per  100  lbs.) 

New  York  Philadelphia    Baltimore 

Agricultural  implements  CL 63  61  60 

Clothing  CL 1571/^  155».i  I54I2 

Grain  CL,  domestic 41i/^  39^  38»/i 

Grain  CL,  export 33  32  31 J^ 

Meat,  fresh,  CL 96^  94^  93^ 

Steel  (from  Gary,  I nd.) 63  61  60 

The  total  rates  in  cents  per  100  pounds  from  Chicago  to  Liver- 
pool, by  rail  and  ocean,  were  recently  as  follows: 

New  York  Philadelphia  Baltimore 

Agricultural  implements 163  161                 160 

Clothing 257>i  255J.^             254',2 

Grain 73  72                   711^ 

Meat 196  V-i  194»^             193  \l 

Steel  (from  Gary) 112  110                   109 


I 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  91 

These  rates  show  costs  per  ton  from  Chicago  to  Liverpool  via 
New  York  of  $32.60  on  agricultural  implements,  $51.50  on  cloth- 
ing, $14.60  on  grain,  and  $39.30  on  meats.  Vessel  operators  can 
afford  to  make  a  very  low  rate  on  grain  from  Duluth  or  Chicago, 
and  get  their  profits  from  the  general  package  freight  above  men- 
tioned, which  originates  on  the  Lakes  in  very  great  volume.  With 
a  total  cost  for  operating  and  maintaining  the  vessel  $8  to  $10 
per  cargo  ton.  contemplating  full  loads  eastward  and  one-third 
loads  westward,  there  is  a  very  wide  margin  for  profit  on  all 
traffic  to  and  from  ports  of  the  Great  Lakes.  The  rate  on  grain 
from  u]jper  Lake  ports  to  New  York,  by  lake  and  rail  is  approxi- 
mately 18/ 2  cents  per  biishel,  or  31.8  cents  per  hundred  pounds, 
including  elevator  charges  at  Buffalo.  The  lake  rate  to  Buffalo  is 
about  4  cents  per  bushel,  and  if  the  St.  Lawrence  were  open  to 
lake  and  ocean  vessels  the  rate  for  carrying  grain  as  far  as 
Montreal  would  be  about  7  cents  per  bushel,  based  on  present 
costs.  It  would  therefore  be  entirely  feasible  to  get  the  gram 
as  far  as  Montreal,  a  distance  of  3,207  statute  miles  from  Liver- 
pool, at  a  saving  of  8  to  12  cents  per  bushel,  as  compared  with 
the  cost  of  getting  it  to  New  York,  3,578  statute  miles  from  Liver- 
pool. Since  the  cost  of  transferring  grain  to  ocean  carrier  at 
Montreal  would  not  exceed  1  cent  per  bushel,  there  is  clearly  an 
opportunity  for  a  net  saving  of  6  to  10  cents  per  bushel,  utilizing 
the  lake  ^  essel  as  far  as  Montreal.  As  shown  elsewhere  in  this 
report,  however,  the  greatest  economies  will  result  from  shipping 
direct  in  ocean  vessels  carrying  well  balanced  cargoes  consisting  of 
proper  proportions  of  grain  and  high-class  freight.  It  is  this 
combination  of  bulk  and  package  freight  that  permits  the  lowest 
rates  on  the  bulk  cargo. 

Comparing  the  present  rail  and  ocean  rates  from  Chicago  to 
the  Lniited  Kingdom  with  the  ocean  rates  from  Gulf  ports, 
which  are  assumed  to  be  equivalent  to  the  probable  Lake  rate, 
it  will  be  seen  that  a  very  great  saving  will  be  effected  by  the 
proposed  waterway.  On  agricultural  implements  a  saving  of 
45  cents  a  hundred  is  indicated,  on  meat  75  cents  a  hundred,  and 
on  clothing  probably  $1.00  a  hundred.  Grain  is  carried  from 
Gulf  ports  for  60  cents  a  hundred,  while  the  rate  through  New 
York  from  Chicago  is  T^  cents  a  hundred,  indicating  a  possible 
saving  of  13  cents  a  hundred,  with  a  rate  from  Chicago  and 
Duluth  similar  to  that  from  Gulf  ports.  Steel  from  Gary  to  the 
LTnited  Kingdom  via  New  York  takes  a  rate  of  $1.12  a  hundred. 
It  can  be  shipped  from  Gulf  ports  for  64  cents  a  hundred,  and 


92  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

a  similar  rate  would  probably  be  feasible  by  vessel  direct  from 
Gary : 

Taking  up  the  Ohio  River  points,  we  find  the  following : 

Rail  rates  on  coal  to  specified  ports  on  Lake  Erie  and  the  Atlantic  Coast, 
effective    Aug.    26,    1920 

From  To  Rate  per  ton 

New  River  District Toledo $2 .  86 

New  River  District Newport  News 2.80 

Kanawha  and  Big  Sandy  District Toledo 2 .  66 

Kanawha  and  Big  Sandy  District Newport  News 2  .90 

Pittsburgh A  shtabula 1 .  86 

Pittsburgh Cleveland 1 .  86 

It  is  believed  that  Lake  Erie  ports  would  be  able  to  attract 
export  coal,  particularly  in  view  of  the  great  congestion  in  this 
traffic  moving  to  the  Atlantic  coast.  During  the  summer  of  1920, 
the  movement  of  coal  through  Norfolk  and  Baltimore  was  com- 
pletely blocked.  At  Norfolk  prices  as  high  as  $18  to  $20  a  ton 
were  offered  for  coal  for  export.  If  the  St.  Lawrence  had  been 
open  to  ocean  vessels,  Lake  Erie  ports  would  have  relieved  the 
situation. 

Rail  rates  on  manufactured  iron  and  steel  from   Pittsburgh,  Pa.,  to  specified 
ports,  effective  Aug.  26,  1920 

Cetits  per  100  Ihs. 

A  shtabula 23 

Cleveland 24 

New  York 38 

Philadelphia 36 

Baltimore 35 

Adding  the  ocean  rate  to  United  Kingdom  points,  the  total 
rate  from  Pittsburgh  is  87  cents  per  100  pounds,  or  $17.40  per 
short  ton.  lliere  is  no  doubt  that  Lake  Erie  ports  can  expect 
to  obtain  a  share  of  this  traffic.  The  rate  from  Cleveland  or 
Ashtabula  to  the  United  Kingdom  should  be  in  the  neighborhood 
of  50  of  55  cents  a  hundred  pounds,  making  a  total  charge  from 
Pittsburgh  of  75  to  80  cents. 

Since  it  has  been  determined  that  rates  may  be  made  from 
Lake  Michigan  and  Lake  Superior  to  the  United  Kingdom  and 
western  Euroi)e.  which  will  conijjare  favorably  with  the  rates  to 
those  points  from  the  Gulf  ports,  the  study  of  the  area  between 
the  Lakes  and  the  Gulf  resolves  itself  largely  into  a  study  of 
rail  rates  to  the  two  outlets.  The  rates  to  Atlantic  ports  are 
included  for  comparison. 


1 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  93 

Rail  rales  from  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  effective  Aug.  26,  1920.     {In  cents  per  100  lbs.) 

To  New  To  New  To  *To 

York  Orleans  Galveston  Chicago 

Agricultural  implements  CL  for  export.     733^  52  52  28^ 

Clothing  CL  for  export 148  136^  1363^  88 

Meat  CL  for  export 1033/2  5534  553^  2834 

Shoes  CL  for  export 15734  1363^  1363^  88 

Grain  CL  for  export 4334  2334  373^  16 

*  Domestic  rates. 

These  rates  show  a  pronounced  advantage  in  shipping  via 
Chicago,  amounting  to  23^  cents  on  agricuUural  implements, 
483/2  cents  on  clothin,g,  27  cents  on  fresh  meat,  48^  cents  on 
shoes,  and  7^^  cents  on  grain  as  compared  with  New  Orleans, 
and  21  j^  cents  as  compared  with  Galveston.  The  rates  to 
Chicago  are  of  course  domestic  rates,  and  some  reduction  could 
be  expected  to  place  these  on  an  export  basis.  With  the  opening 
of  the  St.  Lawrence  this  route  is  clearly  indicated  as  the  most 
economical  for  shipment  from  St.  Louis.  Shipments  through 
Atlantic  Coast  ports  in  comparison  would  be  unduly  expensive. 
The  claim  made  by  proponents  of  the  new  route  that  its  influence 
would  extend  as  far  as  Oklahoma  has  foundation. 

The  rates  on  grain  from  Boise,  Idaho,  in  cents  per  100  lbs., 
are  as  follows : 

Boise  to  Portland 48 

Boise  to  Seattle S7}4 

Boise  to  Chicago 74J--2 

From  Helena,  the  following  rates,  in  cents  per  100  lbs.,  are 
quoted : 

To  Portland      To  DululJi 
Grain 423^  503^ 

The  above  rates  on  grain  show  a  difiference  in  favor  of  Port- 
land of  26y2  cents  from  Boise,  and  SjA  cents  from  Helena.  At 
the  assumed  lake  rate  of  60  cents  per  100  lbs.,  from  Duluth  or 
Chicago,  corresponding  to  the  rate  from  Gulf  ports,  the  total 
rate  to  Liverpool  would  be  as  follows  : 

Rates  on  grain  to  Liverpool  from  Boise  and  Helena. 
(In  cents  per   100  lbs.) 

Boise  to  Liverpool,  via  Chicago 1343^ 

Helena  to  Liverpool,  via  Duluth 11034 

There  is  quite  a  large  movement  of  grain  from  Portland, 
Seattle  and  San  Francisco  to  the  United  Kingdom  and  to  North 


94  ECONOMIC   ASPECTS    OF    THE 

Atlantic  ports  by  way  of  the  Panama  Canal.  During  the  fiscal 
year  ending  June  30,  1920,  120  vessels  loaded  with  grain  and  flour 
passed  through  the  Canal,  of  which  twenty-nine  were  destined  for 
points  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  Europe,  and  ninety-one  for 
Atlantic  ports  of  the  United  States.  The  rate  on  grain  from 
Portland,  Seattle  and  San  Francisco  to  New  York.  Boston 
and  Philadelphia  by  vessel  is  $1,563/2  per  100  lbs.  This  rate  was 
furnished  by  the  Shipping  Board  under  date  of  September  20, 
1920.  Shipping  Board  charter  rates  on  grain  were  $20  a  ton  for 
full  cargoes  from  San  Francisco,  Portland,  Puget  Sound  to  the 
United  Kingdom  or  continent,  Bordeaux  to  Hamburg.*  The 
rates  vary,  however,  according  to  the  demand  for  carriers. 

The  following  statistics  published  by  the  Department  of 
Agriculture  show  that  in  1913  the  area  tributary  to  Atlantic 
ports  for  grain  shipments  extended  as  far  westward  as  Blackfoot, 
Idaho. 

Approximate    transportation   costs   from    Blackfoot,   Idaho,    to    Liverpool, 
England    (1913),  per  bushel  of  zvheat 

I'm  Pacific                                   Cents  Via  Atlantic                                   Cents 

By     rail     to     Seattle     or  By  rail  to  New  York 39 . 2 

Tacoma 24 

Ocean  freight  to  Liverpool.     21  New  York  to  Liverpool.  .  .      5.6 


Total 45  Total 44 . 8 

In  order  that  Pacific  ports  can  com])ete  on  this  business,  the 
vessel  rate  is  adjusted  so  that  the  total  rate  to  Liverpool  is 
approximately  the  same  as  via  Atlantic  ports.  x*\s  noted  above, 
however,  the  grain  movement  is  largely  eastward  from  Montana 
and  southern  Idaho. 

In  further  support  of  the  statement  that  the  influence  of  the 
St.  Lawrence  route  will  extend  as  far  as  the  western  boundary 
of  Montana,  attention  is  invited  to  the  letter  of  the  Traffic 
Manager  of  the  Anaconda  Copper  Companv,  dated  December 
4.  1920: 

./ANACONDA  COPPER  MIXING  COMPANY 
Traffic  Department, 

42  Broadway 

Nkw  York,  December  4.    1920. 
International  Joint  Commission, 

Washington,  D.  C,  and  Ottawa,  Canada. 
To  the  Honorable  Members  of  the  Commission: 

Snpplemcnting  the  statement  made  by  me  in  Helena,  Montana,  at  a 
previous  hearing  before  your  Body,  I  beg  to  advise  that  we  are  now  moving 


*Lower  rates  have  since  been  c|uoted. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  95 

copper  and  zinc  to  New  York,  via  Seattle,  Washington  and  tlie  Panama 
Canal,  a  distance  of  sonre  7,800  miles,  at  a  very  material  saving  in  freight 
rates.      The  rates  are  as  follows  : 

Per    ton 

Butte  to  New  York,  all  rail,  2,500  miles $22  .00 

Lake  and  rail 20 .  93 1  ^ 

Rail  rate,  Butte  to  Puget  Sound,  800  miles 7  .87}^ 

The  rate,  Seattle  to  New  York,  is  somewhat  of  an  uncertain  factor, 
depending  entirely  upon  the  available  bottoms.  A  rate  of  40c 
per  cwt.  has  prevailed  in  the  past,  with  reductions  recently.  I 
should  sa}'  the  rate  would  vary  from $5  to  $8 

A  route  from  Duluth,  such  as  the  proposed  ocean  way  via  the  Welland 
Canal  and  St.  Lawrence  River,  would  afford  us  a  much  more  attractive 
rate  than  across  the  Rocky  Mountains,  the  Cascades  and  through  the 
Panama  Canal.  The  distance  from  Butte  to  Lake  Superior  is  but  little! 
greater  by  rail  than  to  Puget  Sound,  with  the  mountain  ranges  eliminated,! 
and  the  water  distance  from  Lake  Superior  points  to  New  York  is  lessl 
than  40  per  cent  of  the  distance  via  Panama  Canal  to  reach  New  York\ 
and  other  North  Atlantic  Coast  points,  while  for  overseas  trading  the  \ 
saving  in  distance  and  cost  would  be   pronounced. 

From  the  above  it  will  be  seen  that  the  present  saving  via  the  Seattle  ' 
and  Panama  route  amounts  to  some  $6.00  or  more  per  ton.  This  would 
be  increased  via  Lake  Superior  points  and  the  St.  Lawrence.  When  this  , 
saving  is  applied  to  our  monthly  production  of  13,000  tons  of  copper  and 
4,500  tons  of  zinc  in  normal  times,  it  will  give  some  conception  of  what 
such  a  sea-way  to  the  heart  of  the  American  continent  would  mean  in 
transportation  economies  to  our  industry  alone,  and  when  applied  to  all 
of  the  varied  production  of  that  vast  section  its  benefit  to  the  Nation  / 
becomes  almost  incalculable. 

Verv   truly  vours, 

(Sgd.)     E.  H.  L.-vxG 


f 


96 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


97 


The  Tributary  Area  for  Commerce  With  Mediterranean  Ports 

The  comparative  distances  to  Mediterranean  ports  will  be  seen 
from  the  following-  statement  of  distances  to  Gibraltar : 


Pittsburgh  to  Gibraltar,  Via — 

New  York 

Philadelphia 

Baltimore 

Cleveland 

Ash  abula 

Erie 

Cincinnati  to  Gibraltar,  Via — 

New  York 

Philadelphia 

Baltimore 

Norfolk 

Cleveland 

Toledo 

Louisville  to  Gibraltar,  Via — 

New  York 

Philadelphia 

Baltimore 

Norfolk 

Cleveland 

Toledo 


Distance,  statute  miles 


Rail 

Water 

Total 

444 

3,693 

4,137 

353 

3,858 

4,211 

334 

4,019 

4,353 

135 

4,199 

4,334 

124 

4,142 

4,266 

147 

4,104 

4,251 

757 

3,693 

4,450 

666 

3,858 

4,524 

593 

4,019 

4,612 

668 

3,880 

4,548 

263 

4,199 

4,462 

211 

4,276 

4,487 

871 

3,693 

4,564 

780 

3,858 

4,638 

703 

4,019 

4,722 

731 

3,880 

4,611 

377 

4,199 

4,576 

325 

4,276 

4,609 

The  above  shows  that  New  York  is  the  shortest  route  from 
Ohio  River  points  to  the  Mediterranean,  but  that  it  involves  the 
greatest  rail  distance,  which  is  the  thing  to  be  avoided.  The 
distance  from  Cincinnati  to  Gibraltar  by  way  of  New  York 
is  12  miles  less  than  by  way  of  Cleveland,  but  the  rail  haul  is 
494  miles  greater,  involving  an  average  additional  cost  of  over 
$6.00  per  ton  for  the  haul  alone.  To  partially  offset  this  dif- 
ference, the  lake  route  involves  500  miles  of  additional  naviga- 
tion, and  a  loss  of  10  hours  due  to  passage  through  the  Welland 
Canal  and  upper  St.  Lawrence  River.  The  loss  of  time  is 
equivalent  to  100  miles  of  navigation,  making  the  equivalent  of 
600  miles  additional  distance.  At  2  mills  per  cargo  ton  mile, 
the  actual  cost  of  transporting  a  ton  over  this  additional  distance 
by  ocean  carrier  would  be  $1.20,  indicating  a  possible  saving 
averaging  $4.80  a  ton  by  using  the  Lake  route. 


98  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

Comparing  existing  rail  rates  frum  Pittsbtirgh  to  New  York 
on  steel  of  38  cents  a  hundred  pounds  or  $7.60  a  ton,  with  the 
existing  rate  to  Cleveland  of  24  cents  a  hundred  pounds  or  $4.80 
a  ton,  shows  a  saving  of  $2.80  a  ton  on  the  rail  haul.  At  2  mills 
per  ton  mile  the  additional  water  haul  and  time  of  vessel  involves 
a  cost  of  $1.20,  making  a  difference  uf  SI. 60  per  ton  in  favor  of 
shipping  steel  via  Lake  Erie.  On  high  class  package  freight  the 
saving  would  be  greater. 

Proceeding  westward,  the  difference  in  favor  of  the  Lake  route 
continues,  and  it  will  therefore  be  unnecessary  to  work  out  the 
costs  for  each  point.  The  following  table  of  distances  may, 
however,  be  of  interest : 

Distances  to  Gibraltar  by  Water. 

Statute  miles 

Clevsland 4,199 

Chicago 4,917 

Duluth 5,010 

New  Orleans ■ 5,289 

Galveston 5,473 

San  Francisco 8,775 

Portland,  Oreg 9,523 

The  figures  show  that  the  area  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes- 
St.  Lawrence  waterway  for  Mediterranean  trade  will  not  extend 
quite  so  far  in  every  direction  from  the  Great  Lakes  as  the  area 
for  the  Baltic,  United  Kingdom  and  western  Europe  trade.  The 
distance  to  Gibraltar  from  lake  ports  is  464  miles  farther  than  to 
Liverpool,  while  the  distance  from  New  York,  Philadelphia  and 
Baltimore  to  Gibraltar  is  only  115  miles  farther  than  to  Liverpool. 
New  Orleans  and  Galveston  are  23  miles  nearer  Gibraltar  than 
to  Liverpool,  while  San  Francisco  and  Portland  are  249  miles 
nearer  Gibraltar  than  to  Liverpool.  These  differences  mean  little 
on  voyages  of  the  length  considered,  but  theoretically  they 
limit  the  tributary  area  for  Mediterranean  i)orts  as  compared 
with  United  Kingdom  ports  by  a  distance  ranging  from  50 
miles  throughout  the  eastern  part  of  the  country  to  120  miles 
in  the  western  portion  of  the  country. 


GREAT   LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


99 


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100 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


The  Area  Tributary  for  Traffic  with  the  West  Indies,  Central 
and  South  America,  and  the  Orient 

The  probable  commerce  between  the  Northwest  and  the  West 
Indies,  Central  and  South  America,  includes  the  importation  of 
raw  sugar  from  Cuba,  bananas  and  other  tropical  fruits  from 
Jamaica  and  Central  America,  chiefly  Honduras,  asphalt  from 
Trinidad,  coffee  and  rubber  from  Brazil,  nitrate  of  soda  from 
Chili,  sisal,  ixtle  and  possibly  oil  from  Mexico,  hard  woods  from 
Panama  and  Central  America,  flaxseed  and  hides  from  x\rgen- 
tine,  and  many  other  items.  The  exports  to  these  places  will 
consist  in  general  of  iron  and.  steel,  agricultural  implements 
and  machinery,  automobiles  and  vehicles,  clothing  and  other 
manufactured  goods,  flour,  corn  and  oats  to  Mexico  and  Cuba 
and  in  lesser  quantities  to  other  countries,  cement,  chemicals, 
etc.  Some  of  the  more  important  of  these  commodity  move- 
ments will  be  analyzed  later  in  this  report,  and  the  present 
consideration  will  be  confined  to  a  study  of  the  cost  of  trans- 
porting commerce  between  these  countries  and  the  Great  Lakes, 
as  compared  with  existing  routes  via  Gulf  and  Atlantic  ports. 
The  distances  in  statute  miles  are  as  follows : 


Via 

New  York 

Via  Galveston 

Via  St. 
Law- 

rence 

direct 

Rail 

Water 

Total 

Rail 

Water 

Total 

Total 

Havana  to  Cleveland .... 

584 

1,366 

1,950 

1,412 

886 

2,298 

3,375 

Havana  to  Chicago 

912 

1,366 

2,278 

1,148 

886 

2,034 

4,093 

Havana  to  Duluth 

1,391 

1,366 

2,757 

1,485 

886 

2.371 

4,186 

Tampico  to  Chicago 

912 

2,338 

3,250 

1,148 

545 

1,693 

5,047 

Tampico  to  Duluth 

1,391 

2,338 

3,729 

1,485 

545 

2.030 

5,140 

Panama  to  Chicago 

912 

2,n?, 

3,235 

1,148 

1.769 

2.917 

4,934 

Rio  de  Janeiro  to  Toledo. 

705 

5,493 

6,198 

1,301 

6,173 

7,474 

6,773 

Rio  de  Janeiro  to  Chicago. 

912 

5,493 

6,405 

1,148 

6,173 

7,321 

7,414 

Rio  de  Janeiro  to  Duluth. 

1.391 

5,493 

6,884 

1,485 

6,173 

7,658 

7,507 

Buenos  Aires  to  Duluth . . 

1,391 

6,761 

8,151 

1,485 

7,490 

8,975 

8,775 

Buenos  Aires  to  Chicago. . 

912 

6,761 

7,673 

1,148 

7,490 

8,638 

8.682 

Buenos  Aires  to  Cleveland 

584 

6,761 

7,345 

1,412 

7,490 

8,902 

7,964 

Pernambuco  to  Cleveland 

584 

4,258 

4,842 

1,412 

4,987 

6.399 

5,461 

GREAT    LAKES-ST.'  LAWRENCE    SHiTP    CHANNEL 


101 


Via  New  Orleans 

- 

Rail 

Water 

Total 

Rio  de  Janeiro  to  Toledo 

1,046 
912 

1,098 
912 

5,965     7.011 

Buenos  Aires  to  Chicago 

Pernambuco  to  Cleveland 

7,233 
4,731 
1,650 

8,145 
5,829 

Panama  to  Chicago    

2,562 

These  figures  show  that  the  distance  from  points  on  the  east 
coast  of  South  America  to  Duluth  and  Lake  Erie  ports  by  way  of 
the  St.  Lawrence  is  less  than  by  way  of  Gulf  ports.  The  distance 
from  similar  points  to  New  York  is  less  than  to  Lake  ports,  but 
the  difference  is  by  no  means  sufficient  to  overcome  the  cost  of 
transfer  at  New  York  and  the  cost  of  the  rail  haul.  For  instance, 
taking  Pernambuco  as  a  basing  point,  rubber  can  be  shipped  di- 
rect to  Cleveland  by  way  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  a  total  distance  of 
5,461  statute  miles,  for  much  less  cost  than  it  can  be  shipped 
4.258  miles  by  water  to  New  York,  and  there  stand  the  cost 
of  a  transfer  and  a  rail  haul  of  584  miles  to  Cleveland.  Similarly, 
cofifee  could  be  shipped  from  Rio  de  Janeiro  direct  to  Toledo,  a 
distance  of  6,773  miles,  at  a  substantial  saving  as  compared 
with  the  cost  of  shipping  this  commodity  5,493  miles  to  New 
York,  with  a  transfer  and  further  haul  of  705  miles  by  rail  to 
destination.  The  transfer  and  rail  haul  will  together  cost  as 
much  as  the  entire  trip  between  Rio  de  Janeiro  and  Toledo  by 
water. 


102 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


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GREAT   LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  103 

There  is  no  question  that  raw  sugar  can  be  shipped  from 
Havana  to  Duluth  direct  by  water  at  less  cost  than  it  can  be 
shipped  via  either  Atlantic  or  Gulf  ports.  The  long-  rail  haul  to 
Duluth  is  an  item  of  such  heavy  expense  as  to  make  direct  water 
shipments  to  this  place  advantageous  from  practically  all  parts 
of  the  world.  The  most  unfavorable  points  for  such  shipments 
to  Duluth  are  apparently  Mexican  ports,  but  even  here  the  long 
rail  haul  more  than  overcomes  the  advantages  of  distance 
possessed  by  the  Gulf  ports.  Frdm  Tampico  to  Duluth  is  5,140 
miles  by  way  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  while  the  distance  via  Galves- 
ton is  only  2,030  miles.  But  the  latter  route  involves  a  rail 
haul  of  1,485  miles  with  an  average  rail  charge  for  this  distance 
of  about  $15  a  ton.  This  item  and  the  cost  of  transfer  are  suf- 
ficient to  pay  the  entire  cost  of  the  shipment  by  water.  The  rail 
haul  alone  is  equivalent  in  cost  to  a  water  haul  of  5,000  to  9,000 
miles.  The  same  conditions  apply  to  manufactured  goods  and 
other  freight  shipped  from  the  Great  Lakes. 

The  following  are  the  rail  rates  effective  August  26,  1920,  be- 
tween New  Orleans  and  specified  Lake  ports  : 

Rates  from    New    Orleans   in    cents    per    100   lbs. 

Chicago  Toledo  Duluth 

Bananas,  CL 883^  ....  .... 

Burlap,  CL 42 

Sisal,  CL 51K 

Coffee : 60  72  77^ 

Sugar 60  60  74^ 

These  figures  show  costs  per  ton  on  colTee,  of  $12  to  Chicago, 
$14.40  to  Toledo,  and  $15.50  to  Duluth,  for  the  rail  haul  from 
New  Orleans  alone,  and  to  this  must  be  added  the  cost  of  the 
water  haul  from  Brazil  to  New  Orleans.  The  total  distance  by 
water  from  Rio  de  Janeiro  to  Toledo  is  6,773  miles,  and  from 
Rio  de  Janeiro  to  New  Orleans  5,965  miles,  a  difference  of  808 
miles  in  favor  of  New  Orleans.  But  the  route  to  Toledo  via 
New  Orleans  involves  a  rail  haul  of  1,046  miles  and  a  transfer. 
The  proportion  is  so  plainly  in  favor  of  the  lake  route  as  to 
require  no  further  discussion.  The  saving  may  be  expected  to 
amount  to  fully  $10  a  ton. 

From  Havana  to  Duluth  the  existing  route  by  way  of  New 
York  involves  a  water  haul  of  1,366  miles  and  a  rail  haul  of 
1,391  miles,  while  the  distance  via  the  St.  Lawrence  is  4,186 
miles.  The  diflFerence  in  the  water  haul,  2,820  miles,  is  to  be 
compared  with   a   rail   haul  of   1,391   and  the  added  cost   of  a 


104 


ECONOMIC   ASPECTS    OF    THE 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  105 

transfer.    On  sugar  to  Duluth  there  is  clearly  an  opportunity  for 

a  saving  of  $5  a  ton,  as  compared  with  either  the  New  York, 

New  Orleans  or  Galveston  routes. 

The  tributary  area  for  commerce  between  the  Lakes  and  the 

West  Indies  and  Central  America,  however,  will  not  extend  very 

far  in  a  southerly  direction  from  the  Lakes,  except  as  aflfected 

by  the  normal  processes  of  accumulation  and  distribution.     We 

could  scarcely  expect  iron  from  Colorado  to  reach  Mexico  by 

way  of  the  Great  Lakes,  nor  could  we  expect  shoes  or  other 

manufactured  goods   from   St.   Louis  to  seek  those  markets  by 

way  of  the  Lake  route.    If  the  goods  are  of  such  nature  that  they 

are    ready    for    movement    to    final    destination,     they    would 

naturally  go  by  rail  to  the  Gulf  rather  than  by  rail  to  the  Lakes, 

as  a  transfer  would  be  involved  in  either  case  and  the  difference 

in  rail  distances  in  favor  of  Lake  ports  would  be  offset  by  the 

greater  water  distance  by  this  route.    The  area  tributary  to  the 

waterway  for  trade  with  the  West  Indies  and  Central  America 

will  therefore  be  confined  rather  closely  to  the  Lakes  themselves, 

with  an  extension  of  the  area  westward  penetrating  the  States 

situated  at  the  greatest  distances  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.    The 

westerly  limit  of  this  area  will  be  fixed  by  the  competition  of  the 

Pacific    routes.     The    distances    from    Pacific    ports    to    Rio    de 

Janeiro,  Buenos  Aires,  Havana,  and  some  of  the  other  points 

considered,  however,  are  considerably  greater  than  from  Lake 

ports  by  way  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  as  will  be  seen   from  the 

following: 

Statute  miles 

San  Francisco  to  Rio  de  Janeiro 8,794 

Seattle  to  Rio  de  Janeiro 9,720 

San  Francisco  to  Havana 4,941 

San  Francisco  to  Pernambuco 7,560 

San  Francisco  to  Buenos  Aires 10,062 

San  Francisco  to  Tampico 5,496 

Seattle  to  Tampico 6,422 

It  may  be  conceded  that  Pacific  Coast  ports  have  alvantages 
on  nearly  all  trafific  which  requires  a  transfer  from  rail  to  vessel, 
bound  to  and  from  Hawaii,  Japan,  the  Philippines,  and  Australia. 
The  advantages  are  reversed  for  trade  with  the  west  coast  of 
South  America,  however. 


Yokohama. 
Sydney. .  .  . 
Honolulu .  . 

Callao 

Guayaquil. 
Valparaiso . 


Montreal 

San  Francisco 

Seattle 

Stat,  miles 

Stat,  miles 

Stat,  miles 

12,534 

5,223 

4,900 

12,525 

7,766 

9,083 

2,408 

2,774 

5,238 

4,591 

5,517 

4,601 

4,047 

4,973 

6,701 

5,919 

6,845 

106 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


Duluth  is  1,339  miles  by  water  from  Montreal  and  1,808  miles 
by  rail  from  Seattle,  while  Chicago  is  1,246  miles  by  water  from 
Montreal  and  2,279  miles  by  rail  from  San  Francisco.  The 
through  distances  from  Lake  ports  to  points  on  the  west  coast  of 
South  America  are  as  follows : 


Via  Pacific  ports 


Rail         Water       Total 


Via  St. 
Lawrence 


All  water 


Chicago  to  Callao. . .  . 
Chicago  to  Guayaquil 
Chicago  to  Valparaiso 
Duluth  to  Callao .... 
Duluth  to  Guayaquil. 
Duluth  to  Valparaiso. 


2,279 

2,279 
2,279 
1,808 
1,808 
1,808 


4,591 
4,047 
5,919 
5,517 
4,973 
6,845 


6,870 
6,326 
8,198 
7,325 
6,781 
8,653 


6,484 
5,847 
7,947 
6,577 
5,940 
8,040 


The  distances  from  points  east  of  Duluth  and  Chicago  are 
more  favorable  to  the  Lake  route.  It  will  be  seen  that  direct 
sailings  between  Lake  ports  and  South  America  should  be 
more  economical  than  shipments  through  Pacific  ports,  with  the 
long  rail  haul  and  transfer  involved.  The  same  is  true  to  a  less 
extent  of  shipments  through  Gulf  ports. 

It  is  believed  that  the  route  through  Pacific  ports  to  the  Orient 
will  be  found  to  be  the  more  economical  for  practically  all  of  the 
territory  west  of  the  Great  Lakes.  In  the  past,  the  rate  on  steel 
from  Pittsburgh  to  Yokohama,  for  instance,  has  been  the  same 
whether  shipped  through  New  York  or  San  Francisco,  but  the 
vessel  operating  from  San  Francisco  or  other  Pacific  port  was 
compelled  to  adjust  its  rate  in  connection  with  the  transcon- 
tinental rate,  so  as  not  to  exceed  the  combined  rail  and  water 
rate  via  New  York.  This  traffic  has  been  conducted  on  rather 
a  slender  margin,  and  it  is  claimed  that  the  recent  increase  of 
rail  rates  makes  it  impracticable  for  the  vessels  operating  from 
Pacific  ports  to  the  Orient  to  make  a  profit.  Since  45  per  cent  of 
the  cars  going  west  are  empty,  it  is  economically  imjiortant  that 
this  traffic  be  preserved,  and  it  may  be  expected  that  more  favor- 
able rates  will  be  made  on  the  commodities  ordinarily  moving 
through  these  ports.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  area  tribu- 
tary to  the  St.  Lawrence  waterway  for  commerce  with  Hawaii. 
Japan,  China,  Australia  and  the  Philippines  will  probably  not 
extend  far  from  the  shores  of  the  Great  Lakes. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  107 


The  Area  Tributary  for  Coastwise  Traffic 

The  utilization  of  the  St.  Lawrence  waterway  for  coastwise 
traffic  between  lake  and  ocean  ports  involves  the  substitution 
of  a  water  haul  for  a  rail  haul,  the  former  being  of  greater 
length  than  the  latter.  In  this  case  the  problem  involves  only 
the  comparative  cost  of  the  two  methods,  the  time  of  transit, 
including  delays  at  ports,  being  a  factor  of  cost.  In  case  of  a 
movement  from  or  to  a  point  not  directly  reached  by  the  water 
carrier,  the  cost  of  the  land  haul  and  transfer  must  be  added  to 
the  cost  of  the  water  haul.  So  far  as  the  territory  between 
Lake  Erie,  Lake  Ontario  and  the  Atlantic  Coast  is  concerned, 
it  is  obvious  that  the  tributary  area  will  not  extend  very  far 
from  the  shore  line  for  goods  which  ordinarily  move  directly 
to  destination.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  many  com- 
modities do  not  move  directly  from  point  of  origin  to  point  of 
destination,  but  are  first  dispatched  to  points  of  accumulation  or 
primary  markets.  Every  important  rail  and  water  point  is  to 
a  greater  or  less  extent  a  point  of  accumulation.  The  agricultural 
products  of  Illinois,  Indiana  and  Ohio  go  first  to  Chicago,  Toledo, 
Cleveland,  and  other  points.  For  all  products  moving  to  points 
of  accumulation,  this  additional  haul  is  involved  regardless  of 
the  method  by  which  the  larger  transportation  movement  is 
made.  Products  from  central  Illinois  may  move  to  Chicago 
as  their  primary  market,  and  may  then  proceed  in  carload  lots 
to  New  York,  from  which  point  they  may  be  carried  in  smaller 
lots  to  points  some  distance  inland  for  consumption.  To  fix 
with  reasonable  accuracy  the  limits  of  the  area  tributary  for  such 
traffic  would  involve  careful  study  of  the  extent  and  character 
of  the  business  of  every  port  involved,  which  is  beyond  the 
scope  of  this  report.  The  discussion  will  therefore  be  restricted 
to  movements  from  points  of  accumulation  or  direct  shipment 
only. 

Rail  distances  in  statute  miles 

From  To  Boston      To  New  York     To  New  Orleans 

Duluth 1,513  1,391  1,391 

Chicago 1,034  912  912 

Detroit 750  693  1,106 

Toledo 795  705  1,046 

Cleveland .  , 682  584  1,098 

San  Francisco 3,313  3,191  2,482 

Seattle 3.258  3,136  2,935 


108  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

Water  distances  in  statute  miles 

From  To  Boston       To  New  York      To  New  Orleans 

Duluth 2,775  3,019  4,869 

Chicago 2,682  2,926  4,776 

Detroit 2,048  2,292  4,142 

Toledo 2,041  2,285  4,135 

Cleveland 1,964  2,208  4,058 

San  Francisco 6,270  6,059  5,297 

Seattle 7,196  6,954  6,223 

The  above  shows  that  the  rail  distance  between  San  Francisco 
and  New  York  is  3,191  miles  and  the  water  distance  by  way 
of  the  Panama  Canal  is  6,059  miles,  the  former  being  53  per  cent 
of  the  latter.  The  tolls  on  vessels  passing  through  the  canal 
have  averaged  about  50  cents  per  ton  of  cargo,  but  the  railroads 
have  been  unable  to  compete  with  the  water  route.  Rates  by 
rail  have  been  as  much  as  200  to  300  per  cent  of  the  water 
rates,  and  the  rail  traffic  has  been  largely  confined  to  high-class 
goods  on  which  the  saving  of  interest  on  capital  invested  justifies 
the  use  of  the  quicker  but  more  expensive  route.  The  distance 
from  Seattle  to  New  York  by  rail  is  3,136  miles,  while  the  distance 
by  water  is  6,954  miles,  the  rail  distance  being  45  per  cent  of 
water  distance.  Large  quantities  of  grain  and  flour  are  carried 
from  Seattle.  Tacoma  and  Portland  to  New  York,  and  also  to  the 
United  Kingdom,  Scandinavian  and  Mediterranean  ports.  During 
the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30.  1920.  a  total  of  120  vessels  carried 
grain  eastward  through  the  Panama  Canal.  In  the  past,  goods 
have  been  carried  from  the  Pacific  Coast  to  New  York  by  vessel 
and  sent  long  distances  inland  for  less  cost  than  the  same  goods 
could  be  sent  direct  by  rail  from  the  Pacific  Coast.  Document  No. 
22  of  the  Committee  on  Rivers  and  Harbors  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  U.  S.  (63d  Congress.  3d  Session),  explains  the 
disadvantages  under  which  the  Trans-Mississippi  territory  was 
placed  because  of  the  cheaper  transportation  afforded  competing 
points  included  in  the  territory  tributary  to  the  water  route 
between  the  Pacific  and  the  Atlantic,  and  calls  attention  to 
the  need  of  water  communication  with  the  interior  of  the  country 
to  ofifset  these  disadvantages.  The  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence 
waterway  will  extend  the  benefits  of  cheap  transportation  to  the 
territory  which  has  been  placed  at  a  serious  disadvantage,  as 
a  result  of  the  influence  of  the  Panama  Canal. 

From  Chicago  to  New  York  is  a  distance  of  912  miles  by 
rail  and  2,926  miles  by  water,  the  former  being  31.  per  cent 
of    the   latter.     There    can    be   no    reasonable    doubt    that    high- 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  109 

class  freight  can  be  carried  between  these  points  by  water  at 
less  cost  than  by  rail.  The  present  rail  rate  on  fresh  meat 
from  Chicago  to  New  York  is  93y^  cents  per  hundred  pounds, 
or  $18.70  a  ton.  It  is  carried  from  New  York  to  Liverpool, 
a  distance  of  3.578  statute  miles,  for  $1.00  per  hundred  pounds, 
or  $20.00  per  ton,  and  the  vessels  make  handsome  profits  at 
this  rate.  It  could  be  carried  by  the  St.  Lawrence  to  New- 
York  for  75  cents  a  hundred  pounds  and  afford  the  vessel  a 
large  profit  on  the  business.  This  would  be  at  the  rate  of  over 
5  mills  per  ton  mile,  or  more  than  double  the  actual  cost  to  the 
vessel,  counting  a  return  load  of  one-third. 

From  Duluth  to  Boston  is  a  distance  of  1,513  miles  by  rail 
and  2,775  miles  by  water,  the  former  being  54  per  cent  of 
the  latter.  From  Cleveland  to  Boston  the  distances  are  682 
miles  by  rail  and  1,964  miles  by  water.  The  rail  haul  is  about 
35  per  cent  of  that  by  water.  Wool,  hides,  salt,  copper,  iron, 
steel,  etc.,  could  be  carried  to  Boston  and  vicinity  by  water  at  a 
large  saving  as  compared  with  the  rail  rates.  The  relation  of 
the  rail  to  the  water  haul  between  Duluth  and  Boston  is  more 
favorable  for  the  use  of  the  waterway  than  is  the  relation  of  rail 
to  water  haul  on  the  Panama  Canal  route  between  the  Pacific  and 
the  Atlantic. 

One  factor  that  must  not  be  overlooked  is  that  the  large 
packers,  steel  companies  and  other  corporations  can  and  no 
doubt  will  operate  their  own  vessels,  at  an  actual  cost  to  them 
of  about  2  mills  per  ton  mile.  This  is  equivalent  to  a  cost  of 
$5.84  a  ton  between  Chicago  and  New  York,  $5.36  between 
Chicago  and  Boston,  $6.03  between  Duluth  and  New  York,  $5.55 
between  Duluth  and  Boston,  $4.41  between  Cleveland  and  New 
York,  and  $3.92  between  Cleveland  and  Boston.  Existing  rail 
rates  are  from  3  to  5  times  these  figures,  so  that  there  is  ample 
margin  for  savings  or  profits. 

The  movement  of  lumber  from  the  Pacific  Coast  to  the  Lakes 
is  new  business  which  will  be  entirely  feasible,  as  will  be  the 
movement  of  sulphur  from  Sabine.  Tex.,  and  phosphate  from 
Florida.  These  commodities  can  not  afford  the  costs  of  rail  haul 
for  the  distances  involved,  and  there  is  accordingly  no  great 
movement  of  them  to  the  lakes  at  the  present  time.  They 
can  come  by  water  in  full  cargoes,  however,  at  a  cost  which 
will  make  a  large  movement  possible.  Sulphur  is  now  shipped 
from  Sabine  in  the  vessels  of  the  producing  company  to  all  parts 
of  the  world,  and,  as  will  be  shown  in  another  chapter  analyzing 


1  10  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

the  extent  and  character  of  the  traffic  movements,  a  large  tonnage 
of  sulphur  will  be  shipped  from  Sabine  by  vessel  into  the  Lakes. 
These  bulk  commodities  are  either  shipped  in  vessels  belonging 
to  the  shipper  or  in  vessels  chartered  for  the  purpose,  at  a  cost 
much  lower  than  rates  by  regular  carriers.  Hence,  a  comparison 
of  rates  is  not  appHcable  to  this  class  of  business,  which  includes 
large  shipments  from  the  Lakes  as  well  as  into  them. 

As  previously  stated  in  this  report,  the  cost  of  transportation 
on  a  vessel  of  the  size  adapted  for  use  on  the  proposed  St. 
Lawrence  waterway  is  about  one-sixth  the  average  rate  of  rail 
transportation,  assuming  average  load  conditions.  This  is  a 
comparison  of  average  cost  with  an  average  rate,  the  latter  in- 
cluding profits,  if  any.  At  the  assumed  average  rail  rate  of  1.25 
cent  per  ton  mile,  however,  the  profits  would  be  very  small. 
Comparing  actual  water  rates  with  actual  rail  rates,  we  find  the 
following: 

Rate  per  ton  Rate  per  ton 

Chicago  to  New  York,  912  statute  miles,  mile,  cents 

Agricultural  implements $12 .  60  1.38 

Steel 12.60  1.38 

Clothing 31.50  3.45 

Meat 19.30  2.11 

Grain 6.60  0.72 

New  York  to  Liverpool,  3,578  statute  miles. 

Agricultural  implements $20.00  0.56 

Steel 9.80  0.27 

Clothing 20.00  0.56 

Meat 20.00  0.56 

Grain 8.00  0.22 

New  Orleans  to  Liverpool,  5,312  statute  miles. 

Agricultural  implements $23.00  0.45 

Steel 12.80  0.24 

Clothing 23.00  0.45 

Meat 23.00  0.45 

Grain 12.00  0.22 

Seattle  to  Liverpool,  9,950  statute  miles. 

Charter  rates $20.00  0.20 

Seattle  to  New  York,  6,954  statute  miles. 

Copper 8.00  0.11 

The  above  shows  the  relationship  of  rail  and  water  rates, 
with  the  railroads  barely  existing,  and  the  ocean  carriers  making 
large  profits.  Moreover,  some  of  the  ocean  rates  are  based  on 
making  the  costs  of  the  round  trip  on  the  outward  voyage.  On 
the  basis  of  existing  rates  alone,  the  water  route  may  expect  to 
compete  successfully  with  rail  routes  for  distances  3  to  12 
times  as  great  as  the  latter.*     As  heretofore  stated,  actual  costs 

♦Since  the  above  was  prepared,  ocean  rates  have  been  greatly  reduced, 
and  the  comparison  is  more  favorable  to  water  transportation. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


11 


112  GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 

are  considered  more  important  than  rates,  as  indicating  the  limits 
within  which  competition  may  extend.  From  a  study  of  the 
distances  by  rail  and  water,  it  may  be  concluded  that  all  points 
on  the  Great  Lakes  may  ship  by  vessel  to  North  Atlantic  ports 
at  less  cost  than  by  rail,  and  that  points  on  Lake  Superior  and 
Lake  Michigan  will  particularly  benefit  by  the  water  route.  The 
hauls  from  points  west  of  these  lakes  to  the  Atlantic  coast  are 
so  long  as  to  justify  a  transfer  to  ocean  vessel  at  Duluth, 
Milwaukee  or  Chicago,  both  in  the  interests  of  economy  and  for 
the  betterment  of  transportation  conditions.  New  England  is 
the  farthest  by  rail  from  the  Great  Lakes  district,  but  is  the 
nearest  by  water,  and  will  benefit  greatly  by  her  advantage  in 
coastwise  shipping. 

General  Conclusions 

The  areas  indicated  on  the  accompanying  maps  as  tributary  to 
the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway  include  the  principal 
points  of  accumulation  and  distribution,  but  they  do  not  mark 
the  limits  to  which  the  influence  of  the  waterway  would  extend 
either  for  exports  or  imports.  To  determine  with  accuracy  these 
limits,  every  commodity  movement  would  have  to  be  studied 
individually,  and  the  tributary  area  of  every  port  would  similarly 
have  to  be  treated  by  itself.  The  boundaries  are  given  in  straight 
lines  for  convenience  in  estimating  population  and  production  ; 
the  actual  boundaries  would  be  irregular  and  would  depend 
upon  the  railroad  communications  at  every  point.  With  respect 
to  imports  particularly,  the  areas  indicated  on  the  maps  can  not 
be  considered  as  limiting  the  distribution  of  the  products.  For 
instance,  Toledo  is  located  within  the  area  deemed  economical 
for  the  importation  of  green  coffee  from  Brazil,  but  roasted 
coffee  distributed  from  Toledo  will  by  no  means  be  limited  to  the 
territory  shown  on  the  map.  The  same  principle  will  apply  to 
practically  all  imports.  Chicago  may  receive  large  consignments 
of  freight  from  South  and  Central  America,  which  freight  may 
be  economically  distributed  either  in  original  or  refined  condition 
to  points  outside  of  the  limits  shown.  The  distribution  of  the 
refined  product  is  limited  only  by  the  enterprise  of  the  manu- 
facturer in  creating  a  demand  for  his  product. 


Chapter  IX 

PRODUCTION  OF  THE  TRIBUTARY  AREA 

The  statistics  of  production  of  the  sixteen  States  particularly 
interested  in  the  opening  of  the  Great  Lakes  to  ocean  vessels 
show  that  in  these  States  is  produced  the  larger  proportion  of 
our  surplus  raw  materials.  This  area  now  produces  75  per  cent 
of  the  wheat,  65  per  cent  of  the  corn,  100  per  cent  of  the  flax,  85 
per  cent  of  the  iron,  39  per  cent  of  the  copper,  74  per  cent  of  the 
zinc,  and  46  per  cent  of  the  lead  produced  in  the  entire  country. 
Within  this  area  are  also  located  the  centers  of  some  of  our  most 
important  manufacturing  industries.  The  increase  in  manufac- 
turing at  the  principal  cities  of  the  Great  Lakes  has  been  greater 
than  at  the  principal  manufacturing  centers  of  the  Atlantic  coast, 
and  the  conditions  with  respect  to  economical  procurement  of 
materials  are  such  that  with  adequate  transportation  facilities 
there  will  be  a  more  pronounced  development  in  the  future. 

Production  estimated  on  basis  of  population. — The  entire  pro- 
duction of  the  United  States  is  estimated  to  have  a  value  of 
over  $70,000,000,000  annually.  The  population  of  the  country 
on  January  1,  1920,  is  announced  by  the  Census  Bureau  at 
105,683,108,  showing-  a  per  capita  production  valued  at  over  $650. 
The  population  of  the  States  embraced  within  the  area  considered 
tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway  for  com- 
merce with  the  United  Kingdom  and  western  Europe  amounts  to 
36,027,144,  as  follows: 

Population,   1920 

Illinois 6,485,098 

Michigan 3,667,222 

Wisconsin 2,631,839 

Minnesota 2,386,371 

Ohio 5,759,368 

Indiana 2,930,544 

Iowa 2,403,630 

North  Dakota 645,730 

South  Dakota 635,839 

Montana 547,593 

Idaho 431,826 

Wyoming 194,402 

Colorado 939,376 

Nebraska 1,295,502 

Missouri 3,403,547 

Kansas 1,769,257 

36,027,144 

In  addition  to  the  alx)ve,  there  are  twenty-two  counties  in 
Pennsylvania  and  thirty-two  counties  in  New  York  which  may 
be  considered  properly  tributary  to  this  route.    The  population 

113 


114  ECONOMIC   ASPECTS    OF    THE 

of  these  counties  in  1917  was  placed  at  5,583,850,  making  a 
total  of  over  41,000,000  people  who  will  be  benefited  by  the 
proposed  improvement,  exclusive  of  a  portion  of  the  population 
of  the  States  of  West  Virginia,  Kentucky  and  Utah.  On  the 
basis  of  population,  the  production  of  this  area  has  an  annual 
value  of  over  $26,000,000,000. 

Statistics  of  production  by  States.' — There  is  outlined  below 
the  industrial  development,  which  is  well  indicated  by  the 
statistics  of  manufactures,  mineral  output,  and  agricultural 
products.  The  year  1914  has  been  selected,  as  that  is  the  latest 
one  for  which  statistics  of  manufactures  are  available.  The 
figures  for  agriculture  do  not  include  all  farm  products,  but 
they  show  the  staple  and  important  crops  raised  in  this  region. 
Statistics  for  all  farm  products  are  not  available  for  any  year 
later  than  1909,  and  it  has,  therefore,  been  deemed  best  to  use  the 
1914  figures  for  important  crops  rather  than  complete  figures  for 
a  year  when  values  were  so  much  less. 

There  is  some  slight  duplication  between  the  statistics  of 
mineral  ])roduction  and  the  statistics  of  manufactures.  There 
is  also  much  duplication  in  the  statistics  showing  the  value  of 
manufactured  products,  as  the  finished  product  of  one  industry 
is  the  raw  material  for  another.  Thus  the  product  of  blast 
furnaces  and  rolling  mills  is  used  as  raw  material  by  many 
industries.  The  material  used  by  one  industry  may  have  been 
reworked  several  times  in  its  passage  from  the  blast  furnace  to 
the  plant  where  it  is  finally  worked  into  a  commodity  for  sale 
to  the  ultimate  consumer.  The  industries  which  manufacture 
foodstuffs  are  almost  the  only  ones  that  use  ])rimary  raw 
materials.  Other  industries  have  for  their  raw  materials  the 
finished  products  of  other  establishments.  In  the  automobile 
industry,  for  example,  the  value  of  products  was  $632,831,474. 
included  in  which  is  the  cost  of  raw  materials  amounting  to 
$356,207,930.  These  raw  materials  include  iron  and  steel,  leather, 
glass,  wire  rods,  lumber,  canvas,  and  practically  everything  else 
that  goes  into  an  automobile.  If  it  is  borne  in  mind  that  the 
production  statistics  do  not  indicate  goods  ready  for  the  use  of 
the  ultimate  consumer,  the  figures  will  not  be  misleading. 


'Production  l)y  States,  largely  from  a  study  by  L.  S.  Schmeckebier,  Ph.D.,  some  time 
Chief  of  the  Division  of  Research,  Bureau  of  Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce,  now 
National   Research   Council. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  115 

Illinois 

In  manufactures  Illinois,  with  a  total  product  valued  at 
$2,247,322,819,  ranked  third  among  the  States,  being  outranked 
by  New  York  and  Pennsylvania.  It  is  the  leading  State  in  the 
slaughtering  and  meat  packing,  agricultural  implement,  and 
zinc  smelting  and  refining  industries.  The  products  of  the 
slaughtering  and  meat  packing  industry  were  valued  at 
$489,230,324,  or  21.8  per  cent  of  all  products  of  the  State  and 
29.2  per  cent  of  that  of  this  industry  in  all  States.  The  agricul- 
tural implement  industry  ranked  fifth  among  those  of  the  States, 
with  products  valued  at  $65,337,663,  or  2.9  per  cent  of  the  value 
of  all  manufactures  produced  in  the  State  and  39.8  per  cent  of  the 
value  of  all  goods  of  this  class  produced  throughout  the  country. 
The  zinc  smelting  and  refining  industry  produced  goods  valued 
at  $18,421,039  or  0.8  per  cent  of  the  total  value  of  the  manu- 
factures of  the  State  and  34.4  per  cent  of  the  output  of  this 
industry  in  all  States.  Illinois  was  third  in  value  of  steelworks, 
rolling-mill,  and  blast-furnace  products,  the  production  being 
valued  at  $90,856,649,  or  7.4  per  cent  of  the  total  production  of 
the  United  States.  Industries  to  the  number  of  121  reported 
products  valued  at  more  than  one  million  dollars  each.  Impor- 
tant industries  in  addition  to  those  mentioned  above  include 
foundry  and  machine-shop  products,  $141,328,624;  printing  and 
publishing,  $112,833,427;  men's  clothing,  $89,144,448;  railroad 
cars,  $61,315,638;  flour-mill  and  grist-mill  products,  $49,493,224; 
and  electrical  apparatus,  machinery,  and  supplies,  $45,667,456. 

The  total  mineral  output  of  the  State  was  valued  at  $117,- 
116,370,  the  leading  products  being  coal,  $64,693,529,  and 
petroleum,  $25,426,179. 

Corn  is  the  staple  crop  of  Illinois,  which  competes  with  Iowa 
for  first  place  in  quantity  produced.  The  value  of  the  corn  crop 
in  1914  was  $183,021,000,  or  more  than  three  times  that  of  any 
other  crop.  The  next  leading  crops  and  their  value  were  oats, 
$55,436,000;  wheat,  $46,712,000;  and  hay,  $27,533,000. 

Value  of  products,  Illinois,  1914 

Manufactures $2,247,322,819 

Mineral  products 117,168,370 

Principal  crops 31Q,656.000 

Live  stock  on  farms,  Jan.  1,  1915 154,456,000 

Total =    $2,828,603,189 


116  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

Michigan 

The  manufacture  of  automobiles  was  the  main  industry  of 
Michigan,  the  products  being  valued  at  $398,289,022,  or  36.7 
per  cent  of  that  of  all  manufactures  of  the  State  and  62.9  per 
cent  of  the  value  of  the  products  of  the  automobile  industry  in  all 
States.  Statistics  for  75  industries  are  given  in  the  Census  re- 
ports, the  total  output  being  valued  at  $1,086,162,432.  Foundry 
and  machine-shop  products  held  second  place  with  a  value  of 
$64,576,497,  followed  by  lumber  and  timber  products,  $58,523,- 
217;  furniture  and  refrigerators,  $33,857,041;  flour  and  grist-mill 
products,  $27,381,474;  and  leather,  $25,503,573.  Twenty  indus- 
tries produced  goods  valued  at  more  than  $10,000,000  each. 
Under  the  heading  "All  other  industries"'  are  included  14  which 
had  a  product  in  excess  of  $1,000,000  each,  but  which  are  not 
shown  in  the  •  statistics  in  order  not  to  disclose  individual 
operations. 

The  mineral  production  of  the  State  was  valued  at  $57,743,555, 
the  principal  mineral  products  being  copper  and  iron  ore.  Alich- 
igan  was  third  among  the  States  in  the  production  of  copper  ore, 
with  an  output  valued  at  $21,857,759,  or  14.3  per  cent  of  the 
total  for  the  United  States,  and  second  in  the  production  of 
iron  ore,  with  an  output  valued  at  $18,722,358,  or  26  per  cent 
of  the  total  for  the  country'. 

The  principal  crops  of  Michigan  for  which  farm  values  are 
available  and  their  value  in  1914  were  corn,  $42,210,999;  hay. 
$36,132,000;  and  oats,  $22,838,000.  This  State  was  second  in 
the  production  of  beet  sugar,  the  factory  value  of  the  sugar  pro- 
duced being  $11,023,058;  figures  for  the  farm  value  of  this  crop 
are  not  available. 

Value  of  products,  Michigan,  1914 

Manufactures $1,086,162,432 

Mineral  products 57,743,555 

Principal  crops 139,899,000 

Live  stock  on  farms,  Jan.  1,  1915 95,654,000 

Total $1,379,458,987 

Wisconsin 

The  manufactures  of  Wisconsin,  valued  at  $695,172,002.  are 
made  mostly  from  the  products  of  the  farm  and  the  forest.  The 
butter,  cheese,  and  condensed-milk  industry  heads  the  list,  with 
a  value  of  $72,858,592.  or  10.5  per  cent  of  the  total  of  all  indus- 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  117 

tries  of  the  State  and  20  per  cent  of  the  total  for  this  industry 
for  all  States.  Foundry  and  machine-shop  products  come  second, 
with  a  value  of  $60,698,391.  The  next  seven  industries  all  use 
as  their  main  material  farm  or  forest  products.  They  are.  in 
order  of  importance,  lumber  and  timber  products,  $55,362,511; 
leather,  $42,204,202 ;  malt  liquors,  $40,884,284 ;  slaughtering  and 
meat  packing,  $34,697,955;  paper  and  wood  pulp,  $31,205,395; 
flour-mill  and  grist-mill  products,  $28,697,413;  furniture  and 
refrigerators,  $22,586,531.  Altogether  separate  statistics  are 
given  for  69  industries,  each  of  which  reported  products  valued 
at  more  than  $250,000.  The  lumber  industry  showed  a  consid- 
erable decrease  from  1909  to  1914,  and  is  likely  to  show  further 
decline  owing  to  the  depletion  of  the  forests.  The  malt  liquor 
industry  will  be  eliminated  in  the  future  as  far  as  intoxicants 
are  concerned,  but  it  is  likely  that  considerable  non-intoxicating 
malt  beverages  will  continue  to  be  manufactured  and  that  the 
remaining  plants  will  be  converted  into  other  industrial  uses. 

The  mineral  output  of  the  State  is  not  important,  the  products 
being  valued  at  only  $11,140,365.  Zinc  was  the  most  important 
mineral  produced,  the  yield  being  valued  at  $3,173,526. 

The  importance  of  the  dairying  industry  in  Wisconsin  is  shown 
by  the  high  value  of  the  milch  cows  on  farms,  estimated  at  $96.- 
747,000  on  January  1,  1915,  or  8.2  per  cent  of  the  value  for  the 
entire  United  States. 

The  principal  crops  and  their  values  in  1914  were  corn, 
$45,410,000;  hay,  $41,497,000;  and  oats,  $26,703,000. 

Value  of  products,  Wisconsin,  1914 

Manufactures $695,172,002 

Mineral  products 11,140,365 

Principal  crops 152,321,000 

Live  stock  on  farms,  Jan.  1,  1915 161,395,000 

Total $1,020,028,367 

Minnesota 

The  manufactures  of  Minnesota  had  a  value  of  $493,354,136, 
and  were  mainly  dependent  upon  the  farm  and  the  forest  for 
their  raw  materials.  Flour  and  grist-mill  products  to  the  value 
of  $148,243,708  constituted  30  per  cent  of  the  total  manufac- 
tures of  the  State.  Minnesota  is  the  leading  State  in  this  in- 
dustry; its  output  was  16.9  per  cent  of  the  total  for  the  United 
States  and  was  almost  twice  as  great  as  that  of  the  next  highest 


118  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

State.  Other  important  industries  and  the  value  of  their  prod- 
ucts were  slaughtering  and  meat  packing,  $47,710,059;  lumber 
and  timber  products,  $44,674,948 ;  butter  and  cheese,  $33,746,396 ; 
foundry  and  machine-shop  products,  $21,405,023.  Its  proximity 
to  the  producing  centers  for  flaxseed  within  its  own  borders  and 
in  North  Dakota  and  Montana  place  it  in  the  lead  in  the  manu- 
facture of  linseed  oil,  the  output  of  which  had  a  value  of 
$12,356,906,  or  27.5  per  cent  of  the  total  for  the  United  States. 
The  mineral  production  of  the  State  was  valued  at  $45,680,- 
865,  the  greater  part  of  which  was  iron  ore  valued  at  $40,628,771. 
The  value  of  the  shipments  from  Minnesota  was  56.6  per  cent  of 
the  value  of  the  ore  shipped  from  all  mines  in  the  United  States. 
The  great  iron  ore  resources  of  the  State  are  not  reflected  in 
its  manufactures,  as  the  ore  is  shipped  to  Pennsylvania,  Ohio, 
and  Indiana  mills  for  smelting. 

Corn,  wheat  and  oats  were  the  principal  crops  with  value  of 
$47,320,000  .for  corn,  $43,834,000  for  wheat,  and  $34,048,000 
for  oats. 

Value  of  products,  Minnesota,  1914 

Manufactures $493,354, 136 

Mineral  products 45,680,865 

Principal  crops 180,432,000 

Live  stock  on  farms,  Jan.  1,  1915 117,333,000 

Total $836,800,001 

Ohio 

Ohio  is  essentially  a  manufacturing  State,  ranking  fourth 
with  products  valued  at  $1,782,808,279,  or  7.4  per  cent  of  the 
total  of  the  United  States.  Almost  every  industry  is  represented 
within  its  borders,  the  census  returns  giving  statistics  of  101 
industries,  each  of  which  reported  products  valued  at  more  than 
$1,000,000.  It  was  first  among  the  States  in  manufactures  of 
rubber  goods  other  than  belting,  hose,  boots,  and  shoes,  with 
a  total  output  valued  at  $109,658,605,  or  49  per  cent  of  the  total 
value  of  this  classification  in  the  United  States  and  6.2  per  cent 
of  the  value  of  AX  products  of  the  State.  It  ranked  second 
among  the  States  in  products  of  steel  work,  rolling  mills,  and 
blast  furnaces,  the  output  being  valued  at  $277,716,759,  or  22 
per  cent  of  the  total  for  the  United  States  and  15.6  per  cent  of 
the  value  of  all  products  of  the  State. 

It  ranked  fourth  among  the  States  in  value  of  mineral  output, 
the  products  being  valued  at  $101,661,384,  or  4.8  per  cent  of  the 
total    for   the   United    States.     The   princip.nl    mineral    products 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  119 

were  clay  products  valued  at  $37,166,768,  coal  valued  at  $21,- 
250,642,  natural  gas  valued  at  $14,667,790,  and  petroleum  valued 
at  $13,372,729. 

The  principal  crop  of  Ohio  was  corn,  with  a  value  of  $87,- 
056,000,  or  twice  that  of  the  next  most  valuable  agricultural 
product.  Other  important  crops  and  their  values  were  hay, 
$42,585,000 ;  wheat,  $38,365,000 ;  and  oats,  $22,646,000.  Wool  is 
also  an  important  product  in  this  State,  which  ranked  third,  with 
a  production  of  6,645,120  pounds  of  scoured  wool. 

Value  of  products,  Ohio,  1914 

Manufactures $1,782,808,279 

Mineral  products 101,661,384 

Principal  crops 207,337,000 

Live  stock  on  farms,  Jan.  1,  1915 138,799,000 

Total $2,230,605,663 

Indiana 

Indiana  ranked  eighth  among  the  States  in  manufactures,  the 
value  of  the  output  being  $730,795,021.  Sixty-three  industries 
each  produced  goods  vakied  at  more  than  $1,000,000  each, 
29  of  these  having  an  output  valued  at  more  than  $5,000,000. 
As  in  Ohio,  the  largest  production  was  that  of  steel  works  and 
rolling  mills,  valued  at  $58,882,522,  or  8.1  per  cent  of  the  total 
production  of  the  State  and  6.4  per  cent  of  the  production  of  the 
United  States  for  this  industry.  Statistics  for  blast  furnaces  are 
not  shown  separately  as  the  figures  would  reveal  the  operations 
of  individual  plants.  It  is  evident  that  the  iron  and  steel 
industry  is  of  greater  importance  than  is  indicated  by  the  sta- 
tistics. Other  important  industries  and  the  value  of  the  products 
are  slaughtering  and  meat  packing,  $51,065,774;  foundry  and 
machine  shop  products,  $48,879,894  ;  flour  and  grist-mill  products, 
$37,488,223,  and  automobiles,  $29,389,088. 

The  mineral  products  were  valued  at  $42,864,267.  Coal  valued 
at  $18,290,928  was  the  leading  mineral  product,  the  value  of  coal 
being  more  than  twice  as  great  as  that  of  any  other  mineral. 

Corn,  wheat,  and  hay  were  the  principal  agricultural  products 
in  1914,  the  values  of  the  crops  being  as  follows :  Corn,  $94,- 
724,000 ;  wheat,  $44,536,000 ;  and  hay,  $24,872,000. 

Value  of  products,  Indiana,  1914 

Manufactures $730,795,021 

Mineral  products 42,864,267 

Principal  crops 189,553,000 

Live  stock  on  farms,  Jan.  1,  1915 108,860,000 

Total $1,072,072,288 


120  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

Iowa 

Iowa  is  primarily  an  agricultural  Slate,  although  the  value 
of  its  manufactures  amounted  to  $310,749,974.  The  leading 
industry  was  slaughtering  and  meat  packing,  with  products 
valued  at  $74,289,387,  or  23.9  per  cent  of  the  total  for  the  State. 
Other  important  products  and  their  values  were  butter,  cheese, 
and  condensed  milk,  $27,605,968;  foundry  and  machine-shop 
products,  $16,606,080;  printing  and  publishing,  $15,934,486;  and 
flour-mill  and  grist-mill  products,  $14,336,576.  The  Census 
reports  give  separate  statistics  for  44  industries  each  of  whose 
products  were  valued  at  more  than  $500,000;  eight  of  these 
produced  goods  to  the  value  of  more  than  $5,000,000  each. 

The  mineral  production  amounted  in  value  to  $25,287,115,  the 
principal  products  and  their  value  being  coal,  $13,364,070.  and 
clay  products,  $6,401,745. 

Corn  is  the  great  crop  of  Iowa,  which  competes  with  Illinois 
for  first  place  in  quantity  produced.  The  value  in  1914  was 
$214,183,000,  or  more  than  three  times  that  of  any  other  crop. 
Oats  and  hay  followed  corn  with  values  of  $67,650,000  for  oats 
and  $41,117,000  for  hay. 

Value  of  products,  Iowa,  1914 

Manufactures $310,749,974 

Mineral  products 13,364,070 

Principal  crops 351,450,000 

Live  stock  on  farms,  Jan.  1,  1915 282,015,000 

Total $957,579,044 

North  Dakota 

North  Dakota  is  essentially  an  agricultural  State,  the  value 
of  its  manufactures  being  only  25  per  cent  of  the  value  of  the 
wheat  crop  in  1914.  The  manufactures  were  valued  at  $21,- 
147,431.  As  is  to  be  expected,  Hour-mill  and  grist-mill  products 
to  the  value  of  $12,029,905  contributed  56.9  per  cent  of  the  total 
value  of  all  products  for  the  State.  No  other  industry  had  an 
output  valued  at  more  than  $2,500,000.  The  factory  products 
were  destined  mainly  for  local  consumption. 

The  mineral  ])roduction  was  not  important,  the  total  value 
being  only  $l,0r)3.540.  Coal  to  the  value  of  $771,379  formed  the 
largest  item  in  the  mineral  i)roduction. 

Wheat  is  the  staple  crop  in  North  Uakota,  which  competes 
with  Kansas  for  first  place  in  the  amount  produced.     In  1914  it 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  121 

held  second  place  with  a  value  of  $82,408,000  or  more  than  three 
times  that  of  any  other  cereal.  The  other  leading  agricultural 
products  and  their  values  were  oats,  $24,014,000,  and  barley, 
$12,724,000. 

Value  of  products,  North  Dakota,  1914 

Manufactures $  21,147,431 

Mineral  products 1,063,540 

Principal  crops 144,383,000 

Live  stock  on  farms,  Jan.  1,  1915 48,089,000 

Total $214,682,971 

South  Dakota 

South  Dakota,  Hke  its  northern  neighbor,  is  predominantly 
agricultural.  Its  total  output  of  manufactured  products  was 
\alued  at  only  $24,138,566,  while  its  corn  crop  had  a  value  of 
$39,000,000.  The  principal  industry  was  the  manufacture  of 
flour,  the  value  of  flour-mill  and  grist-mill  products  being 
$5,556,996,  or  23  per  cent  of  the  total  for  all  industries  in  the 
State.  Butter  making  is  the  second  industry,  with  a  value  of 
$2,920,342,  or  12.1  per  cent  of  the  total  for  all  products.  It  is 
Hkely  that  few  of  the  factory  products  find  markets  at  any  great 
distance  from  the  place  of  production. 

The  gold  deposits  of  the  Black  Hills  yield  the  only  mineral 
output  of  importance.  The  value  of  the  gold  production  was 
$7,333,508  out  of  a  total  mineral  output  of  $7,861,601. 

In  1914  corn  was  the  most  valuable  crop  with  value  of  $39,- 
000,000.  Next  in  order  of  value  came  wheat,  $29,672,000 ;  oats, 
$16,783,000;  and  barley,  $9,775,000. 

Value  of  products.  South  Dakota,  1914 

Manufactures $24,138,566 

Mineral  products 7,861,601 

Principal  crops 106,488,000 

Live  stock  on  farms,  Jan.  1,  1915 81,157,000 

Total $219,645,167 

Montana 

With  the  exception  of  copper  and  lead  products,  beet  sugar, 
and  cement,  the  manufactured  products  of  Montana  are  consumed 
mostly  within  the  State.  Unfortunately  separate  figures  can  not 
be  given  fcrr  the  four  industries  mentioned,  as  they  would  dis- 
close the  operation  of  individual  establishments.  The  total  value 
of  the  products  of  Montana  amounted  to  $84,446,136,  but  the 


122  ECONOMIC   ASPECTS    OF    THE 

class  "Other  industries"  is  credited  with  $54,199,438,  or  64.2 
per  cent  of  the  total,  because  some  important  industries  are  car- 
ried on  by  less  than  three  establishments  and  it  is  necessary  to 
combine  the  reports  in  order  not  to  disclose  individual  operations. 
Of  the  industries  reported  separately  the  leading  one  is  the  man- 
ufacture of  lumber  and  timber  products,  which  had  a  value  of 
$6,720,881,  or  8  per  cent  of  the  total  of  all  manufactures  of  the 
State. 

The  mineral  production  was  valued  at  $54,244,889.  The  lead- 
ing items  were  copper,  $31,019,542;  silver,  $6,645,102;  and  zinc, 
$5,690,608.  The  State  ranked  second  in  output  of  copper  and 
zinc  and  third  in  output  of  silver. 

The  field  crops  of  Montana  were  less  important  than  those  of 
any  State  in  the  region,  with  the  exception  of  Wyoming,  wheat 
being  the  leading  crop  with  a  value  of  $16,704,000.  The  only 
other  crops  having  a  value  of  more  than  $5,000,000  were  hay, 
valued  at  $15,225,000,  and  oats,  valued  at  $7,234,000.  Wool, 
however,  is  an  important  product,  this  State  holding  first  place 
in  1914,  with  a  production  of  11,165,490  pounds  of  scoured  wool. 

Value  of  products,  Montana,  1914 

Manufactures $84,446,136 

Mineral  products 54,244,899 

Principal  crops 47,893,000 

Live  stock  on  farms,  Jan.  1,  1915 69,558,000 

Total $256,142,035 

Wyoming 

Manufactures  were  of  little  importance  in  Wyoming,  the  total 
value  of  products  in  1914  being  only  $11,223,415.  Cattle  and 
sheep  raising  furnished  the  i)rincipal  sources  of  wealth,  but  the 
cattle  raising  industry  is  not  reflected  in  the  statistics  of  manu- 
factures, as  the  slaughtering  and  packing  were  carried  on  in  the 
centers  of  this  industry  in  the  States  farther  east. 

The  mineral  products  were  valued  at  $12,417,752,  the  principal 
item  being  coal  valued  at  $10,033,747. 

In  value  of  field  crop  Wyoming  is  the  least  important  State 
in  the  region.  Only  four  crops  had  a  value  of  over  one  million 
dollars  in  1914;  namely,  hay,  $8,625,000;  oats,  $3,780,000;  wheat, 
$2,038,000;  and  potatoes,  $1,134,000.  Sheep  raising,  however, 
is  ail  important  industry,  Wyoming  ranking  seconcf  in  1914  in 
amount  of  wool  produced,  with  an  output  of  9,397,080  pounds 
of  scoured  wool. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  123 

Value  of  products,  Wyoming,  1914 

Manufactures $11,223,415 

Mineral  products 12,417,752 

Principal  crops 16,352,000 

Live  stock  on  farms,  Jan.  1,  1915 58,552,000 


Total $98,545,167 

Colorado 

Beet-sugar  factories  formed  the  most  important  group  of 
industries  in  Colorado,  the  value  of  their  output  reaching  $17,- 
635,556,  or  12.9  per  cent  of  the  value  of  all  manufactures,  which 
amounted  to  $136,839,321. 

Other  leading  industries  and  the  value  of  their  products  were 
slaughtering  and  meat  packing,  $12,726,127;  the  flour-mill  and 
grist-mill  products.  $7,535,633;  and  printing  and  publishing, 
$7,027,420. 

The  value  of  the  mineral  output  amounted  to  $52,161,660,  the 
leading  products  and  their  value  being  gold,  $19,883,105;  coal, 
$13,60l,718;  zinc,  $4,935,523;  and  silver,  $4,864,224. 

Hay  to  the  value  of  $17,227,000  and  wheat  to  the  value  of 
$9,842,000  were  the  principal  crops  for  which  values  are  avail- 
able. Colorado  was  the  leading  State  in  the  amount  of  beet  sugar 
produced,  but  figures  on  the  farm  value  of  the  crop  are  not 
available.  The  factory  value  of  the  sugar  produced  at  the  beet 
sugar  factories  amounted  to  $J 7,635,556. 

Value  of  products,   Colorado,  1914 

Manufactures v$136,839,321 

Mineral  products 52,161,660 

Principal  crops 46,111,000 

Live  stock  on  farms,  Jan.  1,  1915 67,857,000 

Total $302,968,981 

Nebraska 

The  value  of  manufactures  of  Nebraska  amounted  to  $221,- 
615,848  in  1914,  but  agricukure  furnishes  the  economic  founda- 
tion of  the  State,  54  per  cent  of  the  total  manufactures  being 
furnished  by  the  meat-packing  and  flour-milling  industries. 
Slaughtering  and  meat  packing  was  the  leading  industry  with 
products  valued  at  $104,503,333,  or  47.2  per  cent  of  the  total  of 
all  manufactures  of  the  State.  Other  important  products  and 
their  values  were  flour-mill  and  grist-mill  products,  $15,022,126; 
butter.   $11,082,123;    printing   and   publishing,   $7,835,653;    and 


124  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

foundry  and  machine-shop  products.  $5,110,961.  The  census 
returns  give  separate  statistics  for  32  industries,  each  of  which 
reported  products  valued  at  more  than  $1,000,000  for  each  one. 
The  mineral  output  of  Nebraska  is  not  important,  amounting  to 
only  $1,166,787. 

Corn,  wheat,  and  oats  were  the  leading  crops  of  this  State 
with  values  of  $92,194,000  for  corn;  $64,710,000  for  wheat;  and 
$27,840,000  for  oats. 

Value  of  products,  Nebraska,  1914 

Alanufactures $221,615,848 

Mineral  products 1,166,787 

Principal  crops 184,744,000 

Live  stock  on  farms,  Jan.  1,  1915 165,362,000 

Total $572,888,635 

Missouri 

Missouri  is  a  State  of  diversified  industries,  51  separate  in- 
dustry groups  with  a  total  production  valued  at  $637,952,128 
being  shown  in  the  reports  of  the  Census  of  Manufactures.  The 
leading  industries  and  the  value  of  their  products  were  slaugh- 
tering and  meat  packing,  $92.060,499 ;  boots  and  shoes,  $52,- 
522,006 ;  flour-mill  and  grist-mill  products,  $38,686,308 ;  tobacco 
manufactures,  $33,380,843;  printing  and  publishing,  $33,173,414; 
malt  liquors,  $31,801,404;  and  foundry  and  machine-shop  prod- 
ucts, $22,270,635. 

The  total  luineral  output  (^f  the  State  was  valued  at  $48,- 
597,593.  the  leading  products  and  their  values  being  lead, 
$15,023,736;  zinc,  $10,811,388;  and  coal,  $6,802,325.  It  ranked 
first  among  the  States  in  the  production  of  lead  and  zinc,  sup- 
plying 35.8  per  cent  of  the  lead  output  of  the  country,  and  26.8 
l)cr  cent  of  the  zinc  smelted  in  the  United  States. 

The  leading  agricultural  product  of  Missouri  was  corn,  which 
in  1914  had  a  value  of  $107,712,000,  or  more  than  twice  that  of 
any  other  crop.  The  other  crops  with  values  of  more  than 
$3,000,000  were  wheat,  $42,466,000 ;  hay  $24,752.000 ;  and  oats, 
$11,352,000. 

Value  of  products,  Missouri,  1914 

Manufactures $637,952,128 

Mineral  products 48,597,593 

Principal  crops 190,645,000 

Live  stock  on  farms,  Jan.  1.  1915 181,902,000 

Total $1,059,096,721 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  125 

Kansas 

While  the  value  of  the  manufactures  of  Kansas  amounted  to 
$323,234,194,  agriculture  was  the  leading  industry  and  furnished 
the  greater  part  of  the  material  worked  up  l)y  manufacturing 
establishments,  the  combined  value  of  the  products  of  flour-mill, 
grist-mill,  slaughtering,  and  meat-packing  industries  being  69.5 
per  cent  of  the  total  for  the  State.  Slaughtering  and  meat 
packing  was  the  leading  industry,  the  value  of  the  products 
amounting  to  $151,647,123,  or  46.9  per  cent  of  the  total  for'all 
industries.  Other  important  industries  and  the  value  of  their 
products  are  the  manufacture  of  flour,  $72,894,736  ;  butter,  cheese, 
and  condensed  milk,  $10,219,813;  petroleum  refining,  $8,922,718; 
and  foundry  and  machine-shop  products,  $7,027,145. 

The  value  of  the  mineral  output  amounted  to  $25,866,351.  The 
leading  products  and  their  value  were  coal,  $11,238,253;  natural 
gas,  $3,340,025  ;  and  petroleum,  $2,433,074. 

Wheat  is  the  most  valuable  of  the  crops  of  Kansas,  which 

alternates  with  North  Dakota  for  the  lead  in  the  production  of 

this   staple.     In   1914  the   total   value   of  the   wheat   crop   was 

$168,340,000,   while  the   value   of   the  corn   crop   reached   $68,- 

182,000.     These  two  crops  form  the  backbone  of  the  prosperity 

of  the  State,  the  only  other  leading  crops  of  high  value  being 

oats,   to   the    value    of   $24,763,000,    and    hay,    to   the    value    of 

$18,441,000. 

Value  of  products,  Kansas,   1914 

Manufactures $323,234,194 

Mineral  products 2,S,866,351 

Principal  crops 287,672,000 

Live  stock  on  farms,  Jan.  1,  1915 149,615,000 

Total $786,387,545 

Idaho 

Idaho  is  a  large  producer  of  raw  materials,  which  are  divided 

into  the  following  items  : 

Tons 

Products  of  agriculture 1,404,239 

Products  of  animals 267,410 

Products  of  mines 1,323,923 

Products  of  forests 2,415,393 

Products  of  manufactories 148,854 

Miscellaneous 212,548 

The  area  of  the  State  is  83,888  square  miles,  and  the  population 
approximates  440,000  people.    One  of  the  principal  reasons  for 


126  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

the  small  population  is  lack  of  transportation,  while  another 
reason  is  the  unfavorable  location  with  respect  to  markets.  The 
products  of  the  State,  however,  are  conceded  to  be  of  the  finest 
quality.  The  soil  is  not  cultivated  to  its  full  degree  of  intensity, 
and  these  lands  can  not  and  will  not  be  developed  until  such 
time  as  a  market  for  the  products  may  be  found.  The  State  is 
surrounded  by  a  number  of  other  States  having  a  surplus  pro- 
duction, and  hence  is  at  a  great  disadvantage.  It  has  vast  potash 
deposits,  which,  how^ever,  are  of  low  grade  and  can  not  be 
profitably  developed  until  cheaper  transportation  is  provided. 
The  soil  is  well  adapted  to  the  production  of  fruit  and  potatoes, 
and  large  quantities  of  these  products  would  be  forwarded  to 
foreign  markets  and  to  the  Atlantic  seaboard  if  transportation  by 
water  from  Duluth  were  available.  Among  other  products  of 
importance  in  this  State  are  grain,  lumber,  live  stock  and  wool. 
Its  most  valuable  crop  is  wheat. 


Increase  in  value  of  manufactures  at  principal  cities  on  the  Great  Lakes  and  the 
Atlantic  seaboard,  between  1899  and  1914. 

Value  of  all  manufactures 

Atlantic  Coast:  1899  1914 

New  York 1,172,870,000  2,292,831,693 

Philadelphia 519,982,000  784,499,633 

Boston 167,149,000  284,802,479 

Baltimore 135,108,000  215,171,530 

Newark 112,728,000  210,601,047 

2,107,837.000     3,787,906,382 
Increase  at  fiv?  principal  manufacturing  cities  on  Atlantic  Coast,  79  per  cent. 

Chica)?,o.  . 797,897,000  1,483,498,416 

Detroit 88,366,000  400,347,912 

Cleveland 139,356,000  352,418,052 

Buffalo 105,627,000  247.515,476 

Milwaukee 110,854,000  223,555,142 

1,242,100,000     2,707,334,998 

Increase  at  five  principal  manufacturing  cities  on  Great  Lakes,  118  per  cent. 

The  figures  of  the  1919  census  of  manufactures  are  not  yet 
available,  but  it  is  clear  that  there  is  an  increasing  tendency  to 
develop  manufacturing  industries  in  the  regions  of  the  GrSat 
Lakes,  in  close  proximity  to  the  raw  materials  of  production  and 
to  the  center  of  population.  The  sole  disadvantage  of  this 
location  appears  to  be  the  excessive  cost  of  transportation  to 
foreign  destinations,  and  this  handicap  would  be  entirely  removed 
bv  the  construction  of  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  127 


128  ECOXOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

Production  centers, — It  is  important  to  note  that  the  center  of 
production  of  many  of  the  most  important  commodities  entering 
into  our  export  trade  Hes  within  the  area  tributary  to  the  Great 
Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway.  The  map  on  page  127  and  the 
following  list  of  production  centers  are  taken  from  an  article 
by  Mr.  Horace  C.  Gardner,  in  Mechanical  Engineering.  Sep- 
tember, 1920: 

Production  Centers 

1  Center  of  population Indiana 

2  Farm  acreage .'  .  Central  Missouri 

3  Farm  values S.  E.  Iowa 

4  Wheat S.  E.  Nebraska 

5  Com Illinois 

6  Oats S.  E.  Iowa 

7  Potatoes S.  E.  Wisconsin 

8  Wool Wyoming 

9  Tobacco N.  E.  Kentucky 

1 1  Beet  sugar Western  Colorado 

12  Horses N.  W.  Missouri 

13  Sheep Northern  Colorado 

14  Milch  cows Illinois 

15  Other  cattle Western  Kansas  ■ 

16  Butter Northern  Illinois 

1 7  Swine S.  W.  Illinois 

18  Iron  ore N.  E.  Minnesota 

19  Pig  iron  production Eastern  Ohio 

20  Bituminous  coal  reserves S.  E.  Wyoming 

21  Bituminous  coal  production Panhandle  of  W.   Va. 

23  Manufacture — Primary  horse  power  used  in Eastern  Ohio 

24  Persons  engaged  in  manufacture S.  W.  Pennsylvania 

25  Manufacture — Value  added  bv N.  W.  Pennsylvania 

26  Cheese S.  E.  Wisconsin 

28  Shoes Near  Rochester,  N.  Y. 

29  Eggs N.  E.  Iowa 

30  Men's  clothing Near  Chicago 

31  Slaughtering  and  meat  packing N.  E.  Iowa 

32  Automobiles Near  Detroit,  Mich. 

33  Rubber  goods Near  Akron,  Ohio 

The  following  graphs  show  clearly  the  magnitude  of  the  in- 
dustries of  the  region  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence 
waterway. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL 


129 


Distribution,  by  Principal  Articles,  of  tin  Valuation  of  Manufactures  Reported 
by  Principal  Cities  According  to  Census  of  Manufactures  for  1914. 


PlTTSBl^RGH 


Millions  of  dollars 

Per   cent 
of 

Value        0                                              50                                               100 

total 

Iron  and  steel .  . 

Foundry 

Slaughtering.  .  . 

Printing 

Cars 

Bread 

Liquor* 

Other 

80,454,000 

27,778,000 

17,947,000 

10,825,000 

9,707,000 

9,363,000 

5,200,000 

85,420,000 

32.6 
11.2 
7.3 
4.4 
3.9 
3.8 
2.1 
34.7 

— 

Milwaukee 


Millions  of  dollars 

Per  cent 
of 

Value         0                                             50                                               100 

total 

Liquors 

Leather  goods .  . 

Clothing 

Boots  and  shoes. 

Foundry 

Printing 

Iron  and  steel .  . 
Confectionery .  . 
Bread 

32,435,755 

22,893,306 

14,568,873 

11,665,824 

9,902,102 

6,279;488 

5,645,308 

4,943,459 

4,571,0*? 

3,994,646 

2,848,626 

2,396,501 

101,410,197 

^ 

14.5 
10.2 
6.5 
5.2 
4.4 
2.8 
2.6 
2.2 
2.0 

Electric  Mach.  . 

Lumber 

Furniture 

Other 

1.8 
1.3 
1.1 

43  4 

Cincinnati 

Articles 

Millions  of  dollars 

Per  cent 
of 

Value 

0 

50 

100 

total 

Slaughtering.  .  . 

Foundry 

Clothing 

Boots  and  shoes 

Printing 

Liquors 

Leather  goods .  . 

Bread 

Copper  work . . . 

Paints 

Tobacco 

Furniture 

Lumber 

Coffee  and  spices 
Other 


23,245.000 

21,122,000 

17,672,000 

15,329,000 

13,378,000 

10,353,000 

6,974,000 

6,386,000 

5,550,000 

4,517,000 

4,121,000 

3,514,000 

3,246,000 

2,286,000 

73,038,000 


11.1 
10.0 
8.4 
7.3 
6.4 
4.9 
3.3 
3.0 
2.7 
2.2 
2.0 
1.7 
1.6 
1.1 
34.3 


130 


ECONOMIC    -ASPECTS    OF    THE 


MlNNEAPOUIS 


Millions  of  dollars     • 

Per  cent 

of 

total 

Value         0                                         50                                                  100 

Flour  mills 

Printing 

Liquors 

Iron  work 

Clothing 

Bread 

88.935,924 
7,429,729 
6,302,975 
5.766,029 
5,737,265 
4,917.245 
4.549,448 
4,460,655 
3.780,260 
2.037.634 
1.652.565 
1,610.903 
1,390,310 
1,315.274 

46.875,576 

■ 

47.4 
3.9 
3.3 
3.1 
3.1 
2.6 

Cars 

2.4 

Lumber 

Foundry 

Coffee  and  spices 

Furniture 

Confectionery .  . 

Cooperage 

Medicines 

Other 

2.4 
2.0 
1.1 
0.9 
0.9 
0  7 
0  7 
24.9 

Kansas  City 


Articles 


Millions  of  dollars 


Per  cent 

of 

total 


ValiK- 

0 

.lO 

100 

133.826,.338 
5,552.901 

83.8 
3.5 

m 

3.158.499 

m 

2.0 

2,458.961 

■ 

1.5 

I1,70:{,169 

"■■ 

9  2 

Slaughtering 
Hour  mills.  . 
Foundry. .  .  . 

Cnrs 

Other 


HOCHESTEH 


Articles 


Millions  of  dollars 


Viilii. 


Per  cent 

of 

total 


Clothing 

20.822,858 

■■■^^ 

14.8 

|{<K>ts  and  shoes. 

13,519.755 

■■■ 

9.6 

Foundry 

6,586.267 

^ 

4.7 

Printing 

4,588.923 

^ 

3.3 

Flour  mills 

4,351.542 

■ 

3.1 

Liquors 

4,279.456 

■ 

3.0 

Furniture 

3.458.985 

■ 

2.5 

2,718,449 
2,458.936 

J 

1  9 

ICIertric  mach.  . 

1.7 

Lumber 

2,193..^60 

1.6 

("onfectionery .  . 

1,897, .348 

13 

1,268,484 
72.552.192 

0.9 

Other 

51.6 

GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


131 


Indianapolis 


Articles 


Millions  of  dollars 


Value 


Per  cent 
of  t1 
total 


Slaughtering.  . 
Automobiles. . . 

Foundry 

Flour  mills. . .  . 

Printing 

Clothing 

Furniture 

Bread 

Lumber 

Druggists  prep 

Liquors 

Cars 

Confectionery . 

Carriages 

Other 


37,780,039 
12,693,097 
8,752,318 
7,971,329 
6,423,546 
4,2.59,730 
3,442,741 
3,227,511 
3,137,300 
2,9.55,829 
2,764,610 
1,741.028 
1,542,784 
1,400,402 
39,428,373 


Akbon 


Articles 

Millions  of  dollars 

Per  cent 
of 

Value         0                                                  50                                                100 

total 

Rubber  goods .  . 
Other 

Toledo 


Millions  of  dollars 

Per  cent 

Articles 

of 

total 

Value       0                                                    50                                                100 

Foundry 

6,544,602 

warn 

5.7 

Coffeeandspices. 

5,889,320 

■■ 

5.1 

Flour  mills 

5,815,388 

■■ 

5.1 

Clothing 

3,355,488 

2.9 

Electric  mach .  . 

3,229,882 

2.8 

Printing 

2,797,092 

2.4 

Liquors 

2,474,913 

2.1 

Bread 

2,307,211 

2.0 

Copper  work .  .  . 

2,029,356 

1.8 

Lumber 

1,480,636 

1.3 

1,201,929 
873,570 

1 

1.0 

Iron  work 

0.8 

Confectionery .  . 

777,552 

1 

0.7 

Furniture 

Other 

734,231 
75,538,256 

1 

0.6 
65.7 

132 


ECONOMIC   ASPECTS    OF   THE 


YOUNGSTOWN 


Articles 


Millions  of  dollars 


Value 


Per  cent 

of 

total 


Iron  and  steel 

Foundry 

Lumber 

Printing 

Bread 

Other 


48,796,464 

3,077.945 

1,010,128 

791,777 

619,886 

37,815,072 


53.0 
3.3 
1.1 
0.9 
0.7 

41.0 


DaYTOiN 


Articles 

Millions  of  dollars 

Per  cent 
of 

Value       0 

25                                                  50 

total 

Foundry 

Slaughtering.  .  . 

Tobacco 

Bread 

5,595,634 
4,830,647 
2.055,431 
2,012,777 
1,899,216 
1,107,527 
863,497 
824,823 

■ 
1 

I 

7.9 
6.8 
2.9 
0  8 

Lumber 

Printing 

2.7 
1.6 
1.2 

Furniture 

1.2 

Other 

72.9 

Chicago 


Hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars 

Per  cent 

Articles 

of 

total 

Value       0                         12                        3                      4 

Slaughtering.  .  . 

Clothing 

Printing 

410.709,000 

109,089,000 

97,507,000 

27   7 

.7  4 

6.6 

Cars 

67,619,000 

^1^1^^^ 

4.6 

Bread 

42,122,000 

^^^ 

2.8 

Liquors 

28.933,000 

MB 

1.9 

Lumber 

28,711,000 

^■B 

1.9 

Iron  and  steel .  . 

27,002,000 

■H 

1.8 

PainU 

22,811,000 

IB 

1.6 

Leather  goods.  . 

21,126,000 

■i 

1.4 

Confectionery .  . 

20,349.000 

^ 

1.4 

Electric  mach .  . 

17.568,000 

■1 

1.2 

Metal  work 

13,236,000 
434.166.000 

■                                                                                                             111^ 

1.0 
31.6 

Other 

GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWKEXCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


133 


Detroit 


Articles 


If undreds  of  millions  of  dollars 


Value       0 


Automobiles. . . 
Slaughtering .  . 

Foundry 

Tobacco 

Brass  work. .  .  . 

Medicines 

Printing 

liquors 

Bread    

Stoves 

Lumber 

Copper  work .  . 

Clothing 

Other 


171,231.962 

20,077,148 

17.185,368 

17,044,106 

14,629,751 

13.691,495 

11,149,376 

9.409,722 

7,488,821 

5,921,410 

5.566,510 

4,369.116 

3,770.564 

98,813,563 


St.  Lons 


Hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars 

Per  cent 

Articles 

of 

total 

Value      0                                                        1                                                            2 

Slaughtering .  .  . 

36,506,1.52 

j^g^^ 

10.1 

Boots  and  shoes. 

31,048,946 

^■■■B 

8.6 

Liquors 

26,829,474 

^■■H 

7.4 

Printing 

16,604,879 

1^^ 

4.6 

Clothing 

15,626,033 

^m 

4.3 

Coffee  and  spices 

11.171,901 

^B 

3.3 

Bread 

9.453,646 

^^ 

2.6 

2.4 

Foundry 

8,806,184 

Mi 

Flour  mills 

8,093,910 

■■■ 

2.2 

7,478,760 

^gi 

2.1 
1.6 

Chemicals 

6,471.081 

■i 

Medicines 

6,048,497 

^ 

1    7 

Furniture 

5,621,890 

^ 

1.6 

Paints 

5,002  918 

1^ 

1.4 
1.3 

Confectionery.  . 

4,668.334 

m 

Druggists  prep, . 

3,275,247 

m 

0.9 

Brass  products.. 

2,936,923 

m 

0.8 

Iron  work 

2,721,358 

m 

0.8 

2,235,117 

2,112,814 

147,785.935 

■ 

0.6 
0.6 

Lumber 

Other 

» 

134 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS   OF   THE 


Cleveland 


Articles 


Millions  of  dollars 


Value 


100 


Per  cent 

of 

total 


Iron  and  steel .  . 

Foundry 

Clothing 

Automobiles. . .  . 
Slaughtering.  . 

Printing 

Electric  mach .  . 
Paints 

50.029.151 

34.959.583 

28.811,322 

27,116,595 

23.210.323 

12.150,628 

11.357.538 

10,092.979 

6,907,608 

6,528,168 

6,035.669 

4.957.868 

4,946.892 

3.864.955 

121.128,793 

U.2 
9.9 

51^^^ 

8.2 
7.7 
6.6 
3.4 
3.3 
2.9 

Bread 

Liquors 

Iron  work 

Cars      

1.9 
1.9 
1.7 
1.4 

Confectionery .  . 
Copper  work .  .  . 

1.4 
1.1 

Other 

34.4 

Buffalo 


Millions  of  dollars 

Per  cent 

of 

total 

Value        0                                                   50                                               100 

Flour  mills j   22,185.983 

13.0 

Slaughtering.  .  . 

29,398.200 

11.6 

Liquors 

16,036.439 

■■■■ 

6.5 

Foundry 

11.375.640 

■■■ 

4.6 

Printing 

7.170,610 

■■ 

2.9 

Bread 

6.514,477 

■ 

2.6 

5.507.262 
3.830.576 

■ 

2.2 

Leather  goods . . 

1.6 

Lumber 

3,944.209 

1.6 

Furniture 

3,728.066 

1.5 

Clothing 

3.517.308 

1.4 

Bra.ss  work 

3,399.130 

1,4 

Medicines 

3.160,665 

1.3 

Iron  work 

2,681.649 

11 

Confectionery  .  . 

1,875.503 

0.3 

Automobiles. . .  . 

1.764.212 

0,7 

Copper  work .  . . 

1,450.401 

0.6 

Boxes 

1.486,341 
1.499.457 

0  6 

Boots  and  shoes. 

0.6 

Other 

106.902.448 

43.2 

GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


135 


Distribution  by  States  of  the  Value  of  Manufactures,  1914. 
(Prepared  by  the  Ports  Facilities  Commission,  U.  S.  Shipping  Board. 


Flour  and  Grist  Mill  Products 


136 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


^1 


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/  1-  LINOIS 

^ 

i^  7,  6  ao  J-03 

..^^ 


0  ® 


Glass  Manufactures 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


137 


AUTOMORILES 


138 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


Agricultural  Implements 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


139 


Iron  and  Steel 

(Steel  works  and  rolling  mills  only) 


140 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


Si  AUGHTERING    ASD    MeAT    PACKING 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


141 


NEW  YOR« 
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Butter,  Cheese  and  ^Condensed  Milk 


142 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


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Leather  Products 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


143 


Rubber  Goods 


144 


ECONO>riC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  145 


146 


ECONOMIC   ASPECTS    OF    THE 


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GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL 


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148 


ECONOMIC   ASPECTS    OF    THE 


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GREAT   LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  149 


2  00 


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Chapter  X 

BRIEF   HISTORY   OF   IMPROVEMENTS   FOR   NAVIGA- 
TION ON  THE  GREAT  LAKES 

Progressive  improvements  by  the  United  States  have  resulted 
in  providing  depths  in  the  channels  and  harbors  of  the  Great 
Lakes  suitable  for  vessels  drawing  up  to  21  feet.  The  project 
depths  of  the  principal  lake  harbors  are  20  and  21  feet  at  low 
water,  but  in  a  number  of  cases  greater  depths  are  provided  in  * 
the  entrance  channels.  During  the  last  24  years  the  depths  in 
the  principal  harbors  have  been  increased  several  feet.  The  St. 
Marys  Falls  Canal  provides  a  depth  of  24.5  feet.  The  Welland 
Canal  now  has  a  depth  of  14  feet,  but  is  being  enlarged  to  pro- 
vide an  initial  depth  of  25  feet  and  an  ultimate  depth  of  30 
feet  at  extreme  low  water.  The  lateral  canals  of  the  St.  Law- 
rence River  now  have  a  depth  of  14  feet. 

Original  conditions. — Prior  to  the  initiation  of  improvements 
for  the  benefit  of  navigation  on  the  Great  Lakes,  through  traffic 
was  restricted  by  physical  conditions  to  Lakes  Erie,  Huron,  and 
Michigan.  Communication  with  Lake  Superior  was  rendered 
impracticable  by  the  Falls  of  Saint  Marys  River,  having  a  drop 
of  about  20  feet,  and  communication  between  Lake  Erie  and 
Lake  Ontario  was  blocked  by  the  Falls  of  the  Niagara.  Prior 
to  1832,  Detroit  was  the  western  terminus  of  most  of  the  Lake 
traffic,  except  that  of  fur  traders  and  military  posts.  It  is  said 
that  the  Black  Hawk  War  which  broke  out  in  that  year  was  one 
means  of  diffusing  knowledge  of  Illinois  and  Wisconsin  through- 
out the  East  and  helped  to  accelerate  the  settlement  of  the  country 
on  the  west  shore  of  Lake  Michigan,  which  was  followed  by 
an  extension  of  traffic  to  Lake  Michigan. 

St.  Marys  River. — Originally  St.  Marys  River,  connecting 
Lakes  Huron  and  Superior,  was  obstructed  by  St.  Marys  Falls 
and  by  a  number  of  shoals  upon  which  the  least  depths  were 
from  5  to  17  feet  at  mean  low  water.  Navigation  past  the  Falls 
was  impracticable  except  for  downbound  canoes  and  log  rafts. 
A  small  canal  was  built  on  the  Canadian  side  by  the  Northwest 
Fur  Company  in  1797-8,  and  provided  a  depth  of  about  2  feet. 
This  canal  was  destroyed  in  1814.  Thereafter  until  1855  the 
movement  of  freight  to  and  from  Lake  Superior  was  by  boat  to 
Sault  Ste.  Marie,  where  cargoes  were  unloaded,  taken  across 
the  portage  one  mile  long,  and  reloaded  on  boats.  In  1855 
the    State   of    Michigan    completed    a   canal    with    a    double    lift 

150 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  151 

lock,  providing  a  channel  for  vessels  having  a  draft  of  11.5  feet 
at  mean  stage  of  water,  thus  establishing  the  first  through  navi- 
gation route  to  Lake  Superior.  This  canal  was  taken  over  by 
the  United  States  in  1881,  and  in  1888  the  original  locks  were 
destroyed  in  making  the  excavation  for  the  present  Poe  Lock, 
which  is  800  feet  long,  100  feet  wide,  and  has  a  depth  of  22  feet 
on  the  sills.  This  lock  was  completed  in  1896.  The  Weitzel 
Lock,  built  in  the  years  1870  to  1881,  is  515  feet  long,  80  feet 
wide  in  the  chamber,  narrowing  to  60  feet  at  the  gates,  and  has 
a  depth  of  17  feet  of  water  on  the  sills.  The  Davis  or  Third 
lock  opened  in  1914,  and  the  Sabin  or  Fo'urth  lock  opened  in 
1919,  are  1,300  feet  long,  80  feet  wide,  and  have  24.5  feet 
on  the  sills.  The  existing  project  for  the  improvement  of  the 
St.  Marys  River  provides  for  a  depth  of  21  feet  at  low  water, 
over  a  minimum  width  of  300  feet  for  one-way  traffic  and  of 
600  feet  for  two-way  traffic  throughout  the  river.  The  project 
depth  of  the  South  Canal  is  24^^  feet,  and  of  the  North  Canal 
25  feet.  At  the  present  time  the  dredged  areas  afford  a  least 
width  of  300  feet,  increasing  at  angles  and  other  critical  places 
up  to  1,000  feet. 

In  addition  to  the  improvements  provided  by  the  United  States 
at  St.  Marys  Falls,  the  Dominion  of  Canada  between  the  years 
1888  and  1895  constructed  a  canal  lyi  miles  long,  150  feet  wide, 
with  a  lock  900  feet  long  and  60  feet  wide,  having  a  depth  of 
18  feet  3  inches  on  the  sills  at  lowest  known  water  level. 

St.  Clair  River,  Mich. — The  St.  Clair  River  connects  Lake 
Huron  and  Lake  St.  Clair,  and  has  a  total  fall  of  5.8  feet  in 
its  length  of  40  miles.  With  the  exception  of  the  delta  section 
which  begins  about  33  miles  below  the  head  of  the  river,  the 
width  averages  about  2,000  feet.  It  discharges  into  Lake  St. 
Clair  through  seven  mouths,  the  one  known  as  the  South  Channel 
being  used  for  deep-draft  vessels,  while  several  other  channels 
are  used  for  small  craft.  The  least  depths  above  the  mouths  of 
the  river  were  suitable  for  vessels  plying  these  waters  during 
the  early  period  of  lake  navigation.  The  existing  project  pro- 
vides for  channels  20.  21,  and  22  feet  deep  at  low  water  through 
various  sections. 

Lake  St.  Clair,  Mich. — Lake  St.  Clair  is  the  smallest  of  the 
Great  Lakes,  being  about  503  square  miles  in  area,  and  is  shallow 
throughout.  On  the  sailing  course  it  is  18  miles  wide.  Originally 
the  channels  through  the  Lake  were  obstructed  by  a  shoal  at  the 
entrance  to  the  Detroit  River  and  by  bars  at  the  several  mouths 


152  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

of  the  St.  Clair  River.  According  to  a  report  of  conditions  in 
1846,  lighters  were  used  at  the  latter  point  to  relieve  boats 
of  some  of  their  freight,  thus  enabling  them  to  pass  with  greater 
safety  over  the  shallow  places  The  existing  project  provides  for 
a  ship  canal  known  as  St.  Clair  Flats  Canal,  consisting  of  two 
dredged  cuts  each  300  feet  wide  and  20  feet  deep,  extending 
from  deep  water  in  St.  Clair  River,  a  distance  of  17,460  feet, 
into  Lake  St.  Clair ;  and  for  a  channel  800  feet  wide  and  20 
feet  deep  through  the  shoal  at  the  entrance  to  the  Detroit  River, 
known  as  Grosse  Pointe  Channel. 

Detroit  River. — The  Detroit  River  connects  Lakes  St.  Clair  and 
Erie  and  is  28  miles  long.  The  total  fall  is  about  3  feet,  most 
of  which  occurs  in  the  length  of  about  5  miles  in  the  lower  por- 
tion of  the  river.  The  width  of  the  river  varies  from  ]/>  mile 
to  about  3  miles.  In  its  original  condition  the  river  was  navigable 
throughout  its  entire  length,  but  the  shoals  at  Limekiln  Crossing, 
about  8  miles  above  Detroit  River  Lighthouse,  limited  the  usable 
depth  to  \2y2  to  15  feet  at  Lake  Erie  stage  over  a  bottom  of  solid 
rock.  The  existing  project  provides  for  a  channel  known  as 
Amherstburg  Channel,  at  least  600  feet  wide,  with  a  depth  of  22 
feet  north  of  its  junction  with  the  Livingstone  Channel,  and 
of  21  feet  south  of  said  junction  ;  and  for  a  second  channel  known 
as  Livingstone  Channel,  with  a  least  depth  of  22  feet  and  a 
least  width  of  800  feet  from  deep  water  in  Lake  Erie  to  Bar 
Point,  and  a  least  width  of  300  feet  thence  to  its  junction  with 
the  Amherstburg  Channel.  The  project  also  provides  for  a 
channel  22  feet  deep  and  800  feet  wide  abreast  of  Fighting 
Island,  and  for  removing  the  shoal  at  the  head  of  Grosse  Isle. 
The  Amherstburg  Channel  is  for  upbound  traffic  and  the  Living- 
stone Channel  is  for  downbound  traffic. 

The  Welland  Canal. — To  overcome  the  barrier  to  traffic  formed 
by  Niagara  Falls  the  Dominion  of  Canada  constructed  the  Wel- 
land Canal,  extending  from  Port  Colborne  on  Lake  Erie  to  Port 
Dalhousie  on  Lake  Ontario.  The  canal  is  26-v:|  miles  long  and 
has  a  total  descent  of  326^)4  feet,  overcome  by  twenty-five  lift 
locks  each  270  feet  long,  with  an  available  length  of  255  feet, 
a  width  of  45  feet,  and  a  depth  of  about  14  feet  on  the  sills. 
Tn  order  to  provide  accommodation  for  larger  vessels,  opera- 
tions were  begun  in  1913  for  the  construction  of  a  new  ship 
canal  between  Lakes  Erie  and  Ontario.  The  line  of  the  pro- 
posed canal  follows  the  course  of  the  present  canal  froiri  Port 
Colborne   to   Allanburg,   about   half    way   across    the   peninsula; 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  153 

thence  an  entirely  new  channel  will  be  provided  and  the  canal 
will  enter  Lake  Ontario  at  Port  Weller  about  3  miles  east  of 
the  terminus  of  the  present  canal.     The  total  length  of  the  new 
line  is  25  miles,  and  the  difference  in  elevation  between  the  two 
lakes,  about   325}^    feet,  will  be  overcome  by  seven  lift  locks, 
each  having  a  lift  of  46 J/2   feet.     The  locks  will  be  800  feet  in 
length  by  80  feet  in  width  in  the  clear,  with  30  feet  of  water 
over  the  miter  sills  at  extreme  low   stages  in  the  Lakes.     The 
width  of  the  canal  at  the  bottom  will  be  200  feet,  and  for  the 
present  the  canal   reaches   will   be  excavated   to   a   depth   of   25 
feet  only,  but  all  structures  will  be  sunk  to  a  30-foot  depth  so 
that  the  canal  can  be  deepened  at  any  future  time  by  the  simple 
process  of  dredging  out  the  reaches.     The  proposed  depths  are 
at  extreme  low  water  in  Lake  Erie,  568  feet  above  sea  level,  while 
the  datum  plane  of  improvements  by  the  United  States  on  Lake 
Erie  is  referred  to  low  water  datum  570.8  feet  above  sea  level. 
The  cost  of  the  new  Welland  Canal  was  originally  estimated  at 
$50,000,000,  but  this  estimate  will  no  doubt  have  to  be  increased. 
The  St.  Lawrence  River. — From  the  head  of  the  St.  Lawrence 
River  to  Montreal  is  a  total  distance  of  182  statute  miles,  and 
from  the  latter  point  to  the  Strait  of   Belle  Isle  at  the  mouth 
of  the  St.  Lawrence  a  distance  of  1,003  miles,  making  the  total 
length  of  the  St.   Lawrence  River   1,185  miles.     Between  Lake 
Ontario  and  Garlop  Island,  a  distance  of  68  miles,  there  is  a  chan- 
nel 30  feet  or  more  in  depth,  with  a  minimum  width  of  500  feet. 
At  Galop   Island  the  uppermost  rapids  are  encountered,  which 
have   been   overcome   by   the   Galop   Canal,   constructed    by   the 
Dominion  of   Canada.     This  canal  is  7   1-3  miles  long,  with  a 
bottom  width  of  80  feet,  a   surface  width   of    144   feet,   and  a 
depth  of  14  feet  on  the  sills.     It  has  two  lift  locks,  one  of  which 
is  800   feet  long  by  50   feet  wide  and  the  other  303   feet  long 
by  45  feet  wide.     A  guard  lock  at  the  head  of  the  canal  is  270 
feet  long  by  45   feet  wide,  and  the  total  lockage  is   151/2    feet. 
Below  this  canal  is  a  stretch  of  4^/2  miles  of  navigable  river  ex- 
tending to  the  head  of  the  Rapide  Plat  Canal.    This  canal  is  3  2-3 
miles  long,  80  feet  wide  at  bottom  and   152   feet  wide  at  the 
surface,  with   14   feet  of  water  on  the  sills.     It  has  two  locks 
each   270    feet   long  by   45    feet   wide.      It   was    constructed    to 
enable  vessels  ascending  the  river  to  pass  the  rapids ;  descending 
vessels  run  the  rapids  safely.     From  the  foot  of  the  Rapide  Plat 
Canal  to  the  head  of  Farran's  Point  Canal,  there  is  a  navigable 
stretch  of  9^/2   miles.     The   Farran's   Point   Canal   is    1%    miles 


154  ECONOMIC   ASPECTS    OF    THE 

long,  90  feet  wide  at  bottom  and  154  feet  wide  at  the  surface, 
with  14  feet  of  water  on  the  miter  sills  of  the  new  lock,  which 
has  a  length  of  800  feet  and  a  width  of  50  feet.  The  total 
lockage  is  3^  feet,  and  descending  vessels  run  the  rapids  with 
ease  and  safety.  The  new  lock  enables  vessels  ascending  the 
river  to  avoid  Farran's  Point  rapids,  passing  a  full  tow  at  one 
lockage.  The  Farran's  Point,  Rapide  Plat,  and  Galop  Canals  are 
collectively  known  as  the  Williamsburg  Canals. 

From  the  foot  of  Farran's  Point  Canal  to  the  head  of  the 
Cornwall  Canal  there  is  a  distance  of  five  miles  of  navigable 
river.  The  Cornwall  Canal  is  11  miles  long,  90  feet  wide  at 
bottom  and  54  feet  wide  at  the  water  surface.  It  has  one  guard 
gate  and  six  locks  270  feet  long  by  45  feet  wide,  with  a  total 
lockage  of  48  feet.  The  Cornwall  Canal  extends  past  the  Long 
Sault  Rapids,  from  the  town  of  Cornwall  to  Dickinson's  Landing. 
Below  the  Cornwall  Canal  there  is  a  stretch  of  31  miles  of 
navigable  water  through  Lake  St.  Francis  to  the  head  of  the 
Soulanges  Canal.  The  Soulanges  Canal  is  14  miles  long.  100 
feet  wide  at  bottom  and  164  feet  wide  at  the  surface,  with  15 
feet  of  water  on  the  sills.  It  has  one  guard  lock  and  four  lift 
locks  280  feet  long  by  45  feet  wide,  overcoming  a  total  rise  or 
lockage  of  84  feet.  This  canal  extends  from  Cascades  Point 
to  Coteau  Landing,  overcoming  the  Cascades  Rapids,  Cedar 
Rapids  and  Coteau  Rapids.  From  the  foot  of  the  Soulanges 
Canal  there  is  a  navigable  stretch  of  16  miles  in  Lake  St.  Louis 
and  the  St.  Lawrence  River  to  the  head  of  the  Lachine  Canal. 
The  latter  canal  is  8^/^  miles  long,  with  an  average  width  of  150 
feet.  There  are  five  locks  270  feet  long  by  45  feet  wide,  at  two 
of  which  the  depth  on  the  sills  is  18  feet,  and  on  the  other  three 
there  is  a  depth  of  14  feet.  The  total  rise  or  lockage  is  45  feet. 
The  canal  consists  of  one  channel  with  two  distinct  systems  of 
locks,  the  old  and  the  enlarged,  and  there  are  two  lock  entrances 
at  each  end.  The  canal  overcomes  the  St.  Louis  Rapids  and 
extends  from  the  town  of  Lachine  to  the  city  of  Montreal. 

From  Montreal  to  Father  Point  a  30-foot  channel  has  been 
practically  completed,  with  a  width  of  450  feet  in  the  straight 
portions  and  of  600  to  750  feet  in  the  bends  between  Montreal 
and  Quebec,  and  of  1,000  feet  everywhere  below  Quebec.  The 
deepening  of  this  channel  to  35  feet  was  begun  in  1909.  By 
means  of  these  channel  improvements  Montreal  has  been  placed 
at  the  head  of  ocean  navigation  on  the  St.  Lawrence  River. 

Lake    Harbors. — .As    the   depths    of   the   connecting   channels 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


155 


of  the  Great  Lakes  place  definite  limits  upon  the  drafts  to  which 
vessels  may  load,  the  improvement  of  the  lake  harbors  has  neces- 
sarily maintained  close  relationship  to  the  facilities  available 
in  these  channels.  The  project  depths  of  the  principal  lake 
harbors  are  20  and  21   feet  at  low  water,  but  in  a  number  of 

Project  depths  in  feet  at  Lake  Ports,  1896  and  1920 


1896 

1920 

Reference 

Reference 

Project 

above  mean 

Project 

ibove  mean 

Incrctisc 

depth 

tide  at 
New  York 

depth 

tide  at 
w  York 

Lake  Superior 

Duluth-Superior,  Minn. 

and  Wis 

16 

■601.2 

30  at  entr^ce 
24  in  outer  harbor 

2601.6 

3.6-13.6 

20-22      inside 

Grand  Marais,  Minn.. .  . 

16 

'601.2 

16 

2601.6 

0.0 

Ashland,  Wis. 

17 

'601.2 

20 

2601.6 

2.6 

Ontonagon,  Mich 

12 

'601.2 

17  at  bar 
15  in  harbor 

=601.6 

2.6-4.6 

Marquette,  Mich. 

15 

'601.2 

21 

2601.6 

5.6 

Grand  Marais,  Mich. .  .  . 

15H 

'601.2 

18-20 

2601.6 

2.1  -  4.1 

Lakes  Michigan  and 

Huron 

Cheboygan,  Mich 

18 

3581.28 

\?,y, 

2579.6 

2.18 

Charlevoix,  Mich 

12 

3581.28 

15 

2579.6 

4.68 

Frankfort,  Mich 

12 

3581.28 

13 

2579.6 

7.68 

Manistee,  Mich 

15 

3581.28 

20 

2579.6 

6.68 

Ludington,  Mich..  .  . 

13 

3581.28 

18 

2579.6 

5.68 

Muskegon,  Mich 

14 

3581.28 

20 

2579.6 

7.68 

South  Haven,  Mich 

12 

3581.28 

17-19 

2579.6 

6.68-8.68 

St.  Joseph,  Mich 

16 

3581.28 

18 

2579.6 

3.68 

Milwaukee,  Wis 

18 

'580.34 

19 

2579.6 

1.74 

Racine,  Wis 

16 

'580.34 

19 

2579.6 

3.74 

Menominee,    Wis.    and 

Mich 

16 
14-18 

'580.34 
'580.34 

18 
19 

2579.6 
2579.6 

2.74 

Sheboygan,  Wis 

1.74-5.74 

Manitowoc,  Wis 

14-18 

'580.34 

18 

2579.6 

0.74-4.74 

Kenosha,  Wis 

15 
14 

'580.34 
'580.34 

19 

18 

2579.6 
2579.6 

4.74 

Kewaunee,  Wis 

4.74 

Manistique,  Mich 

12 

'580.34 

18 

2579.6 

6.74 

Two  Rivers,  Wis 

12 

'580.34 

14 

2579.6 

2.74 

Waukegan,  111 

12 

'580 .  34 

18 

2579.6 

6.74 

Chicago,  111 

16 
16 

'■580.6 
6580.6 

21 
21 

2579.6 
2579.6 

6.00 

Calumet,  111 

6.00 

'.Duluth  city  datum. 

2,Low  water  datum  adopted  1916. 

3(Mean  lake  level,  1860-1875. 

'  Four  feet  below  high  water,  1838. 

'  One  foot  above  Chicago  city  datum. 

cases  greater  depths  are  provided  in  the  entrance  channels,  in 
order  to  afford  safer  navigation  in  rough  weather  and  to  provide 
for  the  lowering  of  level  due  to  winds.  Ordinary  fluctuations 
of  water  surface  at  Buffalo  due  to  winds  are  about  2  feet,  while 
extreme  fluctuations  are  about  7  feet  above  and  5  feet  below 
normal  level.     Changes  at  the  westerly  end  of  Lake  Erie  and 


156 


GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL 


in  the  Detroit  River  have  been  as  much  as  6  feet  within  eight 
hours,  but  such  violent  changes  are  rare.  The  accompanying 
tables  show  the  changes  in  the  project  depths  of  lake  harbors  and 
channels  since  1896.  and  the  increase  of  depths  indicated  by  a 
comparison  of  the  reference  planes.  During  this  period,  however, 
lake  levels  have  been  lowered  as  a  result  of  artificial  diversions 
of  water,  and  the  actual  increases  of  depth  at  the  various  local- 
ities are  modified  to  the  extent  of  the  lowering  at  each  point. 


Project  d-^pths  in  feet  at  Lake  Ports,  1896  and  1930 


1896 

1920 

Project 
depth 

Reference 
above  mean 

tide  at 
New  York 

Project 
depth 

Reference 
above  mean 

tide  at 
New  York 

Increase 

Lake  Erie 

Cleveland,  Ohio 

16 
17 
17 
20 
17 
15-18 
18 
17 
18 
19 

■572.8 
■572.8 
■572. 8 
'572.8 
■572.8 
'572.8 
'572.8 
'572.8 
'572.8 
■572.8 

19-23 
21 
19 
19 
19 
18 
20 
20 
20 

21-23 

2570.8 
2570.8 
2570.8 
2570.8 
=570.8 
■570.8 
2570.8 
2570.8 
2570.8 
2570.8 

5.00-9.00 

Toledo,  Ohio 

Sandusky,  Ohio 

6.00 
4.00 
1.00 

4.00 

Fairport,  Ohio 

Lorain,  Ohio  (Black  River) . 

Conneaut,  Ohio 

Erie,  Pa 

Buffalo.  N.  Y 

2.00-5.00 
4.00 
5.00 
4.00 

4.00H5.00 

Lake  Ontario 

Oswego,  N.  Y 

Charlotte,  N.  Y 

IS 
16 
15 
16 

3244.21 
3244.21 
'244.21 
3244.21 

16 
20 

153-^ 
ISJi 

2244.5 
=244 . 5 
2244 . 5 
2244.5 

0.7 

3.7 

Little  Sodus  Bay,  N.  Y 

Great  Sodus  Bay.  N.  Y 

0.2 
0.0 

St.  Lawrence  River 

Ogdensburg,  N.  Y 

16.5 

*245. 33 

19 

2243 . 7 

4.13 

Connecting  Channels 

St.  Marys  River,  above  locks.. 

St.  Marys  Falls  Canal 

St.  Marys  River,  below  locks . 
St.  Clair  River  (foot  of  Lake 

21 
21 
20 

21 
20 

21 

601.2 
601.1 

583 . 8 

581.17 
575.44 
572.58 

21 
25 
21 

22 
20 
22 

'■601.2 
601.1 
580.6 

579.6 
573.8 
570.8 

0.00 
4.00 

(«) 

(•) 

Lake  St.  Clair 

(•) 

Detroit  River  (mouth) 

(•) 

'  Mean  lake  level  1860-1875. 

2  Low  water  datum. 

3  Zero  of  Oswego  gauge. 

*  Zero  of  Ogdensburg  gauge. 
»  Vidal  Shoal. 

*  Sloping  surface.     Increase  can  be  determined  only  by  comparing  data  for  specific  points. 
Average  increase  about  2  feet. 


Chapter  XI 

BENEFITS   FROM   NAVIGATION   IMPROVEMENTS    ON 
THE  GREAT  LAKES 

The  reduction  in  freight  rates  on  the  Great  Lakes,  due  to  im- 
provements by  the  United  States,  is  equivalent  to  a  saving  of 
about  $130,000,000  per  annum  on  the  present  lake  commerce.  An 
increase  in  depth  to  25  feet  in  the  channels  of  the  Great  Lakes 
and  the  St.  Lawrence  would  afford  an  estimated  saving  of  $31,- 
300,000  per  annum,  based  on  the  benefits  to  purely  lake  navigation. 
Irrespective  of  the  improvement  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  the  bene- 
fits from  the  improvement  of  navigation  on  the  Great  Lakes  are 
so  vast  and  so  closely  related  to  the  prosperity  of  our  industries 
and  our  foreign  trade  that  these  improvements  must  go  on.  It  is 
only  a  matter  of  time  when  the  connecting  channels  of  the  Great 
Lakes  will  be  deepened  to  accommodate  vessels  of  25  or  30  feet 
draft,  since  the  economies  thereby  afforded  will  eventually  justify 
the  outlay.  If  the  betterment  of  conditions  on  the  Lakes  should 
be  hastened  by  the  construction  of  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence 
waterway,  it  will  be  because  the  returns  clearly  warrant  the 
investment. 

Reduction  in  freight  rates. — The  improvement  of  the  lake 
connecting  channels  has  permitted  a  great  increase  in  the  draft 
of  vessels,  resulting  in  the  use  of  vessels  of  greater  tonnage,  the 
carrying  capacity  of  the  largest  lake  freight  steamers  having 
increased  from  4,000  tons  in  1893  to  over  15,000  tons  at  the 
present  time.  The  reduction  in  freight  rates  from  2.3  mills  in 
1887  to  0.6  mill  per  ton-mile  in  1914  is  attributed  chiefly  to  these 
improvements.  This  reduction  is  equivalent  to  a  saving  of 
about  $130,000,000  per  annum  on  the  present  lake  commerce. 
Due  to  conditions  brought  about  by  the  war,  there  was  an  in- 
crease in  the  average  freight  charge  per  ton-mile  to  1.21  mills  in 
1917,  reducing  to  1.19  mdls  in  1918,  and  1.05  mills  in  1919. 
During  the  period  from  1887  to  the  present  time,  the  commerce 
passing  through  St.  Marys  Falls  Canals  increased  from  less  than 
6,000,000  tons  to  more  than  90,000,000  tons  per  annum. 

Increase  in  size  and  capacity  of  vessels. — Every  increase  in 
the  depth  of  channels  and  harbors  has  been  promptly  utilized  to  its 
full  capacity  by  navigation.  Tlie  Deep  Waterways  Commission  in 
1896  reported  that  the  largest  vessels  in  use  on  the  Great  Lakes 
had  lengths  of  426  to  438  feet,  breadths  of  45.5  to  48.27 
feet,  and  capacities  of  6,300  to  6,800  tons  on  a  draft  of  19  feet, 
or  less  than  one-half  the  capacity  of  the  largest  lake  freighters 

157 


158  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

at  the  present  time.  The  boats  constituting  the  existing  lake 
fleet  of  about  700  large  vessels  now  load  to  drafts  of  19  to  21 
feet.  About  58  per  cent  of  these  vessels  are  capable  of  loading 
to  drafts  in  excess  of  20  feet,  48  per  cent  to  21  feet  or  more, 
23  per  cent  to  23  feet  or  more,  and  12  per  cent  to  24  feet  or  more. 
The  provision  of  the  necessary  channel  facilities  permitting  the 
use  of  these  large  vessels  has  resulted  in  great  economy.  The 
bulk  freighter  of  the  lakes  now  carries  each  year  about  80  per 
cent  of  the  nation's  production  of  iron  ore,  more  than  20  per 
cent  of  the  combined  wheat  crops  of  the  United  States  and 
Canada,  and  about  5  per  cent  of  the  coal  production  of  the 
United  States.  It  has  been  estimated  that  each  tenth  of  a  foot  of 
draft  on  the  Great  Lakes  corresponds  to  freight  earnings  of  $44.57 
per  trip  of  a  modern  bulk  freighter.  With  25  trips  per  season, 
the  loss  due  to  a  reduction  of  one-tenth  foot  of  depth,  and 
the  gain  due  to  an  equal  increase  of  depth,  amounts  to  $590,000 
annually,  and  the  corresponding  gain  for  the  smaller  vessels 
using  the  present  Welland  Canal  and  upper  St.  Lawrence  River 
amounts  to  $70,000  annually.  At  this  rate,  one  foot  increase 
in  depth  represents  a  gain  of  $5,900,000  to  general  lake  navigation, 
and  $700,000  to  navigation  on  the  Welland  Canal  and  St. 
Lawrence  River,  based  entirely  upon  the  volume  of  the  existing 
movement  through  those  channels. 

Value  of  a  25-foot  channel  to  existing  lake  navigation. — 
P>ased  upon  the  above  figures,  the  annual  saving  to  be  eflfected 
by  an  increase  in  the  depth  of  lake  channels  from  21  to  25 
feet  would  be  $23,600,000  for  general  lake  navigation,  and 
the  proposed  increase  of  the  Welland  Canal  and  St.  Lawrence 
River  channels  from  14  to  25  feet  would  represent  an  annual 
saving  of  $7,700,000,  or  a  total  saving  of  $31,300,000,  which 
is  equal  to  the  interest  at  5  per  cent  on  $626,000,000.  With 
such  evidence  before  us  of  the  economies  resulting  from 
the  provision  of  deeper  channels  on  the  Great  Lakes,  we  can 
not  share  the  \iew  occasionally  expressed  that  the  limits 
of  depth  and  vessel  capacity  on  the  Great  Lakes  have  been 
reached.  The  history  of  improvements  of  both  the  connecting 
channels  and  harbors  of  the  Great  Lakes  shows  a  progressive 
increase  in  project  dimensions,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  believe 
that  this  normal  growth  has  come  to  a  definite  termination. 
The  savings  to  be  effected  by  the  further  improvement  of  the 
channels  through  Detroit  River,  St.  Clair  River  and  St.  Marys 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  159 

River,  will  more  than  compensate  for  the  cost  of  the  necessary 
improvements.  Moreover,  the  savings  effected  in  the  cost  of 
transporting  such  essential  products  as  iron  ore,  coal  and  grain 
have  a  far  greater  economic  significance  than  the  immediate  cash 
returns.  The  cost  of  iron  ore  and  coal  to  our  important  indus- 
tries directly  affects  the  cost  of  a  multitude  of  finished  manu- 
factured products  upon  which  our  trade  with  the  world  depends, 
and  this  is  also  true  of  other  raw  materials  obtainable  in  the 
territory  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes.  There  is  no  factor  of 
greater  importance  to  commercial  and  industrial  prosperity  than 
the  opportunity  to  secure  an  abundance  of  raw  material  at 
low  cost.  Our  estimate  of  benefits  must  not  be  restricted  to 
the  immediate  returns ;  we  must  grasp  the  broader  significance 
which  decreased  cost  of  production  means  to  our  world  trade. 

The  navigation  facilities  of  the  Great  Lakes  have  exercised 
a  powerful  influence  in  the  upbuilding  of  commercial  and  in- 
dustrial America.  They  have  permitted  the  iron  ore  of  Lake 
Superior  to  be  brought  to  the  furnaces  of  the  Lake  Erie  and 
Pittsburgh  districts  at  a  saving  of  over  $100,000,000  annually, 
as  compared  with  the  cost  of  shipping  this  material  by  rail, 
and  they  have  permitted  the  return  of  vast  quantities  of  coal 
to  the  upper  lakes  at  a  saving  of  $25,000,000  to  $50,000,000 
annually.  They  have  permitted  the  wheat  from  the  Northwest 
to  obtain  economical  transportation  for  a  portion  of  its  journey 
to  the  markets  of  the  world.  The  task  is  not  completed,  however. 
There  can  be  no  such  thing  as  a  pause  in  economic  progress. 
To  cease  to  advance  is  to  fall  behind  other  nations  of  the  world 
who  are  assiduously  seeking  every  avenue  of  trade.  Fresh 
economies  must  be  sought  to  lower  the  cost  of  production  and  to 
maintain  our  commercial  supremacy,  and  it  is  inevitable  that 
we  shall  proceed  with  the  improvement  of  our  Great  Lakes 
channels  and  harbors  for  the  development  of  greater  economy 
and  efficiency.  Irrespective  of  the  improvement  of  the  St. 
Lawrence  River,  the  work  of  deepening  these  channels  and 
harbors  will  go  on,  and  the  objection  made  by  opponents  of  the 
St.  Lawrence  improvement  that  it  will  make  necessary  the 
expenditure  of  large  sums  for  the  deepening  of  the  harbors 
and  channels  of  the  lakes,  has  no  merit.  If  such  improvements 
should  be  hastened  by  the  construction  of  the  St.  Lawrence 
waterway,  it  will  be  because  the  benefits  clearly  justify  the 
outlay.  With  a  continuation  of  the  normal  rate  of  progress 
in  the  improvement  of  these  channels  which  has  prevailed  in  the 


160  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

past,  it  may  be  contidently  expected  that  they  will  be  able  to 
accommodate  ocean  carriers  of  average  capacity  by  the  time  the 
St.  Lawrence  improvement  is  completed.  All  of  the  lake  harbors 
will  not  become  ports  of  the  first  class.  There  will  be  the  same 
competition  between  ports  on  this  route  as  elsewhere.  A  few 
ports  advantageously  situated  with  respect  to  areas  of  production 
and  distribution,  possessing  adequate  terminals  and  connections, 
and  the  enterprise  to  attract  and  develop  traffic,  will  take  the 
lead  in  commerce.  At  these  few  ports  only  will  deep  channels 
be  essential. 

Regulation  of  lake  levels  will  provide  increased  depth  at 
small  cost. — Deepening  the  channels  by  dredging  is  not  the  only 
way  to  increase  the  depths.  The  Great  Lakes  constitute  a  series 
of  enormous  natural  reservoirs  connected  by  waterways  of 
restricted  capacity.  Every  change  in  the  elevation  of  one  lake 
afl:"ects  the  elevation  of  the  lakes  below,  and  every  change  in 
the  cross  section  of  the  connecting  waterways  likewise  afifects 
the  elevations  of  the  lakes  above  and  below  it.  By  providing 
outlets  of  limited  capacity,  nature  has  established  an  efficient 
regulator  of  lake  levels.  In  connection  with  the  improvement 
of  the  St.  Marys  Falls  Canal,  controlling  works  have  been  found 
necessary,  and  with  these  works  the  level  of  Lake  Superior  can 
be  regulated  within  a  maximum  range  of  2.5  feet  and  ordinarily 
within  a  range  of  1.5  feet,  or  between  elevations  of  602.1  and 
603.6  feet  above  mean  tide  at  New  York,  thus  permitting  an 
increase  of  as  much  as  2  feet  in  the  depths  of  the  channels  and 
harbors  of  this  lake. 

With  a  view  to  better  maintaining  the  normal  level  of  Lake 
Erie,  the  International  Waterways  Commission  in  1913  rec- 
ommended the  construction  of  compensating  works  consisting 
of  a  submerged  weir  in  the  Niagara  River,  with  a  guard  lock 
at  Tonawanda  River  and  one  at  the  entrance  to  Welland  River. 
The  effect  of  this  weir  would  be  to  raise  the  level  of  Lake  Erie 
0.39  foot.  Lake  St.  Clair  0.23  foot,  and  Lake  Huron  0.09  foot 
at  mean  stage.  The  estimated  cost  was  $3,500,000.  A  j^lan 
for  regulating  the  levels  of  Lake  Erie,  Lake  St.  Clair  and  Lake 
Huron  by  controlling  the  discharge  was  presented  by  the  Board 
of  Engineers  on  Deep  Waterways  in  1900,  and  provided  for 
the  regulation  of  Lake  Erie  between  the  levels  574.2  and  574.8 
feet.  The  datum  plane  of  the  existing  navigation  projects  on 
Lake  Erie  being  570.8  feet,  this  improvement  would  result  in 
providing  an  increase  of  3  to  4  feet,  and  would  enable  vessels 


GREAT    LAKES-3T.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  161 

of  24  to  25  feet  draft  to  use  the  improved  harbors  on  these 
lakes.  The  increase  of  depth  in  the  connecting  channels  would 
obviously  be  less,  but  would  amount  to  a  substantial  improve- 
ment of  navigation  conditions. 

The  instructions  to  the  engineers  require  consideration  of  the 
advisability  of  constructing  works  for  the  regulation  of  the  level 
of  Lake  Ontario,  and  it  is  entirely  practicable  in  connection 
with  the  improvement  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River  to  provide  the 
necessary  regulating  works  to  afford  a  substantial  increase  in  the 
depth  of  all  harbors  on  this  lake.  By  the  adoption  of  plans 
as  above  suggested  for  controlling  the  levels  of  the  Great  Lakes, 
it  is  entirely  feasible  to  secure  increased  facilities  of  navigation, 
affording  economies  in  transportation  amounting  to  many  millions 
of  dollars  a  year,  and  decreasing  b)-  many  millions  the  cost  of 
the  ultimate  development  of  these  channels.  Li  connection  with 
such  regulation  of  levels,  it  is  of  course  essenf'al  to  consider 
not  only  their  influence  upon  navigation,  but  also  their  effect 
upon  other  public  and  [)rivate  improvements,  including  water- 
power  development. 


Chapter  XII 

COMPARISON   OF  NAVIGATION  FACILITIES   ON   THE 
GREAT  LAKES  WITH  THOSE  OF  THE  OCEAN  PORTS 

The  project  depths  of  channels  on  the  Great  Lakes  are  referred 
to  a  plane  of  low  water  which  is  2  feet  below  mean  lake  level. 
The  low  water  season  on  the  Lakes  is  during  the  winter,  while 
the  high  water  season  is  during  the  summer;  hence  it  is  not 
unusual  for  vessels  to  load  to  drafts  equal  to  or  greater  than  the 
project  dimensions  of  the  channels.  While  the  vessels  on  the  Great 
Lakes  utilize  every  foot  of  available  depth  through  the  connect- 
ing channels,  only  a  small  percentage  of  vessels  visiting  our  ocean 
ports  require  the  full  depths  provided  in  the  main  channels  of 
the  inner  harbors.  At  the  entrances  to  exposed  ocean  harbors  an 
excess  depth  is  required  to  allow  for  the  "send"  of  the  vessel  in 
rough  water.  These  facts  must  be  kept  in  mind  in  considering 
the  depths  required  for  the  accommodation  of  vessels  on  the  Great 
Lakes  as  compared  with  those  existing  at  our  ocean  ports.  A 
channel  25  feet  deep  at  the  project  datum  plane  through  the  con- 
necting channels  of  the  Great  Lakes  will  permit  the  passage  of 
vessels  drawing  1  to  3  feet  more  than  would  ordinarily  attempt 
to  enter  an  ocean  port  having  a  similar  depth  at  mean  low  water. 

Capacity  of  channels  of  the  Great  Lakes. — From  the  brief 
description  given  of  the  project  depths  at  the  variotis  harbors 
and  throtigh  the  several  connecting  channels  of  the  Great  Lakes, 
it  will  be  seen  that  provision  has  been  made  for  channels  20  to 
21  feet  deep  inside  the  entrances  of  important  harbors,  with 
greater  depths  in  the  approach  cliannels  at  several  ports,  and 
that  the  connecting  channels  between  Lake  Erie  and  the  upper 
lakes  have  likewise  been  improved  to  20  and  21  feet,  with  greater 
depths  in  several  of  the  imjwrtant  channels  and  throtigh  the 
St.  Marys  Falls  Canal.  These  depths  are  all  referred  to  a 
plane  of  low  water,  which  is  2  feet  below  the  plane  of  mean  lake 
level,  1860-1875.  formerly  used  as  the  reference  plane  of  many 
of  the  Great  Lakes  projects.  Because  of  this  fact,  the  vessels 
of  the  Great  Lakes  are  frequently  able  to  load  to  greater  drafts 
than  the  stated  project  depths  of  the  channels,  and  it  is  not 
uncommon  for  vessels  drawing  21  feet  or  more  to  pass  througli 
these  channels.  Vessel  oi)erators  are  kept  informed  of  the  depth 
that  can  be  carried  through  the  connecting  channels,  and  the 
vessels  are  loaded  to  the  greatest  capacity  which  the  facilities 
existing  at  the  moment  will  permit.  The  high  water  season  on 
the  Great  Lakes  is  during  the  summer,  while  the  low  water 
season  is  during  the  winter  ^\•hen  navigation  is  closed,  so  that  in 

162 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  163 

general  there  is  available  during  the  season  of  navigation  greater 
(leptli  in  the  harbors  and  channels  of  the  Great  Lakes  than  might 
be  apparent  from  a  statement  of  the  approved  project  depths. 
As  already  stated  in  this  report,  the  project  for  thejiew  Welland 
Canal  provides  for  a  preliminary  depth  of  25  feet  at  extreme 
low  water  in  Lake  Erie,  568  feet  above  sea  level.  This  plane 
is  2.8  feet  below  low  water  datum,  which  is  the  reference  plane 
of  adopted  projects  for  improvement  on  Lake  Erie,  and  it  is  4.8 
feet  below  the  plane  of  mean  lake  level,  indicating  that  vessels 
drawing  more  than  25  feet  will  be  able  to  pass  through  this  canal. 
The  instructions  to  the  engineers  in  connection  with  the  improve- 
ment of  the  St.  Lawrence  River  require  consideration  of  channels 
25  and  30  feet  deep  at  low^  water.  These  depths  at  the  stage 
specified  will  be  sufficient  to  pass  vessels  drawing  as  much  as  the 
stated  depth  of  the  waterway  during  the  greater  part  of  the 
customary  navigation  season. 

Ample  depth  required  at  exposed  entrances. — The  projects 
for  improvement  of  our  harbors  along  the  Atlantic  coast  are 
referred  to  a  plane  of  mean  low  water,  and  there  are  many 
limes  when  the  actual  depths  available  to  navigation  are  less 
than  those  stated  in  the  authorized  project.  A  great  deal  has 
been  said,  and  some  testimony  appears  in  the  record  of  the 
hearings  before  the  International  Joint  Commission,  regarding 
the  necessity  for  ample  depth  below  the  keel.  It  is  well  known 
that  vessels  at  full  speed  draw  more  water  than  when  navigating 
at  low  speed,  and  this  fact  must  be  given  due  weight  in  deciding 
upon  the  most  suitable  channel  depths  to  be  provided.  At  ocean 
entrances  where  the  channels  are  exposed  to  severe  wave  action, 
it  is  also  essential  that  ample  depth  below  the  keel  be  provided 
to  prevent  pounding  of  the  vessel  on  the  bottom.  At  Boston 
the  authorized  project  provides  for  a  depth  of  40  feet  from  the 
sea  to  President  Roads,  with  45  feet  through  rock,  this  channel 
being  exposed  to  heavy  seas.  The  depth  reduces  to  35  feet 
from  Broad  Sound  to  the  Navy  Yard,  and  other  channels  have 
depths  of  27,  25  and  23  feet.  There  is  thus  a  diiTerence  of  10 
feet  between  the  exposed  outer  channel  and  the  deepest  channel 
inside.  These  conditions,  however,  are  not  applicable  to  the 
connecting  channels  of  the  Great  Lakes,  which  are  protected 
from  the  violent  wave  action  found  at  ocean  entrances. 

In  actual  practice,  vessels  passing  through  the  Detroit  River, 
St.  Clair  River  and  St.  Marys  Falls  Canal  have  loaded  drafts  in 
excess  of  the  customary  drafts  of  vessels  entering  many  of  our 


164  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

seaboard  harbors  which  now  enjoy  a  successful  foreign  trade. 
As  will  be  shown  later  in  this  report,  these  lake  channels  now 
accommodate  vessels  having  drafts  equal  to  that  of  the  average 
vessel  engaged  in  foreign  trade  at  our  Atlantic,  Gulf  and  Pacific 
ports,  as  w^ell  as  those  in  use  on  many  of  the  important  trade 
routes  of  the  world.  The  passage  through  the  connecting  chan- 
nels of  the  Great  Lakes  is  no  more  difficult  than  is  the  navigation 
of  the  long  entrance  channels  of  some  of  our  ocean  ports,  such 
as  Wilmington,  N.  C.,  Jacksonville,  Fla.,  Mobile,  Ala.,  Houston 
and  Beaumont,  Tex.,  and  Portland,  Oreg. 

For  the  same  reasons  that  the  channels  of  ocean  harbors  must 
provide  a  reasonable  margin  of  depth  below  the  keel,  a  similar 
margin  of  safety  is  needed  at  the  entrance  to  harbors  of  the 
Great  Lakes.  From  the  table  of  project  depths  at  lake  ports,  it 
will  be  seen  that  a  depth  of  30  feet  has  been  provided  at  the  en- 
trance to  Duluth-Superior  Harbor,  with  24  feet  at  the  outer  har- 
bor, and  that  at  Cleveland  and  Bufifalo  depths  of  23  feet  are  author- 
ized at  the  entrances.  At  ocean  ports  greater  depths  than  those 
specified  in  the  authorized  projects  are  of  course  available  at 
high  tide,  but  vessels  bound  to  an  ocean  port  can  not  load  so 
as  to  take  advantage  of  this  increase,  as  unfavorable  weather 
conditions  or  delays  from  other  causes  might  render  it  imprac- 
ticable to  reach  the  entrance  at  the  proper  stage  of  tide.  The 
maximum  drafts  of  vessels  using  our  ocean  ports  are  usually  a 
foot  or  more  less  than  the  depth  available  at  mean  low  water. 

The  point  to  be  emphasized  is  that  a  depth  of  21  feet  at  the 
project  datum  plane  through  the  connecting  channels  of  the 
Great  Lakes,  will  permit  the  passage  of  vessels  drawing  one  to 
three  feet  more  than  would  ordinarily  attempt  to  enter  an 
Atlantic  coast  harbor  having  a  similar  depth  at  mean  low  water. 
In  the  statistical  report  of  commerce  passing  through  the  canals 
at  Sault  Ste.  Marie  during  the  season  of  1919.  it  is  stated  that 
"conditions  at  the  wharves  and  in  the  channels  of  the  Great  Lakes 
system  limit  the  draft  of  vessels  to  about  21  feet" ;  that  is,  vessels 
using  these  channels  draw  as  much  and  in  some  cases  more  than 
the  stated  depths  of  the  channels.  At  the  exposed  entrances  of 
Atlantic.  Gulf  and  Pacific  coast  harbors,  a  de])th  of  23  to  25  feet 
is  necessary  for  the  safe  navigation  of  vessels  of  similar  draft. 

Speed  of  vessels  in  restricted  channels  of  the  Great  Lakes. — 
'Ihe  shoal  portions  of  the  through  channels  of  the  Great  Lakes 
are  not  of  great  length,  and  the  diminution  of  speed  required 
for  their  safe  navigation  is  very  small.     Vessels  normally  having 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  165 

a  speed  of  12  miles  an  hour  reduce  their  speed  to  8  to  10  miles 
per  hour  when  passing  through  these  channels. 

At  the  hearing  held  at  Sault  Ste.  Alarie.  Mich.,  on  May  10,  1920, 
Mr.  L.  C.  Sabin,  General  Superintendent  of  the  St.  Marys  Falls 
Canal,  testified  that  in  taking  the  actual  passage  of  four  steamers 
at  random  in  the  St.  Marys  River,  he  found  that  the  average 
time  for  three  trips  each  going  upstream  from  Sailors'  Encamp- 
ment to  the  Canal,  22.08  miles,  amounted  to  a  total  of  2  hours  and 
23  minutes,  including  all  delays,  showing  a  speed  of  8.8  miles 
per  hour.  Downstream  for  a  distance  of  22.49  miles  it  takes 
2.53  hours,  an  average  of  8.9  miles  per  hour.  Allowing  20  min- 
utes for  supplies,  the  running  time  is  10  miles  per  hour.  Mr. 
Sabin  stated  that  between  8  and  10  miles  per  hour  may  be  ex- 
pected in  channels  of  this  kind,  of  which  about  three-fourths  are 
improved,  and  that  such  channels  are  properly  considered  re- 
stricted because  they  have  been  dredged  out  and  are  very  narrow. 
(See  pp.  662-663  of  the  record.) 


Chatter  XIII 

CHARACTER  OF  NAVIGATION  TO  BE  PROVIDED  ON 
THE  ST.  LAWRENCE  RIVER 

The  effect  on  the  earnings  of  a  vessel  due  to  passage  through 
restricted  channels  is  due  almost  entirely  to  the  greater  time  re- 
quired to  make  the  journey.  The  passage  through  the  canals  and 
dredged  channels  between  Montreal  and  Duluth  under  the  pro- 
posed project  for  the  deep  waterway  will  involve  a  total  delay 
of  about  12.6  hours  as  compared  with  the  navigation  of  an  equal 
distance  in  open  waters.  This  loss  of  time  will  lessen  the  earning 
ability  of  the  vessel  to  practically  the  same  extent  as  an  increase 
of  120  miles  in  the  length  of  her  voyage.  Such  an  increase  in  dis- 
tance in  a  voyage  of  between  3,000  and  5,000  miles  is  of  no  conse- 
quence. Vessels  now  make  the  same  rates  from  Europe  to  all 
north  Atlantic  ports  of  the  United  States  and  to  Montreal,  not- 
withstanding differences  in  distance  of  over  500  miles.  Where 
the  restricted  channel  constitutes  only  a  small  portion  of  a  long 
route,  the  history  of  navigation  shows  that  there  is  no  perceptible 
disadvantage  to  commerce.  The  extensive  use  of  important  re- 
stricted waterways  such  as  the  Manchester  Canal,  the  Suez 
Canal,  the  Panama  Canal,  the  Kiel  Canal,  the  Amsterdam  Canal, 
and   others,  fully  sustains   this   assertion. 

Navigation  on  the  St.  Lawrence  will  not  be  excessively 
restricted. —  The  instructions  to  the  engineers  require  considera- 
tion of  channels  25  and  30  feet  deep  at  low  water  in  the  St.  Law- 
rence River  between  Lake  Ontario  and  Montreal.  The  im- 
provement by  the  United  States  at  Ogdensburg  on  the  St. 
Lawrence  River  is  based  upon  a  plane  of  low  water,  corre- 
sponding to  a  Lake  Ontario  stage  of  244.5  feet  above  mean 
sea  level.  The  St.  Lawrence  River  has  a  discharge  of  241,000 
cubic  feet  per  second  at  mean  stage  of  Lake  Ontario,  which  is 
246.18  feet  above  mean  sea  level.  The  provision  of  a  channel 
25  feet  deep  at  low  water  in  the  St.  Lawrence  River  will  ordi- 
narily afford  sufficient  depth  for  the  passage  of  vessels  loaded 
to  25  or  26  feet,  and  will  compare  favorably  with  the  capacity 
of  an  ocean  harbor  having  an  exposed  entrance  channel  of 
28  to  30  feet.  Contrary  to  the  views  of  some  opponents  of 
this  improvement,  whose  views  are  given  in  the  record,  the 
navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River  between  Montreal  and 
Lake  Ontario  will  involve  but  little  of  the  restricted  naviga- 
tion usually  characteristic  of  canals.  In  fact,  the  naviga- 
tion above  Montreal  will  in  some  respects  be  superior  to  that 
now  existing  in  portion--  of  the  channel  between   Montreal  and 

166 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  167 

Quebec,  and  it  can  scarcely  be  claimed  that  the  navigation  of  the 
St.  Lawrence  River  up  to  Montreal  is  impracticable  for  ocean 
vessels.  Montreal  is  a  successful  ocean  port,  with  a  rapidly 
increasing  commerce.  In  the  year  1919  a  larger  quantity  of 
wheat  was  shipped  to  Europe  from  Montreal  by  way  of  the  St. 
Lawrence  River  than  from  any  port  in  the  United  States  except 
New  York.  The  navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River  below 
Montreal  must  therefore  be  considered  as  thoroughly  practicable. 
From  Montreal  to  Lake  Ontario,  which  is  the  stretch  of  river 
now  under  consideration,  is  a  distance  of  182  miles,  and  in  this 
stretch  there  are  a  number  of  falls  and  rapids  at  present  sur- 
mounted by  lateral  canals  having  a  depth  of  14  feet  and  a  total 
length  of  about  46  miles.  Under  present  conditions,  there  is 
also  some  open  river  navigation  that  might  be  regarded  as  re- 
stricted, but  with  the  improvements  proposed  this  section  of  the 
river  will  consist  of  long  pools  created  by  dams  extending  across 
the  stream,  and  affording  full  speed  navigation  for  vessels  ex- 
cept at  the  six  or  seven  locks  and  possibly  in  a  canal  section 
about  20  miles  long  between  Lake  St.  Francis  and  Montreal,  in- 
volving a  total  delay  of  not  exceeding  5  hours.  The  other  artifi- 
cial canals  to  be  passed  to  reach  the  head  of  the  Lakes  are  the 
Welland  Canal,  25  miles  long,  the  St.  Clair  Flats  Canal,  3.5  miles 
long,  and  the  St.  Marys  Falls  Canal.  1.6  miles  long.  In  all,  14 
lockages  will  be  required  to  reach  Duluth,  and  13  lockages  to 
reach  Chicago.  The  total  length  of  canals  at  the  present  time  is 
76.1  miles  which,  as  just  stated,  will  be  reduced  by  the  proposed 
improvement  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River.  In  addition,  there  are 
now  74  miles  of  improved  river  channel  where  a  reduction  in  speed 
of  1  to  3  miles  per  hour  only  is  necessary.  The  total  time  lost  in 
the  entire  trip  between  Duluth  and  Liverpool  will  not  exceed  13 
hours,  and  may  be  less.  The  following  table  shows  the  lengths 
of  restricted  channel  and  the  probable  time  required  for  the  trip: 


168 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


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GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  169 

Effect  of  restricted  channels  on  vessel  costs  and  rates. — The 
effect  on  the  earnings  of  the  vessel  due  to  passage  through  re- 
stricted channels  is  due  almost  entirely  to  the  greater  time 
required  to  make  the  journey.  The  same  effect  upon  the  earnings 
of  the  vessel  would  be  produced  if  this  additional  time  were  lost 
in  ocean  travel,  and  a  loss  of  12  hours  time  in  passing  through 
the  restricted  portions  of  the  St.  Lawrence  route  lessens  the 
earning  ability  of  the  vessel  to  practically  the  same  extent  as  an 
increase  of  120  miles  in  the  length  of  her  voyage.  We  know 
that  such  an  increase  on  a  voyage  of  between  3.000  and  5,000 
miles  is  of  no  importance.  Vessels  make  the  same  rate  from 
■  Europe  to  all  North  Atlantic  ports,  although  Baltimore  is  550 
miles  farther  from  Liverpool  than  Boston  and  requires  48  hours 
additional  time.  It  is  surprising  to  know  that  men  supposed 
to  be  informed  on  shipping  can  contend  that  the  small  loss  of 
time  to  be  occasioned  in  passing  through  the  restricted  sections 
of  the  St.  Lawrence  River  will  have  a  controlling  influence  on 
the  utilization  of  this  route.  Where  the  restricted  channel  con- 
stitutes only  a  small  portion  of  a  long  route,  as  in  the  present 
case,  the  history  of  navigation  shows  that  there  is  no  perceptible 
disadvantage  to  commerce.     A  few  instances  will  be  cited. 

The  Manchester  Canal. — In  1880  the  City  of  Manchester  found 
its  industrial  prosperity  in  danger  of  extinction  due  to  the  ex- 
cessive costs  of  shipping  through  Liverpool,  which  involved  a 
transfer  from  vessel  to  car  and  a  45-mile  haul  by  rail.  Engi- 
neers said  that  a  ship  canal  to  Manchester  was  impracticable, 
and  traffic  men  said  that  no  vessel  would  ever  use  it.  The  condi- 
tions were  somewhat  similar  to  those  now  confronting  the  St. 
Lawrence  project.  Manchester  was  obliged  to  fight  the  oppo- 
sition of  the  Liverpool  interests,  but  she  kept  doggedly  on  and 
in  1894  the  canal  was  completed  at  a  cost  of  more  than  $100,- 
000,000.  A  port  was  developed  with  modern  econoinical  termi- 
nals, and  the  upper  end  of  the  canal  was  broadened  into  a  basin 
lined  with  mile  after  mile  of  warehouses.  Manchester's  trade 
came  back,  her  prosperity  returned,  and  she  is  once  again  one 
of  the  chief  centers  of  industrial  activity  of  the  world.  The 
benefits  gained  by  avoiding  trans-shipment  at  Liverpool  are 
shown  by  Mr.  Wm.  E.  Curtis  in  a  letter  from  Manchester  pub- 
lished in  the  Chicago  Record-Herald  on  October  20.  1908: 

Before  the  canal  was  built  all  the  cotton  consunred  in  the  Manchester 
district,  which  is  the  largest  manufacturing  district  in  the  world,  had 
to  be  unloaded  from  the  ocean  steamers  at  Liverpool,  hauled  tbrough  that 


170  ECONOMIC   ASPECTS    OF    THE 

city  on  carts  to  a  railway  station,  carried  to  Manchester  by  rail,  unloaded 
from  the  cars  into  warehouses  and  then  hauled  to  the  factories  by 
wagons  at  a  total  expense  of  14  shillings,  8  pence  per  ton — about  $3.66  in 
our  money.  Of  this  the  dock  charge  was  3  shillings,  the  cost  of  handling 
1  shilling  3  pence,  cartage  to  railway  1  shilling  3  pence,  freight  to 
Manchester  7  shillings  2  pence,  cartage  to  factories  2  shillings — which 
equals  14  shillings  8  pence. 

In  the  saving  of  this  high  charge  of  $3.66  per  ton  rested  the 
justification  for  the  construction  of  the  Manchester  Canal,  which 
involves  35.5  miles  of  restricted  navigation.  The  total  rise 
from  the  water  level  at  Liverpool  to  Manchester  is  60  feet, 
which  is  overcome  by  five  sets  of  locks.  The  canal  passes 
through  a  populous  section  and  is  crossed  by  eight  bridges  and 
viaducts.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  same  rates  apply  to 
Manchester  as  to  Liverpool. 

The  Suez  Canal. — The  Suez  Canal  was  opened  for  the  passage 
of  vessels  November  17,  1869.  It  has  a  length  of  87  nautical 
miles  or  about  102  statute  miles,  and  a  present  depth  of  about 
36  feet  1  inch,  with  a  bottom  width  of  137  feet.  The  total  cost 
to  1912  was  approximately  $127,000,000.  It  is  a  sea-level  canal, 
and  about  two-thirds  of  its  length  is  through  shallow  lakes.  It 
should  be  noted  that  the  construction  through  shallow  lakes 
art'ords  no  advantage  to  navigation  over  a  land  cut  of  suitable 
cross  section.  It  has  been  found  that  channels  constructed 
through  wide  shallow  lakes  are  difficult  to  maintain  and  are 
more  difticult  to  follow  than  land  cuts.  The  total  length  of 
restricted  navigation  through  this  canal  may,  therefore,  be  placed 
at  100  miles.  The  net  tonnage  of  the  Suez  Canal  has  increased 
l-rogressively  from  436,609  tons  in  1870  t(T  over  20.000.000  tons 
in  1913,  and  the  tendency  is  still  upward,  although  the  traffic 
was  impaired  during  the  War.  The  earnings  and  profits  of  the 
(anal  ('onipany  are  very  large. 

The  Panama  Canal. — The  Panama  Canal  was  ofticially  opened 
on  August  16.  1914.  Its  length  is  40^  j  miles  from  shore  to 
shore,  and  about  50  miles  between  deep  water  at  its  two  ex- 
tremes. It  has  a  nn'nimum  depth  of  41  feet  and  a  ininimum 
width  of  300  feet,  the  average  bottom  width  being  649  feet. 
The  summit  level  is  85  feet  above  sea  level,  this  rise  being  over- 
come by  locks.  The  total  cost  of  its  construction  is  placed  at 
$400,000,000.  and  the  yearly  cost  of  its  operation  is  estimated 
at  $3,500,000.  The  traffic  has  grown  from  4.969.790  cargo  tons 
in  1915  to  over  8.000,000  cargo  tons  in  1920.  The  distance  from 
New  "S'ork  to  San   Franci-co  by  way  of  the  Magellan   Strait  is 


GREAT    LAKi:S-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  171 

15,126  Statute  miles,  while  the  distance  by  way  of  the  Panama 
Canal  is  6.059  statute  miles,  a  saving  of  over  9,000  miles.  The 
distance  from  Liverpool  to  San  Francisco  via  Magellan  Strait 
is  15.548  miles,  as  compared  with  9,024  miles  via  the  Panama 
Canal,  a  saving  of  over  6,500  miles.  There  is  an  extensive  coast- 
wise movement  through  this  canal  between  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
ports  of  the  United  States,  involving  distances  of  over  6,000  miles. 

The  Kiel  Canal. — The  Kiel  Canal,  also  known  as  the  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  Canal  and  the  North  Sea-Baltic  Canal,  was  opened  in 
1895.  The  length  of  the  canal  is  61  miles,  the  terminus  in  the 
Baltic  Sea  being  at  the  harbor  of  Kiel.  This  canal  has  been 
deepened  and  provided  with  locks  larger  than  those  of  the 
Panama  Canal,  in  order  to  accommodate  the  largest  battleships. 

The  Helder  or  Holland  Canal. — This  canal  extends  from 
Amsterdam  to  Helder,  a  distance  of  51  miles,  and  avoids  the 
shoals  of  the  Zuyder  Zee.  It  has  been  described  as  "the  chief 
cause  of  the  prosperity  of  Amsterdam." 

The  Amsterdam  Canal. — With  the  development  of  the  shipping 
industry,  the  dimensions  of  the  Helder  Canal  became  inadequate, 
and  to  maintain  the  commercial  position  of  Amsterdam  the  con- 
struction of  a  new  and  larger  canal  was  undertaken.  This  canal, 
known  as  the  Amsterdam  Canal,  has  a  length  of  iSjA  miles.  Its 
effect  upon  the  commerce  of  Amsterdam  was  instantaneous. 
For  twenty  years  the  tonnage  statistics  of  shipping  at  that  port 
had  shown  almost  a  complete  stagnation,  but  in  six  years  after 
the  opening  of  the  new  canal  the  tonnage  had  doubled. 

The  Amsterdam  and  Manchester  Canals  were  each  constructed 
to  serve  the  needs  of  a  single  port,  and  their  potential  economic 
value  must  be  regarded  as  very  much  less  than  that  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  Suez  Canal,  and  the  proposed  St.  Lawrence  waterway, 
which  connect  large  bodies  of  water  and  afford  communica- 
tion with-  a  large  number  of  ports.  In  our  own  country,  we 
have  some  instances  of  artificial  waterways  leading  up  to  single 
ports.  Among  these  may  be  mentioned  the  Houston  Ship  Chan- 
nel, extending  50  miles  in  a  northwesterly  direction  across  Gal- 
veston Bay  through  the  San  Jacinto  River  and  Buffalo  Bayou. 
This  waterway  is  25  feet  deep  at  mean  low  tide,  150  feet  wide 
on  bottom  across  Galveston  Bay  and  100  feet  wide  on  bottom 
in  the  river  section.  It  has  exercised  an  important  influence 
upon  the  development  of  commerce  of  Houston,  Tex.,  and  not- 
withstanding the  50  miles  of  restricted  navigation,  vessels  make 
the  same  rate  to  Houston  as  to  Galveston.     A  similar  situation 


172  GREAT  LAKES-ST.   LAWRENCE   SHIP  CHANNEL 

is  found  at  Sabine.  Beaumont,  and  Orange,  Tex.  At  this  lo- 
cality, the  entering  vessel  first  passes  through  Sabine  Pass,  7  miles 
long,  and  thence  through  Port  Arthur  Canal,  a  further  distance 
of  7  miles  to  Port  Arthur.  From  this  point  to  Beaumont  by 
way  of  the  Sabine-Neches  Canal  is  a  further  distance  of  35  miles, 
making  a  total  distance  of  49  miles  from  the  sea.  of  which  more 
than  40  miles  are  restricted  navigation.  Notwithstanding  this 
supposed  handicap,  the  commerce  of  Beaumont  has  grown  from 
157,797  tons  in  1914  to  over  a  million  tons  at  the  present  time. 
Vessels  make  the  same  rate  to  Beaumont  as  to  Port  Arthur. 

From  this  information,  it  will  be  seen  that  while  the  loss  of 
time  involved  in  passing  through  restricted  channels  of  50  to 
100  miles  in  length  increases  the  cost  of  the  boat's  operation 
in  proportion  to  the  additional  time  required,  the  increased  cost 
is  not  sufficient  to  affect  steamship  rates.  The  rate  on  grain 
from  Seattle,  Portland,  and  San  Francisco  to  all  north  Atlantic 
ports  of  the  United  States  is  the  same,  although  the  ditference 
in  distance  may  amount  to  nearly  1.000  miles,  and  in  time  to 
80  to  100  hours.  The  additional  time  consumed  is  about  eight 
times  that  lost  on  account  of  restricted  navigation  in  the  Great 
Lakes-St.  Lawrence  route,  but  the  loss  in  earning  power  is  not 
sufficient  to  affect  the  rate.  Many  examples  could  be  cited 
-bowing  similar  rate  conditions. 


Chapter  XIV 

COMPARISON  OF  THE  ST.  LAWRENCE  WITH  OTHER 

OCEAN  ROUTES 

The  European  analogies  afford  abundant  encouragement  for 
the  expectation  of  a  commensurate  utilization  of  the  St.  Law- 
rence ship  channel.  From  London  to  Genoa  by  water  is  2,500 
statute  miles,  while  the  distance  by  rail  is  about  the  same  as 
from  Chicago  to  New  York.  The  water  distance  is  about  2^ 
times  the  rail  distance  and  yet  it  is  not  customary  to  ship  from 
London  to  Genoa  by  rail,  but  by  water.  From  London  to  Con- 
stantinople by  rail  is  2,176  statute  miles,  while  the  water  distance 
is  about  3,800  statute  miles.  Regardless  of  the  saving  by  rail  of 
1,600  to  1,700  miles,  the  main  freight  traffic  is  by  water  through 
Gibraltar  and  not  by  rail.  Other  European  analogies  show  similar 
conditions.  The  St.  Lawrence  ship  channel  will  afford  greater 
opportunities  than  the  Manchester  or  Kiel  Canals.  It  will  give 
access  to  2,700  miles  of  coast  dotted  with  rich  and  productive 
industrial  cities  offering  unusual  inducement  to  vessels  in  the 
way   of  well  balanced   cargoes. 

European  distances. — Charts  for  full-powered  steam  vessels 
prepared  by  the  Hydrographic  Office,  United  States  Navy,  show 
some  extremely  interesting  figures.  Montreal  and  New  York 
are  almost  exactly  the  same  distance  from  Gibraltar,  and  the 
distance  from  New  York  to  London  is  a  little  farther  than  from 
New  York  to  Gibraltar.  The  point  is  this :  It  is  about  as  near 
by  water  from  the  lake  ports  to  Montreal  as  it  is  by  rail  to 
New  Yofk.  but  once  in  Montreal  it  is  no  farther  by  water  to 
Gibraltar  than  it  is  from  New  York  to  Gibraltar  and  to  all  the 
ports  of  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Black  Sea.  All  of  southern 
Europe,  North  Africa,  the  Near  East,  South  Russia,  and  India, 
are  just  as  close  to  the  Great  Lakes  ports  by  the  all-water  route 
as  by  the  rail-and- water  route  via  New  York. 

When  one  considers  the  North  Sea  and  Baltic  Sea  ports,  all 
of  the  rich  area  of  northwestern  and  northern  Europe  and  Russia, 
the  advantage  is  distinctly  in  favor  of  the  St.  Lawrence  route 
by  several  hundred  miles.  Therefore,  if  port  expenses  and  dis- 
patch are  equal,  once  the  St.  Lawrence  is  opened,  the  Great 
Lakes  ports  Avould  have  an  advantage  over  New  York  in  time 
and  distance  to  all  northern  Europe  and  the  British  Isles,  and 
an  equal  chance  to  southern  Europe,  north  Africa,  the  Near 
East,  and  India.  But,  considering  the  enormous  cost  of  getting 
goods  through  the  congested  port  of  New  York  and  the  possi- 

173 


174  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

bilities  of  building  absolutely  modern  ports  on  the  Great  Lakes, 
the  potential  advantages  to  lake-coast  shippers  through  the  St. 
Lawrence  are  so  enormous  that  there  is  simply  no  room  for 
argument. 

Europe  affords  another  anology.  Viewing  Montreal,  New 
York,  London,  and  Gibraltar  as  four  points  from  which  radi- 
ate steamship  lines,  we  find  some  very  interesting  compari- 
sons. \\'e  may  argue  this  way :  before  the  war,  before  Eu- 
rope got  all  cracked  up,  it  was  the  usual  thing  to  ship  goods  from 
London  to  Genoa,  or  from  London  to  the  Baltic  ports  by  water 
and  not  by  rail.  We  find  the  steaming  distance  from  London 
to  Gibraltar  is  1,351  nautical  miles,  thence  860  nautical  miles  to 
(Jenoa,  a  total  of  2,211  nautical  miles,  or  about  2,500  land  miles. 
The  distance  from  New  York  to  Montreal  is  1,460  nautical 
miles,  plus  1,082  nautical  miles  to  Chicago,  or  2,542  nautical 
miles  or  about  3,000  land  miles.  In  this  particular  case  the 
distance  from  New  York  to  Chicago  would  be  about  500  land 
miles  farther  than  from  London  to  Genoa.  From  London  to 
Genoa  by  rail,  that  is,  from  Calais  by  rail,  would  be  about  the 
same  distance  as  from  Chicago  to  New  York  by  rail.  The  water 
distance  is  about  2^  to  3  times  the  rail  distance,  and  yet  it  is 
not  customary  to  ship  from  London  to  Genoa  by  rail,  but  by 
water.  From  London  to  Constantinople  by  rail  is  2,176  land 
miles,  and  from  London  to  Gibraltar  and  thence  to  Constantinople 
by  water  is  3,175  nautical  miles,  or  about  3,800  statute  miles. 
Regardless  of  a  saving  by  rail  of  1,600  to  1,700  miles, ^the  main 
freight  traffic  is  by  water  around  through  Gibraltar  and  not  by 
rail.  Whether  you  take  Hamburg,  or  Havre,  or  Antwerp  or 
London  as  the  starting  point,  our  European  analogies  will  indi- 
cate that  rather  than  ship  overland  by  rail  all  of  these  points  ship 
to  the  Mediterranean,  even  twice  as  far,  by  water.  If  Europe 
ships  out  and  around  by  water,  rather  than  across  by  rail,  why 
not  through  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence? 

Better  than  Manchester. — The  confined  chaiincl  and  locks  of 
the  St.  Lawrence  and  the  new  Welland  Canal  will  not  exceed 
fifty  miles.  Wide  river  navigation,  when  the  channels  are  well 
lighted,  offers  no  particular  obstacle  to  ocean  vessels.  Bearing 
in  mind  this  fifty  miles  of  restricted  waterway,  wc  find  that 
5,000,000  tons  of  shipping  every  year  are  willing  to  pass  by 
Liverpool  and  go  up  35^  miles  of  canal  and  through  five  sets 
of  canal  locks  in  order  to  reach  the  one  city  of  Manchester.  By 
entering  the  Great  Lakes  a  vessel  could   reach  numerous   Man- 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  175 

cliesters  and  have  a  choice  of  any  one  of  them.  It  is  fair  to 
assume  that  with  adequate  port  facilities,  at  least  5,000.000  tons 
could  be  induced  to  work  through  fifty  miles  of  canal  and  locks 
to  enter  the  Great  Lakes  to  reach  a  far  bigger  prize  than  that 
at  the  end  of  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal. 

More  useful  than  Kiel. — The  best  illustration  for  our  argu- 
ment is  the  Kiel  Canal.  The  Kiel  Canal  is  61  miles  long.  It  is 
used,  not  to  reach  an  otherwise  inaccessible  place,  but  only  to 
save  distance,  and  only  a  few  hundred  miles  out  of  1,400  at  that. 
The  Baltic  was  not  opened  to  ocean  navigation  by  the  Kiel  Canal. 
Since  the  dawn  of  history  the  Baltic  was  opened  to  navigation 
around  Jutland  through  the  Skagerack  and  Kattegat.  For  in- 
stance, the  port  of  Riga  from  London  is  988  miles  through  the 
Kiel  Canal  and  1,400  miles  through  the  Skagerack.  a  saving 
of  412  miles.  In  normal  times  most  vessels  prefer  to  go  through 
the  61  miles  of  the  Kiel  Canal  and  pay  the  dues  rather  than  take 
the  longer  trip  around  Jutland,  in  order  to  save  only  400  miles 
of  steaming.  If  vessels  going  from  London  and  other  channels 
and  north  seaports  to  Baltic  ports  will  pass  through  61  miles  of 
canal  in  order  to  save  400  miles  in  distance,  would  they  not  be 
willing  to  pass  through  50  miles  of  canal  that  is  the  only  avenue 
of  entry  and  will  give  access  to  2,700  miles  of  coast  dotted  with 
rich  and  productive  industrial  cities?  Petrograd  is  just  about  as 
far  from  London  as  Duluth  or  Chicago  is  from  Montreal.  The 
reply  then  to  our  second  query,  "Will  ocean  ships  enter  the  Great 
Lakes?"  must  be  very  strongly  in  the  affirmative.  According  to 
all  that  other  ship  canals  of  the  world  can  show  us  this  would 
be  the  case. 


176 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


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Chapter  XV 

NAVIGATION  CONDITIONS  ON  THE  ST.  LAWRENCE 

ROUTE 

The  length  of  the  navigation  season  on  the  Great  Lakes-St. 
Lawrence  Ship  Channel  will  be  about  215  days,  but  it  will  be 
possible  to  extend  this  season  by  the  use  of  ice  breakers.  The 
Barge  Canal  has  no  advantage  over  the  St.  Lawrence  River  in 
respect  to  the  length  of  the  navigation  season.  The  St.  Law- 
rence below  Quebec  seldom,  if  ever,  freezes  completely  over.  The 
harbors  and  bays  of  the  Gulf  and  lower  St.  Lawrence  freeze 
early  in  December,  but  the  Gulf  itself  does  not  freeze  over  so  as 
to  prevent  navigation  by  vessels  properly  equipped  to  withstand 
ice.  Cabot  Strait  is  never  frozen  completely  over,  and  sealing 
steamers  use  the  strait  throughout  the  winter.  Experience  on 
the  Baltic  indicates  that  by  the  use  of  powerful  ice  breakers  and 
the  maintenance  of  an  international  ice  patrol  and  an  ice  signal 
system,  it  would  be  possible  to  extend  greatly  the  period  of  navi- 
gation by  modern  steamers  between  the  upper  St.  Lawrence  and 
the  open  sea. 

Observations  by  the  Hydrographic  Office  of  the  U.  S.  Navy 
and  the  U.  S.  Weather  Bureau  show  that  the  areas  of  greatest 
fog  frequency  are  southeast  of  Newfoundland  where  the  cold 
Arctic  waters  come  in  contact  with  the  warm  waters  of  the  Gulf 
Stream.  The  amount  of  fog  encountered  on  routes  between 
North  Atlantic  ports  and  Europe  is  very  much  greater  than  is 
encountered  on  the  routes  between  the  St.  Lawrence  River  and 
similar  points. 

Length  of  navigation  season. — Xavigation  on  the  Great  Lakes 
usually  opens  about  the  latter  part  of  April  and  closes  in  De- 
cember, making  an  average  of  eight  months  each  year.  Many 
of  the  car  ferries,  however,  operate  the  entire  year.  The  num- 
ber of  days  the  St.  Marys  Falls  Canals  were  opened,  1891  to  1909. 
was  219  to  264  days  a  year. 

The  data  available  at  the  time  of  the  report  of  the  United 
States  Deep  Waterways  Commission  indicated  a  navigation  sea- 
son of  235  days  at  Montreal,  216  days  at  Lachine,  253  days  at 
Lake  St.  Francis,  220  days  at  Cornwall,  224  days  at  Farran 
Point,  247  days  at  Buffalo,  and  237  days  at  Welland.  It  was 
stated,  however,  that  the  records  were  incomplete  and  general 
dedtic-tions  were  not  warranted.  With  the  records  of  more  than 
twenty  subsequent  years  now  available,  however,  the  results  do 
not  differ  greatly,  as  will  !)e  seen  from  tiie  following  table  giving 
the  latest  information. 

177 


178 


ECONOMIC   ASPECTS    OF    THE 


Table  showing  length  of  navigation  season  it  selected  points  along  route  of 
proposed  deep  waterway. 


Locality 


Average  date  of  Average    date    of 
opening  of  closing  of 

navigation      '        navigation 


Average  length 

of     navigation 

season 

Days 


Duluth,  Minn |  April  22  December  15 

St.  Marys  Falls  Canal    ...  April  26  December  6 

Straits  of  Mackinac ^  April  12  [     December  15 

St.  Clair  River March  31  I     December  19 

Detroit  River March  30  \     December  18 

Cleveland,  Ohio Alarch  26  December  22 

Buffalo,  N.  Y ;  April  9  December  12 

Welland  Canal April  17  December  10 

Oswego,  X.  Y j  April  5  December  13 

Lachine  Canal i  April  30  December  1 

Montreal April  24  November  25 


237 
224 
247 
263 
263 
271 
248 
237 
252 
215 
215 


From  the  above  it  will  be  seen  that  the  latest  average  date  of 
the  opening  of  navigation  is  April  30  at  the  Lachine  Canal,  and 
the  earliest  average  date  of  closing  is  November  25  at  Montreal. 
The  date  of  closing  of  navigation  at  Montreal  is  the  average 
date  of  the  last  sailing  to  sea.  \\'ith  the  St.  Lawrence  canalized, 
some  increase  in  the  navigation  season  might  be  expected  in  the 
upper  part  of  the  river  as  compared  with  the  present  small 
lateral  canals,  and  a  navigation  season  averaging  215  days,  cor- 
responding to  the  average  time  between  the  first  and  last  sailing 
at  Montreal,  is  conservative.  The  average  time  of  actual  closing 
of  navigation  at  Montreal  is  stated  by  the  Hydrographic  Office 
of  the  United  States  Navy  to  be  about  the  middle  of  December. 
Navigation  opened  on  the  23rd  of  April.  1912.  and  closed  on 
the  3rd  of  January,  1913.  Below  Montreal  ice-breaking  steamers 
have  been  in  operation,  by  means  of  which  the  channel  has 
been  opened  about  two  weeks  earlier  than  formerly.  In  the 
report  on  the  survey  of  the  proposed  Georgian  Bay  Canal, 
traversing  a  more  northerly  route  and  less  commodious  water- 
ways,, it  was  estimated  that  the  navigation  season  for  that  canal 
would  average  210  days. 

The  length  of  the  navigation  season  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River 
as  compared  with  that  of  general  lake  navigation  is  of  im- 
portance in  determining  the  value  of  the  proposed  deep  water- 
way. So  far  as  the  average  dates  afifect  this  question,  it  will 
be  seen  that  a  vessel  which  might  leave  Duluth  on,  say,  April 
24,  could  pass  through  .^t.  Marys  Falls  Canal  on  April  26,  and 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


179 


would  have  an  unobstructed  course  until  she  reached  the  Lachine 
Canal,  which  would  be  open  on  April  30.  Average  dates  are  of 
little  value,  however,  in  considering  the  conditions  that  might 
be  encountered  on  a  through  trip.  Apparently,  eastbound  vessels 
would  in  general  be  able  to  proceed  from  Lake  Superior  points 
at  the  opening  of  navigation  without  delay,  and  from  Lake 
Michigan  points  with  but  little  delay.  \'essels  loaded  with  grain 
now  winter  in  Buffalo  Harbor,  thus  greatly  increasing  the  avail- 
able grain  storage  facilities  of  that  port  beyond  the  capacity  of 
its  elevators,  and  enabling  ex-lake  shipments  to  be  made  two  to 
three  weeks  earlier  than  would  be  the  case  if  these  vessels  were 
to  load  at  Duluth  upon  the  opening  of  navigation.  The  worst 
part  of  the  entire  route,  from  the  standpoint  of  navigation  season, 
appears  to  be  the  section  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River  between  Lake 
St.  Francis  and  Montreal.  With  the  river  improved,  as  pro- 
posed, however,  the  navigation  season  on  the  St.  Lawrence  might 
be  lengthened  so  that  there  would  be  little  practical  difference 
between  the  average  season  on  this  river  and  at  St.  Marys  Falls 
Canals.  Even  under  present  conditions,  the  difference  is  so  small 
as  to  exercise  no  important  effect  upon  the  general  utility  of 
the  proposed  deep  waterway. 

Table  showing  the  dates  of  the  opening  and  closing  of  Canadian  Canals  for  the 
sea'^ons  1916,  1Q17  and  1918. 


Lachine 

Soulanges 

Cornwall 

(  Farran's  Point 
Williamsburg  -j  Rapide  Plat . 

,  Galops 

Welland 

Sault  Ste.  Marie 


1916 


Opened 


Closed 


Opened 


Closed 


Opened 


Closed 


Apr.  26 

Dec.  15 

Apr.  25 

Dec.  15 

Apr.  30 

Apr.  26 

Dec.  15 

Apr.  25 

Dec.  15 

May  1 

Apr.  24 

Dec.  14 

Apr.  17 

Dec.  12 

Apr.  24 

Apr.  24 

Dec.  16 

Apr.  17 

Dec.  10 

Apr.  26 

Apr.  24 

Dec.  16 

Apr.  17 

Dec.  10 

Apr.  24 

Apr.  24 

Dec.  16 

Apr.  17 

Dec.  10 

Apr.  24 

Apr.  22 

Dec.  16 

Apr.  18 

Dec.  8 

Apr.  2.^ 

Apr.  18 

Dec.  19 

Apr.  25 

Dec.  16 

Apr.  2.3 

Dec.  17 
Dec.  17 
Dec.  17 
Dec.  16 
Dec.  16 
Dec.  16 
Dec.  20 
Dec.    17 


The  Erie  Canal  between  1891  and  1909  opened  usually  the 
first  week  in  May  and  closed  early  in  December.  The  average 
length  of  season  between  1891  and^l905  was  216  days.  The 
.season  does  not  differ  materially  from  that  of  the  St.  Lawrence 
River,  and  neither  the  Erie  nor  Oswego  barge  canal  route  would 
afford  any  appreciable  advantages  over  the  St.  Lawrence  route 
in  this  respect. 

The  dates  given  for  the  opening  and  closing  of  na\igation  at 
Montreal  take  into  consideration  the  conditions  in  tlie  channels 


180  ECONOMIC   ASPECTS   OF   THE 

lielow  that  point.  XuLwithstanding-  the  tact  that  the  navigation 
(if  the  lower  St.  Lawrence  is  known  to  be  commercially  tea.sible 
and  vessels  operate  regularly  between  Montreal  and  the  United 
Kingdom,  the  statement  has  been  made  that  this  route  is  bc^et 
by  many  dangers  and  difficulties,  and  that  the  cost  of  insurance 
on  vessels  and  cargoes  using  it  would  be  prohibitive.  It  there- 
fore appears  to  be  advisable  to  examine  into  the  facts. 

St.  Lawrence  River  between  Montreal  and  Quebec. — The  dis- 
tance between  Montreal  and  Quebec  is  159  miles,  of  which 
about  88  miles  is  naturally  deep  water.  The  remainder  has  been 
dredged  to  provide  a  depth  of  30  feet  at  extreme  low  water  of 
1897  from  IMontreal  to  tide  water  at  Batiscan,  and  30  feet  at 
extreme  low  tide  thence  to  Quebec,  the  minimum  width  being 
450  feet  in  the  straight  portions  and  from  550  to  750  feet  at  the 
bends.  The  St.  Lawrence  River  Pilot,  issued  by  the  Hydro- 
graphic  Office  of  the  United  States  Navy,  contains  the  following 
information  relative  to  navigation  on  this  section  of  the  river: 

The  weather  on  the  St.  Lawrence  between  Quebec  and  Montreal  is 
remarkably  favorable  for  navigation.  Fogs  are  most  unfrequent  and  of 
short  duration.  Smoke  rarely  affects  day  navigation.  Snowstorms  do  not 
last  over  24  hours.  .  .  . 

Vessels  drawing  28  feet  can  now  navigate  the  St.  Lawrence  up  to 
Montreal.  The  ship  channel  between  Quebec  and  Montreal  is  marked 
with  range  lights  and  lightbuoys  to  facilitate  navigation  both  by  day  and 
night  for  all  vessels. 

The  best  time  to  leave  Quebec  when  ascending  the  river  in  a  steamer 
with  a  speed  of  15  knots  is  at  the  top  of  high  water,  as  the  flood  stream 
is  then  carri'cd  as  far  as  it  goes.  .  .  . 

Above  Batiscan  the  current  is  always  down,  and  between  that  and  Lake 
St.  Peter  the  effect  of  the  tide  is  an  increase  or  decrease  in  th'e  rate  of  the 
downward  current. 

The  rate  of  the  current  varies  throughout ;  its  general  a\\;rage  is  2'/.' 
miles  an  hour.  It  is  greatest  at  Richelieu  Rapids,  at  Caps  a  la  Roche,  and 
at  St.  Marys  Rapid,  in  Montreal  Harbor.  No  reliable  rates  have  been 
obtained,  but  in  some  parts  of  the  river  it  is  about  1  mile  an  hour,  in  Lake 
St.  Peter  about  ^^  mile  an  hour,  and  in  St.  Marys  Rapid  about  6  to  7 
miles  an  hour.  It  is  usually  greater  in  spring  tlian  at  other  times  of 
the  year. 

St.  Lawrence  River  below  Quebec. — The  stretch  of  river  just 
below  Quebec  is  divided  into  three  channels,  known  as  the  South, 
Middle  and  North  Channels.  The  South  Channel  is  generally 
used  for  navigation.  It  is  buoyed,  has  excellent  anchorage,  and 
the  rate  of  flow  is  moderate  in  every  part  except  for  a  few  miles 
in  the  Traverse,  at  the  upper  end  of  which  is  a  lighthouse  and 
at  the  lower  end  a  light-vessel.     The  Traverse  mav  be  consid- 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  181 

ered  the  crucial  point  on  the  lower  St.  Lawrence,  as  the  tidal 
streams  here  attain  their  greatest  strength.  In  South  Traverse 
the  rate  of  ebb  is  7  to  8  knots,  and  that  of  the  flood  6  to  7>^ 
knots.  The  new  35- foot  channel,  which  is  in  progress  of  con- 
struction, will  utilize  the  North  Channel.  Below  the  Traverse 
there  are  no  navigation  difficulties  due  to  restricted  channel  or 
excessiA^e  currents.  The  river  widens  out  and  is  in  fact  an 
estuary  of  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence. 

The  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence. — The  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence  is  an 
irregularly  shaped  inland  sea,  inclosed  on  its  northern  and  south- 
western sides  by  Canadian  territory,  and  on  its  eastern  side  by 
Newfoundland.  It  has  an  area  of  101.562  square  miles.  Cabot 
Strait,  its  principal  entrance,  is  55  miles  wide  and  lies  between 
Cape  Breton  Island  and  Newfoundland.  Belleisle  Strait,  by 
which  it  communicates  with  the  Atlantic  at  its  northeastern 
end,  is  about  10  miles  wide.  It  is  also  connected  with  the  ocean 
by  the  Gut  of  Canso.  about  ^  mile  wide.. which  separates  Nova 
.Scotia  from  Cape  Breton  Island.  The  rate  of  the  current  in  the 
Gulf  seldom  exceeds  1  mile  an  hour. 

Ice. — The  St.  Lawrence  below  Quebec  seldom,  if  ever,  freezes 
completely  over.  The  harbors  and  bays  in  the  lower  part  of 
the  river  begin  to  freeze  early  in  December,  and  there  is  heavy 
ice  at  the  mouth  of  the  river  toward  the  end  of  that  month,  lasting 
until  about  the  middle  of  April,  but  during  the  season  leads 
can  be  found  wh^n  the  wind  drives  the  ice  to  either  side  of  the 
river.  As  a  rule,  navigation  at  Quebec  is  suspended  from  the 
26th  of  November  to  the  27th  of  April.  During  the  spring  and 
autumn  the  navigation  of  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence  is  rendered 
difficult  by  ice.  and  general  navigation  is  suspended  during  the 
winter.  In  spring,  generally  until  May,  and  sometimes  early  in 
June,  parts  of  the  Gulf  are  usually  covered  with  drift  ice,  and 
if  imprepared  for  it  vessels  may  sufifer  from  it,  but  serious  acci- 
dents from  this  cause  do  not  frequently  occur,  as  the  ice  is 
then  generally  more  or  less  in  a  melting  condition  from  the 
efifect  of  the  sun  and  warmer  winds.  In  autumn,  accidents  from 
ice  seldom  happen,  except  when  winter  commences  unusually 
early  or  when  vessels  have  lingered  imprudently.  Cabot  Strait 
is  never  frozen  completely  over,  but  vessels  not  specially  built 
to  encounter  ice  can  not  navigate  it  safely  between  January  and 
April.  Seahng  steamers  use  the  strait  throughout  the  winter. 
Ice  from  the  Gulf  is  generally  met  with  in  Cabot  .Strait  earlv 
in  January.     At   this  time  it  is  thin,  but  it  increases  gradually 


182  ECONf)MIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

to  as  much  as  4  feet  in  thickness ;  occasionally  small  bergs  are 
seen,  but  a  large  berg  is  seldom  visible.  Ice  may  flow  through 
until  May  or  the  beginning  of  June.  Nearly  every  year  between 
the  middle  of  April  and  the  middle  of  May,  the  ice  forms  a 
blockade  between  St.  Paul  Island  and  Cape  Ray,  known  as  the 
Bridge. 

In  the  Gulf  the  harbors  and  bays  begin  to  freeze  in  December, 
and  are  usually  closed  to  navigation  at  about  the  end  of  that 
month.  Even  in  the  southern  part  of  the  Gulf,  navigation  is 
not  considered  safe,  on  an  average,  after  the  tirst  week  in  De- 
cember or  before  the  15th  of  April.  The  Gut  of  Canso  and 
Northumberland  Strait  are  rarely  closed  by  ice  after  the  25th 
of  April. 

At  Belleisle  Strait,  the  most  northerly  entrance  to  the  Gulf 
of  St.  Lawrence,  thin  sheet  ice  makes  its  appearance  between 
the  15th  and  25th  of  December,  and  at  about  the  beginning  of 
the  year  ice  3  to  10  feet  in  thickness  passes  between  the  coast 
of  Labrador  and  Belle  Isle,  and  drifts  into  the  strait.  Icebergs, 
which  are  liberated  from  the  northerly  regions  during  the  sum- 
mer, do  not  begin  to  arrive  in  any  great  number  until  April. 
The  greater  number  of  the  bergs  enter  between  Belle  Isle  and 
Labrador,  and  pass  slowly  through  the  strait,  frequently  ground- 
ing and  breaking  up.  No  bergs  drawing  more  than  .^0  fathoms 
of  water  can  reach  the  westerly  end  of  the  strait  without  break- 
ing up.  Heavy  drift  ice  also  enters  the  strait  with  easterly 
winds  during  the  latter  part  of  May.  The  first  steamers  enter 
the  strait  between  the  7th  of  June  and  25th  of  July,  and  the 
last  pass  outward  between  the  11th  and  the  26th  of  November. 
On  account  of  the  varying  conditions  at  the  several  entrances 
into  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence  at  different  seasons,  definite 
routes  have  been  laid  down  for  westbound  and  eastbound  vessels. 
The  routes  for  full-powered  steamers  between  England  and 
North  America  are  as  follows : 

Westbound. — From  the  11th  of  April  to  the  I5th  of  May  and 
15th  of  November  to  the  14th  of  February,  inclusive:  Steer 
on  the  Great  Circle  course  to  cross  meridian  of  50  degrees  VV. 
in  latitude  46  degrees  N.,  whence  steer  to  the  Gulf  of  St. 
Lawrence. 

From  16th  of  May  to  the  opening  of  the  Belleisle  Strait  route: 
Steer  Great  Circle  course  to  Cape  Race,  thence  to  the  St. 
Lawrence. 

From  the  opening  of  Belleisle  Strait  to  the  14th  of  November, 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL 


183 


inclusive :     Steer  on  a  course  10  miles  north  of  the  Great  Circle 
track  until  approaching  Belle  Isle. 

Eastbound. — From  the  11th  of  April  to  15th  of  May  and  15th 
of  November  to  14th  of  February,  inclusive :  Steer  to  latitude 
45  degrees  30  minutes  N.,  longitude  50  degrees  W.,  and  thence 
steer  bv  Great  Circle. 


M                                                                                   W                                                                                   «>                                               il 

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1       General  enveloping  lines  of 

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From  the  16th  of  May  to  the  opening  of  the  Belleisle  Strait 
route :    Steer  to  Cape  Race,  and  thence  Great  Circle. 

From  the  opening  of  Belleisle  Strait  route  to  14th  of  Novem- 
ber, inclusive :  Steer  from  Belle  Isle  on  a  course  10  miles  south 
of  the  Great  Circle  track. 

Ice  movements  in  the  North  Atlantic  Ocean. — .\11  ocean  routes 


184 


ECONOMIC    ASl'tCTS    CF    THE 


have  some  dangers.  The  Hydrographic  Office  states  that  "ves- 
sels crossing  the  Atlantic  Ocean  between  Europe  and  the  ports 
of  the  United  States  and  British  America  are  liable  to  encounter 
icebergs  or  extensive  fields  of  compact  ice.  which  are  carried 
southward  from  the  Arctic  resrion  bv  the  ocean  currents.     It  is 


in  the  vicinity  of  the  great  bank  of  Newfoundland  that  these 
masses  of  ice  appear  in  the  greatest  numbers  and  drift  farthest 
southward."  The  accompanying  charts  show  the  areas  in  which 
icebergs  and  field  ice  have  been  reported  by  mariners  in  tlic  years 
1904  to  1913,  in  the  months  of  April.  May,  and  June,  when  they 
occur  in  the  greatest  number.     Another  chart  is  presented  show- 


(;reat  lakes-st.  lawrence  ship  channel 


185 


ing  the  general  limits  in  which  icebergs  and  field  ice  have  been 
encountered  during  the  same  months.  The  locality  in  which  ice 
of  all  kinds  is  most  apt  to  be  found  during  the  months  of  April, 
May.  and  June,  lies  between  latitude  42  and  45  degrees,  and 
longitude  47  and  52  degrees  west  of  Greenwich.     Here  the  Gulf 


Stream  and  the  Labrador  current  meet,  and  the  movement  of 
the  ice  is  influenced  sometimes  by  the  one  and  sometimes  by  the 
other  of  these  currents.  This  area  is  well  to  the  south  of  the 
entrance  to  Belleisle  Strait  and  the  St.  Lawrence  River,  but 
envelops  the  steamer  tracks  to  the  North  Atlantic  ports  of  the 
United  States. 


186 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


In  April,  May,  and  June,  icebergs  have  been  seen  as  far  south 
as  latitude  37  degrees  50  minutes  N.,  and  as  far  east  as  longi- 
tude 38  degrees  W.  Exceptional  drifts  have  occurred  almost 
down   to   latitude   30  degrees   north,   and   between   longitude    10 


and  7b  degrees  west,  in  these  months  as  well  as  during  other 
seasons  of  the  year.  Between  Newfoundland  and  the  40th 
parallel,  floating  ice  may  be  met  in  any  month,  but  not  often 
from  August  to  December.  For  more  complete  information 
relative  to  ice  and  its  movement   in   the   .\orth  Atlantic  Ocean, 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  187 

reference  is  made  to  Reprint  No.  2  of  December  1,  1917,  en- 
titled "North  Atlantic  Ice  Movements,"  published  by  the  Hydro- 
graphic  Otifice,  U.  S.  Navy.  In  brief,  the  information  given 
therein  shows  that  while  ice  conditions  at  Belleisle  Strait  and  the 
Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence  at  certain  periods  of  the  year  are  such 
as  to  require  careful  navigation,  the  shipping  lanes  between 
North  Atlantic  ports  and  Europe  are  by  no  means  immune 
from  these  dangers,  and  on  both  of  these  routes  the  navigator" 
must  exercise  caution  and  keep  a  sharp  lookout  west  of  the 
40th  degree  of  longitude. 

The  ice  problem  in  the  Baltic  Sea. — The  interference  of  ice 
with  navigation  in  the  Great  Lakes  and  St.  Lawrence  River 
Finds  a  close  parallel  in  the  Baltic  Sea.  The  navigation  season 
in  the  Baltic  as  a  rule  extends  from  April  to  December.  On 
account  of  the  many  fresh  waters  emptying  into  this  sea  its  sa- 
linity is  only  about  1  per  cent,  and  consequently  it  freezes  at 
about  30  degrees  Fahrenheit.  Ice  often  begins  to  form  first  at 
the  bottom,  and  it  is  frequently  brought  up  in  fishermen's  nets 
at  depths  of  10  to  15  fathoms  while  the  surface  is  still  clear. 
The  Gulf  of  Bothnia,  the  eastern  part  of  the  Gulf  of  Finland, 
areas  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Finnish  Islands  and  the  Aland 
Islands,  and  portions  of  the  Gulf  of  Riga  freeze  over  so  as 
to  prevent  all  navigation  for  a  period  of  4  to  6  months.  Along 
the  Swedish  shore  the  water  freezes  usually  as  far  as  Stockholm, 
but  the  winter  temperatures  on  this  shore  are  milder  than  on  the 
Russian  coast.  Southward  of  the  Gulf  of  Riga,  the  Baltic 
rarely,  if  ever,  freezes.  While  the  eastern  part  of  the  Gulf 
of  Finland  is  usually  completely  frozen  over  by  the  end  of 
January,  the  Gulf  of  Riga  rarely  freezes  over,  but  usually  ice 
makes  out  from  the  shores  from  1^^  to  2  miles.  Fixed  ice  very 
rarely  occurs  at  the  ports  of  Libau  and  Windau,  and  then  only 
in  severe  winters  and  for  a  very  short  time.  For  navigational 
purposes  these  ports  may  be  considered  as  ice  free. 

All  ports  in  the  Gulf  of  Finland  are  blocked  by  ice  from 
about  the  first  of  January  until  the  first  of  April.  However, 
ice  breakers  have  little  difticulty  in  keeping  channels  to  open 
water  from  ports  with  which  it  may  be  particularly  desirable 
to  have  communication.  Ice  in  the  Gulf  of  Finland  varies  in 
thickness  from  9  inches  to  3  feet.  Even  through  the  latter  the 
heavy  ice  breakers  go  at  a  speed  of  6  to  8  knots.  These  ice 
breakers  not  only  keep  open  the  channels  of  the  Baltic  Sea 
itself,  but  also  the  channels  of  the  important  rivers  flowing  into 


188  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

the  sea.     The  Hydrographic  Office  of  the  United  States  Navy 
makes  the   following  statement: 

The  conditions  of  winter  navigation  in  the  Baltic  are  now  being  modified 
by  the  gradual  introduction  of  ice  breakers.  They  may  be  said  to  be  of 
two  kinds :  Those  designed  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  a  port  open  by 
constantly  passing  up  and  down  the  channel  to  be  frozen,  and  those  for  the 
navigation  of  waters  lightly  froz-en  over. 

They  are  very  strongly  built  vessels  with  a  spoon  bow,  and  break  the 
ice  partly  by  impact  and  partly  by  crushing  it  under  this  bow.  and  have 
l)roved  to  be  verj'  efficient. 

The  ice  breakers  have  proved  that  they  are  of  enormous  value  to  the 
shipping  of  the  ports  of  Swinemiinde  and  Stettin. 

The  mails  between  Stockholm  and  Hango  in  Finland  are.  during  winter, 
1)1  )W  carried  on  by  one  of  these  vessels. 

In  addition  to  the  effective  work  of  ice  breakers  in  keeping 
Open  the  channels  to  Baltic  ports,  a  system  of  ice  signals  has 
been  devised  in  order  to  give  the  mariner  the  earliest  possible 
information  as  to  the  state  and  condition  of  the  ice.  Ice  signals 
are  not  shown  from  light  vessels  or  ice  signal  stations  until  navi- 
gation is  closed  for  sailing  vessels.  These  ice  signals  have  been 
established  not  only  in  the  main  passage  between  the  North 
Sea  and  the  Baltic,  but  also  along  the  Swedish.  German,  and 
Russian  coasts. 

The  results  accomplished  in  keeping  open  the  ports  of  the 
Baltic  Sea  and  the  channels  of  the  rivers  emptying  into  this  sea 
are  capable  of  duplication  in  the  St.  Laurence  River.  The  im- 
portance of  the  commerce  zvhich  -will  ntiljce  the  St.  Lawrence 
amply  justifies  the  maintetiance  of  ati  international  ice  patrol 
and  an  ice  signal  system,  which  would  greatly  extend  the  period 
of  nai'igation  by  modern  steamers  beticecn  the  upper  St.  Law- 
rence and  the  open  sea. 

Fogs. — Fogs  occur  in  the  gulf  and  river  during  the  open  or 
navigable  season,  and  sometimes  last  several  days.  They  are 
most  frequent  during  the  early  part  of  the  summer  and  seldom 
fail  to  accompany  an  easterly  wind,  though  they  are  rare  during 
westerly  winds.  Westerly  winds  become  more  frequent  toward 
summer,  and  southwesterly  winds  prevail  in  summer  in  all  parts 
of  the  gulf  and  river.  It  is  unusual  for  a  very  heavy  gale  to 
occur  between  May  and  October,  although  fresh  to  strong  breezes 
are  common.  In  view  of  the  statements  made  by  opponents  of 
the  St.  Lawrence  River  improvement  regarding  the  prevalence  of 
fog  on  this  route,  a  study  has  been  made  of  the  most  reliable 
data  on  this  subject  to  determine  the  relative   frequency  of   fog 


(;keat  lakes-st.  lawrence  shii"  channel  189 

on  a  route  extending  from  the  St.  Lawrence  River  to  Europe, 
as  compared  with  the  existing  routes  from  north  Atlantic  ports 
to  Europe. 

The  area  of  greatest  fog  frequency  in  the  north  Atlantic 
Ocean  is  southeast  of  Newfoundland  where  the  warm  waters  of 
the  Gulf  Stream  meet  the  cold  Arctic  waters.  The  heavy  fogs 
from  this  source  extend  southward  and  envelop  the  steamer 
tracks  from  north  Atlantic  ports  to  Europe.  From  this  center 
of  greatest  fog  frequency,  the  fog  diminishes  in  all  directions, 
although  in  some  months  there  is  another  area  of  great  fog 
frequency  directly  east  of  Boston  and  New  York.  The  follow- 
ing is  a  description  of  the  average  conditions  during  each  month 
of  the  year  as  shown  by  charts  recording  the  results  of  observa- 
tions made  by  the  Hydrographic  Ofifice  of  the  Navy  Department 
and  the  Weather  Bureau  of  the  Department  of  Agriculture : 

Fog  Frequency  in  the  North  Atlantic  Ocean 

Jamiarx. — St.  Lawrence  closed  by  ice,  and  free  from  fog. 
Ten  per  cent  fog  is  found  from  Atlantic  ports  to  the  meeting 
of  the  Gulf  Stream  and  Arctic  current  southeast  of  Newfound- 
land, where  there  is  30  to  35  per  cent  fog.  Beyond  this  area 
the  percentage  of  days  with  fog  diminishes  to  about  5  per  cent. 

Fcbruarx. — St.  Lawrence  closed  by  ice,  and  free  from  fog. 
Area  of  greatest  fog  southeast  of  Newfoundland,  30  to  35  per 
cent.  Routes  from  Atlantic  ports  are  south  of  this  area  and 
fog  is  not  of  great  importance. 

March. — St.  Lawrence  closed  and 'no  fog  shown.  No  icebergs 
near  Belle  Isle,  but  a  number  shown  southeast  of  Newfoundland. 
Immediatelv  southeast  of  Newfoundland  is  an  area  of  40  to  45 
per  cent  fog.  but  this  does  not  extend  to  the  steamship  lanes  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Europe.  The  routes  from  Atlantic 
ports  to  Europe  are  in  10  to  20  per  cent  fog  for  about  1,000  miles, 
after  which  there  is  little  or  no  fog  until  the  British  Isles  are 
approached. 

April. — Mouth  of  St.  Lawrence  and  Belleisle  Strait  are  indi- 
cated as  free  from  fog.  Extensive  areas  of  fog  are  shown  south- 
east of  Newfoundland  with  20  to  35  per  cent  on  the  steamship 
lanes  between  ports  of  the  United  States  and  Europe  and  40  to 
45  -per  cent  between  these  lanes  and  Newfoundland.  Beyond 
these  areas  the  fog  frequency  decreases  to  10  and  5  per  cent. 

May. — No-  fog  is  shown  at  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Lawrence 
or  in  Belleisle  Strait.  East  and  southeast  of  Newfoundland  is 
an  area  of  40  to  45  per  cent  days  with  fog,  diminishing  in  all 


190  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

directions  therefrom.  The  steamer  route  to  Europe  from  Bos- 
ton passes  through  another  area  of  40  to  45  per  cent  fog  and  is 
in  20  to  30  per  cent  fog  for  a  distance  of  about  1,000  miles. 
New  York  and  Philadelphia  are  in  an  area  of  30  per  cent  fog. 

June. — The  amount  of  fog  at  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Lawrence 
and  in  Belleisle  Strait  is  not  shown.  The  greatest  frequency 
is  found  in  an  area  of  60  to  65  per  cent  fog  east  and  southeast 
of  Newfoundland,  reducing  in  all  directions  therefrom.  Thirty 
per  cent  is  shown  in  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence  just  west  of 
Newfoundland,  with  probably  20  per  cent  at  the  mouth  of  the 
St.  Lawrence.  Ofif  Boston  and  New  York  is  an  area  of  40  to 
45  per  cent,  and  the  30  per  cent  area  extends  as  far  south  as 
Norfolk.  No  icebergs  are  shown  in  or  near  Belleisle  Strait,  but 
a  large  number  of  them  are  indicated  close  to  the  steamer  track 
between  Atlantic  ports  and  Europe.  The  routes  from  Boston 
and  New  York  are  in  30  per  cent  fog  or  more  for  about  1,200 
miles,  after  which  they  enter  areas  of  diminished  fog  frequency. 

Jitly. — The  conditions  during  July  are  worthy  of  careful  ob- 
servation. Fog  areas  of  10  to  50  per  cent  envelop  the  entire 
north  Atlantic  coast  and  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence.  The  mouth  of 
the  St.  Lawrence  is  in  an  area  of  10  to  20  per  cent  fog.  Belleisle 
Strait  is  between  the  curves  of  40  and  50  per  cent.  Portland, 
Me.,  is  in  a  50  per  cent  area.  Boston  45  per  cent.  New  York 
35  per  cent,  Philadelphia  30  per  cent,  and  the  10  per  cent  line 
is  between  Baltimore  and  Norfolk.  The  area  of  greatest  fog 
frequency,  amounting  to  50  to  55  per  cent,  extends  southeastward 
from  Newfoundland,  and  is  of  wide  area,  including  all  of  New- 
foundland except  its  northerly  extremity  and  extending  south- 
eastward along  the  Atlantic  Coast  nearly  to  Boston.  Belleisle 
Strait  is  in  practically  the  same  relative  position  to  this  area 
as  Boston.  On  the  St.  Lati'vcncc  route  to  Europe  the  20  per 
cent  curyc  is  passed  about  600  miles  off  Belle  Jsle,  hut  the  routes 
from  North  .Itlantic  ports  have  from  1,200  to  1,500  miles  in 
areas  of  20  per  cent  or  greater  fog  frequency.  No  icebergs  are 
shown  in  Belleisle  Strait,  nor  in  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  but 
some  are  shown  in  and  near  the  routes  to  Atlantic  ports. 

August.- — The  mouth  of  the  St.  Lawrence  is  in  an  area  of  10 
per  cent  days  with  fog.  Belleisle  Strait  shows  20  per  cent.  The 
greatest  per  cent  of  fog  is  found  in  a  very  small  area  o\  40  to  45 
per  cent  southeast  of  Newfoundland.  Outside  Belie  Isle  the  20 
per  cent  area  extends  for  about  500  miles,  after  wliich  the  10 
per  cent  area  extends  for  a  distance  of  800  to  1.000  miles,  de- 
pending upon  the  route.  Beyond  this  the  5  per  cent  area  is 
entered.  An  examination  of  the  map  shows  that  the  routes 
from  Atlantic  coast  ports  have  no  advantage  over  the  St.  Law- 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL         "  191 

rence  route  as  respects  fog.  From  Boston  to  the  United  King- 
dom the  route  passes  tirst  through  the  20  per  cent  area,  after 
which  it  enters  a  30  to  35  per  cent  area,  beyond  which  it  is  in 
20  and  10  per  cent  areas  for  double  the  distance  which  the  St. 
Lawrence-Liverpool  route  passes  through  such  areas.  The  New 
York  route  is  not  much  better.  For  ports  of  Norway  and  Sweden 
and  the  Baltic  Sea,  the  St.  Lawrence  route  is  vastly  superior 
having  only  about  1,000  miles  of  10  to  20  per  cent  fog.  as  com- 
pared with  about  2,000  miles  of  10  to  35  per  cent  fog  from  New 
York  or  Boston. 

September. — In  this  month  we  find  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Law- 
rence in  10  per  cent  fog,  Belleisle  Strait  in  20  per  cent  fog.  and 
the  area  north  of  Belleisle  Strait  in  10  per  cent  fog.  The  20  per 
cent  area  passes  southeastward  from  Belleisle  in  a  wide  circle, 
inclosing  the  routes  from  north  Atlantic  ports,  which  also  pass 
through  a  wide  area  of  30  to  35  per  cent  fog  southeast  of  New- 
foundland. Within  the  latter  area  numerous  icebergs  are  indi- 
cated extending  well  into  the  shipping  lanes.  East  of  Boston 
is  another  30  to  35  per  cent  area.  The  St.  Lawrence  route  is 
clearly  more  favorable  this  month,  both  as  regards  fog  and  ice- 
bergs. On  the  route  to  Liverpool  it  comprises  about  300  miles 
of  20  per  cent  fog,  300  miles  of  10  per  cent  fog.  600  miles  of 
5  per  cent  fog,  and  the  balance  practically  clear.  The  Boston 
route  to  Liverpool  comprises  about  600  miles  of  30  to  35  per 
cent  fog.  300  miles  of  20  per  cent,  1,000  miles  of  10  per  cent, 
about  100  miles  of  5  per  cent,  and  the  balance  clear. 

October. — The  mouth  of  the  St.  Lawrence  is  in  10  per  cent 
fog.  Belleisle  Strait  is  in  20  per  cent  fog.  The  area  southeast 
of  Newfoundland  is  still  the  worst  spot,  with  30  to  35  per  cent 
fog  and  with  icebergs  well  within  the  shipping  lanes.  Icebergs 
are  also  shown  in  Belleisle  Strait.  The  routes  from  Boston  and 
New  York  to  the  United  Kingdom  are  practically  all  in  areas 
of  fog  prevalence  ranging  from  10  to  20  per  cent,  with  small 
areas  of  5  and  30  to  35  per  cent. 

November. — The  mouth  of  the  St.  Lawrence  is  in  5  per  cent 
fog,  and  Belleisle  Strait  in  10  per  cent  fog.  The  worst  area  of 
fog  is  southeast  of  Newfoundland  extending  as  in  previous 
months  well  across  the  shipping  routes  from  north  Atlantic  ports 
to  Europe.  The  conditions  along  the  Atlantic  coast  are  very  much 
better  than  in  preceding  months,  but  the  fog  increases  as  the 
Newfoundland  banks  are  approached  until  the  30  to  35  per  cent 
area  is  entered.  In  this  area  icebergs  are  noted,  as  also  in  the 
vicinity  of  Belle  Isle. 

December. — Navigation  in  the  St.  Lawrence  is  generally  closed 
by  ice,  and  there  is  very  little  fog.     The  area  of  greatest   fog 


192  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

is  southeast  of  Newfoundland,  inclosing  the  shipping  route  from 
Atlantic  ports  to  Europe.  Numerous  icebergs  are  noted  in  this 
vicinity. 

From  the  above  description,  it  nnll  be  sccu  that  the  normal 
route  from  Belle  Isle  to  the  United  Kingdom  and  Europe  is  not 
nearly  so  beset  by  fog  as  the  customary  lanes  to  North  Atlantic 
ports.  In  the  early  part  of  the  navigation  season  when  Belleisle 
Strait  can  not  be  used,  vessels  must  proceed  south  of  Newfound- 
land, but  it  will  be  observed  that  the  fog  conditions  in  the  North 
Atlantic  are  not  nearly  so  bad  as  they  become  later  in  the  season, 
and  at  this  later  period  the  Belleisle  Strait  is  available.  The  maps 
prepared  by  the  Hydrographic  Office  show  clearly  that  the  routes 
to  and  from  Boston  and  New  York  involve  a  much  greater 
distance  through  areas  of  fog  frequency  than  does  the  St.  Law- 
rence route,  and  that  icebergs  are  frequently  encountered  in 
the  former  routes. 

As  affording  a  basis  for  comparison  of  the  fog  frequency 
of  the  St.  Lawrence  route  to  Europe  with  other  important  ocean 
routes,  a  study  has  likewise  been  made  of  fog  conditions  in  the 
Pacific  Ocean  as  follows: 

Fog  Frequency  in  the  North  Pacific  Ocean 

January. — The  Asiatic  coast  within  the  area  visited  by  vessels  is 
practically  free  from  fog,  but  the  San  Francisco- Yokohama 
route  for  about  1.800  miles  passes  through  area  of  15  to  20  per 
cent  days  with  fog.  The  Columbia  River-Yokohama  route  is 
about  one-half  in  this  area. 

February. — The  fog  areas  are  not  greatly  different  from 
January  but  the  10  per  cent  area  is  seen  to  be  moving  westward 
and  extends  more  than  half  way  across  the  P^acitic.  The  area 
southwest  of  San  Francisco  is  in  10  to  15  per  cent  fog  for 
about  800  miles. 

MarcJi. — The  area  of  15  to  20  per  cent  days  with  fog  extends 
2,000  miles  along  the  route  from  San  Francisco  to  Yokohama, 
and  slightly  less  along  the  route  from  Puget  Sound  and  Columbia 
River  to  ^'ok()hama.  Beyond  this  there  is  10  and  5  per  cent 
fog  for  a  further  distance  of  about  1.500  miles.  The  area  of 
15  per  cent  fog  extends  along  the  American  coast  to  Cape 
San  Lucas. 

April. — The  percentage  of  days  with  fog  is  15  to  20  n\  mid- 
ocean  and  alf>ng  the  American  coast  from  San  Francisco  to 
Cape  San  Lucas.  The  San  Francisco-Yokohama  route  is  prac- 
tically all  in  areas  of  10  to  15  per  cent  fog. 


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GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  193 

May. — An  area  of  20  to  25  per  cent  days  with  fog  is  within 
a  curved  Hne  extending  from  40  degrees  N.  148  degrees  E.  to 
52  degrees  N.  179  degrees  W.  and  includes  the  Great  Circle 
route  from  San  Francisco  and  points  north  to  Yokohama,  for 
distances  ranging  from  800  to  1,500  miles.  All  of  the  routes 
specified  above  are  almost  wholly  within  this  15  per  cent  area, 
while  the  routes  between  San  Francisco  and  United  States  ports 
south  to  Honolulu  and  Australia  are  partially  in  15  per  cent  fog. 

June. — The  North  Pacific  routes  are  practically  all  in  areas 
of  fog  prevalence.  There  is  a  wide  area  of  40  to  50  per  cent  days 
with  fog  between  the  western  Aleutian  Islands  and  Kamchatka. 
The  area  of  30  per  cent  or  greater  fog  covers  the  Yokohama 
routes  for  2,000  miles  and  the  20  per  cent  area  for  about  2.000 
miles  more.  There  is  30  per  cent  fog  along  the  American  coast 
between  San  Francisco  and  Cape  San  Lucas. 

July. — The  fog  shows  considerable  increase  this  month.  There 
is  an  area  of  about  1.000  miles  of  55  to  60  per  cent  days  with 
fog  along  the  routes  to  Yokohama,  outside  of  which  there  is  35 
to  45  per  cent  fog  for  fully  1,000  miles,  and  25  per  cent  fog  for 
a  further  distance  of  1,000  miles  or  more.  The  routes  from 
Puget  Sound  and  Columbia  River  to  Yokohama  are  entirely  in 
areas  of  25  per  cent  or  more  fog  until  within  about  500  miles 
of  Japan. 

August. — An  area  of  40  per  cent  fog  includes  over  1,000  miles 
of  the  Great  Circle  routes  between  San  Francisco  and  points 
north  and  Yokohama.  Of  the  remainder  of  these  routes  the 
greater  distance  is  in  the  30  per  cent  area  and  a  small  distance  in 
the  20  per  cent  area.  The  30  per  cent  area  also  extends  along 
the  Pacific  coast  from  Vancouver  to  Cape  San  Lucas.  Outside 
of  this  area  vessels  north  of  San  Francisco  must  pass  through 
the  20  and  10  per  cent  areas. 

September. — The  Great  Circle  route  between  San  Francisco  and 
Yokohama  passes  for  about  1.500  miles  through  an  area  of  40 
to  45  per  cent  days  with  fog,  and  the  remainder  is  in  the  30  and- 
20  per  cent  area.  Practically  the  entire  distance  of  4,536  nautical 
miles  is  in  area  of  20  to  45  per  cent  fog  prevalence,  40  per  cent 
fog  extends  along  the  Pacific  coast  from  Vancouver  to  and  in- 
cluding San  Francisco.  Thirty  per  cent  fog  extends  outside  this 
area  from  the  head  of  Vancouver  Island  to  Lower  California, 
while  20  per  cent  fog  is  encountered  outside  of  this  area.  The 
entire  expanse  of  the  Pacific  north  of  the  34  degree  parallel  is 
subject  to  20  per  cent  or  more  fog,  except  for  the  central  portion 
where  the  curve  extends  uj)  nearly  to  the  40  degree  of  N.  latitude. 

October. — This  month  shows  a  decided  change  in  the  areas  of 
fog   prevalence.      The    San    Francisco- Yokohama   route   extends 


194  GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 

over  1.200  miles  through  10  to  15  per  cent  days  with  fog,  with 
about  1.000  miles  through  10  to  30  per  cent  areas  off  the  Xorth 
American  coast. 

November. — In  this  month  the  Asiatic  side  is  practically  free 
from  fog,  but  the  North  American  coast  has  a  small  area  of  20 
per  cent  fog  close  to  shore  with  10  per  cent  area  along  the  San 
Francisco-Yokohama  route  for  about  1,800  miles. 

December. — There  is  15  per  cent  fog  along  the  American  coast 
from  Vancouver  to  Cape  San  Lucas,  and  the  10  per  cent  curve  is 
about  1,000  miles  from  San  Francisco.  Beyond  this  point  the 
percentage  is  low. 

Compared  with  the  route  from  the  St.  Lawrence  to  Europe, 
the  Northern  Pacific  routes  involve  a  much  greater  distance  in 
areas  of  great  fog  frequency  during  the  larger  part  of  the  navi- 
gation season.  The  Hydrographic  Office  states  that  'Tnvestiga- 
tions  have  shown  that  the  strandings  on  the  Gulf  and  River  of 
St.  Lawrence  and  the  approaches,  including  the  coast  of  New- 
foundland, are  not  owing  to  the  dangers  of  the  route,  but  to 
the  want  of  care  and  attention  to  navigation."  The  farther  a 
vessel  proceeds  from  the  fog  area  southeast  of  Newfoundland 
in  any  direction,  the  less  the  fog  becomes  and  it  extends  but  a 
short  distance  up  the  St.  Lawrence.  As  stated  above,  fogs 
are  rarely  encountered  above  Quebec. 


Chatter  X\'I 

DEPTHS  REQUIRED  FOR  THE  ACCOMMODATION  OF 
VESSELS  ENGAGED  IN  MARITIME  TRADE 

The  depths  to  be  provided  in  the  St.  Lawrence  waterway  must 
be  adequate  for  the  accommodation  of  the  class  of  vessels  which 
now  carry  the  world's  commerce.  At  some  of  our  chief  ocean 
ports  depths  in  excess  of  those  needed  for  freight  vessels  have 
been  provided  in  order  to  accommodate  the  great  liners  and  the 
larger  naval  vessels.  There  are  many  foreign  ports  with  depths 
between  20  and  30  feet  which  now  conduct  an  important  inter- 
national trade.  Vessels  entering  the  ports  of  the  Great  Lakes  will 
not  have  to  compete  with  vessels  plying  to  At,lantic  ports.  They 
will  have  to  compete,  however,  with  a  transportation  movement 
by  rail  between  points  in  the  Northwest  and  Atlantic  ports, 
plus  the  cost  of  transfer  to  vessel  at  such  ports,  plus  the  heavy 
but  indefinite  charges  due  to  delays  at  those  ports,  plus  the 
steamship  rate  to  destination.  The  average  size  freight  vessel 
will  be  better  adapted  to  the  conditions  to  be  met  in  developing 
the  trade  of  Lake  ports.  The  large  vessels  require  a  longer 
time  for  their  turnaround  in  the  port  and  can  therefore  make 
fewer  trips  during  the  year.  They  can  be  accommodated  at  only 
a  few  harbors  in  the  world  and  are  consequently  unsuitable  for 
developing  trade  routes.  Their  economy  is  dependent  upon  the 
availability  of  full  cargoes,  and  their  operation  is  usually  con- 
fined to  two  important  terminal  ports. 

Opponents  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River  improvement  have  con- 
tended that  great  depths  are  essential  for  the  accommodation  of 
ocean  vessels.  It  may  be  admitted  that  great  depths  are  advanta- 
geotis,  but  it  must  be  clearly  affirmed  that  they  are  not  necessary 
to  the  development  of  an  important  trade  under  the  conditions 
which  will  govern  the  economies  of  transportation  on  the  Great 
Lakes.  The  reasons  which  have  led  to  the  continued  demand 
for  greater  depth  at  our  seaports  are  not  applicable  to  the  pro- 
posed seaports  of  the  Great  Lakes. 

Conditions  at  American  Seaports. — At  New  York  the  depths 
must  be  sufficient  to  accommodate  the  largest  vessels  because  this 
harbor  is  the  terminus  of  many  of  the  great  liners  and  it  must 
be  entered  by  the  largest  war  vessels  desiring  to  proceed  to  the 
Brooklyn  Navy  Yard.  The  ability  of  this  port  to  provide  full 
cargoes  for  the  largest  freighters  and  to  absorb  large  quanti- 
ties of  imports  makes  the  use  of  these  great  vessels  economical, 
but  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  all  our  Atlantic  ports  provide 
sufficient  business  to  give  profitable  employment  for  this  class 
of  vessels.     Boston,  for  example,  is  a  port  of  call  and  is  rarely 

195 


196  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

able  to  provide  a  full  cargo  for  one  of  these  large  freighters, 
and  there  is  no  port  between  Norfolk  and  New  Orleans  that 
can  provide  full  cargoes  for  such  vessels  regularly.  There  is  no 
such  full  utilization  of  the  available  depths  as  is  found  on  the 
Great  Lakes,  and  the  reason  for  this  is  that  depths  have  been 
provided  at  our  important  ports  to  take  care  of  the  occasional 
large  vessel.  There  may  be  some  local  advantage  in  this  where 
there  are  a  number  of  ports  competing  for  the  same  business,  as 
the  port  having  the  greatest  depth  is  in  a  favorable  position  to 
control  the  larger  share  of  the  trade.  But  these  conditions  do 
not  afifect  the  question  of  the  most  advantageous  depth  to  be 
provided  on  the  S^  Lawrence  waterway.  The  depths  of  this 
waterway  will  control  the  facilities  of  all  the  ports  of  the  Great 
Lakes,  and  it  will  control  the  size  of  the  vessels  to  be  used  at 
these  ports.  It  will  serve  as  an  effectual  check  upon  the  inclina- 
tions of  individual  ports  to  obtain  excessive  depths,  and  will  avoul 
the  all  too  frequent  expenditures  made  at  our  seacoast  harbors 
for  the  purpose  of  giving  one  port  an  advantage  over  another, 
or  of  removing  alleged  disadvantages  between  competing  ports. 
In  fixing  the  depth  of  the  St.  Lawrence  waterway  for  navi- 
gation of  ocean  vessels,  the  study  should  eliminate  the  fast  pas- 
senger liners,  the  largest  combination  liners,  the  large  freighters 
built  for  the  transportation  of  particular  commodities  not  com- 
mon to  the  proposed  route,  and  the  deep  draft  Navy  vessels, 
all  of  which  enter  conspicuously  into  the  vessel  statistics  of 
the  Atlantic,  Gulf,  and  Pacific  ports.  The  influence  which  these 
special  types  of  vessels  have  exerted  in  fixing  the  authorized 
depths  at  our  various  ports  will  be  seen  from  the  following  table. 
The  depths  given  refer  to  mean  low  water  on  the  Atlantic  coast, 
mean  low  Gulf  on  the  Gulf  coast,  and  mean  lower  low  water 
on  the  Pacific  coast. 

Authorized  depths  of  Main  Channels  at  Unittd  States  Ports,  1920 

Port  Depth 

(Feet) 
Portland,  Me Entrance  and  lower  harbor 35 

Anchorage  and  inner  harbor 30 

Boston,  Mass Outer  entrance 40 

Sea  to  Navy  Yard 35 

New  York,  N.  Y Entrince 40 

Inner  channels 30  and  40 

Philadelphia,  Pa Delaware  River  to  the  sea 35 

Baltimore,  Md Baltimore  to  sea 35 

Norfolk,  Va Entrance  and  Southern  Branch..  .40 

Other  channels 12  an<l  25 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  197 

Port  Depth 

(Feet) 

Charleston,  S.  C Sea  to  Navy  Yard 40 

Savannah,  Ga Sea  to  quarantine 30 

Harbor 21  and  26 

Jacksonville,  Fla To  ocean 30 

"Key  West,  Fla Main  channel 30 

Opposite  wharves 26 

Tampa,  Fla Gnlf  of  Mexico  to  Tampa 27 

Mobile,  Ala Entrance  channel 30 

In  harbor 27 

New  Orleans,  La -.  Southwest  Pass 35 

South  Pass 30 

Galveston,  Tex Entrance  channel 35 

Galveston  channel 30 

Houston,  Tex Galveston  Bay  to  Houston 30 

Texas  City,  Tex Galveston  Harbor  to  Texas  City.. 30 

Sabine  Pass,  Tex Over  bar 28 

Inside 26 

Beaumont,  Tex Port  Arthur  to  Beaumont 25 

San  Diego,  Cal Entrance 35 

Channel  to  Municipal  pier 32 

Los  Angeles,  Calif Entrance 35 

Inner  harbor 30 

Portland,  Ore Mouth  to  Portland 30 


It  will  be  noted  from  the  above  that  the  greatest  depths  are 
provided  at  the  harbors  used  by  the  combination  liners  and 
naval  vessels.  Navy  yards  are  located  at  all  ports  having  as 
^reat  a  depth  as  40  feet.  The  depths  mentioned  are  the  maxi- 
mum authorized  for  the  locality  and  are  in  general  limited  to 
the  entrances  and  to  certain  parts  of  the  inner  harbor  only% 
It  will  be  seen  that  a  number  of  ports  conducting  a  successful 
foreign  trade  have  depths  inside  the  entrance  of  25  feet  or  less. 
The  depth  in  the  entrance  channels  can  not  be  taken  as  a  measure 
of  the  facilities  of  the  harbor,  inasmuch  as  these  channels  being 
exposed  and  subject  to  heavy  wave  action  must  have  a  safe 
margin  of  depth  to  prevent  pounding  of  the  vessel  on  the  bottom. 
The  maximum  draft  that  can  be  carried  up  to  the  wharves  is 
more  accurately  indicated  by  the  depths  given  for  the  inner  chan- 
nels. In  providing  a  depth  of  40  feet  at  Boston,  Norfolk,  and 
Charleston,  the  needs  of  the  Navy  were  given  especial  considera- 
tion, and  the  depths  at  Port  Arthur,  Houston  and  Beaumont  were 
.selected  to  meet  the  requirements  of  vessels  engaged  in  the  oil 
trade.  The  project  depth  at  the  mouth  of  the  Columb'a  River 
is  40  feet.  Pilots  claim  that  an  excess  of  8  to  12  feet  is  required 
at  this  entrance  to  allow  for  the  pitching  of  the  vessel,  and  similar 
conditions  are  found  at  other  entrances. 

Depths  at  foreign  ports. — The  Mediterranean  and  Black  Sea 


198  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

ports,  after  centuries  of  development,  are  not  as  much  superior 
to  the  Great  Lake  ports  as  to  depth  of  water  and  facihties  as 
might  be  first  supposed.  The  greatest  one,  Odessa,  has  a  depth 
of  24  feet  along  the  newer  quays,  while  the  older  docks  have 
only  about  20  feet.  Novorossisk  has  a  depth  of  26  feet,  and 
Batum  29.5  feet,  while  Rostof  on  the  Don  has  a  depth  of  only 
18  feet,  or  less  than  the  Great  Lake  ports  of  the  United  States 
and  Canada  at  present.  In  the  Baltic,  Petrograd  has  a  depth 
of  only  19.7  feet,  and  Riga  only  23  feet,  while  Libau  and  Copen- 
hagen have,  respectively,  27.5  feet  and  29.8  feet  of  water  at  the 
newest  wharves.  Even  Constantinople,  the  central  port  for  the 
entire  eastern  Mediterranean,  has  a  depth  at  the  wharves  of  only 
22.3  feet.  It  may  reasonably  be  concluded  that  with  a  maximum 
depth  of  21  feet  in  most  of  the  Great  Lake  ports,  ocean  com- 
merce would  come  to  them,  and  that  with  the  growth  of  water 
commerce  of  the  areas  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes,  the  successive 
deepening  of  the  ports  for  ocean-going  vessels  would  be  justified 
and  it  would  pay  to  provide  a  depth  of  25  feet,  in  which  case 
most  of  the  tramp  commerce  of  the  world,  as  it  is  today,  could 
be  accommodated.  With  a  deepening  of  4  feet  in  the  channel 
and  along  the  wharves  of  the  Great  Lakes,  the  American  inland 
seaports  would  compare  favorably  with  the  most  famous  ports 
of  the  Baltic,  Mediterranean,  and  Black  Seas. 

The    following   shows    the    depths    in    some    of    the    principal 
foreign  harbors : 

British  Ports 

Depth  at  High       Depth  at  Low 
Water  (Feet)  Water  (Feet) 

Aberdeen,   Basins 25  18  to  22 

Channel 27  15 

Belfast,  Channel 31  23 

Docks 15  to  25 

Bristol,  City  docks 22 

Cardiff,  Entrance 24  (in  docks) 

Cork 22 

Falmouth 23 

Glasgow 23 

Hartlepool ?>i  17 

Leith 26  11 

Liverpool 55  30 

London 14  to  30 

Manchester,  Canal 28 

Plymouth 30 

Southampton 35 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  199 

Other  Foreign  Ports 

Depth  at  High       Depth  at  Low 
Water  (Feet)  Water  (Feet) 

Aden,  Arabia 30 

Alexan  Iria,     Egypt 35 

Amsterdam,  Holland ii    (canal) 

Antwerp,  Belgium 30 

Archangel,  Russia ^ 23 

Auckland,  N.  Z 31 

Bangkok,  Siam 14 

Barcelona,  Spain 24  to  32 

22  at  berths 

Bordeaux,  France 20  to  25 

Bremen,  Germany,  entrance 22  18 

Bremerhaven,  Germany 30  22 

Brest,  France 36  23 

Bruges,  Belgium 26'3" 

Buenos  Ayres,  Argentine,  entrance 24  to  30 

Cadiz,  Spain 35  or  more 

Calais,  France 14'  11" 

Calcutta,  India 24  to  30 

Cherbourg,  France 17 

Callas,  Peru,  entrance 25  21 

Constantinople,  Turkey 22.3  at  wharves 

Copenhagen,  Denmark   29.8  (in  free  port) 

Danzig 23 

Dunkirk,  France 29  23 

Emden c>2  23 

Fiume,  entrance 100  to  120 

Fiume  quays 24  to  26 

Genoa,  Italy,  entrance 52  to  69  ' 

TT      t           /^  f  40  at  new  basins 

Hamburg,  Germany \ Hamburg- American  line 

Havana,  Cuba,  entrance 35 

Havre,  France 44  15  to  23^ 

Hong  Kong,  China 35  to  40 

Leghorn,   Italy   (One  of  the  chief 

Mediterranean  ports) 22  to  28 

Kiel 23 

Libau,  Russia 24  (in  commercial  harbor) 

Melbourne,  Auttralia 24  to  28 

Montevideo,Uruguay,  in  outer  roads  30 

in  inner  harbor 24 

Odessa,  Rusi-ia 30  maximum 

Oporto,  Portugal 18 

Ostend,  Belgium 32  to  35  17 

Pernambuco,  Brazil .24  21 

Rio  de  Janeiro,  Brazil ii  (neap  tide) 

Riga..." 22 

Petrograd,  Russia 21     (basin) 

Rouen 18  10 

Shanghai,    China. 28  20 

Singapore,  S.  S Up  to  45 

Stettin 25  21 

Stockholm,  Sweoen 23 

Venice 27 


200  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

Large  capacity  is  practicable  on  small  draft. — Tht-  capacity  of 
the  average  cargo  vessel  has  been  increased  by  giving  additional 
length  and  beam  rather  than  additional  draft.  Within  reasonable 
limits  this  would  appear  to  be  the  solution  of  the  problem  of 
providing  greater  capacity  for  the  general  freight  vessel  that 
must  be  able  to  enter  a  multitude  of  ports.  That  it  is  entirely 
feasible  to  construct  an  ocean  carrier  with  a  cargo  capacity  of 
7,000  tons  on  a  draft  of  20  feet,  is  shown  by  the  following  com- 
munication from  the  Bethlehem  Shipbuilding  Corporation,  Ltd. : 

Mr.  H.  I.  Harriman, 
6  State  :5tr-?et,, 
Boston,  Massachusetts. 
Aly  dear  Mr.  riarriman : 

Referring  to  the  questions  you  asked  me  regarding  the  design  of  an 
ocean-going  vessel  to  ply  on  the  Great  Lakes  with  a  cargo  capacity  of 
7,000  tona,  It  IS  perfectly  feasibk  to  design  a  boat  of  8,000  tons  deadweight 
on  a  draft  oi  20  feet,  making  a  speed  of  about  eleven  knots. 

Her  breadth  would  be  about  60  feet,  and  length  somewhere  around 
400  feet. 

I  should  imagine  it  would  not  cost  over  five  or  ten  per  cent  more  for  a 
vessel    of    this    type    than    it    would    for    an    ordinary    open    carrier. 

You  will  note  by  these  dimensions  that  the  ship  is  very  broad  and  quite 
shallow;  therefore,  the  scantlings  would  have  to  be  a  little  heavier  than  for 
a  boat  of  the  same  capacity  used   for  purely  ocean  purposes. 

Very  truly  yours, 

(Signed)   S.  W.  Wakem.'lN, 

General  Manager. 

Influence  of  new  trade  routes  on  vessel  design. — While  it 
would  be  too  much  to  expect  that  vessels  of  special  type  would 
be  constructed  for  the  use  of  a  single  port,  it  is  entirely  reason- 
able to  anticipate  that  vessels  adapted  particularly  to  the  re- 
quirements of  an  important  trade  route  serving  a  number  of 
])orts  and  an  area  of  great  productivity,  w'ould  l)e  built.  This  has 
already  been  demonstrated  by  the  construction  of  the  bulk  car- 
rier on  the  Great  Lakes.  It  is  a  very  small  step  in  naval  archi- 
tecture to  design  an  ocean-going  vessel  capable  of  carrying  10.000 
to  15,000  tons  on  a  draft  of  25  feet. 

Mr.  Adam  W.  Kirkaldy.  the  English  authority,  in  his  book  on 
"British  Shipping,"  thus  describes  the  effect  of  the  opening  of 
the  Suez  Canal  on  the  vessel  tonnage  then  existing: 

A  new  ocean  route  was  opened  to  the  world  by  the  piercing  of  a  great 
natural  barrier  for  shipping.  In  order  to  utilize  this  new  route,  and  make 
the  most  of  it,  a  new  type  of  ship  was  required.  That  the  opening  of 
the  Suez  Canal  was  a  death  blow  to  the  sailing  ship  was  fairly  generally 
realized,  because  the  Red  Sea  is  not  navigable  by  sail,  but  it  was  also  even 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  201 

more  decisively  and   immediately  the   death   blow   to  the  existing  type   of 
steamer. 

Steamship  owners,  engaged  in  the  Eastern  trades,  in  order  to  tak'e  full^ 
advantage  of  the  canal,  must  scrap  their  existing  fleets  and  build  steamers 
of  a  special  type.  Would  they  do  this,  could  they  do  it  ?  TlTey  had  many 
thousands  of  tons  of  steamships  operating,  why  not  continue  to  run  these 
obsolescents  and  gradually  renew  their  fleets  with  the  new  type  as  time 
went  on?  But  there  was  the  possibility  that  the  foreigner  with  no  tonnage 
in  existence  might  enter  the  trade  with  the  requisite  type  of  steamship, 
and  had  he  done  so,  to  recover  the  lost  ground  would  have  severely  tried 
the  resources  of  British  owners.  Our  premier  shipping  company  in 
the  Eastern  trade  had  something  like  100,000  tons  of  steamers  rendered 
unsuitable.  Without  unnecessary  hesitation  this  fleet  was  replaced 
by    ships    of    the    required    tj'pe,    fitted    with    the    new    marine    engine. 

It  was  a  hazardous  step  to  take,  but  although  it  required  time  to  justify 
the  action  of  the  management,  the  consequent  reductions  in  rates  of 
freight  and  passage  money,  which  averaged  somewhere  between  50  and  75 
per  cent  of  those  previously  charged,  eventually  and  completely  justified 
the  policy.  Nor  was  this  the  only  British  shipping  company  that  adopted 
up-to-date  methods,  the  result  being  that  throughout  the  history  of  the 
canal  the  British  flag  has  been  easily  first  among  the  shipping  making  use 
of  this  great  highway  to  the  East. 

It  is  then  fairly  conceivable  that  in  addition  to  the  steamers 
that  may  navigate  the  Great  Lakes,  just  as  they  are,  the  com- 
merce of  that  enormous  region  will  be  of  such  a  volume  that 
new  types  of  vessels,  probably  of  the  Diesel  system,  will  be 
built  especially  for  this  trade. 

Deep  draft  vessels  not  essential  for  the  St.  Lawrence  water- 
way.— The  conditions  afifecting  the  St.  Lawrence  route  are  en- 
tirely different  from  those  governing  channel  depths  at  Atlantic 
ports.  The  existing  lake  harbors  are  now  effectually  bottled  up. 
There  are  no  deep  lake  harbors  now  served  by  other  deep  water 
routes,  with  which  the  new  route  will  have  to  compete.  Vessels 
entering  the  ports  of  the  Great  Lakes  will  not  have  to  compete 
with  vessels  plying  to  Atlantic  ports.  They  will  have  to  com- 
pete, however,  with  a  transportation  movement  by  rail  between 
points  in  the  Northwest  and  Atlantic  ports,  plus  the  cost  of  trans- 
fer to  vessel  at  such  ports,  plus  the  heavy  but  indefinite  charges 
due  to  delays  at  those  ports,  plus  the  damages  and  loss  occa- 
sioned by  rehandling,  plus  the  steamship  rate  to  destination. 
Since  the  rail  and  terminal  charges  involved  in  putting  a  ton  of 
merchandise  from  Chicago  on  board  ship  at  New  York  exceed  the 
reasonable  cost  of  shipping  by  an  average  sized  vessel  from 
Chicago  to  Europe,  it  matters  little  whether  the  ocean  rate  from 
New  York  to  Europe  be  less  than  from  Chicago.  The  vessel  -. 
trading  at  lake  ports  will  be  competing  chiefly  with  the  railroads. 


202  ECONOMIC   ASPECTS    OF    THE 

The  costs  and  rates  involved  are  analyzed  in  another  portion  of 
this  report. 

Where  there  is  a  real  demand  for  transportation,  as  in  the 
present  instance,  the  navigation  facilities  available  will  determine 
the  character  of  vessels  to  be  used,  and  the  only  requisite  is  that 
these  facilities  should  be  ample  for  the  accommodation  of  a 
large  number  of  vessels  customarily  engaged  in  similar  traffic. 
In  opening  up  a  new  route  for  world  trade  there  are  some  de- 
cided advantages  in  the  use  of  average  sized  vessels.  It  may  be 
conceded  that  the  general  export  and  import  business  will  de- 
velop gradually,  and  that  in  the  early  stages  of  this  development 
it  will  be  easier  to  find  full  cargoes  for  vessels  of  this  class  than 
for  those  of  great  size.  The  largest  types  of  ocean  freighters 
operate  generally  between  two  important  terminal  harbors  hav- 
ing great  depth.  To  provide  sufficient  cargo  for  such  vessels, 
these  terminal  harbors  will  in  all  cases  be  found  to  be  long 
established  ports  whose  business  has  gradually  developed  to  its 
present  proportions.  While  these  vessels  afiford  the  greatest 
economy  when  they  can  be  provided  with  full  cargoes,  they  are 
not  adapted  for  service  on  routes  where  such  full  cargoes  can  not 
be  provided,  nor  where  cargo  must  be  picked  up  at  a  number 
of  ports.  They  are  only  economical  when  they  can  be  operated 
regularly  with  full  loads,  and  it  seems  certain  that  in  the  early 
years  of  the  development  of  ocean-going  commerce  on  the  Great 
Lakes  the  smaller  vessel  will  better  meet  the  requirements. 

The  large  freighters  require  a  longer  time  for  their  turnaround 
in  the  port,  and  they  can  consequently  make  fewer  trips  per 
year.  A  few  days'  delay  in  port  awaiting  sufficient  cargo  to 
provide  a  full  load  would  completely  ofifset  the  greater  economies 
of  this  type  of  vessel.  It  must  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  suit- 
able terminal  facilities  for  the  accommodation  of  ocean  vessels 
will  have  to  be  built  at  lake  ports,  and  with  a  view  to  avoiding 
excessive  initial  expense  these  facilities  should  be  so  planned 
that  they  can  be  expanded  from  time  to  time  as  the  development 
of  commerce  proceeds.  If  these  facilities  were  planned  for 
the  accommodation  of  the  largest  vessels  in  the  world,  the  initial 
expenditure  and  the  related  fixed  charges  would  be  vastly  greater 
than  if  they  were  planned  for  the  accommodation  of  vessels  of 
moderate  size.  The  number  of  large  vessels  used  would,  in  any 
event,  be  a  small  proportion  of  the  total,  as  they  are  at  long  es- 
tablished ports,  and  the  additional  expenditure  for  terminal 
facilities  and  dredging  of  harbors  for  their  especial  accommoda- 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  203 

tion  would  not  be  warranted,  at  least  until  there  has  been  a  de- 
velopment of  commerce  sufficient  to  guarantee  profitable  operat- 
ing conditions.  The  Great  Lakes  will  have  a  large  trade  with 
Baltic,  Mediterranean,  and  South  American  ports,  and  the  vessels 
now  used  on  these  routes  are  all  of  the  smaller  type.  In  de- 
veloping trade  with  the  world's  markets,  the  use  of  vessels  which 
can  enter  a  large  number  of  ports  and  operate  on  all  of  the 
world's  routes  is  desirable. 

Where  great  depths  are  required. — The  facts  above  adduced 
should  not  be  interpreted  as  indicating  that  large  vessels,  when 
employed  under  favorable  operating  conditions,  are  not  more 
economical  than  small  vessels,  nor  that  deep  channels  are  not 
essential  in  some  cases.  A  study  of  conditions  rendering  great 
depth  indispensable  will  show  clearly  that  the  St.  Lawrence 
River  does  not  fall  in  this  category.  Two  instances  where  great 
depths  are  essential  are  the  Suez  Canal  and  Panama  Canal. 
These  canals  constitute  connecting  links  between  oceans,  and 
to  render  the  maximum  service  and  to  secure  the  greatest  revenue 
they  must  be  able  to  accommodate  all  vessels  operating  between 
all  points  affected  in  competition  with  open  sea  routes.  The 
Great  Lakes  have  no  such  competition,  as  no  other  ship  channel 
or  route  can  reach  theuL  The  project  depth  of  the  Suez  Canal  is 
11  meters,  or  36  feet,  1  inch  ;  while  the  depth  of  the  Panama  Canal 
is  41  feet.  An  important  consideration  in  fixing  the  depth  of 
the  latter  canal  was  the  desirability  of  being  able  to  pass  the 
largest  war  vessels.  The  reports  of  the  Panama  Canal  Commis- 
sion show  that  the  average  draft  of  vessels  using  the  canal  is 
about  21  feet. 


Chapter  X\'II 

TYPES  AND  SIZES  OF  VESSELS  WHICH  CARRY  THE 
WORLD'S  COMMERCE 

Examination  of  the  records  of  entrances  and  clearances  at 
our  important  ports  shows  that  vessels  engaged  in  foreign  trade 
during  1918  had  an  average  net  tonnage  of  2,414.  A  freight 
vessel  of  this  tonnage  would  have  a  loaded  draft  averaging 
about  21.5  feet.  Vessels  in  the  coastwise  trade  during  the  same 
year  had  an  average  net  tonnage  of  1,341,  and  a  draft  of  about 
18  feet.  The  statistics  likewise  show  that  there  has  been  no 
increase  in  the  average  net  tonnage  of  vessels  used  in  the  foreign 
trade  with  the  United  States  during  the  last  ten  years.  While 
there  has  been  a  pronounced  increase  in  the  size  of  the  larger 
types  of  vessels,  the  number  of  vessels  of  this  class  in  use  is  too 
small  to  exert  any  pronounced  effect  upon  the  averages.  Out 
of  14,513  steamships  listed  in  Lloyd's  Register  for  1918-19, 
81.45  per  cent  have  drafts  of  25  feet  or  less,  and  99.32  per  cent 
have  drafts  of  30  feet  or  less.  At  New  York,  where  the  largest 
vessels  in  the  world  call  and  where  vessels  customarily  load 
deeper  than  at  any  other  port  of  the  United  States,  96  per  cent 
of  the  vessels  paying  pilot  fees  during  the  first  six  months  of 
1914  drew  30  feet  of  water  or  less.  Out  of  30,939  vessels  which 
passed  through  the  Suez  Canal  during  the  last  eight  years,  only 
3.3  per  cent  had  drafts  of  27  feet  or  more. 

Classes  of  vessels  using  American  ports. — It  may  be  freely 
admitted  that  the  commensurate  utilization  of  a  waterway  from 
the  Great  Lakes  to  the  seaboard  is  dependent  upon  the  provision 
of  channel  dimensions  suitable  for  the  accommodation  of  the 
vessels  ordinarily  engaged  in  the  world's  commerce.  It  is  not 
essential  that  the  waterway  should  admit  vessels  of  the  largest 
class,  which  are  limited  to  a  very  few  routes  and  a  very  few 
ports.  These  largest  vessels  are  the  great  ocean  greyhounds 
for  passengers  and  mail,  and  the  combination  passenger  and 
freight  liners  owned  by  the  regular  steamship  lines,  such  as  the 
Cunard,  White  Star,  and  formerly  the  North  German  Lloyd 
and  Hamburg-American  ^ine.  On  account  of  the  limitations 
imposed  by  their  great  draft,  they  can  only  run  on  fixed  routes 
and  can  not  alter  their  movements  to  suit  trafific  needs.  Their 
revenue  from  passenger  and  mail  service,  however,  enables  them 
to  carry  a  small  amount  of  high  class  express  freight  at  low 
rates,  and  instances  have  been  recorded  in  the  past  where  they 
carried  grain  free  in  order  to  obtain  the  ballast.  It  is  unlikely 
that  such  conditions  will  ever  occur  again,  but  it  may  be  re- 
marked that  abnormally  cheap  transportation  on  the  small 
fraction  of  the  total  movement  thus  carried  exerts  little  or  no 
influence  on   the   crop   movement   as   a   whole.      In   the   United 

205 


206 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


States  these  large  combination  liners  in  normal  times  are  con- 
fined principally  to  the  port  of  New  York. 

Deep  draft  freight  vessels  are  increasing  in  numbers,  but  as 
in  the  case  of  the  large  combination  liners  they  are  built  for 
specific  purposes  or  for  specific  routes.  A  large  proportion  of 
deep  draft  freight  vessels  constructed  in  recent  years  have  been 
tankers,  and  at  a  number  of  harbors  there  is  now  an  insistent 
demand  for  increased  depth  to  accommodate  these  vessels. 

Drafts  of  vessels  using  United  States  seaports. — The  Govern- 
ment statistics  give  very  little  data  regarding  -drafts  of  vessels 
using  the  improved  channels  of  the  United  States. 

The  following  information  is  given  relative  to  drafts  of  vessels 
at  Portland,  Me.;  New  York,  N.  Y. ;  Charleston,  S.  C. ;  and 
Mobile,  Ala. : 

Portland,    Me. 
Steamers  entering  and  clearing,   1918 

Foreign,  draft  from  30  to  34  feet 

Foreign,  draft  from  25  to  29  feet 

Foreign,  draft  from  20  to  24  feet 

Foreign,  draft  from  15  to  19  feet 

Coastwise,  draft  from  25  to  29  feet 

Coastwise,  draft  from  20  to  24  feet 238 

Coastwise,  draft  from  15  to  19  feet 146 

Coastwise,  draft  from  10  to  14  feet 79 

Coastwi.sc,  draft  under  10  feet 1,003 


New  York,  N.   Y. 
Deep  draft  vessels,  1918 


1,619 


Outward 

Inward 

Draft 

Vessels 

Trips 

Vessels 

Trips 

43  feet  draft  and  under  44       

1 

1 
1 

"3 

2 

7 

8 

13 

15 

25 

54 
91 

172 
273 
338 

1     1      .... 

42  feet  draft  and  under  43    

6 

2 

■"s 

5 

14 

19 

32 

23 

56 

54 

77 

121 

235 

401 

469 

.... 

1 

.... 

3 
4 

7 

31 

49 

99 

185 

200 

41  feet  draft  and  under  42    

40  feet  draft  and  under  41 

39  feet  draft  and  under  40 

7 

38  feet  draft  and  under  39 

37  feet  draft  and  under  38        

3 

35  feet  draft  and  under  36   

2 

34  feet  draft  and  under  35 

3 

33  feet  draft  and  under  34 

10 

12 

31  feet  draft  and  under  32 

40 

30  feet  draft  and  under  31 

74 

29  feet  draft  and  under  30   

144 

28  feet  draft  and  under  29 

296 

27  feet  draft  and  under  28 

284 

Total          

1,520 

875 

GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SUIT    CHANNEL 


207 


Charleston,  S.   C. 
Steamers    entering    and    clearing,     1918 


Draft 

Foreign  trade 

Coastwise 

American 

Foreign 

crade 

25  to  29  feet 

4 
16 
12 

1 

22 

48 

36 

3 

25 

20  to  24  feet 

38 

15  to  19  feet 

395 

10  to  14  feet..  . 

6 

Under  10  feet 

Total 

a 

109 

464 

Mobile,  Ala. 
Steamers  entering  and  clearing,  1918 

Up 

Less  than  13  feet 92 

13  to  14  feet ' 30 

14  to  15  feet 68 

15  to  16  feet 38 

16  to  17  feet 20 

17  to  18  feet 4 

18  to  19  feet 8 

20  to  21  feet 3 

21  to  22  feet 3 

22  to  23  feet 8 

23  to  24  feet ^ 2 

24  to  25  feet 2 

25  to  26  feet 10 

26  to  27  feet 4 

Over  27  feet 

Total 293 


Down 
53 
38 
34 
34 
19 
22 
22 
12 
10 

4 

6 

0 
12 

3 

1 

290 


The  large  number  of  deep  draft  vessels  calling  at  Portland, 
Me.,  is  due  to  its  tise  by  the  Ctmard  liners  and  the  White  Star 
steamers  Megantic,  Laurentic,  Northland,  Southland,  Irishman. 
Georgic,  Arabic,  etc.,  all  of  which  draw  30  feet  or  more.  Port- 
land is  used  as  a  winter  port  by  the  Grand  Trunk  Railway,  and 
large  quantities  of  grain  are  shipped  through  it  during  the 
season  of  closed  navigation  on  the  Great  Lakes.  It  will  be  noted 
that  the  statistics  given  above  for  New  York  incltide  only  deep 
draft  vessels.  While  the  figures  show  a  large  number  of  these, 
they  are  really  only  a  small  proportion  of  the  whole. 

Considerable  information  regarding  the  entrances  and  clear- 
ances at  the  various  ports  is  available,  but  uniform  information 
is  not  given  for  all  localities.    At  some  localities  it  is  possible  to 


208 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


separate  the  tonnage  in  the  foreign  trade  from  that  in  the 
domestic  trade,  but  in  other  cases  this  distinction  is  not  made. 
In  some  cases  the  figures  for  steam  vessels  are  separated  from 
those  for  sailing  vessels  and  other  craft,  but  in  this  respect  also 
there  is  no  fixed  practice.  It  is  recognized  that  there  is  no 
uniform  relationship  between  draft  and  tonnage,  and  no  rule 
can  be  applied  to  determine  the  draft  of  a  vessel  from  a  mere 
statement  of  her  tonnage,  but  the  average  of  a  large  number  of 
vessels  in  general  use  at  the  present  time  gives  a  reasonable 
basis  for  determining  average  drafts  of  vessels  engaged  in  ocean 
traffic.  Such  averages  have  been  determined  by  the  Shipping 
Board  from  a  study  of  vessels  in  actual  use  at  the  present  time, 
and  the  following  table  shows  the  results  of  that  study  for 
vessels  of  specified  gross  tonnage.  As  the  entrances  and  clear- 
ances of  vessels  at  our  various  ports  are  reported  in  net  tonnage, 
a  column  has  been  added  to  show  the  average  draft  of  freight 
vessels  on  net  tonnage  basis  in  order  that  the  table  may  be 
utilized  to  indicate  the  average  draft  of  such  vessels  using  Amer- 
ican seaports. 


Tonnage 

Average    draft 

Net 

Gross 

feet 

10,000  and  over 

9,333  to  10.000 

15,000  and  over 

14,000  to  14,999 

13,000  to  13,999 

12,000  to  12,999 

11,000  to  11,999 

10,000  to  10,999 

9,000  to    9,999 

8,000  to    8,999 

7,000  to    7,999 

6,000  to    6,999 

5,000  to    5.999 

4,000  to    4,999 

3,000  to    3,999 

2,000  to    2,999 

1,000  to     1,999 

34.1 
30.8 

8,666  to 

9,333 

31.6 

8,000  to 

8,666 

29.7 

7,333  to 
6,666  to 
6,000  to 

8,000 

7,333 

6,666 

29.4 
28.3 
29.2 

5,333  to 

6,000 

28.5 

4,666  to 

5,333 

27.5 

4,000  to 

4,666 

27.0 

3,300  to 

4,000 

25.4 

2,666  to 

3,33^           .    .  . 

24.3 

2,000  to 

2,666 

22.6 

1,333  to 

2,000 

20.1 

666  to 

1,333 

17.2 

An  examination  has  been  made  of  the  records  of  entrances 
and  clearances  at  our  jjrincipal  Atlantic  and  Gulf  ports  with  a 
view  to  obtaining  a  definite  idea  of  the  size  of  vessels  which  are 
actually  carrying  the  commerce.  The  vessels  used  in  foreign 
trade  are  generally  larger  than  those  employed  in  coastwise 
trade,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  FoUowint;  tabiC : 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL 


209 


Number  and  Tonnage  of  Steam   Vessels  Entered  and  Cleared  at  Selected  Ports 
During  the  Year  1918 


Number  of 
entrances 

and 
clearances 


Net 
tonnage 


Average 

net 
tonnage 

per 
vessel 


Average 

loaded 

draft 

(approx.) 


Boston,  Mass 

Philadelphia.  Pa 

Baltimore,  Md 

Norfolk,  Va.  (all  classes 
of  vessels) 

Savannah,Ga.(all  classes 
of  vessels) 

Jacksonville,  Fla 

Tampa,  Fla 

New  Orleans,  La 

Galveston,  Tex 

Sabine  Pass,  Tex 

Beaumont,  Tex 


1,208 

2,073 

1,105 

385 

2,282,594 
5,593,520 
2,618,605 
1,143,605 

1,889 
2,698 
2.369 
2,970 

Feet 

20 

23 

21 

24 

7,716 

7,411,474 

960 

15 

2,195 
5,270 

5,511,332 
9,268,738 

2,511 

1,757 

22 
19 

192 

756 

2,005 

384,8*^0 
1,745,305 
2,691,656 

2,005 
2,308 
1,345 

20  5 

21 

18 

2,482 

775,982 

313 

1,518 

3,096,072 

2,039 

20.5 

1,035 
508 

345 
534 
"  76 

1,962,107 
1,307,946 
1,114,198 
1,354,036 
183,875 

1,896 
2,575 
3,229 
2,536 
2,416 

20 
22 
24 
22 
21.5 

83 

184,383 

2,221 

21 

Foreign  trade  only 
Foreign  trade  only 
Foreign  ves?els  only 
American  vessels  in 

foreign  tia.^e 
Coastwise  only 

Foreign  trnde  only 
Coastwise  only 

Foreign  trade  only 

Coastwise 

Foreign  and  coast- 
wise 

Foreign  and  coast- 
wise 

Foreign  and  coast- 
wise 

Foreign  trade  only 

Coastwise  only 

Foreign  trade 

Coastwise  only 

Foreign  trade 
largely 

Coastwise  only 


The  above  table  includes  only  steamers  except  at  Norfolk 
and  Savannah  where  they  are  not  classified.  The  available 
statistics  for  the  port  of  New  York  do  not  give  the  information 
required  for  the  purposes  in  view. 

From  the  table  given  we  find  that  at  the  ports  specified 
vessels  engaged  in  foreign  trade  during  1918  numbered  8,614, 
having  a  net  tonnage  of  20,794,716,  or  an  average  net  tonnage 
per  vessel  of  2,414.  A  vessel  of  this  net  tonnage  would  have  a 
gross  tonnage  of  about  3,500,  and  a  loaded  draft  averaging  about 
21.5  feet,  \essels  in  the  coastwise  trade  at  these  ports  (steamers 
only  except  at  Norfolk  and  Savannah)  numbered  14,867,  having 
a  net  tonnage  of  21,271,882,  or  an  average  net  tonnage  per  vessel 
of  1,341.  Such  a  vessel  would  have  a  gross  tonnage  of  about 
2,000  and  a  draft  of  about  18  feet.  The  ports  considered  are 
among  the  largest  in  the  country  and  it  therefore  seems  desirable 
to  compare  the  results  shown  with  the  figures  for  the  entire 
country.  The  following  tables  show  the  number,  net  tonnage 
and  approximate  drafts  of  vessels  entering  and  clearing  in  the 
foreign  trade  for  the  fiscal  years  1910  to  1919,  inclusive: 


210 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


Entrances   and    Clearances    in   the    Foreign    Trade 
Atlantic  Coast 


Fiscal  year 

Number  of 
vessels  en- 
tered   and 
cleared 

Net  tonnage 

Average  net 

tonnage  per 

vessel 

Average 

loaded  draft 

feet 

(approx.) 

1910 

20,255 
20,270 
20,660 
21,651 
20,573 
21,841 
25,747 
24,969 
20,198 
19,451 
21,562 

43,297,873 
45,109,850 
47,375,679 
50,152,197 
51,893,150 
44,971,298 
51,227,560 
49,058,553 
38,258,602 
41,899,303 
46,324,406 

2,137 
2,225 
2,293 
2,316 
2,522 
2,057 
1,989 
1,965 
1,894 
2,154 
2,148 

20  5 

1911 

21  0 

1912 

1913 

21.0 
21  0 

1914 

21  5 

1915 

'20  5 

1916 

1917 

20.0 
20  0 

1918 

19  5 

1919 

20.5 

10  year  average.  .  .  . 

20.5 

Gulf  Coast 


Fiscal  year 

Number  of 
vessels  en- 
tered   and 
cleared 

Net  tonnage 

Average  net 

tonnage  per 

vessel 

Average 

loaded  draft 

feet 

(approx.) 

1910 

6,925 
7,228 
7,870 
9,051 
9,555 
9,996 
9,198 
9,902 
9,429 

10,491,690 
11,224,753 
12,542,154 
14,762,264 
15,832,584 
14,778,772 
13,892,802 
14,561,577 
13,663,094 
14,464,062 
13,621,375 

1,515 
1,553 
1,594 
1,631 
1,657 
1,643 
1,510 
1,470 
1,449 
1,458 
1,546 

18  5 

1911 

1912 

1913 

18.5 
18.5 
19  0 

1914 

1915 

1916 

19.0 
19.0 
18.5 

1917 

1918 

18.0 
18  0 

1919 

10  year  average.  .  .  . 

9,921 
8,807 

18.0 
18  5 

Pacific   Coast 


Fiscal  year 

Number  of 
vessels  en- 
tered   and 
cleared 

Net  tonnage 

Average  net 

tonnage  per 

vessel 

Average 

loaded  draft 

feet 

(approx.) 

1910 

7,435 
8,201 
10,061 
11,347 
10,555 
10,215 
12,755 
12,763 
12,732 
12,311 
10,837 

7,637,185 

8,421,133 

9,444,972 

10,490,948 

11,840,585 

10,598,451 

11,420,471 

10,864,577 

10,918,886 

9,096,266 

10,073,347 

1,027         1         17  0 

1911 

1,027         '          17  0 

1912 

938 
924 
1,122 
1,037 
895 
851 
857 
739 
929 

16  5 

1913 

16  5 

1914 

17  0 

1915 

17.0 

1916 

16  0 

1917 

16  0 

1918 

16  0 

1919 

15.5 

1 0  year  average .... 

16.5 

GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL 


211 


These  tables  disclose  a  most  remarkable  situation.  It  has  been 
generally  accepted  that  the  vessels  employed  in  ocean  traffic 
are  constantly  becoming  of  greater  size  and  draft.  If  the 
maximum  vessels  only  are  considered,  this  is  no  doubt  true, 
but  the  figures  show  clearly  that  there  has  been  no  increase  in 
the  average  size  of  vessels  employed  in  our  foreign  trade  during 
the  last  ten  years.  This  fact  is  more  definitely  shown  by  the 
following  graph.  The  increase  in  average  size  of  vessels  on  the 
Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts  during  1918  is  probably  due  to  the 
transfer  to  these  coasts  of  the  larger  vessels  pertaining  to  the 
Pacific  coast  fleet,  for  war  purposes,  which  would  also  account 
for  the  decrease  in  size  of  vessels  on  the  Pacific  Coast  during 
that  period. 

Average  Net  Tonnage  of  Vessels  in  the  Foreign  Trade 


Atlantic  Cm« 
Gul  r  CMSt 
PAclfic  COASt. 


Tendencies  in  vessel  dimensions. — -In  substantiation  of  the  re- 
sults obtained  by  the  above  study,  attention  is  invited  to  the  fol- 
lowing data  prepared  by  the  Port  Facilities  Commission  of  the 
Shipping  Board. 


212 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


Percentage  which  the  number  of  steam  and  sail  vessels,  of  specified  classes  of 

tonnage  (500  tons  and  over),  represented  of  the  total  vessels  of  all  classes 

built,  by  quinquennial  periods,  from  1959  to  1918. 


Gross  tonnage 


1889 

to 

1893 


1894 

to 

1898 


1899 

to 

1903 


1904 

to 

1908 


1909 

to 

1913 


1914 

to 

1918 


15,000 

14,000 

13,000 

12,000 

11,000 

10,000 

9,000 

8,000 

7,000 

6,000 

5,000 


and  over 
to  14,999 
to  13,999 
to  12,999 
to  11,999 
to  10,999 
to  9,999 
to  8,999 
to  7,999 
to  6,999 
to    5,999 


0.3 

2.5 


0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.6 


0.1 


0.3 
0.6 
1.2 
0.7 
1.9 
3.0 
5.7 


0.7 
0.1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.6 
1.5 
1.8 
5.7 
5.8 


0.5 
0.3 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
0.7 
1.2 
3.4 
6.2 
8.3 


0.7 
0.1 

'6'3 
0.4 
0.8 
1.0 
2.4 
4.8 
6.1 

19.8 


Gross  tonnage 


4,000  to  4,999 

Steam 

3,000  to  3,999 

Steam 

Sailing 

2,000  to  2,999 

Steam 

Sailing 

1,000  to  1,999 

Steam 

Sailing 

500  to  999 

Ste^m 

Sailinc 


1859 
to 
1863 


13.5 
10.9 


59.5 
16.1 


1864 
to 
1868 


2.0 
1.2 


12.8 
13.8 


,47.9 
21.3 


1869 

to 
1873 


1874 
to 
1878 


1879 

to 

1883 


2.8 
1.2 


28.0 
9.1 


42.5 
15.2 


2.7 
2.0 


21.8 
24.2 


27.7 
21.6 


3.1 
0.1 


13.2 
2.3 


42.9 
8.2 


22.7 
7.6 


1884 

1889 

1894 

1899 

1904 

1908 

to 

to 

to 

to 

to 

to 

1888 

1893 

1898 

1903 

1908 

1913 

1914 


21.0 
5.0 


28.4 
14.3 


21.3 
5.0 


10.5 
0.9 


22.0 
5.3 


22.3 
10.6 


17.4 
4.6 


18.0 
1.4 


18.1 
1.7 


19.3 

3.7 


14.3 

5.4 


17.0 
0.9 


12.1 
3.2 


18.5 
i.i 


12.5 
5.5 


15.6 
0.3 


11.6 
0.4 


21.8 
1.0 


14.6 
3.7 


15.7 


11.9 
0.9 


9.2 
0.2 


20.6 
0.7 


15.9 
2.3 


10.1 


14.5 
0.4 


17.3 
2.3 


9.2 
2.0 


During  the  five-year  period  from  1914  to  1918,  inclusive,  there 
were  constructed  twenty  vessels  of  15,000  gross  tons  and  over, 
_and  forty-six  vessels  between  10,000  and  15,000  tons,  or  a  total 
of  sixty-six  vessels  of  10,000  gross  tons  and  over ;  while  during 
the  same  period  there  were  also  constructed  2,796  vessels  of  500 
tons  or  more  and  less  than  10,000  tons.  The  figures  already 
given  show  that  an  astonishingly  large  number  of  the  smaller 
steamers  are  used  in  the  foreign  trade,  and  that  the  large  vessels 
are  so  few  as  to  exercise  no  pronounced  effect  upon  the  averages. 
The  following  data  regarding  the  ten  largest  vessels  built  during 
quinquennial  periods  from  1889  to  1918  show  clearly  the  steady 
increase  in  the  size  of  the  large  combination  ])assenger  and  freight 
liners.     Observation  of  the  tendency  toward  increase  of  dimen- 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


213 


sions  in  these  large  vessels  has  no  doubt  contributed  largely  to 
the  widespread  misconception  of  the  size  of  the  average  cargo 
carrier. 


Name,  Gross  Tonnage  and  Dimensions  of  the  Ten  Largest   Vessels 
{Combination  Freight  and  Passenger)  Built  during  Quin- 
quennial Periods  1889  to  1918. 

1914-1918 


Name  of  vessel 


Gross 
tonnage 


Length 


Width 


Deep 
load 
draft 


Bismarck 

Leviathan 

Britannic 

Statendam 

Justicia 

Belgic 

DuiHo 

William  O'Swald.  . 

Cap.  Polonio 

Tirpitz 

Average  per  ship 


56,000 

54,282 
48,158 
32,500 
32,234 
24,547 
22,000 
20,000 
19,500 
19.300 


912.0 
907.6 
852.5 
740.0 
740.5 
670.4 
601.4 
587.8 
636.0 
588.0 


100.0 
100.3 
94.0 
86.4 
86.4 
78.4 
75.9 
72.0 
72.2 
75.0 


41.3 
41.3 
34.0 
34.0 
34,0 
36.3 
35.0 
34.0 

33.0 


32,852 


723.6 


84.1 


35.6 


1909-1913 


Name  of  vessel 


Gross 
tonnage 


Length 


Width 


Deep 

load 
draft 


Imperator. .  .  r 

Olympic 

Columbus 

France 

Alsatian 

Ceramic 

Franconia 

Laconia 

Empress  of  Asia .  .  . 
Empress  of  Russia . 

Average  per  ship 


51,969 
46,359 
35,000 
23,666 
18,481 
18,441 
18,150 
18,099 
16,909 
16,810 


882.9 
852.5 
750.0 
692.2 
571,4 
655.1 
600.3 
600.6 
570.1 
570.2 


98.3 
92.5 
80.0 
75.6 
72.4 
69.4 
71.3 
71.3 
68.2 
68.2 


37.0 
34.7 
36.0 
34.0 
35.0 
34.8 
29.6 
29.6 
29.0 
29.0 


26.388 


674.5 


76.7 


32,8 


214 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 
1904-1908 


Name  of  vessel 


Gross 
tonnage 


Length 


Width 


Deep 

load 

draft 


\ 

Mauretania 

George  Washington 

Kaiserin  Augusta  Victoria 

Adriatic 

Rotterdam 

Baltic 

Amerika  (America) ...... 

Minnesota 

Caronia 

Carmania 

y  Average  per  ship 


30,704 
25,570 
24,581 
24,541 
24,149 
23,876 
22,622 
20,718 
19,687 
19,524 


762.2 
699.1 
677.5 
709.2 
650.5 
709.2 
669.0 
622.0 
650.0 
650.4 


88.0 
78.2 
77.3 
75.5 
77.4 
75.6 
74.3 
73.5 
72.0 
72.2 


36.3 
34.0 
36.0 
37.3 
33.0 
37.3 
33.0 
38.0 
33.3 
33.3 


23,597 


679.9 


76.4 


35.1 


1899-1903 


Name    of    vessel 


Gross 
tonnage 


Length    I   Width 


Deej) 
load 
draft 


Cedric 

Celtic 

Northland 

Victoria  Luise 

Kronprins  Wilhelm . 

Patricia 

Saxonia 

Ivernia  

Carpathia 

Orotic 


Average  per  ship . 


21,040 
20,904 
17,905 
16,703 
14,908 
14,466 
14,297 
14,278 
13,603 
13,518 


16,162 


680.9 
680.9 
561.6 
660.9 
637.3 
560.3 
580.0 
582.0 
540.0 
582.0 


606,6 


75.3 
75.3 
60.2 
67.3 
66.3 
62.3 
64.2 
64.9 
64.5 
60.3 


66.1 


36.9 

36.5 

30  0 

30.5 

30.0 

32.2 

31.11 

32.0 

31.4 

32   1 


32.4 


GREAT   LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL 
1894-1898 


215 


Name  of  vessel 


Gross 
tonnage 


Length 


Width 


Deep 
load 
draft 


Cumric 

Pennsylvania.  .  . 

Pretoria 

Graf  Wladersee . 
Scandinavian   .  . 

Burdegala 

St.  Louis 

St.  Paul 

Bremen 

Bulgaria 


13,370 
13,333 
13,234 
13,193 
12,099 
12,009 
11,639 
11,639 
11,540 
11,440 


585,5 
559.4 
561.0 
561.2 
550.3 


581 
535 
535 
550 
501 


64 

3 

62 

2 

62 

2 

62 

2 

59 

3 

63 

7 

63 

0 

63 

0 

60 

2 

62 

2 

62 

2 

31,0 
32.2 
32.2 
32.2 
30  0 
31.0 
29.5 
29.5 
28.5 
30.0 


Average  per  ship. 


12,350 


552.2 


30.6 


1889-1893   (and  prior) 


Name  of  vessel 


Gross 
tonnage 


Length 


Width 


Deep 
load 
draft 


Campania. .  .  . 
New  York. .  .  . 
Philadelphia . . 

Teutonic 

La  Touraine . . 

Ophir 

Himalaya .... 
La  Bretagne.  . 
Alphonso  XIL 
Bovec 


12,884 
10,798 
10,186 
9,984 
8,429 
6,942 
6,929 
6,756 
6,748 
6,583 


Average  per  ship | .  .       8  624 


601.0 
517.0 
527.6 
565.8 
520.2 
465.0 
465.6 
495.4 
463.5 
470.0 


509.1 


65.2 
63.6 
63.2 
57.8 
56.0 
53.4 
52.2 
51.8 
51.7 
53.1 


56.8 


29.0 
30.4 
30.4 
29.4 
27.0 
27.5 
28.0 
26.5 
27.0 
27.0 


28.2 


While  the  number  of  large  vessels  of  great  draft  has  increased, 
the  average  draft  of  freight  vessels  of  equal  tonnage  has  appar- 
ently decreased.  For  instance,  an  average  vessel  of  recent 
design  of  8,000  gross  tons  has  less  draft  than  a  vessel  of  similar 
tonnage  constructed  twenty  years  ago.  These  facts  will  be 
evident  from  an  examination  of  the  following  tables  prepared 
by  the  Shipping  Board : 


216 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


Deep  Load  Draft  of  Steam   Vessels  (5000  Gross  Tons  and  Over)  Built  During 
Each  Quinquennial  Period  1889  to  1918. 


Gross  tonnage 


1889 

1894 

1899 

1904 

1909 

to 

to 

to 

to 

to 

1893 

1898 

1903 

1908 

1913 

1914 

to 

1918 


15,000  and  over 

33.0 

34.1 

32.8 

35.3 

14,000  to  14,999 

32.2 

31.5 

31.1 

30.5 

28.8 

13,000  to  13,999 

32.2 

32.0 

32.7 

29.9 

32.3 

12,000  to  12,999 

29 

0          31.0 

31.2 

31.5 

27.9 

29.3 

11,000  to  11,999 

29.3 

31.8 

27.6 

^  30.1 

28.4 

10,000  to  10,999 

30 

4          28.2 

30.9 

27.2 

27.6 

28.0 

9,000  to    9,999 

30.0 

29.2 

29.0 

28.7 

8,000  to    8,999 

29.9 

29.2 

28.1 

28.0 

28.4 

7,000  to    7,999 

27.6 

27.6 

27.6 

27.5 

27.4 

6,000  to    6,999 

26.8 

26.9 

26.7 

27.2 

27.0 

5,000  to    5,999 

26 

3          25.8 

25.6 

25.5 

25.3 

25.3 

Deep  Load  Draft  of  Steam  and  Sail    Vessels   {Under  5,000  gross  tons)   built 
During   each    Quinquennial   Period    1859   to    1918. 


Gross  tonnage 

1859    1864    1869 

to         to         to 

1863    1868    1873 

1874 

to 
1878 

1879 

to 

1883 

1884 

to 

1888 

1889 

to 

1893 

1894|    1899 

to        to 

1898  J    1903 

1904    1909    1914 

to       to            to 
1908    1913    1918 

4,000  t..  4,999 

Steam 

3.000  tu  3,999 

Steam 

Sailing 

2,000  ts  2,999 

Steam 

Sailing 

1,000  to  1,999 

Steam 

Sailing 

500  to  999 

Steam 

Sailing 



15.1 

.... 

22.8 

14.8 
17.7 

21.6 

18.8 
21.5 

15.9 
14.7 

18.8 

18.8 
20.4 

14.9 
17.6 

25.8 

24.5 

22.8 
21.8 

18.0 
21.2 

14.8 
18.3 

25.0 
24.0 

21.6 
22.1 

18.3 
20.7 

14.3 
18.4 

24.4 

23.8 
23.0 

21.1 
22.1 

17.9 
20.1 

14.4 
17.5 

25.0 

22.7 
23.4 

20.3 
21.4 

16.9 
20.4 

13.9 
12.8 

25.0 

22.8 
23.1 

19.9 

21.8 

17.3 
21.0 

13.7 
16.5 

24.3 

22.5 
23.4 

19.8 
21.9 

16.6 
14.0 

13.5 
16.0 

24.1 

21.9 
22.6 

19.4 
22.5 

16.8 
11.8 

13.2 
10.5 

23.7 
22.5 

19.5 
22.4 

16.5 
18.8 

13.4 
15.4 

In  order  to  get  a  clearer  idea  of  the  relative  sizes  and  dead- 
weight capacities  of  cargo  carriers,  we  append  the  following 
tables : 


Deadweight  carrying 
capacity 


Length  of 
keel 


Beam 


Load 
draft 


Speed 
loaded 


1,000  tons. 

3,000  tons. 

2,500  tons. 

3,000  tons. 

4,000  tons . 

4,500  tons. 

5,600  tons. 

8,200  tons. 

8,800  tons. 
10,000  tons. 
14,000  tons. 


Ft. 
185 
227 
250 
250 
304 
334 
350 
400 
423 
450 
500 


In 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 


Ft.    In. 
29       0 


38 
35 
43 
46 
4cS 
49 
54 
54 
59 
64 


Ft. 

13 

17 

18 

20 

20 

21 

21 

24 

24 

28 

28 


In. 

Knots 

0 

10 

0 

10 

0 

10 

0 

10 

0 

10 

0 

10 

W?. 

10 

0 

10 

1 

11 

2 

10 

5 

10 

GREAT   LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHAXNEI, 


217 


The  above  ships  are  slow-speed  carriers,  and  if  higher  speeds 
are  desired,  this  simply  adds  to  the  increased  weight  of  machinery 
and  fuel  and  reduces  the  deadweight  cargo.  For  instance,  the 
5,200-ton  ship  when  increased  in  speed  to  11  knots  carries  about 
4,800  tons  and  at  12  knots  carries  4,400  tons.  The  slow  speed 
vessel  has  been  found  to  be  the  more  economical  for  cargo 
purposes. 

The  following  table  shows  the  maximum  drafts,  loaded  and 
light,  of  the  standard  vessels  constructed  by  the  Shipping 
Board,  the  figures  being  derived  from  actual  measurements  of 
vessels  constructed  at  dififerent  points  under  the  same  plans : 


Dead- 
weight 
tonnage 

Draft 

Type 

Loaded 

Light 

Mean 

Forward 

Aft 

Steel: 

Cargo 

Troop-cargo 

Tanker 

Cargo 

Cargo 

12,000 
11,800 
10,500 
9,600 
8,800 
7,500 
7,500 
5,075 
4,300 
4,000 
3,500 

4,700 
4,500 
4,000 
3,500 
3,500 
3,500 

Ft.     In. 
30       6 

28       VA 

25  734 
27      .. 
24       2 
24       5H 

26  0 

22  IIM 
24       4H 
24       2 
21       1 

24       9 

23  5 
26      .. 

24  2 
23     11 
23       3 

Ft.  In. 
9  3M 
9       214 

18       3 

7  lOH 

11  AH 
9       5 

12  1 

8  9}^ 
16       7 

9  11 

7       6M 

11       3 

11  2 

13  4H 

12  31^ 

10  7 

11  IV2 

Ft.       In. 

17      '.'. 

4  6 
8       8 
6       6 

12        1 

5  6 
11       5M 

6  6 

5       9^ 

5  6 

7  11 

8  10 
8       7 

6  6 
8     11 

Ft.     In. 

19       6 
11       3 
14       1 

Cargo 

Tanker 

12       4 
12       1 

Cargo 

11       9 

Cargo  passenger. . 
Cargo  (Lake) .... 
Cargo  (Lake) .... 

Wood: 

Dougherty 

Bailin 

21       8>2 
13       4 
9       4 

18       0 
16       5 

Peninsula 

Ferris 

17      11 
16       0 

Ferris- Mod 

Hough 

14       8 
13       4 

The  table  shows  that  ocean-going  cargo  vessels  as  large  as 
the  standard  8,800-ton  vessel  would  be  able  to  load  to  maximum 
draft  on  a  waterway  25  feet  deep  at  low  water,  and  that  such  a 
waterway  would  more  than  meet  the  requirements  for  getting 
out  to  the  ocean  newly  constructed  vessels  of  all  the  standard 
classes. 

The  very  important  question  therefore  arises — what  propor- 
tion of  the  world's  cargo  tonnage  will  be  excluded  from  the 
Great  Lakes  because  of  the  limitations  of  channels,  provided 
that  it  is  otherwise  economical  to  send  ocean  ships  to  Great  Lake 
ports? 


218 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


Given  a  controlling-  depth  throughout  the  lakes  and  in  the 
principal  harbors  as  at  present  constituted  of  21  feet  at 
low  water  and  given  25  feet  as  limiting  below  Detroit  River, 
with  all  important  Ontario  and  Erie  ports  requiring  a  compara- 
tively small  amount  of  dredging  to  give  depths  of  25  feet,  and 
assuming  that  progressive  improvement  for  the  coming  genera- 
tion will  bring  all  depths  to  30  feet — the  lock-sill  limits  of  the 
present  projects — what  proportion  of  the  ocean  tonnage  will  be 
admitted  at  each  stage  of  progress? 

Studies  made  by  the  Shipping  Board  of  the  drafts  of  vessels 
show  the  following  results  : 


Average  Deep  Load  Draft,  by  Quinquennial  Periods  of  Vessels 
(500  Gross  Tons  and  Over)  Built  1859  to  1918,  and  Now  in  Use.* 


Jict.      . 

TSRIOS 

of 
Vessels 

IBep 
Draft. 

DSEP       LOAD       DRAFT 
5                       10                     15                     20                     25 

Prsv. Period 

1859-1663 

Ho 
Peet 

Per 
Cant 

Ho 

?eet 

For 
Cent 

1924-1928' 

- 

24.6 

.8 

3.4 

9.5 

62,9 

1919-1923 

- 

23.8 

.8 

3.5 

8.7 

57.6 

^^^_ 

1914-1918 

1343 

23.0 

1.3 

6.0 

7.9 

52.3 

1909-1913 

1120 

21.7 

.2 

.9 

6.6 

43.7 

^ 

1904-1908 

1062 

21.5 

1899-1903 

978 

22.2 

1.1 

5.2 

7.1 

47.0 

^^ 

1894-1893 

636 

21.1 

.5 

2.4 

6.0 

39.7 

1889-1393 

635 

20.6 

.8 

4.0 

5.5 

36.4 

1384-1833 

216 

19.8 

1.2 

6.5 

4.7 

31.1 

1879-1883 

212 

18.6 

.2 

1.1 

3.6 

23.2 

^^^^^* 

1874-1878 

76 

18.4 

.4 

2.2 

3,3 



1869-1873 

17 

18.0 

1.2 

7.1 

2.9 

19.2 

18&4-1868 

7 

16.8 

1.7 

11.3 

1.7 

11.3 

1869-1863 

2 

15.1 

- 

- 

- 

- 

' 

-A 

^Prepared  by  the  U.  S.  Shipping  Board,  Port  Facilities  Commission. 

The  table  includes  only  vessels  for  which  information 
was  obtainable,  and  the  figures  in  column  "Number  of  Vessels" 
do  not  represent  all  vessels  now  in  service. 

The  above  shows  that  the  average  deep  load  draft  of  vessels 
of  500  gross  tons  and  over  is  23  feet.  In  connection  with  the 
above,  the  following  tables  are  of  peculiar  interest: 


GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE   SHIP   CHANNEL 


219 


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220 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


Average  Deep  Load  Draft,  by  Classes  of  Tonnage,  of  Steam  and 
Sail  Vessels  Built  1859  to  1918,  and  Now  in  Use.* 


Attention  is  invited  to  the  fact  that  while  there  are  only  155 
vessels  of  10,000  gross  tons  or  over,  there  are  3,574  steam  vessels 
of  2,000  to  6,000  gross  tons.  The  average  deep  load  drafts  of  the 
latter  class  of  vessels  range  from  20.1  to  25.4  feet.  These  are 
the  vessels  which  carry  the  world's  commerce,  and  which  will 
continue  to  do  so  for  many  years  to  come.  As  pointed  out  above, 
the  largest  vessels  are  the  passenger  liners,  and  the  combination 
freight  and  passenger  vessels.  Neither  of  these  classes  is  essential 
for  economical  transportation  of  the  commerce  that  may  be 
expected  to  develop  upon  the  St.  Lawrence  and  Great  Lakes 
dee})  waterway. 

In  a  recent  address,  Major  Gen.  W  .  M.  Black,  U.S.A.,  Retired, 
formerly  Chief  of  Engineers,  and  more  recently  Consulting  En- 
gineer of  the  Shipping  Board,  made  the  following  statement : 

Out  of  14.513  steamships  listed  in  Lloyd's  Register  for  1918-1919.  81.45 
per  cent  have  drafts  of  25  feet  or  less,  and  99.32  per  cent  draw  30  feet  or 
less,  leaving  a  percentage  of  0.68  of  vessels  of  over  30  feet  draft.  This 
l)repond'erance  of  vessels  of  less  than  30  feet  draft  is  illustrated  by  the 
fact  that  in  the  first  six  months  of  1914,  out  of  4.476  ships  which  paid  pilot 
fees  at  the  port  of  New  York,  4.402.  or  96  per  cent,  drew  30  feet  of  water 
or  less. 

Since  increased  cargo  capacity  means  an  increase  of  earning  capacity, 
tlTere  must  be  a  good  reason  for  this  limitation  in  size.     There  is,  and  it 


*Prej)ared  by  the  U.  S.  Shipping  Board,   Port  Facilities  Commission. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


221 


is  one  independ'ent  of  the  difliculty  of  obtaining  full  cargoes  for  the 
large  carriers.  It  lies  in  the  fact  that  few  harbors  in  the  world  have  depth 
suffici'ent  to  accommodate  such  ships  as  the  Leviathan.  It  may  surprise 
you  to  learn  that  during  the  war  the  Leviathan  made  one  trip  to  Liverpool. 
By  taking  advantage  of  the  tide  she  made  her  entry  into  the  port,  but  had 
to  be  there  for  about  a  month  before  there  was  sufficient  channel  depth  to 
enable  her  to  get  away. 

Sizes  of  German  commercial  vessels. — The  following  gives 
data  relative  to  the  sizes  of  vessels  used  on  four  different  routes 
from  Hamburg  prior  to  the  war.  Vessel  No.  3  in  each  case  is 
the  typical  vessel  for  the  route  in  question.  On  the  Hamburg- 
Calcutta  route  the  typical  vessel  has  a  loaded  draft  of  25  feet ; 
oil  the  Hamburg-West  Coast  ( Pacitic  route)  25  feet;  on  the 
Hamburg-Mediterranean  service  21  feet ;  and  on  the  Baltic  and 
North  Sea  service  16  feet. 


*  Dimensions,  Tonnage  and  Draft  of  German-owned  Cargo  Boats  Running  on  the 
Hamburg-  Calcutta  Service. 


Gross 
tonnage 


Net 
tonnage 


Length 

(feet) 


Breadth 
moulded 

(feet) 


Mean  loaded 
draft  (feet) 


Vessel  No.  1 

Vessel  No.  2 

Vessel  No.  3  (typical) 

Vessel  No.  4 

Vessel  No.  5 

Vessel  No.  6 

Vessel  No.  7 


4,110 
4,115 
5,625 
7,170 
7,170 
8,900 
8,900 


2,550 
2,550 
3,480 
4,445 
4,445 
5,515 
5,515 


384.5 
384.5 
423.0 
456.0 
456.0 
508.5 
308.5 


48.0 
48.0 
53.0 
57.5 
57.5 
61.0 
61.0 


23.0 
23.0 
25.0 
25.8 
25.8 
27.5 
27.5 


*^ Dimensions ,  Tonnage  and  Draft  of  German-owned  Cargo  Boats  Running  on  the 
Hamburg-West  Coast  (Pacific)  Service. 


Gross 

Net 

Length 

tonnage 

tonnage 

(feet) 

3,630 

2,250 

384.0 

3,630 

2,250 

384.0 

4,970 

3,080 

423.2 

6,380 

3,950 

456.0 

6,380 

3,950 

456.0 

7,780 

4,830 

484.2 

7,780 

4,830 

484.2 

Breadth 

moulded 

(feet) 


Mean  loaded 
draft  (feet) 


Vessel  No.  1 

Vessel  No.  2 

Vessel  No.  3  (typical) 

Vessel  No.  4 

Vessel  No.  5 

Vessel  No.  6 

Vessel  No.  7 


48.5 
48.5 
53.2 
56.5 
56.5 
61.0 
61.0 


23.0 
23.0 
25.0 
27.0 
27.0 
28.8 
28  8 


222 


ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


*Dimensions,  Tonnage  and  Draft  oj  German-owned  Cargo  Boats  Running  on  the 
Hamburg- Mediterranean   Service. 


Gross 

Net 

tonnage 

tonnage 

1,580 

963 

1,580 

963 

2,130 

1,300 

2,695 

1,640 

2,695 

1,640 

Length 

(feet) 


Breadth 

moulded 

(feet) 


Mean  loaded 
draft  (feet) 


Vessel  No.  1 

Vessel  No.  2 

Vessel  No.  3  (typical) 

Vessel  No.  4 

Vessel  No.  5 


255.5 
255.5 
288.0 
311.5 
311.5 


34.75 

34.75 

38.5 

43.25 

43.25 


19.25 

19.25 

21.0 

21.5 

21.5 


*  Dimensions ,  Tonttage  and  Draft  of  German-owned   Cargo  Boats  Running  on 
Baltic  and  North  Sea  Service. 


Gross 

Net 

tonnage 

tonnage 

875 

525 

875 

525 

1,180 

709 

1,490 

895 

1,490 

895 

1,800 

1,080 

1,800 

1,080 

Length 
(feet) 


Breadth 

moulded 

(feet) 


Mean  loaded 
draft  (feet) 


Vessel  No.  1 

Vessel  No.  2 

Vessel  No.  3  (typical). 

Vessel  No.  4 

Vessel  No.  5 

Vessel  No.  6 

Vessel  No.  7 


215.0 
214.5 
236.5 
255.0 
255.0 
270.5 
270.5 


32.0 

32.0 

35.0 

37.75 

37.75 

40.0 

40.0 


14.5 
14.5 
16.0 
17.2 
17.2 
18.5 
18.5 


*  Condensed  from  the  Shipbuilding  and  Shipping  Record,  January  2,  1918. 


Two  of  these  routes  are  several  thousand  miles  longer  than 
the  Duluth-Liverpool  route  and  involve  passage  through  either 
the  Panama  or  Suez  Canal,  the  latter  having  about  100  miles  of 
restricted  navigation.  These  vessels  have  been  operated  success- 
fully vmder  conditions  no  more  favoral^le  than  those  which 
will  govern  the  St.  Lawrence  route,  and  should  set  at  rest  any 
fears  that  might  have  been  entertained  regarding  the  economic 
])racticability  of  the  proposed  navigation. 

Drafts  of  vessels  using  the  Suez  Canal. — The  following  data 
furnished  the  authors  by  tiie  Suez  Maritime  Canal  Company 
show  that  during  the  last  eight  years,  30,939  vessels  have  passed 
through  the  Suez  Canal,  of  which  1.002  vessels  have  had  drafts 
of  27  feet  or  more,  or  about  3.3  per  cent  of  the  total.  It  is 
clear  that  the  average  draft  is  \ery  much  less  than  25  feet,  and 
is  probably  nearer  21  feet. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SIIII 

Year  29-30//.     28-29//.     21-28  ft. 

1919 7                 24  85 

1918 5                 16  43 

1917 1                 12  24 

1916 3                 10  45 

1915 6                28  83 

1914 49  147 

1913 ....  233 

1912 ....  181 

Maximum  draft  of  water  allowed:  30  feet. 


P    CHANNEL 

22 

U?ider  27  //. 

Total  ships 

3,870 

3,986 

2,458 

2,522 

2,316 

2,353 

3,052 

3,110 

3,591 

3,708 

4,606 

4,802 

4,852 

5,085 

5,192 

5,373 

Chapter  XVIII 

STUDY    OF    VESSELS    PASSING    THROUGH    THE 

PANAMA  CANAL  BETWEEN  JULY  1,  1919,  AND 

JUNE  30,  1920 

The  Panama  Canal  has  a  depth  of  41  feet,  but  the  average 
draft  of  vessels  passing  through  it  is  only  about  21  feet.  During 
the  year  ending  June  30,  1920,  120  vessels  carried  grain  from 
Pacific  coast  points  through  the  Panama  Canal,  of  which  73  had 
drafts  under  25  feet  and  none  had  drafts  in  excess  of  28  feet. 
During  the  same  period  160  vessels  carried  cargoes  through  the 
canal  consisting  largely  or  entirely  of  lumber,  ties,  etc.,  and 
of  these  only  5  drew  25  feet  or  more.  The  number  of  vessels 
carrying  nitrates  was  123,  of  which  77  drew  less  than  25  feet; 
while  one  drew  over  30  feet.  Of  118  vessels  carrying  general 
cargo  through  the  Canal  from  the  United  Kingdom  and  Europe, 
36  drew  25  feet  or  more  and  none  drew  as  much  as  30  feet. 
The  figures  show  that  a  depth  of  25  feet  in  the  St.  Lawrence 
waterway  would  accommodate  a  large  proportion  of  the  vessels 
using  the  Panama  Canal;  while  a  depth  of  30  feet  would  accom- 
modate practically  all  of  them. 

While  data  relative  to  drafts  of  vessels  are  not  generally  kept 
at  the  ports  of  the  United  States,  accurate  measurements  are' 
kept  of  all  vessels  passing  through  the  Panama  Canal.  Since 
this  canal  has  a  depth  of  41  feet  and  is  utilized  by  vessels 
proceeding  from  and  to  all  points  of  the  world,  a  study  of  the 
drafts  of  vessels  passing  through  the  canal  with  various  kinds 
of  cargo  should  give  a  true  picture  of  the  vessels  engaged  in  the 
freight  traffic  of  the  world. 

The  Panama  Canal  Record  states  that  during  the  six  months 
from  July  to  December,  1919,  the  average  length  of  the  1,152 
commercial  ships  making  the  transit  of  the  canal  was  342  feet, 
the  average  beam  was  48  feet,  and  the  average  draft  in  salt  water 
was  21  feet. 


224 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


225 


Drafts  of  Vessels  carrying  grain  and  flour  through  the  Panama  Canal, 
July  1,  1919,  to  June  30,  1920. 


Draft 

Draft 

feet 

From 

To 

feet 

From 

To. 

and  ins. 

and  ins. 

23.4 

Seattle 

Europe 

23.6 

Astoria 

New  York 

20.9 

Portland 

New  York 

22.2 

San  Francisco 

Norfolk 

19  7 

San  Francisco 

Europe 

24.0 

Tacoma 

Newport  News 

22.1 

Portland 

New  York 

25.5 

San  Francisco 

Newport  News 

26.1 

Seattle 

New  York 

24.0 

San  Francisco 

United  Kingdom 

26.0 

Vallejo 

Newport  News 

23.8 

Portland 

New  York 

23.0 

Tacoma 

New  York' 

24.0 

San  Francisco 

United  Kingdom 

20  0 

Melbourne 

Christiania 

22.6 

San  Francisco 

London 

23  4 

Portland 

New  York 

24   1 

Portland 

New  York 

23.4 

Portland 

New  York 

21.9 

San  Francisco 

United  Kingdom 

24.3 

Tacoma 

New  York 

26  0 

Astoria 

New  York 

19.6 

San  Francisco 

England 

21.6 

Port  Custer 

Falmouth 

24.0 

Portland 

New  York 

26.0 

Tacoma 

New  York 

22.0 

San  Francisco 

Ipswich 

19.0 

San  Francisco 

Queenstown 

24  0 

San  Francisco 

Christiania 

25.7 

Tacoma 

Newport  News 

24  6 

Seattle 

Norfolk 

23.6 

San  Francisco 

Gibraltar 

24.7 

Portland 

Newport  News 

23  0 

Portland 

Gibraltar 

26.0 

San  Fr.mcisco 

Newport  Nsws 

22  0 

San  Francisco 

Sharpness 

25  S 

San  Francisco 

Copenhagen 

24.6 

Portland 

Gibraltar 

21.0 

San  Francisco 

Ipswich 

25  0 

San  Francisco 

Norfolk 

24.1 

Portland 

New  York 

22.0 

San  Francisco 

Falmouth 

21.9 

San  Francisco 

Queenstown 

23.4 

Portland 

New  York 

26.1 

Seattle 

Norfolk 

26.0 

San  Francisco 

Norfolk 

22.0 

San  Francisco 

New  York 

23.0 

Tacoma 

New  York 

24  3 

Portland 

New  York 

23.6 

Los  Angeles 

New  York 

24  6 

Portland 

New  York 

24.2 

Tacoma 

New  York 

23.10 

Portland 

New  York 

19.8 

San  Franciscb 

New  York 

26.0 

Seattle 

New  York 

23.0 

Portland 

New  York 

23.1 

Tacomi 

New  York 

26.6 

San  Francisco 

New  York 

25. 6 

Adelaide 

Falmouth 

24.0 

Portland 

New  York 

22.0 

San  Francisco 

United  Kingdom 

25.0 

Tacoma 

New  York 

26.0 

Tacoma 

New  York 

23.6 

Seattle 

New  York 

27.0 

Valparaiso 

Ipswich 

25.0 

Seattle 

New  York 

23.6 

Seattle 

New  York 

23.0 

San  Francisco 

Leith 

25.0 

Tacoma 

New  Yoik 

25.1 

San  Francisco 

New  York 

20  0 

Portland 

New  York 

25.7 

Portland 

New  York 

24.6 

Tacoma 

New  York 

26.0 

Seattle 

New  York 

22.0 

San  Francisco 

New  York 

24.0 

Tacoma 

New  York 

23.6 

Tacoma 

New  York 

26.0 

Seattle 

New  York 

23.0 

San  Francisco 

New  York 

27.0 

Portland 

New  York 

26.0 

Seattle 

New  York 

27.0 

Tacoma 

New  York 

27.0 

Astoria 

New  York 

25.0 

Seattle 

New  York 

26.0 

San  Francisco 

New  York 

25.0 

Portland 

New  York 

25.3 

San  Francisco 

New  York 

23.5 

Seattle 

New  York 

24.6 

Portland 

New  York 

24.5 

San  Francisco 

New  Yoik 

23.6 

Seattle 

New  York 

24.0 

Tacoma 

New  York 

25.0 

San  Francisco 

United  Kingdom 

26.6 

Portand 

New  Uork 

25.0 

San  Francisco 

New  York 

24.6 

Everett 

New  York 

26.6 

Portland 

New  York 

27.0 

Tacoma 

New  York 

20.11 

Portland 

New  York 

24.0 

Portland 

New  York 

26.6 

Portland 

New  York 

27.5 

Tacoma 

New  York 

21.6 

San  Francisco 

New  York 

26.0 

San  Francisco 

New  York 

23.0 

Portland 

New  York 

25*  0 

Seattle 

New  York 

22.0 

Seattle 

New  York 

21.0 

Seattle 

New  York 

23.6 

Astoria 

New  York 

24.0 

Tacoma 

New  York 

25.6 

San  Francisco 

Alexandria 

23.6 

Portland 

New  York 

20.0 

Valpariaso 

Ipswich 

27.0 

Portland 

New  York 

23.0 

Tacoma 

New  York 

27.0 

Tacoma 

New  York 

25.6 

San  Francisco 

New  York 

25.6 

Seattle 

New  York 

26.5 

San  Francisco 

Alexandria 

22.0 

Seattle 

New  York 

25.0 

Portland 

Glasgow 

226  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

120  vessels  carried  grain  from  Pacific  coast  points.  The  drafts 
of  these  vessels  were  as  follows : 

Feet  No.  of  vessels 

27-28 8 

26-27 19 

25-26 20 

24-25 23 

23-24 24 

22-23 11 

21-22 6 

20-21 5 

19-20 4 

120 

Of  these  vessels,  twenty-seven  were  destined  for  points  in  the 
United  Kingdom  and  Europe.  The  drafts  of  these  vessels  were 
as  follows : 

Feet  No.  of  vessels 

27 1 

26-27 0 

25-26 4 

24-25 4 

23-24 4 

22-23 5 

21  22 4 

20-21 2 

19-20 3 

Vessels  Carrying  Lumber  Through  the  Panama  Canal  from  the 
Pacific  to  the  Atlantic,  July  1,  1919,  to  June  30,  1920. 

160  vessels  carried  cargoes  consisting  largely  or  entirely  of 
lumber,  ties,  etc.  Of  these  only  5  drew  25  feet  or  over.  The 
following  shows  the  number  of  vessels  of  each  foot  of  draft : 

Feet  No.  of  vessels 

29-30 "  1 

28-29 1 

27-28 0 

26-27 1 

25-26 2 

24-25 13 

23-24 15 

22-23 48 

21-22 27 

20-21 14 

19-20 9 

18-19 10 

17-18 3 

16-17 8 

15-16 5 

14-15 3 

160 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


227 


A  study  of  the  destinations  of  these  vessels  shows  thai  114 
were  bound  for  points  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  Europe, 
and  that  only  one  of  these  vessels  drew  25  feet  or  more.  This 
vessel  carried  a  cargo  of  9,100  tons  of  redwood  and  flour  from 
Seattle  to  Amsterdam,  and  drew  28.6  feet.  Of  the  remaining 
vessels,  fifteen  were  bound  for  points  in  Cuba  and  the  greatest 
draft  was  23.6  feet,  while  twenty-eight  vessels  were  bound  for 
Atlantic  coast  points.  Several  vessels  were  bound  for  Cristobal 
for  orders. 

From  the  figures  given  it  will  be  seen  that  with  a  25-foot 
depth  in  the  St.  Lawrence  River  all  of  these  vessels  carrying 
lumber  through  the  canal,  with  the  exception  of  about  five 
could  have  proceeded  into  the  Great  Lakes. 

The  destination  of  vessels  carrying  nitrates  through  the  Canal 
to  Atlantic  and  Gulf  ports,  and  the  drafts  of  vessels  employed 
in  this  trade  were  as  follows: 


Vessels  carrying  nitrates  from  South  America  to  Atlantic  and  Gulf  ports,  between 
July  1,  1919,  and  Jmie  30,  1920. 


Boston 

New  York 

Philadelphia 

Baltimore 

Norfolk 

Wilmington 

feet 

feet 

feet 

feet 

feet 

feet 

and  inches 

and  inches 

and  inches 

and  inches 

and  inches 

and  inches 

24.0 

24.6 

23.0 

25.9 

18.0 

22.6       23.1 

2.^.0 

23.0 

29.0 

20.6 

24.8 

23.0       26.0 

23.0 

26.0 

24.2 

25.0 

22.6 

25.0       24.0 

29.0 

24.0 

22.0 

19.0 

22.0       20.0 

20.0 

23.0 

24.0 

24.0 

27.6       27.2 

23.6 

23  6 

24.0 

26.6 

20.0       25.0 

21.6 

19.6 

22.0 

23.6 

22.7       27.0 

20.0 

2.13 

28.0 

21.0       21.0 

24.6 

24.6 

19.6 

22.6       21.0 

24.0 

22.6 

22.6        .... 

"rf  ■  ■ 

29.0 

23.2        .... 

228 


ECONOMIC    ASPFXTS    OF    THE 


Charleston 

Savannah 

Mobile 

New  Orleans 

Other  ports 

feet 

feet 

feet 

feet 

feet 

and  inches 

and  inches 

and  inches 

and  inches 

and  inches 

25.5         24.6 

23.0 

20.6 

23.0 

22.10 

25.6         26.6 

23.5 

16.6 

20.0 

22.1 

29.0         27.0 

26.6 

24.4 

23.0 

26.8         26.6 

26.0. 

21.0 

23.0 

28.7         28.6 

26.6 

25.0 

22.3 

24.2         28.0 

29.0 

24.8 

28.0 

20.0         27.0 

23.6 

20.0 

29.2         28.3 

21.6 

29.7 

20.2          29.6 

24.6 

27.8 

20.0         24.6 

22.5 

29.6 

23.6 

23.6 

24.0 

26.3 

21.0 

20.8 

26.6 

31.6 

22.6 

25.0 

28.0 

26.0 

26.6 

27.4 

28.0 

To  summarize  the  above,  one  hundred  and  twenty-three  vessels 

carried  nitrates  from  South  American  ports  to  Atlantic  and  Gulf 

ports  of  the  United  States.    The  drafts  of  these  vessels  were  as 

follows : 

Feet  No.  of  vessels 

31-32 1 

30-31 0 

29-30 9 

28-29 8 

27-28 7 

26-27 13 

25-26 8 

24-25 19 

23-24 19 

22-23 14 

21-22 8 

20-21 12 

19-20 3 

18-19 1 

17-18 » 0 

16-17 • 1 

123 

These  figures  show  that  the  deepest  draft  vessels  carr\ini.j 
nitrates  were  those  supplying  the  large  fertilizer  factories  at  and 
near  Charleston  and  Savannah.  Nitrate  of  soda  is  a  heavy  bulk 
commodity,  for  which  vessels  of  deep  draft  can  advantageously 
be  used  when  the  depths  available  permit.  It  is  noticeable,  how- 
ever, that  the  use  of  ves.sels  drawing  up  to  31.6  feet  at  Charleston 
did  not  make  the  use  of  smaller  vessels  unprofitable.  At  Boston 
and  Mobile  all  vessels  delivering  nitrates  drew  under  25  feet.    At 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


229 


New  York.  Baltimore,  Norfolk,  and  New  Orleans  only  two  ves- 
sels drew  over  25  feet ;  and  at  Philadelphia  only  one  vessel  drew 
over  25  feet.  From  this  it  will  be  seen  that  nearly  all  vessels 
carrying  nitrates  to  Boston,  New  York,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore, 
Norfolk,  Mobile,  and  New  Orleans  could  proceed  into  the  Great 
Lakes  if  a  25-foot  channel  were  available. 

Vessels   carrying   general   cargo  from    United   Kingdom    and    European   ports 
through'the  Panama  Canal,  betioeen  July  1,  1919,  and  June  30,  1920. 


Draft 

Draft 

Cfeet) 

From 

To 

(feet) 

Draft 

To 

and  ins. 

and  ins. 

25.0 

Plymouth 

Wellington 

24.2 

Liverpool 

Valparaiso 

22.0 

London 

San  Francisco 

16.3 

Copenhagen 

San  Francisco 

26.6 

Liverpool 

San  Francisco 

15.6 

Genoa 

Valparaiso 

25.0 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

27.7 

London 

Auckland 

28.0 

London 

Auckland 

22.6 

Liverpool 

Chili 

25.0 

London 

Auckland 

17.6 

Genoa 

Valparaiso 

25.2 

Liverpool 

W.  Coast 

23.9 

Glasgow 

Callao 

25.6 

Liverpool 

Littleton 

15.1 

Rotterdam 

Guayaquil 

26.0 

Liverpool 

Littleton 

22.4 

Liverpool 

Valparaiso 

23.0 

Liverpool 

Peru  and  Chile 

22.0 

London 

Coronel 

23.0 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

23.6 

Glasgow 

San  Francisco 

18.0 

Gothenberg 

Balboa 

20.9 

London 

Seattle 

22.0 

Liverpool 

Valparaiso 

21.0 

Christiania 

Callao 

15.10 

Liverpool 

Vancouver 

19.6 

Amsterdam 

Talcahuano 

14.3 

Genoa 

Valparaiso 

16.0 

London 

W.  Coast 

20.0 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

22.9 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

26.0 

London 

San  Francisco 

18.0 

Liverpool 

Los  Angeles 

16.0 

Gothenberg 

San  Francisco 

27.6 

Manchester 

Adelaide 

28.0 

Manchester 

Sydney 

25.6 

Liverpool 

Dunedin 

24.4 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

19.0 

Genoa 

Valparaiso 

27.6 

Middlesboro 

bydney 

20.6 

Liverpool 

Valparaiso 

21.3 

Liverpool 

Guayaquil 

16.0 

Bordeaux 

Valparaiso 

19.0 

Amsterdam 

Valparaiso 

27.4 

London 

Wellington 

25.0 

London 

Valparaiso 

15.6 

Bordeaux 

Noumea 

26.0 

Manchester 

Sydney 

20.0 

Liverpool 

Valparaiso 

29.3 

Glasgow 

Wellington 

20.6 

Liverpool 

Vancouver 

29.9 

London 

Wellington 

20.0 

Liverpool 

Guayaquil 

28.3 

London 

New  Zealand 

26.8 

London 

Sydney 

22.0 

Liverpool 

Los  Angeles 

20.11 

Genoa 

Guayaquil 

22.8 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

23.6 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

25.0 

Avonmouth 

Wellington 

17.6 

Christiania 

San  Francisco 

20.6 

Genoa 

Valparaiso 

19.0 

Gothenberg 

Valparaiso 

16.0 

Gothenberg 

San  Francisco 

20.0 

Liverpool 

Valparaiso 

16.0 

Rotterdam 

Valparaifo 

19.2 

Genoa 

V^alparaiso 

17.0 

Gothenberg 

Valparaiso 

20.6 

Liverpool 

San  Francisco 

16.0 

Christiania 

San  Francisco 

17.6 

Havre 

Talcahuano 

21.9 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

27.0 

London 

Auckland 

27.3 

London 

Auckland 

15.6 

Amsterdam 

Callao 

28.6 

Avonmouth 

Wellington 

24.0 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

24.6 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

15.0 

Hamburg 

Talcahuano 

23.1 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

23.0 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

16.0 

Genoa 

Valparaiso 

24.0 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

26.0 

Copenhagen 

San  Francisco 

25.0 

London 

Sydney 

19.4 

Genoa 

Valparaiso 

21.7 

Gothenberg 

San  Francisco 

16.6 

Amsterdam 

Valparaiso 

25.8 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

20.6 

London 

Champerico 

27.0 

London 

New  Zealand 

29.0 

London 

Auckland 

23.7 

London 

Valdivia 

23.1 

Glasgow 

Vancouver 

19.0 

London 

Valparaiso 

19.3 

Christiania 

Corral 

26.1 

Liverpool 

Auckland 

25.0 

London 

Adelaide 

16.5 

Bordeaux 

Guayaquil 

15.0 

London 

Champerico 

16.6 

Amsterdam 

Valparaiso 

22.9 

Glasgow 

Corral 

15.0 

Genoa 

Valparaiso 

18.0 

Glasgow 

Valparaiso 

25.0 

Southhampton 

Auckland 

28.6 

Avonmouth 

Auckland 

13.6 

Leith 

San  Francisco 

21.6 

Hull 

Brisbane 

29.0 

Glasgow 

Yokohama 

23.0 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

21.7 

Antwerp 

San  Francisco 

23.6 

Liverpool 

Valparaiso 

22.0 

London 

Talcahuano 

13.0 

London 

Guatamala 

22.0 

Liverpool 

Valparaiso 

29.5 

Liverpool 

Wellington 

20.6 

Glasgow 

San  Francisco 

15.0 

Hamburg 

Talcahuano 

23.0 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

24.0 

Liverpool 

Coronel 

25.0 

London 

Sydney 

230  ECONOMIC    .\SPECTS    OF    THE 

The  figures  show  a  total  of  118  vessels  carrying  general  cargo 
from  points  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  Europe  to  points  on  the 
west  coast  of  North  and  South  x\merica,  and  to  Australia,  New- 
Zealand,  Japan,  and  elsewhere.  The  following  is  the  distribu- 
tion according  to  draft: 

Draft  No.  of  vessels 

Feet 

29-30 5 

28-29 5 

27-28 7 

26-27 7 

25-26 12 

24-25 5 

23-24 II 

22-23 11 

21-22 6 

20-21 12 

19-20 8 

18-19 3 

17-18 4 

16-17.  .  . 11 

15-16 8 

14-15 1 

13-14 2 

118 

The  above  shows  that  36  vessels  drew  25  feet  or  more  and  82 
vessels  less  than  25  feet.     None  drew  as  much  as  30  feet. 

The  vessels  carrying  general  cargo  from  the  points  named  to 
Pacific  coast  ports  of  the  United  States  w^ere  as  follows  : 


San    Francisco 

draft  feet  and 

inches 

Los  A  ngeles 

draft  feet  and 

inches 

Vancouver 
draft  feet  a  nd 
inches 

Seattle 

draft  feet  and 

inches 

26.6 

20.6 

22.0 

23.1 

20.9 

26.0 

17.6 

18.0 

20.6 

26.0 

16.3 

15.10 

23.6 

16.0 

22.0 

16.0 

21.7 

16.0 

21. V 
20.  ■ 

13.6 

These  figures  show  that  with  the  exception  of  three  vessels 
which  went  to  San  Francisco,  all  vessels  from  Europe  and  the 
United  Kingdom  to  Pacific  ports  of  the  United  States  could 
utilize  a  25-fo()t  channel  into  the  Great  Lakes.  This  of  cour.se 
refers  to  vessels  listed  as  carrying  general  cargo,  which  is  the 
class  of  vessel  which  would  I)e  needed  for  use  on  the  St.  Lawrence 
River. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


231 


I'essels  carrying  general  cargo  through  the  Panama  Canal,  destined  for  Atlantic 
and  Gulf  ports  of  the  United  States,  between  July  1,  1919  and  June  30,  1920. 


Draft 

Draft 

(feet) 

From 

To 

(feet) 

From 

To, 

and  ins. 

and  ins. 

19.6 

San  Francisco 

New  York 

24  0 

Valparaiso 

New  York 

25.0 

Yokohama 

New  York 

22.6 

Singapore 

New  York 

22.0 

Singapore 

New  York 

19.0 

Shanghai 

New  York 

21.0 

Valparaiso 

New  York 

24.0 

Talcahuano 

New  YorK 

21.0 

Eureka 

New  York 

24.6 

Kobe 

New  York 

22.6 

Valparaiso 

New  York 

24.6 

Valparaiso 

New  York 

24.6 

Hongkong 

New  York 

26.0 

Wellington 

Baltimore 

20.0 

San  Francisco 

New  York 

25.4 

Singapore 

New  York 

19.0 

San  Francisco 

New  York 

25.3 

Valparaiso 

New  York 

23.6 

Kobe 

New  York 

19.0 

Kobe 

New  York 

26.9 

Singapore 

New  York 

22.0 

Port  Pirie 

Boston 

24.0 

Hongkong 

New  York 

26.0 

Singapore 

New  York 

22.0 

Melbourne 

New  York 

19.0 

San  Francisco 

Baltimore 

23.6 

Kobe 

Camden,  N.  J. 

24.0 

Singapore 

New  Orleans 

25.0 

Manila 

New  York 

26.6 

Sydney 

New  York 

19.7 

Kobe 

New  York 

20.8 

Guayacan 

New  York 

27.0 

Dalny,  China 

New  York 

23.0 

Kobe 

New  York 

17.1 

Valparaiso 

New  York 

23.0 

Valparaiso 

New  York 

19.7 

Guayacan 

New  York 

25.0 

Talcahuano 

New  York 

23.8 

Shanghai 

New  York 

20.6 

Taku 

New  York 

24.8 

Talcahuano 

New  York 

25.6 

Auckland 

New  York 

24.0 

Balboa 

New  York 

21,0 

Eten 

New  York 

25.6 

Valparaiso 

New  York 

22.2. 

Yokohama. 

New  York 

21.0 

Lyttleton 

New  York 

20.9 

Hongkong 

New  York 

26.6 

Singapore 

New  York 

24.0 

Valparaiso 

New  York 

24.0 

Kobe 

New  York 

23.9 

Noumea 

New  York 

19.0 

San  Francisco 

Baltimore 

18.0 

Auckland 

New  York 

22.6 

Adelaide 

Baltimore 

25.2 

Valparaiso 

New  York 

21.5 

Arica 

New  York 

24.6 

Hongkong 

New  York 

16.6 

San  Francisco 

Baltimore 

28.0 

Singapore 

New  York 

17.6 

Gatico,  Chili 

New  York 

24.0 

Manila 

New  York 

26.0 

Singapore 

New  York 

22.1 

Hongkong 

New  York 

24.6 

Singapore 

New  Orleans 

29.0 

Valparaiso 

New  York 

24.6 

Shanghai 

New  York 

24.1 

W.  Coast,  S.A. 

New  York 

26.0 

Shanghai 

New  York 

19.7 

San  Francisco 

Baltimore 

23.6 

Shanghai 

New  York 

24.0 

Shanghai 

New  York 

25.3 

Valparaiso 

New  York 

20.6 

Cahncay 

New  York 

17.0 

San  Francisco 

Baltimore 

26.0 

Shanghai 

New  York 

24.0 

Hongkong 

New  York 

The  figures  given  show   that  77  vessels  loaded  with  general 

cargo  passed  through  the  canal  destined   for  Atlantic  and  Gulf 

ports  of   the  United   States.     The  following  is   the  distribution 

according  to  draft: 

Draft  Feet  No.  of  vessels 

29 1 

28 1 

27 1 

26-27 8 

25-26 9 

24-25 18 

23-24 7 

22-23 8 

21-22 5 

20-21 5 

19-20 9 

18-19 1 

17-18 3 

16-17 1 


77 


232  ECONOMIC   ASPECTS    OF    THE 

From  these  figures  it  will  be  seen  that  20  of  these  vessels  drew 
25  feet  or  more,  while  57  vessels  drew  less  than  25  feet.  None 
drew  as  much  as  30  feet.  In  addition  to  the  above,  166  vessels 
with  g^eral  cargo  passed  through  the  canal  to  Cristobal.  Only 
one  of  these  vessels  drew  25  feet,  the  majority  drawing  from 
15  to  20  feet.  These  vessels  brought  general  cargo  from  west 
coast  points  to  Cristobal  for  transfer  to  vessels  operating  between 
that  point  and  the  East. 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL 


233 


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a;  a 


Chapter  XIX 

WILL  OCEAN  VESSELS  SEEK  INLAND  PORTS? 

Vessels  will  proceed  as  far  inland  as  physically  practicable,  and 
the  farther  inland  they  can  penetrate  the  greater  is  the  resulting 
economy.  Hence  it  will  be  found  that  important  ports  have  gen- 
erally been  developed  at  the  head  of  ocean  navigation.  The 
Amazon  River  is  navigated  by  ocean  vessels  to  Manaos,  900 
miles  above  the  mouth,  and  by  lighter  draft  ocean  vessels  to 
Iquitos,  2,200  miles  above  the  mouth.  The  outbound  cargo  is 
limited  almost  entirely  to  rubber,  while  the  inbound  cargo  con- 
sists principally  of  supplies  for  the  rubber  gatherers.  The  St. 
Lawrence  River  provides  a  noteworthy  instance  of  the  principle 
that  ocean  vessels  will  proceed  as  far  into  the  interior  as  the 
navigation  conditions  will  permit.  The  extension  of  navigation 
beyond  Montreal  to  the  important  industrial  and  shipping  centers 
of  the  Great  Lakes  can  not  fail  to.  attract  the  ocean  carrier. 

Since  it  has  been  contended  that  import  and  export  business 
will  always  be  confined  to  the  seacoast,  it  seems  advisable  to  con- 
sider whether  ocean  vessels  would  seek  the  ports  of  the  Great 
Lakes  if  a  deep  waterway  were  provided.  It  is  a  recognized 
rule  of  transportation  that  where  there  is  a  productive  interior. 
ships  will  proceed  as  far  inland  as  physically  practicable,  and 
the  farther  inland  they  can  penetrate  the  greater  is  the  resulting 
economy,  and  the  more  extensive  is  the  area  benefited.  Hence, 
ports  are  generally  developed  at  the  head  of  ocean  navigation. 
A  few  examples  are  shown  by  the  following  table : 


River 

Place 

Distance  from  ocean. 
Statute   miles 

Scheldt  

Antwerp     

60 

Nieuwe  Mass 

Thames 

Gironde 

Rotterdam  

London  

Bordeau.x   

18 
50 

55 

Elbe  

Hamburg   

70 

Mobile 

Mobile 

40 

BufTalo  Bayou 

Delaware 

Patapsco 

Mississippi 

Houston   

Philadelphia 

Baltimore 

New  Orleans 

Portland 

50 
101 
190 
100 

Willamette 

113 

Yangtse 

Hankau 

Manaos 

615 

Amazon 

900 

St.  Lawrence 

Montreal 

1,003 

Amazon    

Iquitos    

2,200 

234 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  235 

Similarly,  railroads  seek  the  shortest  route  to  deep  water.  An 
addition  of  five  hundred  miles  to  a  rail  haul  results  in  a  heavy 
tax  upon  transportation,  but  a  similar  addition  to  an  ocean  voyage 
is  of  no  great  consequence.  There  is  no  material  difference  in 
the  rates  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  several  North 
Atlantic  ports,  although  the  distance  to  Baltimore  is  550  miles 
greater  than  to  Boston.  X'essels  make  the  same  rate  to  Man- 
chester as  to  Liverpool,  the  same  rate  to  Houston  as  to  Galveston, 
and  the  same  rate  to  Beaumont  as  to  Port  Arthur,  although  in 
each  case  the  additional  navigation  is  entirely  in  restricted 
channels. 

Hankau  and  Manaos  are  comparatively  unimi)ortant  com- 
mercially, and  the  country  tributary  to  the  latter  place  is  sparsely 
settled.  From  Manaos  to  Iquitos,  Peru,  about  1,300  miles,  there 
are  no  towns  of  importance.  Below  Manaos  the  river  in  places 
is  only  38  yards  wide  from  bank  to  bank,  which,  with  a  swift 
current,  makes  navigation  by  large  vessels  difticult  and  dan- 
gerous. Nevertheless,  it  appears  from  the  following  report  on 
the  Amazon  River  traffic  made  before  the  war  by  Capt.  A.  G. 
Winterhalter,  U.  S.  Navy,  that  Manaos  is  a  regular  port  of  call 
for  a  number  of  steamship  lines  and  that  small  ocean  vessels 
go  to  Iquitos. 

Steamers  drawing  14  feet  can  navigate  the  .Amazon  for  2,700  miles  above 
its  mouth,  or  to  Borja,  400  miles  beyond  Iquitos,  Peru.  The  principal 
difficulty  is  due  to  the  shifting  bars,  the  strong  currents,  3  to  5  knots,  and 
the  immense  quantity  of  driftwood  which  comes  down  when  the  river  is 
rising.  Pilots  are  necessary  and  are  regularly  emplo}~ed  by  companies 
operating  river  stieamers. 

Manaos,  about  900  miles  from  the  mouth  of  the  river,  is  the  most 
important  town  above  Para,  and  has  both  ocean  and  river  trade.  There  is 
about  40  feet  difference  between  high  and  low  water  at  this  point. 

From  Manaos  to  Iquitos,  Peru,  about  1,300  miles,  there  are  no  towns 
of  importance.  The  difference  between  high  and  low  water  is  about  18 
feet  at  Iquitos. 

The  following  regular  lines  of  steamers  are  engaged  in  the  commerce 
of  the  Amazon  : 

Amazon  Steam  i\'a7'igattou  Co. — Twenty-nine  steamers,  of  9,184 
aggregate  tonnage,  ply  between  Para  and  points  on  the  .\mazon  and 
tributaries. 

Booth's  Line. — Thirteen  steamers,  from  1,100  to  2,000  tons  each. 
Itineraries  of  these  vessels  include  the  following  ports:  Manaos,  Liverpool, 
Havre,  Lisbon,  Madeira,  New  York,  Maranhao,  Ceara,  and  Barbados. 
Smaller  vessels  of  this  line  go  to  Iquitos.  Sailings  every  10  days  from 
Manaos  for  Europe  ;  every  20  days  for  New  York. 

Red  Cross  Line. — Xine   steamers;   aggregate   tonnage,  9,467.     This   line 


2J6  CHEAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 

has  same  itiiTcrary  as  Booth  Line,  dates  of  saiHngs  alternating  with  those 
of  latter  lin'e. 

Lloyd  Brazilian  Line. — Seven  vessels,  of  1,999  tons  each,  plying  between 
Manaos  and  Rio  Janeiro,  and  touching  at  intermediate  points. 

Liqure  Brasiliana  (Italian). — Two  steamers,  plying  between  Manaos  and 
Genoa,  touching  at  Para  and  Mediterranean  port's. 

A.  Bcrncaud  &  Co. — Twelve  steamers,  of  150  to  300  tons  each,  navigat- 
ing the  Amazon,  Madeira.  Negro,  Purus,  and  other  tributaries. 

The  population  of  Manaos  is  only  about  50.000,  and  its  exports 
consist  of  rubber  and  its  imports  of  supplies  for  the  rubber  gath- 
erers, all  of  which  could  be  handled  on  light  draft  boats  and 
transshipped  at  Para.  But  the  small  ocean  vessel  has  ascended 
900  miles  of  difficult  river  navigation  to  get  the  business.  Having 
this  instance  in  mind,  it  is  unreasonable  to  believe  that  the  rich 
and  populous  industrial  and  shipping  centers  of  Duluth.  Mil- 
waukee. Chicago.  Detroit,  Cleveland,  and  Toledo  will  fail  to  at- 
tract the  ocean  carrier. 

The  idea  that  imports  must  be  restricted  to  the  coast  line  is 
untenable ;  that  they  are  largely  so  restricted  at  the  present  time 
is  due  solely  to  physical  obstacles.  In  considering  the  question 
of  whether  vessels  will  proceed  into  the  Great  Lakes,  we  need 
no  other  analogy  than  that  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River  itself. 
Montreal  at  the  head  of  ocean  navigation  has  developed  into 
the  most  important  commercial  city  of  Canada,  and  only  the 
physical  obstacles  to  navigation  prevent  the  further  penetration 
of  ocean  vessels  beyond  this  port  into  the  Great  Lakes.  In  winter 
when  the  St.  Lawrence  is  not  navigable,  vessels  proceed  to  St. 
John,  which  is  the  farthest  point  inland  that  can  be  reached. 
Numerous  other  examples  could  be  cited  showing  the  tendency 
of  ocean  vessels  to  proceed  as  far  inland  as  the  navigation  condi- 
tions will  permit.  The  advantage  of  developing  ports  as  near  as 
practicable  to  the  center  of  population  of  the  country  seems 
evident.  The  area  within  economical  distribution  of  such  a  cen- 
tral port  will  be  far  greater  than  froiu  any  port  on  the  seacoast. 

In  a  recent  paper  the  Albany  Chamber  of  Commerce  makes 
the  following  truthful  observation: 

"It  should  be  the  policy  of  the  United  States  to  foster  trade  and  to  ex- 
t-c-nd  ocean  routes  as  far  inland  as  practicable." 


Chapter  XX 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  RETURN  LOADS 

While  full  loads  both  inward  and  outward  are  desirable  in 
order  to  afford  the  most  profitable  operating  conditions  for  ves- 
sels, they  are  rarely  obtainable  in  practice.  Our  exports  to 
Europe  during  recent  years  have  been  about  seven  times  our  im- 
ports. At  Newport  News  in  1918  the  exports  were  nearly  seventy 
times  the  imports,  while  at  Los  Angeles  the  exports  were  nearly 
twenty  times  the  imports.  At  Portland,  Oregon,  the  exports  in 
1919  were  forty  times  the  imports.  The  situation,  however,  is 
even  less  favorable  than  these  figures  indicate,  inasmuch  as  in 
some  instances  the  exports  are  chiefly  destined  to  a  different  con- 
tinent than  that  from  which  the  imports  are  received.  The  cotton 
from  Galveston  goes  to  the  United  Kingdom,  while  her  chief 
imports  come  from  Mexico.  To  secure  cargoes,  vessels  can  not 
always  maintain  regular  service  between  such  ports,  but  must 
operate  on  triangular  routes  or  make  their  movements  conform 
to  the  requirements  of  business.  The  conditions  on  the  Great 
Lakes  are  favorable  for  operations  of  this  kind,  and  a  more 
equal  distribution  of  imports  and  exports  at  ports  on  the  Great 
Lakes  may  be  anticipated  than  is  now  the  case  at  the  majority 
of   our   ocean   ports. 

One-way  traffic  not  uncommon. — It  has  been  asserted  that 
ships  must  have  return  cargoes  and  that  ships  saiHng  through 
the  St.  Lawrence  would  not  be  able  to  obtain  such  cargoes.  Both 
of  these  assertions  may  be  challenged.  It  is  of  course  highly 
desirable  that  ships  should  have  return  cargoes  because  the  cargo 
ton  cost  is  thereby  reduced,  providing  there  are  no  conditions 
involved  to  offset  this  result.  The  assertion  that  "ships  must  have 
return  cargoes,"  however,  is  not  borne  out  by  the  actual  condi- 
tions on  many  trade  routes  and  at  many  ports.  For  instance,  the 
ore  carrier  of  the  Great  Lakes  often  returns  light  in  preference 
to  taking"  on  a  cargo  of  coal  at  Lake  Erie  ports,  the  reason  being 
that  the  freight  rate  on  ore  is  a  little  more  than  twice  as  much 
as  the  rate  on  coal  and  the  vessel  is  able  to  show  a  larger  net 
return  on  her  season's  operations  by  saving  the  time  required 
for  the  loading  and  unloading  of  the  coal.  Time  spent  in  port 
is  unproductive  time,  and  in  many  cases  vessels  find  it  more 
profitable  to  operate  with  a  one-way  haul  of  paying  freight  than 
a  two-way  haul  involving  considerable  detention  in  port  in  tak- 
ing on  a  cargo  of  less  profitable  freight.  These  conditions,  of 
course,  are  confined  chiefly  to  comparatively  short  routes  where 
the  time  in  port  is  a  large  proportion  of  the  total.  Nevertheless, 
we  find  from  the  records  of  vessels  passing  through  the  Panaina 

237 


23ii  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

Canal  during  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1920,  that  vessels 
carrying  nitrates  between  Taltal,  Iquique,  Valparaiso,  Antofa- 
gasta,  and  other  points  on  the  west  coast  to  Atlantic  and  Gulf 
ports  of  the  United  States  generally  carried  full  cargoes  eastward 
with  little  or  no  cargo  westward.  These  conditions  are  found 
wherever  there  are  large  quantities  of  natural  resources  in  terri- 
tories of  small  population  and  restricted  consumption. 

Relation  of  import  and  export  cargoes. — It  is  a  mistake  to 
believe  that  the  trade  of  the  United  States  with  the  various  coun- 
tries of  the  world  is  so  well  balanced  that  there  is  a  uniform  move- 
ment in  both  directions.  During  the  calendar  year  1919  our  total 
imports  amounted  to  $3,904,-364,9.32,  and  our  total  exports  to 
$7,920,425,990  or  more  than  double  the  value  of  the  imports. 
It  must  not  be  assumed,  however,  that  the  average  load  of  vessels 
in  our  import  trade  was  one-half  their  load  in  the  export  trade, 
because  the  imports  and  exports  were  not  evenly  distributed. 
Considering  for  instance  our  trade  with  Euroi)e,  it  is  found  that 
our  imports  amounted  to  $750,528,389,  wliile  our  exports  to 
Europe  amounted  to  $^,187,666,363,  or  nearly  seven  times  the 
value  of  the  imports.  \'essels  engaged  in  the  trade  with  Europe 
averaged  about  one-seventh  load  inward  as  compared  with  the 
load  outward.  Our  imports  from  South  America  during  the  last 
ten  years  have  been  practically  double  our  exports.  Many  vessels 
carrying  full  loads  to  Europe  return  practically  empty,  and  many 
\essels  bringing  full  loads  from  South  America  do  likewise. 
Breadstuffs  constitute  our  most  important  exports,  while  sugar 
takes  first  rank  among  our  imports.  The  first  goes  largely  to 
Europe,  while  the  second  comes  largely  from  Cuba.  Our  exports 
io  Europe  comprise  large  quantities  of  coal  and  iron  and  steel, 
l>ro\iding  the  heavy  tonnage  required  for  full  loads,  but  our 
imports  from  Euroj:)e  consist  largely  of  manufactured  goods  of 
small  tonnage  as  compared  with  their  value.  Our  ten  most  im- 
portant imports  consist  of  sugar,  wool,  silk,  India  rubber,  chemi- 
cals, hides  and  skins,  coffee,  copper,  vegetable  oils,  and  fibers. 
Of  these  only  chemicals  and  vegetable  oils  are  received  in  any 
great  quantity  from  Europe.  Our  large  imports  from  South 
America  and  Asia  do  not  solve  the  problem  of  return  loads  for 
vessels  trading  with  Europe.  The  sulphur  from  Louisiana  and 
1>xas  mines  is  carried  to  Europe  in  full  cargoes,  but  the  vessels 
return  empty,  as  do  most  of  the  vessels  carrying  coal  from  Nor- 
folk and  Newport  News.  It  might  be  facetiously  inquired — 
What  is  the  return  cargo  of  the  tanker  ? 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    Sllll'    CHANNEL 


239 


Comparison  of  imports  and  exports  at  ports  of  the  United 
States. — In  evidence  of  the  lack  of  equilibrium  in  tlie  tonnage 
of  inbound  and  outbound  cargoes  of  vessels  engaged  in  foreign 
commerce  with  the  United  States,  the  following  statistics  of  the 
commerce  of  certain  of  our  principal  ports  are  of  interest: 


v» 

Imports,  tons 

Exports,  tons 

1918 

1919 

1918 

1919 

Portland,  Me 

New  York,  N.  Y 

Fernandina,  Fla 

Mobile,  Ala 

Galveston,  Tex 

Newport  News,  Va 

Norfolk,  Va 

Sabine  Pass,  Tex 

Los  Angeles,  Calif 

Portland,  Oreg 

257,849 

6,155,083 

3,981 

200,403 

277,410 

5,250 

517,588 

348,388 

11,716 

22,252 

133,357 

4,490 

193,647 

124,767 

10.497 

382,585 

590,330 

28,365 

14,260 

914,575 

12,252,614 

155,862 

557,824 
2,100,815 
3,646,094 
8,585,305 
2,655,490 
220,891 
230,311 

1,183,968 

315,761 
1,016,548 
1,582,467 
2,854,122 
5,633,200 
2,213,673 
341,591 
579,148 

It  will  be  seen  that  in  a  number  of  cases  the  exports  were 
many  times  the  imports.  The  situation  is  really  more  unfavor- 
able than  these  figures  indicate,  for  the  reason  that  in  several 
cases  the  imports  were  made  up  of  articles  not  obtainable  in  the 
countries  to  which  the  exports  were  destined,  and  vice  versa. 
At  Galveston,  in  1919,  the  exports  were  about  twelve  times 
the  imports.  Similar  conditions  exist  at  Norfolk  and  Newport 
News.  At  the  latter  place,  in  1918,  the  exports  were  nearly  70 
times  the  imports,  while  at  Los  Angeles  the  exports  were  nearly 
20  times  the  imports.  At  Portland,  Oreg.,  the  exports  in  1919 
were  40  times  the  imports.  These  are  all  successful  ports,  not- 
withstanding the  lack  of  imports. 

Analyzing  the  traffic  at  Galveston  in  1918,  it  is  found  that 
mineral  oil  constituted  215,405  tons  of  the  total  of  277.410  tons 
of  imports,  while  grain  and  cottton  comprised  1,702,995  tons 
of  the  total  exports  of  2.100,815  tons.  The  grain  and  cotton 
went  largely  to  the  United  Kingdom,  but  the  oil  came  from 
Mexico,  so  that  in  exchange  for  1,702.995  tons  of  grain  and  cotton 
there  was  a  possible  return  movement  from  the  United  King- 
dom of  62,005  tons  of  miscellaneous  freight.  Let  us  suppose 
that  the  grain  which  was  exported  from  Galveston,  amounting 
to  1,471.759  tons,  had  been  sent  from  Duluth,  requiring  say  200 


240  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

ship  loads.  To  equal  the  performance  at  Galveston,  only  310 
tons  of  imports  would  have  to  be  brought  back  on  each  trip.  It  is 
true  that  the  vessel,  after  discharging  the  grain  at  Liverpool, 
may  not  have  returned  directly  to  Galveston,  but  perhaps  found 
a  better  cargo  for  some  other  port.  Thus  a  vessel  sailing  from 
a  South  Atlantic  port  to  Liverpool  might  proceed  to  Norfolk 
for  bunker  coal  and  thence  by  the  usual  route  to  destination  where 
she  might  find  one-third  of  a  load  for  New  York  or  Boston,  but 
none  for  her  original  port.  She  would  therefore  be  operating 
on  a  triangular  route,  with  a  full  cargo  on  the  first  trip,  one- 
third  cargo  on  the  second  trip,  and  none  on  the  third  trip. 

The  conditions  on  the  Great  Lakes  are  exceedingly  favorable 
for  operations  of  this  kind,  as  there  are  a  number  of  large  cities 
all  situated  directly  upon  the  through  route  and  requiring  no 
diversion  to  reach  any  desired  destination.  A  vessel  taking 
grain  from  Duluth  to  Liverpool  could  bring  back  general  mer- 
chandise for  Quebec,  Montreal,  Oswego,  Rochester,  Buffalo, 
Erie.  Cleveland,  Toledo,  Detroit,  and  Duluth,  without  material 
alteration  of  her  course.  So  far  as  imports  are  concerned,  the 
great  city  of  Chicago  already  serves  a  wider  area  than  any 
South  Atlantic  port,  although  these  imports  now  proceed  through 
Atlantic  ports  before  being  distributed  from  Chicago.  Compared 
with  many  ports  of  the  United  States  which  now  have  a  suc- 
cessful maritime  trade,  the  important  cities  of  the  Great  Lakes 
have  far  greater  opportunities.  Import  business  will  be  devel- 
oped at  these  ports  in  proportion  to  consumption  in  the  territory 
tributary  to  them,  just  as  similar  business  has  been  developed 
at  other  ports  of  the  world  accessible  to  ocean  vessels  and  having 
economical  communication  with  the  interior.  These  lake  cities 
now  take  millions  of  tons  of  imports  annually,  which  are  brought 
by  rail  from  the  seaboard,  and  it  is  worthy  of  note  that  some  of 
the  chief  tonnage  producing  ituports  of  the  United  States  arc 
destined  largely  for  the  industries  of  this  region.  Chicago  is 
the  rail  center  of  the  United  States  as  well  as  the  second  city 
in  population.  As  a  distributing  center  for  imports  it  has  the 
transportation  facilities  for  serving  a  wide  area.  We  would 
be  blind  to  the  truth  if  we  were  to  deny  the  clearly  evident 
opportunities  that  these  cities  have  for  developing  an  miport 
traffic,  comparable  to  the  consuming  ability  of  the  important 
territory  now  served  by  them.  *rhe  maintenance  of  shipping 
service  at  any  port  is  dependent  upon  the  availability  of  profit- 
able cargoes.    The  ideal  conditions  are  found  where  there  is  both 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  241 

bulk  and  package  freight  for  the  loading  of  outbound  vessels, 
manufacturing  industries  requiring  large  quantities  of  imported 
raw  materials,  and  a  large  population  consuming  the  food  prod- 
ucts and  manufactures  of  other  lands.  All  of  these  conditions 
now  exist  at  the  principal  cities  of  the  Great  Lakes.  We  would 
anticipate  a  more  equal  distribuiton  of  imports  and  exports  at 
ports  on  the  Great  Lakes  than  is  now  the  case  at  the  majority 
of  our  ocean  ports. 


Chapter  XXI 

THE  COMMERCE  OF  THE  GREAT  LAKES. 

The  commerce  carried  on  the  Great  Lakes  is  sometimes  meas- 
ured by  the  traffic  of  the  St.  Marys  Falls  Canal.  In  1916  the 
traffic  through  this  canal  amounte'd  to  only  68  per  cent  of  the 
total,  which  in  that  year  was  approximately  133,388,000  tons.  Of 
this  total,  approximately  100,000,000  tons  consisted  of  iron  ore  and 
coal,  and  over  10,000.000  tons  consisted  of  grain.  Part  of  the 
iron  ore  and  coal  and  practically  all  of  the  grain  are  interested 
in  reaching  the  seaboard,  but  the  general  freight  traffic  now 
carried  on  the  Lakes  is  purely  local  and  interlake  freight  not 
destined  to  seaboard.  The  enormous  volume  of  high-class  freight 
destined  to  the  seaboard  now  goes  entirely  by  rail  and  will  con- 
tinue to  do  so  until  the  Great  Lakes  are  opened  to  ocean  vessels. 
This  freight  is  of  the  kind  on  which  the  transfer  costs  are  the 
greatest.  The  present  rail  routes  to  seaboard  from  the  important 
industrial  centers  of  the  Great  Lakes  require  one  transfer  at 
heavy  cost  in  order  to  place  the  goods  on  board  the  vessel  bound 
for  foreign  or  coastwise  destinations.  The  movement  from  the 
same  points  by  way  of  the  Barge  Canal  requires  two  or  more 
transfers,  while  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  Ship  Channel 
will  eliminate  all  transfers  on  this  business. 

Volume  of  present  water-borne  commerce.— Some  of  the  are:u- 
ments  against  the  proposed  deep  route  by  way  of  the  St.  Law- 
rence River  have  been  based  on  a  consideration  of  the  present 
commerce  of  the  Great  Lakes,  and  it  has  been  correctly  stated 
that  the  greater  portion  of  this  commerce  consists  of  iron  ore  and 
coal.  Before  proceeding  wMth  a  study  of  the  commerce  that  may 
be  expected  to  utilize  the  new  route,  it  seems  desirable  to  present 
data  showing  the  actual  commerce  carried  on  the  Great  Lakes. 

The  following  shows  the  commerce  passing  through  the  .St. 
Marys  Falls  Canals  between  1910  and  1919: 


Commerce  Through  the  St.  Marys  Falls  Canals. 


Year 

Iron  ore 
(tons) 

Coal 

(tons) 

Grain* 
(tons) 

Other  com- 
modities 
(tons) 

Total 

commerce 

(tons) 

Number 

of 
vessels 

1910 

41.603.634 
30.731.235 
46.303.423 
48.109.353 
31.413.765 
45.213.604 
63,452.107 
61.374.090 
60.551,296 
46,922.792 

13.513.727 
15,332,876 
14.931,594 
18.662.938 
14,487,221 
13,357,058 
16,123,119 
18,298,853 
17,981,610 
13,874.951 

4,166,859 
4,471,402 
7,588,200 
9,632,792 
6,949,385 
9,861,462 
9,647,125 
7,764.689 
5.200,077 
5,467,413 

3,078,998 
2,941,703 
3,649,459 
3,313,261 
2,519,563 
2,858,180 
2,665,868 
1,839,594 
1,947,344 
1.970,386 

62,363,218 
53,477,216 
72,472,676 
79,718.344 
55,369,934 
71,290,304 
91,888.219 
89,277.226 
85,680,327 
68,235,542 

877 

1911 

765 

1912 

853 

1913 

852 

1914 

813 

1915 

806 

1916 

863 

1917 

780 

1918 

749 

1919 

733 

*  Includes  flour. 

242 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL 


243 


It  will  be  seen  that  the  maximum  tonnage  was  reached  in  1916, 
when  a  total  of  91,888,219  tons  was  transported  through  the 
canals.  This  represents  only  the  commerce  entering  and  leaving 
})oints  on  Lake  Superior,  however.  There  is  no  complete  record 
of  the  total  commerce  of  the  Great  Lakes.  The  Corps  of  Engi- 
neers. U.  S.  Army,  which  is  in  charge  of  the  improvements  on  the 
Great  Lakes,  publishes  annually  a  record  of  the  commerce  of 
the  ports  at  which  improvements  are  carried  on  by  the  Govern- 
ment, but  these  records  include  only  the  important  ports,  num- 
bering in  all  about  83  localities,  while  there  are  approximately 
300  minor  lake  ports  not  included  in  the  records.  The  following 
shows  the  commerce  of  the  principal  ports  only  during  the 
calendar  year  1916: 

Commerce  of  the  Great  Lakes  in  1916,  exclusive  of  car  ferries 


Port 


Iron  ore 
(tons) 


Coal 

(tons) 


Grain 
(tons"! 


All  other 
(tons) 


Total 
(tons) 


Port  Arthur,  Canada  .     .  . 

Grand  Mrrais,  Minn 

Agate  Bay,  Minn 

Duluth-Superior,     Minn. 

and  Wis 

I'ort  Wing,  Wis 

Ashland,  Wis 

t  Keweenaw  Waterway, 

Mich 

Marquette  Bay,  Mich..  .  . 

Marquette,  Mich 

Ontonagon,  Mich 

Grand  Marais,  Mich 

Manistique,  Mich 

Menominee,    Mich,    and 

Wis 

Ocento,  Wis 

Green  Bay,  Wis 

Fox  River,  Wi.~ 

Sturgeon  Bay  Canal 

Escanaba,  Mich 

Algoma,  Wis 

Kewaunee,  Wis 

Two  Rivers,  Wis 

Manitowoc,  Wis 

Sheboygan,  Wis ■  ■  •  ■ 

Port  Washington,  Wis — 

Milwaukee,  Wis 

Racine,  Wis 

Kenosha,  Wis 

Waukegan,  111 

Chicago,  111 

Calumet.  Til 

Indiana  Harbor,  Ind.  .  .  . 

Gary,  Ind 

Michigan  Citv,  Ind 

St.  Joseph,  Mich 

South  Haven,  Mich 

Saugatuck,  Mich 

Holland,   Mich 

Grand  Haven,  Mich 

Grand  River,  Mich 

Muskegon,  Mic^ 

White  Lake,  Mich 

Ludington.  Mich 

Manistee,  Mich 

Portage  Lake.  Mich 

Arcadia,  Mich 

Frankfort,  Mich 


12,024,1.S.S 
38, .347,953 


33,930 
3, 263, .346 
1,060,309 


6„S60 
.457,444 


269,899 


7,745,835 

793,214 

2,718,185 


325 
309,440 


9,585,237 


735,081 

1,415,327 

356,326' 


2,381 
143,920 


776.416 
88,7.39 
104,170 


3.600 

1,100 

21,391 

397,039 

635,413 

13,786 

4,590,384 

198,176 

21,614 

170,751 

471,774 

1,181,262 

416,208 


316 

1,457 

120 

125 


55.568 


187 

<  ,.532 

23,780 


103 

1.323 

556 

5,774 

153 

275 

204.779 

564 


206 
411,778 
421,301 


41 
40,636' 


4,106 
15,683 

1,854,723 

1,463 

316,871 

615,311 

24,749 

21,379 

2,434 

1,280 

22,071 

89,105 

5,292 

81,832 

77,278 

495,906 


8,296 

8,330 

2,561 

37,941 

47,471 

1,771 

1,-591.918 

68,921 

106,3.30 

26.893 

1,555,829 

960,337 

834,076 


8,694 

122,106 

34,732 

9,008 

36,712 

173.410 

49,495 

127,455 

7.063 

201,455 

83.091 

1,779 

4,422 

1,855 


4.431* 

12,349,278 

49,787,913* 
1.463* 
10,076,703 

2,064,568* 

3,288,095 

1,438,014 

2,434 

1,280 

24.452 

2.33,025 

5,292 

858,435 

167,549 

630,416 

7,457,444 

11,999 

10,753 

24,508 

440,754 

683,037 

15,832 

6,656,980 

267,661 

127,944 

197,850 

2.439,381 

10,308,735 

2,043.498 

2,718,185 

8,694 

122,106 

35,048 

10,465 

36,832 

173,535 

49,495 

127,496 

7,063 

297,053 

83,091 

1,779 

4,422 

1,855 


*  Grain  included  under  St.  Marys  Falls  Canals. 
t  1,431,025  tons  local. 


244 


ECONOMIC    ASPKCTS    OF    THE 


Port 

Iron  ore 
(tons) 

Coal 

(tons) 

Grain 

(tons) 

All   other 
(tons) 

Total 

(tons) 

Charlevoix,  Mich 

Petoskey,  Mich 

92,244 

2.400 

150 

64,855 

1,056 

2,204 

11,021 

52,551 

6,857 

3,205.014 

13.221 

419,909 

138,128 

3,773 

69,350 

3,253 

1,025,371 

9,110 

835,132 

9.025 

574.295 

181.126 

711 

111.916 

1,458.752 

247,328 

102,863 

49.559 

655.645 

988 

1.974.328 

349,149 

1.2  71,040 

50,000 

129,387 

159.649 

1.056 

2.204 

22,195 

77,455 

6,857 

3,213,635 

87,054 

555,474 

138  828 

Pentwater.  Mich 

Mackinac.  Mich 

11.174 
24,904 

Cheboygan,  Mich 

Rogers  City,  Mich 

Calcite,  Mich 

8,621 

73,623 

135.565 

700 

15,206 

48,440 

7,693 

5.000 

Alpena,  Mich 

210 

Thunder  Bay,  Mich 

Saginaw  River,  Mich 

Harbor  Beach,  Mich.    . 

18,979 

117,790 

10  946 

Black  River  Mich 

Clinton  River,  Mich 

Rouge  River,  Mich 

385,179 

1.415.550 

Monroe,  Mich 

9.110 

10.335,530 

10  52S 

Toledo,  Ohio 

2,030,538 

7,441,222 

1,500 

2,812,407 

1.203,815 

28,638 

Port  Clinton,  O 

Sandusky,  O. .  . 

3.120 

3,389.822 
2  869  066 

Huron,  O 

1,484,125 

Vermilion,  0 

71 1 

Lorain,  O 

5,167.825 
11,937,252 

2,890,385 
12,838,919 
10,738,942 

1,697,513 

3,668,105 
3,142,419 
515,574 
5.322,353 
2,340,866 
2,104,379 

8,947,846 
16,577,240 

3,828.711 
18,264  135 

38,817 
175,424 

Fairport,  0. .  . 

Ashtabula,  O 

Conneaut,  O 

13  129  367 

Erie,  Pa 

137.582 

4,595,119 
988 

Dunkirk,  N.  Y 

Buffalo,  N.  Y 

Tonawanda,  N.  Y 

7.698,385 
631,461 
630,519 

2,871.370 

5,988.629 

18.532,712 
980,610 

Black  Rock  Canal,  N.  Y.. 

Niagara  River.  N.  Y 

Charlotte.  N.  Y 

6,944 

"i, 11 2,352' 
190,889 
129,563 
527.892 

472,646 

266 

1.908,769 

50.000 

1  241  739 

Great  Sodus  Bay,  N.  Y.. 

190  889 

Little  Sodus  Bay,  N.  Y.... 

22.374 

2,062 

509,940 

129,570 

Oswego.  N.  Y 

550,266 

Cape  Vincent.  N.  Y 

.56,1 02 

9,647.125 

534.822 
3.000.000 

2.062 
1  038  682 

St.    Marys   Falls  Canals, 
for  grain  only  to  and 

9,647,125 

St.    Lawrence    Canals   to 
and     from      Montreal 
(1917)  t 

1,951,021 

905,301 

3  391,144 

Canadian  ports  on  Geor- 
gian Bay 

3.000.000 

Total    receipts    and 
shipments 

Commerce  of  Great  Lakes 

140,968.868 
70,484,434 

57,846,083 
28,923.042 

20,723.267 
10,361,633 

24,208.035 
12,104.018 

243.746.253 
121.873.127 

t  Traffic  for  1916  not  available. 


These  figures  show  a  total  of  243,746,253  tons  received  and 
shipped  at  the  principal  lake  ports,  including  the  greater  part 
of  the  Canadian  conmierce.  To  ascertain  the  actual  commerce, 
it  is  necessary  to  divide  the  total  receipts  and  shipments  hy  2, 
inasmuch  as  each  ton  of  commerce  is  reported  as  a  shipment  in 
one  port  and  as  a  receipt  in  another.  Ihis  shows  that  the  com- 
merce of  the  principal  lake  ports  in  1916  amounted  to  121.873,- 
127  tons.  The  Census  of  'iransportation  hy  Water  in  1916, 
issued  hy  the  Dei)artment  of  Commerce,  places  the  total  freight 
carried  in  American  vessels  on  the  Great  Lakes  at  125,385,545 
tons.      The    report   of   the   Census    Bureau    was   compiled    from 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  245 

vessel  statements  and  therefore  includes  the  traffic  of  the  minor 
lake  ports  as  well  as  the  principal  lake  ports,  but  it  nevertheless 
fails  to  show  the  total  commerce  because  it  is  limited  to  Amer- 
ican vessels.  During  the  year  1916.  94  per  cent  of  the  freight 
passing  through  the  St.  Marys  Falls  Canals  was  carried  in  Anier-  * 
ican  vessels,  while  6  per  cent  was  carried  in  Canadian  vessels. 
Assuming  that  a  similar  ratio  prevailed  on  other  portions  of  the 
Great  Lakes  system,  the  total  commerce  for  the  year  1916  was 
approximately  133,388,000  tons.  The  commerce  passing  through 
the  St.  Marys  Falls  Canals  has  frequently  been  referred  to  as 
representing  the  traffic  of  the  Great  Lakes,  while  in  reality  it 
constituted  in  1916  only  68  per  cent  of  the  total. 

During  the  war  there  was  a  marked  falling  off  in  the  propor- 
tion of  general  package  and  miscellaneous  freight  carried  on  the 
Great  Lakes,  as  compared  with  iron  ore  and  coal,  but  some  im- 
provement in  this  respect  is  already  noticed  in  the  traffic  returns, 
while  there  has  been  a  decline  in  the  amount  of  iron  ore  and 
coal.  The  amount  of  package  freight  passing  through  the  canal, 
however,  is  less  than  during  the  few  years  immediately  preceding 
the  war. 

Commerce  interested  in  reaching  the  seaboard. — Some  of  the 
interests  opposed  to  the  construction  of  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Law- 
rence waterway  have  stated  that  the  present  commerce  of  the 
Great  Lakes  consists  of  approximately  60,000,000  tons  of  iron 
ore  shipped  from  such  ports  as  Duluth,  Ashland,  Marquette  and 
Escanaba  to  Lake  Erie  ports  for  consumption  by  steel  furnaces 
in  the  Lake  Erie  district,  approximately  30,000,000  tons  of  coal 
shipped  west  and  northwest,  and  that  these  two  commodities 
constitute  nine-tenths  of  the  total  freight  on  the  Lakes.  It  is 
contended  by  these  interests  that  not  more  than  5  per  cent  of 
the  total  freight  of  the  Great  Lakes  is  interested  in  ocean  trans- 
portation. When  the  construction  of  the  New  York  State 
Barge  Canal  was  under  consideration,  studies  were  made  and 
statistics  presented  to  show  that  there  would  be  a  very  large 
volume  of  commerce  seeking  transportation  between  the  Great 
Lakes  and  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  At  the  Buffalo  hearing  on 
June  14,  1920,  some  of  the  arguments  of  those  opposing  the  St. 
Lawrence  waterway  were  directed  to  the  purpose  of  showing 
that  there  is  no  such  commerce. 

With  reference  to  the  question  of  iron  and  steel,  it  is  fitting  to 
quote  from  the  report  of  the  Committee  on  Canals  of  the  State 
of  New  York  submitted  in  1899.  on  which  was  largely  based  the 


246  ECONOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 

expenditure  of  approximately  $180,000,000  made  by  the  State  .in 
connection  with  the  enlargement  of  the  Erie  Canal : 

It  is  not  alone,  however,  the  export  grain  trade  which  r^equires  the 
enlargement  of  the  Erie  Canal.  The  chief  argument  for  its  construction 
eighty  years  ago  was  to  have  a  cheap  transportation  route  for  grain  and 
lumber,  and  this  has  continued  to  be  its  most  important  function  down  to 
the  present  time.  But  the  changes  which  are  now  taking  place  in  the  iron 
trade  give  reason  to  belie\'«  that  if  an  adequate  waterway  can  be  secured 
between  Lake  Erie  and  the  Hudson  River  the  centre  of  th'c  iron  industry 
can  be  brought  within  the  State  of  New  York.  This  has  hitherto  been 
within  the  State  of  Pennsylvania  on  account  of  its  own  resources  in  ores, 
coal  and  limestone.  But  the  discovery  within  a  comparatively  recent  period 
of  almost  inexhaustible  beds  of  iron  ore  in  the  upper  lake  region,  combined 
with  clTeap  water  transportation  on  the  lakes,  has  led  to  the  abandonment 
of  its  own  ore  and  the  substitution  of  those  from  the  lakes.  These  ores 
can  be  laid  down  at  any  point  on  a  water  route  between  Buffalo  and  New 
York  at  less  cost  than  they  can  be  laid  down  in  Pittsburgh.  .  .  .  Between 
Pittsburgh  and  tidewater  the  finished  product  must  be  transported  a 
distance  of  350  miles  over  a  range  of  mountains,  whereas  from  either 
Buffalo  or  New  York,  or  any  intermediate  point  on  the  water  route,  the 
enormous  market  for  steel  and  iron  in  Xeiv  York  and  AVtc  England,  as 
well  as  abroad,  can  be  supplied  at  greatly  reduced  charges  for  transporta- 
tion. We  believe  that  a  suitable  enlarg^ement  of  the  Erie  Canal  at  the 
present  time  is  justified  by  the  prospect  of  its  use  in  connection  witli 
manufacture  of  steel  and  iron  and  shipbuilding,  fully  as  much  as  its 
original  construction  was  justified  by  the  prospect  of  transporting  bread- 
stuffs.  Indeed  it  is  not  too  much  to  expect  that,  with  a  canal  which  can 
carry  manufactured  steel  from  Conneaut  to  New  York  for  50  cents  a  tmi. 
and  distribute  this  from  New  York  to  points  on  the  New  England  coast 
without  breaking  bulk,  the  vast  steel  and  allied  interest;  centering  at 
Pittsburgh,  which  support  a  population  greater  than  that  of  Chicago,  will 
seek  an  outlet  for  their  products  by  rail  to  Conneaut  and  thence  by  Erie 
Canal,  rather  than  across  the  AMeghanics  to   Philadelphia. 

Thu.s  it  will  be  seen  that  one  of  the  objects  sought  by  the 
enlargement  of  the  Erie  Canal  was  the  diversion  of  iron  ore  from 
its  present  destination  at  Lake  Erie  ports  to  New  York  and 
New  England,  and  also  the  diversion  of  manufactured  iron  and 
.steel  of  the  Pittsburgh  district  from  its  outlet  at  Philadelphia  to 
similar  destinations  by  way  of  the  canal.  The  assumption  that 
neither  iron  nor  coal  is  concerned  about  cheaper  transportation 
to  the  ocean  fails  to  consider  the  changes  in  industrial  conditions 
which,  as  pointed  out  by  the  Committee  on  Canals,  may  readily 
follow  the  opening  of  a  really  adequate  tran.sportaticm  roiUc.  It 
shotild  be  emphasized  that  economies  of  transportation  determine 
largely  the  routes  and  destinations  of  traffic,  and  while  neither  iron 
ore  nor  coal  now  moves  via  lake  routes  to  seaboard,  the  creation  of 
new  conditions  permitting  the  eouKimiral  assembling  of  the  raw 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE    SHIP    CHANNEL  247 

materials  of  manufacture  at  points  other  than  those  at  which 
this  industry  is  chiefly  concentrated,  would  undoubtedly  result 
in  new  industrial  development.  The  influence  of  transportation 
in  fixing  the  points  of  most  advantageous  manufacture  are  too 
well  known  to  require  detailed  explanation  here,  but  it  may  be 
confidently  asserted  that  the  development  of  the  vast  waterpower 
of  the  St.  Lawrence  River  on  the  shores  of  a  waterway  available 
for  the  procurement  of  raw  materials  which  are  so  abundantly 
found  in  the  regions  of  the  Great  Lakes,  and  for  the  shipment 
of  finished  products  to  all  points  of  the  world  without  transfer, 
presents  an  opportunity  for  the  successful  development  of  trade 
and  industry  which  will  not  be  ignored.  A  similar  thought 
was  clearly  in  the  minds  of  the  Committee  on  Canals  of  the  State 
of  New  York  when  it  made  the  following  statement : 

The  problem  of  transmission  of  power  has  been  so  far  solved  as  to 
permit  the  lighting  of  Buffalo  and  the  operation  of  its  street  car  system 
at  a  distance  of  22  miles  from  the  power  house.  It  is  probable  that  in  less 
than  ten  years  the  transmission  of  power,  at  kast  as  far  as  Rochester, 
will  be  commercially  practicable.  These  advantages,  if  properly  utilized, 
will  make  Western  New  York  the  centre  of  such  a  manufacturing  district 
as  the  world  has  never  seen.  The  lakes  give  cheap  transportation  to  the 
West,  and  it  only  needs  a  suitable  water  route  to  the  Hudson  in  order  to 
give  cheap  transportation  eastward,  which  will  enable  these  inanufactured 
products  to  compete  in  every  market  in  the  world. 

The  assiimpUon  that  the  bulk  traffic  of  the  Great  Lakes  is  not 
interested  in  reaching  seaboard  is  incorrect.  Evidence  shozvs  tlwt 
large  quantities  of  iron  ore  and  pig  iron  will  be  carried  from  the 
lakes  to  points  along  the  Atlantic  Coast. 

The  assumption  that  the  present  package  freight  carried  on  the 
Great  Lakes  is  interested  in  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lazvrence  water- 
wav  is  likezvise  incorrect.  This  is  largely  local  and  interlake  traf- 
fic not  destined  to  seaboard.  The  general  package  freight  consti- 
tuting the  vast  movement  betiveen  the  Northivesiern  States  and 
the  seaboard,  both  for  foreign  and  domestic  destinations,  nozi'  goes 
.entirely  by  rail,  and  will  continue  to  do  so  until  a  ivater  route  ade- 
quate for  ocean  vessels  is  provided. 


Chapter  XXII 

VOLUME  OF  COMMERCE  AFFECTED  BY  THE  GREAT 
LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  WATERWAY 

The  total  traffic  originating  on  Class  I  railroads  of  the  United 
States  in  1918  amounted  to  2,526,531,780  tons,  or  24  tons  per 
capita,  and  on  this  basis  the  total  freight  of  the  territory  affected 
by  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway  amounts  to  nearly 
1,000,000,000  tons  annually.  The  greater  proportion  is  purely 
internal  business  not  interested  in  reaching  the  seaboard,  but 
practically  all  the  foreign  commerce  is  vitally  interested  as  well 
as  the  domestic  commerce  which  now  goes  to  and  from  points 
on  or  near  the  seaboard.  On  a  basis  of  population,  28,000,000 
tons  of  exports  and  12,000,000  tons  of  imports  originate  in  the 
area  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes.  The  rail  traffic  in  and  out 
of  Chicago  alone  amounts  to  nearly  200,000,000  tons  without 
duplication.  In  1918  six  of  the  principal  eastern  trunk  lines 
carried  561,883,194  tons.  The  traffic  moving  to  and  from  points 
on  or  near  the  Atlantic  seaboard  is  estimated  at  about  250,- 
000,000  tons,  and  it  is  from  this  tonnage  that  the  coastwise  traffic 
of  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  Ship  Channel  must  be  drawn. 
In  view  of  the  important  savings  in  freight  charges  and  terminal 
costs  which  the  waterway  will  afford,  it  is  believed  that  a  com- 
merce of  not  less  than  20,000,000  tons  per  annum  may  be  reason- 
ably expected  within  five  years  after  its  opening,  with  continued 
growth  thereafter. 

Total  traffic  estimated  on  basis  of  population. — It  has  already 
been  shown  that  the  population  of  the  area  tributary  to  the  Great 
Lakes  on  January  1,  1920,  was  over  40.000.000.  "Applying  the 
ratio  of  18  tons  per  capita  of  freight  originating  in  the  United 
States,  as  adopted  by  General  W.  W.  Wotherspoon  in  estiinating 
the  possible  tonnage  of  the  Barge  Canal,  the  total  freight  origi- 
nating in  this  area  may  be  placed  at  700.000.000  tons.  The  statis- 
tics of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  show  that  the  total 
traffic  originating  on  Class  1  railroads  of  the  United  States  in 
1918  amounted  to  2,526,531.780  tons,  or  24  tons  per  capita,  and 
on  this  basis  the  total  freight  of  the  territory  interested  in  the 
Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway  amounts  to  nearly  1,000.- 
000,000  tons  annually.  This  figure  represents  the  luaximum 
freiglit  movement  from  which  the  inbound  and  outbound  traffic 
of  the  St.  Lawrence  must  be  drawn.  While  the  greater  propor- 
tion of  purely  domestic  tonnage  is  not  interested  in  this  move- 
ment, practically  all  of  the  foreign  commerce  is  vitally  inter- 
ested, the  exception  being  the  commerce  with  Canada  now  largely 
carried  by  rail. 
248 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWRENCE   SHIP    CHANNEL  249 

Volume  of  foreign  trade  affected. — No  precise  figures  of  the 
total  volume  of  the  foreign  commerce  of  the  United  States  have 
ever  been  prepared,  but  statistics  of  traffic  through  our  principal 
ports  contained  in  the  annual  report  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers, 
and  statistics  of  the  total  value  of  our  foreign  commerce  prepared 
by  the  Bureau  of  Foreign  and  Dojnestic  Commerce,  permit  us 
to  make  rather  a  close  estimate  of  this  tonnage.  The  foreign 
commerce  utilizing  the  improved  channels  at  our  principal  ports 
in  1919  was  71,274,770  tons,  valued  at  $7,943,073,134.  The 
average  value  of  the  imports  was  $118  per  ton,  and  of  the  ex- 
ports $107  per  ton.  The  statistics  of  the  Department  of  Com- 
merce show  that  during  the  same  year  our  total  imports  were 
valued  at  $3,904,364,932,  and  our  exports  at  $7,920,425,990.  Ap- 
plying the  ton  values  of  foreign  traffic  on  our  principal  channels 
gives  a  total  of  33,000,000  tons  of  imports  and  74,000,000  tons 
of  exports,  or  a  grand  total  of  107,000,000  tons,  or  practically  1 
ton  per  capita.  The  per  ton  values  given  do  not  take  into  con- 
sideration, however,  the  rail  commerce  with  Canada  which  in- 
cludes among  other  things  about  15.000,000  tons  of  coal  annually. 
The  value  of  this  traffic  is  included  in  the  total  figures  of  the 
Department  of  Commerce,  but  its  deduction  from  the  total  would 
not  materially  alter  the  results. 

The  territory  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes  is  the  most  im- 
portant producing  section  of  the  United  States,  and  an  estimate 
of  the  total  exports  in  this  region  based  on  population  will  be 
extremely  conservative.  Our  imports  are  quite  equally  dis- 
tributed throughout  the  country,  and  an  estimate  of  the  consump- 
tion of  imports  in  this  territory  based  on  population  will  be  fair. 
Such  an  estimate  shows  that  the  total  foreign  commerce  inter- 
ested in  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway  amounts  in 
round  numbers  to  40,000,000  tons,  consisting  of  about  28,000,000 
tons  of  exports  and  12,000,000  tons  of  imports.  The  tonnages  of 
the  principal  items  will  be  considered  later  in  this  report. 

Volume  of  domestic  trade  affected. — Under  this  head  is  in- 
cluded the  traffic  between  points  on  or  near  the  Atlantic  Coast 
and  points  immediately  adjacent  to  the  Great  Lakes,  and  also 
a  large  area  extending  westward  from  the  lakes.  Certain  traffic 
from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  Pacific  Coast  will  also  be 
affected.  Much  of  the  east  and  west  bound  traffic  touches  the 
lakes  at  Chicago,  and  the  greater  portion  of  the  traffic  is  bound 
either  to  or  from  the  Atlantic  Coast.  The  following  statement 
of  the  inbound  and  outbound   freight  at  Chicago,  prepared  by 


250 


ECOXOMIC    ASPECTS    OF    THE 


Mr.  George  E.  Hooker,  U.  S.  Trade  Commissioner,   shows  the 
magnitude  of  the  traffic  at  this  point : 

Amount  of  Freight,  by  Rail  and  by   Ji'atcr,  hito  and  Out   of  Chicago. 
(Prepared  by  U.  S.  Trade  Commissioner  George  E.  Hooker.) 


Freight  traffic 

All  rail 
Oct.  1.  1918, 

to 
Sept.  30,  1919 

Lake» 
1918 

Lake-rail 
1918 

Rail-lake, 
1918 

Grand 
total 

Inbound: 

Destined  for  Chicago 

Tons 

81.549,900 
53,915,050 

Tons 
8,797,641 

Tons 

Tons 

Tons 
90,347,541 

■  Passing  through  Chicago.  .  .  . 

590,664 

54,505,714 

135,464,950 

50,656,054 
53,915.050 

8,797,641 
171,960 

590,664 

144,853.255 

Outbound: 

Originating  in  Chicago 

50,828.014 

Passing  through  Chicago .... 

2,018.810 

55.933,860 

Total  outbound 

104,571,104 
240,036,054 

171,960 
8.969.601 

590.664 

2.018,810 
2.018,810 

106  761  874 

Total,  in  and  out 

251,615.129 

This  shows  a  grand  total  of  251,615,129  tons,  but  the  through 
traffic  of  53,915.050  tons  is  included  in  both  the  inbound  and  the 
outbound  tonnage.  Deducting  this  sum  gives  a  total  of  197.- 
700,079  tons  without  duplication. 

The  total  freight  on  all  eastern  roads  in  1918  was  1.317.961.397 
tons.  The  tonnage  of  the  principal  trunk  lines  operating  between 
lake  ports  and  the  Atlantic  seaboard  in    1918  was  as   follows : 


Railroad 

Total  revenue 
freight 

Freight  origi- 
nating on  road 

Freight    re- 
ceived   from 
other    roads 

Pennsvlvania 

Tons                     Tons                     Tons 
2.U,738,170          137,017,684            97.720.486 

New  York  Central 

Baltimore  and  Ohio 

Erie 

121,044,996     '       40,582,106 
94,152,556            61,768,315 
44,323,996            20,054,126 
37,250,739           21,118,537 

30,372,737           18,779,780 

80,462,890 
32,384,241 
24,269,870 

Lehigh  Valley 

16,132,202 

Delaware,  Lackawanna  and 
Western 

11,592,957 

Total 

561,883,194          299,320,548 

262,562,646 

While   other   roads  contributed  to  the   freight  traffic  between 
the   j)oints   under  consideration,  the   figures  given   are   sufficient 


GREAT    LAKES-ST.    LAWKEN'CE    SHIP    CIIA.\N1:l  251 

to  indicate  the  volume  of  the  movement  between  the  Northwest 
and  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  and  to  make  it  clear  that  the  possi- 
bilities of  coastwise  traffic  are  very  great.  It  is  well  known  that 
the  domestic  movement  to  and  from  the  seaboard  is  very  much 
larger  than  the  foreign  movement,  the  ratio  being  roughly  esti- 
mated as  ten  to  one.  On  this  basis  the  domestic  traffic  between 
the  seacoast  and  the  territory  interested  in  coastwise  trade  via 
the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway  is  about  250,000,000 
tons.  In  1916,  General  Wotherspoon  estimated  the  traffic  that 
might  be  considered  as  potential  traffic  of  the  Barge  Canal,  at 
175,000,000  tons.     The  following  is  quoted  from  his  report: 

The  traffic  of  the  New  York-Buffalo  liives  is  largely  potential  canal 
tonnage,  in  that  it  moves  between  points  served  by  the  all-water  route 
provided  by  tfe  Hudson  River  and  the  canal. 

The  traffic  of  the  Chicago-Buffalo  lines  is  also  a  potentiality  to  be 
considered  because  a  large  percentage  of  their  total  traffic  moves  to  and 
from  a  territory  east  of  Buffalo  served  by  the  canal.  The  same  is  trur 
of  the  Chicago-New  York  lines. 

The  New  England  rail  tonnage  is  a  very  important  factor,  inasmuch 
as  a  big  portion  of  the  total  moves  to  and  from  areas  served  bj^  the  canal 
and  its  western  connections. 

Sonve  part  of  the  total  tonnage  of  all  these  lines,  therefore,  is  potential 
canal  business 

The  aggregate  of  all  lines  was  : 

Tons 

New  York-Buffalo  lines 106,000,000 

Chicago-New  York  and  lines  west  from  Buffalo.  .        15,000,000 
New  England  lines 5-4,000,000 

175,000,000 

Adding  to  these  figures  the  commerce  moving  to  and  from  all 
ports  south  of  New  York,  including  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  the 
total  domestic  traffic  from  which  the  coastwise  business  of  the 
St.  Lawrence  route  will  be  drawn  is  fully  250,000,000  tons,  as 
given  above.  The  evidence  presented  to  the  International  Joint 
Commission  shows  that  many  large  and  important  industries  are 
prepared  to  utilize  the  water  route  for  domestic  traffic.  The 
Annual  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers  shows  that  the  coast- 
wise traffic  of  Atlantic  ports  in  1919  amounted  to  over  30,000,000 
tons,  without  duplication,  or  63,000,000  tons  counting  both  re- 
ceipts and  shipments.  The  extension  of  the  Atlantic  coastwise 
routes  into  the  Great  Lakes  will  greatly  increase  this  traffic  and 
make  it  economically  feasible  to  carry  a  large  tonnage  of  low- 
priced  coinmodities  on  which  the  transportation  charges  by  rail 


252  GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL 

are  prohibitive.     Some  of  these  are  discussed  in  the  analysis  of 
^commodity  movements. 

It  is  bclici'ed  that  the  foreign  ami  domestic  commerce  of  the 
7vatc)'zvay  unthin  five  years  after  its  opening  should  amount  to  not 
less  than  20,000,000  tons  per  annum,  with  continued  growth  in 
the  future. 


Chapter  XXIII 

THE  GRAIN  MOVEMENT 

The  chief  surplus  grain  producing  countries  of  the  world  are 
the  United  States,  Canada,  Argentina,  Australia,  India,  Russia, 
and  the  Balkan  States.  The  chief  countries  of  deficient  produc- 
tion, which  constitute  the  important  grain  markets  of  the  world 
are  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  countries  of  western  Europe. 
Liverpool  is  the  chief  grain  market  of  the  world,  and  the  price 
at  this  point  determines  not  only  the  price  which  the  producer 
in  America  and  other  countries  receives  for  his  exports,  but 
generally  speaking  it  determines  the  price  received  for  all  the 
grain  produced.  To  keep  the  grain  at  home  the  American  con- 
sumer must  pay  as  much  as  the  foreign  buyers,  less  the  cost  of 
transportation  and  incidental  charges.  A  saving  in  transportation 
of  8  to  10  cents  per  bushel,  which  is  clearly  attainable  by  the 
use  of  the  St.  Lawrence  Ship  Channel,  will  be  reflected  in  sub- 
stantial degree  on  the  total  production  of  grain  within  the  area 
which  is  so  situated  as  to  take  advantage  of  the  facilities  afforded 
by  the  waterway.  It  is  estimated  that  3,664,000,000  bushels  of 
American  grain,  and  440,000,000  bushels  of  Canadian  grain  will  be 
thus  affected,  and  that  the  annual  saving  on  this  grain  will  be  ap- 
proximately equal  to  the  full  cost  of  the  improvements  required 
in  the  interests  of  navigation. 

There  is  no  commodity  more  sensitive  to  changes  in  market, 
financial  and  transportation  conditions  than  grain,  and  this  apphes 
particularly  to  wheat.  During  the  calendar  year  1919  our  ex- 
ports of  agricultural  products  were  valued  at  55  per  cent  of  the 
total  of  all  exports,  and  during  the  last  ten  years  they  have 
amounted  to  46  per  cent  of  the  total.  It  is  essential  that  we 
shall  have  a  surplus  agricultural  production  for  export  in  the 
future,  and  it  is  doubly  essential  that  we  should  take  the  measures 
found  necessary  to  encourage  agricultural  production. 

In  considering  the  future  of  the  grain  industry  of  the  United 
States,  it  is  desirable  to  understand  the  relation  of  the  produc- 
tion of  this  country  to  the  world's  requirements.  During  the  period 
from  1909  to  1913,  the  average  annual  production  of  cereals 
in  the  world  was  377,108,000  tons,  and  in  1918-1919  the  average 
was  254,116,000  tons.  The  decrease  in  12  producing  countries 
in  Europe  amounted  to  20,193,000  tons,  while  there  was  a  loss 
of  119,519,000  tons  in  the  closed  countries  of  Europe.  The 
increase  in  North  American  production  amounted  to  12,711,000 
tons.  The  European  consumption  of  wheat  and  rye  has  de- 
creased from  58,800,000  tons  annually  in  the  period  1909-1913 
to  43,500,000  tons  in  1919.    Western  Europe  furnishes  the  world 

2. S3 


254 


F.CONOMIC  ASPFXTS  OF  THE 


market  for  cereals.  The  decline  in  the  consumption  of  wheat 
and  r>'e  in  the  last  few  years  is  due  largely  to  the  necessity  of 
utilizing  substitutes.  The  following  tables  prepared  by  the  De- 
partment of  Agriculture  show  the  average  production  of  cereals 
for  the  two  periods  1909-1913  and  1918-1919,  and  the  net  im- 
]K)rts  of  wheat  and  rye  into  the  imjiorting  coimtries  of  Europe: 

yet  Imports  of  Wheat  and  Rye  for   Certain    Countries 
(Tons  of  2,000  pounds.) 


Countries 

1909-1913 

1 
1918           Change 

1919           Change 

Belgium 

Tons 

1,659,000 

409,000 

1,200,000 

1,307,000 

1,537,000 

983,000 

295.000 

95,000 

132,000 

320,000 

587,000 

6,499,000 

Tons 

Per  cl. 

Tons 
118,000 
11,000 

2,581,000 
619,000 

2,848,000 
421,000 
288,000 
57,000 
373,000 
123,000 
346,000 

5,399,000 

Per  ct. 
-  92.9 

Denmark 

-  97.3 

France. . . 

2  166  000      -i-xn  =; 

+  115  1 

Germany 

-   52.6 

Italy 

2,448,000 

87,000 

160,000 

+59.3 
-91.1 
-45.8 

+  85.3 

Netherlands 

Norwa}' 

-  57.2 

-  2  4 

Portugal 

-  40.0 

Spain 

177,000 

111,000 

235,000 

5,397,000 

+34.1 
-65.3 
-60.0 
-17.0 

+  182  6 

Sweden 

-   61.6 

Switzerland 

United  Kingdom. 

-  41.1 

-  16.9 

Total .. 

15,022,000* 

10,781,000 

-  6.7 

13,184,000 

-    12.2 

*  Omitting  Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  and  Portugal,  for  purposes  of 
comparison  with  the  figures  for  1918,  the  total  is  11,552,000. 


GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL 


255 


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256 


ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  THE 


GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL  257 

A  general  idea  of  the  impurts  and  exports  of  wheat  by  continents 
may  be  obtained  from  the  map  on  page  256  prepared  by  the  De- 
partment of  Agriculture. 

The  quantities  of  grain  produced  in  the  United  States  and  the 

amounts  exported  between  1900  and  1918  are  shown  in  the 
following  tables : 

Production  of  Grain  in  the    United  States  and  amounts  exported, 
1900  to  1918  (a). 

Wheat       Production  Exported 

Bushels  Bushels 

1900            522,230,000  215,990,073 

1901 748,460,000  234,772,516 

1902 670,063,000  202,905,598 

1903    .                 637,822,000  120,727,613 

1904 552,400,000  44,112,910 

1905    .                692,979,000  97,609,007 

1906 735,261,000  146,700,425 

1907 634,087,000  163,043,669 

1908                      664,602,000  114,268,468 

1909 683,379,000  87,364,318 

1910 635,121,000  69,311,760 

1911    621,338,000  79,689,404 

1912    730,267,000  142,879,596 

1913 763,380,000  145,590,349 

1914    891,017,000  **332,464,975 

1915                       *1,025,801,000  243,117,026 

1916              636,318,000  203,573,928 

1917                                   636,655,000  132,579,533 

1918 917,100,000  287,438,087 

*  Greatest  production  in  the  history  of  the  country. 

**  Greatest  amount  exported  in  the  history  of  the  country,  and  the  greatest 
amount  ever  exported  by  any  country  in  the  world. 

(a)  Production  by  calendar  years.   Exports  by  fiscal  years,  beginning  July  1 . 

Oats         Production  Exported 

Bushels  Bushels 

1900                              809,126,000  42,268,931 

1901            736,809,000  13,277,612 

1902                          987,843,000  8,381,805 

1903    784,094,000  1,960,740 

1904 894,596,000  8,394,692 

1905 953,216,000  48,434,541 

1906 964,905,000  6,386,334 

1907 754,443,000  2,518,855 

1908 807,156,000  2,333,817 

1909    1,007,143,000  2,548,726 

1910 1,186,341,000  3,845,850 

1911 922,298,000  2,677,749 

1912 1,418,337,000  36,455,474 

1913 1,121,768,000  2,748,743 

1914  1,141,060,000  100,609,272 

1915 1,549,030,000  98,960,481 

1916 1,251,837,000  95,105,698 

1917  *1, 592, 740,000  **125, 134,579 

1918 1,538,359,000  

*  Greatest  production  in  the  history  of  the  country. 
Greatest  amount  exported  in  the  history  of  the  country. 


** 


258  l-XONOMIC    ASPECTS    dp    THE 

Bur  ley 

Production  Exported 

Btishels  Bushels 

1900 58,926,000  6,293,207 

1901 109,933,000  8,714,268 

1902 134,954,000  8,429,141 

1903 131,861,000  10,881,627 

1904 139,749.000  10,661,655 

1905 136,551,000  17,729,360 

1906 178,916,000  8,238,842 

1907 153,597,000  4,349,078 

1908 166,756,000  6,580,393 

1909 173,344,000  4,311,566 

1910 173,832,000  9,399,346 

1911 160,240,000  1,585,242 

1912 223,824,000  17,536,703 

1913 1 78,189,000  6,644,747 

1914 194,953,000  26,754,522 

1915 228,851,000  **27,473,160 

1916 182,309,000  16,381,077 

1917 211,759,000  26,408,978 

1918 *256,375,000  20,457,781 

*  Greatest  production  in  the  history  of  the  country. 
**  Greatest  amount  exported  in  the  history  of  the  country. 


Corn 

Production  Exported 

Bushels  Bushels 

1900 2,105,103,000  181,405,473 

1901 1,522,520,000  28,028,688 

1902 1,523,648,000  76,639,261 

1903 3,244,177,000  58,222,061 

1904 2,467,481,000  90,293,483 

1905 2,707,994,000  119,893,833 

1906 2,927,416,000  86,368,228 

1907 2,592.320,000  55,063,860 

1908 2,668,651,000  37,665,040 

1909 2,552,190,000  38,128,498 

1910 2,886,260,000  65,614,522 

1911 2,531,488,000  41,797,291 

1912 3,124,746,000  50,780,143 

1913 2.446,988,000  10,725,819 

1914 2,672,804,000  50,668,303 

1915 2,994,793,000  39,896,928 

1916 2,566,927,000  66,753,294 

1917 *3,065,233,000  49,073,263 

1918 2,582,814,000  23,020,846 

*  Greatest  production  in  the  history  of  the  country. 
Greatest  amount  exported,  2J 3, 123,4 12  bushels  in  1899. 


CREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL 


259 


Rye 

Production  Exported 

Bushels  Bushels 

1900 23,996,000  2,345,512 

1901 30,345,000  2,712,077 

1902 33,631,000  5,445,273 

1903 29,363,000  784,068 

1904 27,242,000  29,749 

1905 28,486,000  1,387,826 

1906 33,375,000  769,717 

1907 31,566.000  2,444,588 

1908 31,851,000  1,295,701 

1909 29,520,000  242,262 

1910 34,897,000  40,123 

1911 33,119,000  31,384 

1912 35,664,000  1,854,738 

1913 41,381,000  2,272,492 

1914 42,779,000  13,026,778 

1915 54,050,000  15,250,151 

1916 48,862,000  13,703,499 

1917 62,933,000  17,130,226 

1918 *89,103,000  ♦*34,980,573 

*  Greatest  production  in  the  history  of  the  country. 
**  Greatest  amount  exported  in  the  history  of  the  country. 

The  following  averages  are  based  on  official  figures  of  the 
United  States  Department  of  Agriculture  and  the  official  returns 
of  the  Census  Bureau.  The  population  given  is  the  average 
for  the  period : 


Production  of  wheat  in  the  United  States  compared  with  population. 

Period 

Average  produc- 
tion  per  year, 
bushels 

Average 
population 

Bushels  per 
capita 

1849 

1859 

1866-1870 

100,486,000 
173,105,000 
240,024,000 
339,391,000 
437,547,000 
526,497,000 
665,417,000 
777,734,000 

23,000,000 
31,000,000 
37,000,000 
45,000,000 
57,000,000 
70,000,000 
84,000,000 
*98,000,000 

4.36 
5.58 
6.49 

1871-1880 

7.54 

1881-1890 

7.67 

1891-1900 

1901-1910 

1911-1918 

7.52 
7.92 
7.93 

*  Based  on  estimated  population  of  105,000,000  in  1918. 


It  will  be  seen  that  the  amount  of  grain  exported  varies  widely. 
The  conditions  brought  about  by  the  war  resulted  in  a  very  great 
increase  in  the  exportation  of  oats,  rye  and  barley,  and  it  is 
impracticable  at  this  time  to  make  an  estimate  of  our  future 
exports  of  these  grains.     In  the  year  1916  over  10,000,000  tons 


260  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  THE 

of  American  and  Canadian  grain  were  shipped  on  the  Great 
Lakes  alone,  and  during  that  year  10,152,025  tons  were  carried 
on  the  Chicago-New  York  rail  Hne,  making  a  total  of  about 
20,000,000  tons  of  grain  which  annually  goes  to  the  Atlantic 
seaboard,  either  for  foreign  shipment  or  domestic  consumption. 
Practically  all  of  the  wheat,  oats  and  rye  is  produced  in  the 
territory  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes.  The  corn  belt  extends 
farther  southward  than  the  wheat  belt,  and  while  export  corn 
does  not  now  utilize  the  Great  Lakes  route  to  any  great  extent, 
it  may  be  expected  to  do  so  when  it  is  possible  to  load  vessels 
at  lake  ports,  proceeding  directly  to  foreign  destinations.  The 
principal  corn  producing  States  are  Illinois,  Iowa,  Ohio,  Indiana, 
Minnesota  and  Missouri,  all  of  which  are  wnthin  the  territory 
which  will  find  it  advantageous  to  use  the  through  water  route 
by  way  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River. 

The  New  York  Produce  Exchange  reports  the   following  re- 
ceipts of  flour  and  grain  : 

Receipts  of  Flour  and  Grain  at  Western  Lake  and  River  Ports. 

Bushels 

1913-14 984,767,000 

1914-15 1,094,817,000 

1915-16 1,266,558,500 

1916-17 1,032,559,000 

1917-18 942,505,000 

1918-19 1,199,714,000 

Receipts  of  Flour  and  Grain  at  Six  Atlantic  Seaboard  Ports. 

Bushels 

1914 446,910,921 

1915  550,357,466 

1916  640,126,787 

1917  486,631,771 

1918  435,187,493 

1919 446,538,219 

Receipts  of  Flour  and  Grain  at  Gulf  Ports  {New  Orleans  and  Galveston). 

Bushels 

1914  96,638,154 

1915  93,132,832 

1916  76.991,413 

1917  76,020,425 

1918  85,424,857 

1919  68,885,393 


GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL 


261 


The    following   shows   the   receipts   of   grain   at   the   principal 
eastern  ports  during  the  last  six  years. 


Port 

1914 

1915 

1916 

1917 

1918 

1919 

Bushels 

Bushels 

Bushels 

Bushels 

Bushels 

Bushels 

Portland  '  .  . .  . 

8,912,063 

15,088.291 

34.341,893 

11,000,000 

23,800,000 

32,800.000 

Montreal 

99,709,493 

68,444,323 

108,190,586 

57,934,559 

106,286,481 

88,567,589 

Boston 

26,182,60.S 

28,132,085 

42,788,468 

28,020,330 

28,723,722 

27,858,616 

New  York .... 

159,264,869 

225,886,601 

233,012,099 

186,217,593 

118,745,017 

142,647,539 

Philadelphia. . . 

49,009.621 

70,765,806 

73,610,091 

65,051,227 

52,569,863 

75,922,899 

Baltimore 

68,909,106 

106,124,331 

143,444,462 

96,831,477 

62,857,556 

68,776,938 

Newport  News' 

3.865,335 

62.627.238 

52.005.699 

32,676,019 

24.423.379 

24,071.447 

'  Exports. 

The  figures  show  that  the  total  movement  of  fiour  and  grain 
to  the  principal  ports  of  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  averages  about 
580.000.000  bushels  annually,  and  to  Atlantic  ports  alone  about 
500,000,000  bushels  annually.  In  1916,  the  movement  to  Atlantic 
ports  amounted  to  687,393,298  bushels,  or  about  20,000,000  tons. 
The  annual  exports  of  flour  and  grain  from  the  United  States 
during  the  last  five  years  have  averaged  424,000,000  bushels.  It  is 
apparent  tliat  the  existing  movement  of  grain  to  Atlantic  ports 
and  Montreal  exceeds  the  entire  eastbound  capacity  of  the  Barge 
Canal,  and  if  the  canal  afforded  economies  sii-jjicicnt  to  attract 
the  grain  to  that  route,  it  ivonld  he  unable  to  handle  the  traffic. 
Since  General  Wotherspoon  has  estimated  that  the  industries  of 
the  area  immediately  tributary  to  the  canal  will  provide  all  the 
tonnage  it  can  carry,  it  is  not  seen  hozv  the  can<al  is  going  to  accom- 
modate an  additional  15,000.000  to  20,000,000  tons  of  grain  in  an 
easterly  direction.  If  it  dors  not  afford  economies  sufficient  to 
attract  this  grain,  it  fails  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  situation,  and 
if  it  does  carry  the  grain  it  ivill  have  no  surplus  capacity  for  the 
large  tonnage  of  other  products  nozv  demanding  a  cheaper  outlet 
to  the  sea. 

Influences  affecting  the  price  to  the  producer. — i\s  wheat  is 
the  most  important  cereal  entering  into  our  export  trade,  this 
study  will  be  confined  to  that  commodity  and  the  results  shown 
may  be  assumed  as  applying  proportionately  to  other  grain.  It 
is  Avell  known  that  the  price  of  wheat  is  fixed  at  Liverpool. 
The  price  which  the  farmer  receives  for  his  wheat  is  the  Liverpool 
price  less  the  several  items  of  expense  incurred  between  point  of 
origin  and  destination.  Of  these  the  principal  cost  is  transporta- 
tion, but  there  are  other  serious  costs  which  arise  directly  from 
the  lack  of  transportation.     In  the  recent   past  there  has  been 


262  ECONOMIC   ASPECTS  OF  TIIF. 

a  margin  of  from  7  to  12  cents  a  bushel  on  wheat  at  New  York 
City,  due  to  the  hazard  involved  in  meeting  contracts  for  delivery 
at  Liverpool.  The  existence  of  this  margin  has  been  caused  by 
the  uncertainties  of  transportation.  With  normal  transportation 
conditions,  however,  the  difference  in  the  price  at  Liverpool  and 
the  price  the  producer  receives  for  his  grain  is  made  up  chiefly 
of  charges  directly  or  indirectly  involved  in  transportation.  It 
has  been  suggested  that  in  the  near  future  the  United  States 
will  have  no  grain  'to  export,  and  that  for  this  reason  the  proposed 
waterway  is  unworthy  of  consideration.  In  answer  to  this 
argument,  it  should  be  stated  that  the  saving  to  the  producer 
by  reason  of  a  decrease  in  transportation  costs  to  Liverpool  will 
be  effective  even  if  there  is  no  movement  of  grain  abroad.  The 
shipper  has  the  right  to  sell  his  grain  in  the  European  market  it 
he  so  elects,  and  in  order  to  keep  the  grain  at  home  the  people 
of  America  must  pay  the  Liverpool  price  less  the  cost  of  transpor- 
tation. If  the  cost  of  transportation  is  reduced  8  to  10  cents  per 
bushel,  as  it  will  be  by  the  St.  Lawrence  waterway,  the  producer 
throughout  all  the  immense  territory  tributary  to  this  route  will 
realize  an  equivalent  saving  on  his  entire  production.  The  saving 
is  therefore  not  to  be  computed  only  on  the  grain  which  actually 
goes  to  foreign  markets,  but  upon  the  much  larger  proportion 
which  remains  at  home,  (in  this  connection,  attention  is  invited 
o  the  following  extract  from  a  statement  by  Julius  H.  Barnes, 
formerly  United  States  W'heat  Director,  made  before  the  Inter- 
national Joint  Commission  at  New  York  on  October  20,  1920: 


/, 


I  think  anyone  familiar  with  the  operating  statements  of  the  lake 
carri-ers  will  agree  that  a  standard  grain  rate  of  4c  per  bushel  for  the 
hve-day  trip  from  Duluth  or  Chicago  to  Buffalo,  with  no  west-bound  cargo 
whatever  and  only  eight  months  of  oi>cration,  would  earn  substantial 
dividends  on  the  cost  of  such  Great  Lake  carriers.  For  the  48-hour  ex- 
tension of  its  voyage,  an  additional  earning  of  two  cents  per  bushel  would 
yield  an  even  higher  net  ratio,  so  that  there  is  a  i)otential  saving  on  this 
route  that  may  well  run  as  high  as  ten  cents  per  bushel.  .\  rate  of  from 
six  to  eight  cents  per  bushel  for  water  carriage  from  Chicago  or  Duluth 
and  Fort  William  to  Montreal  would  on  the  present  rail  structure  extend 
the  arc  of  delivery  costs  as  far  south  as  Oklahoma  and  as  far  west  as  the 
Rocky  Mountains.  In  the  sixteen  States  whose  farm  price  level  would 
inevitably  be  improved  by  a  reduction  of  the  transportation  cost  to  the 
Kuropean  markets,  there  is  grown  3,664  million  bushels  of  grain.  If  such 
a  reduction  of  ten  cents  in  the  transportation  cost  could  be  fully  reflected 
to  the  farm  price  in  this  area,  there  would  be  an  improvement  in  the  farm 
[)osition  of  $366.0()n,(X)()  in  a  single  year.  The  same  improvement  in  farm 
price  position  in  respect  to  western  Canada's  production  of  440  million 
bushels,  would  be  a  gain  to  farmers  of  Canada  of  $44,000,000.     If  we  cal- 


y 


GREAT  LAKES-3T.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL  263 

culate  that  the  full  measure  of  saving  will  not  be   reflected  to  the  farm,\ 
but  that  the  farm  position  will  be  improved  by  five  cents  per  bushel,  we  ^      y 
make  a  saving  in  the  American  farm  income  of  $183,000,000  and   in   they 
Canadian  farm  income  of  $22,(X)0,000,  all  on  a  single  year's  crop. 

Geography    of    wheat    prices. — In    1918    the    Department   of 
Agriculture  made  a  study  of  the  prices  of  wheat  throughout  the 
United  States,  which  is  interesting  as  supporting  the  statements 
made  above   relative   to   the  effects   of   transportation   upon   the 
price  of  wheat,  irrespective  of  whether  it  is  exported  or  consumed 
at  home.     The  investigation  of  the  Department  of  Agriculture 
was  based  upon  data  for  the  five  years  ending  1914,  when  the 
farm  price  in  New  York  was  approximately  $1.00  per  bushel. 
The  minimum  price  paid  wheat  growers  occurs  within  the  areas 
of   surplus   production    in   central    Montana   and   eastern    Idaho. 
With  a   long  rail   haul  and  lower  ocean   freight   rate   eastward, 
and  a   short   rail   hatil   but  higher  ocean   freight   rate   westward, 
this   territory   is   most   disadvantageously   situated   as   to    foreign 
and  domestic  wheat  markets.     Radiating  from  this  region,  prices 
graduate  upward  in  every  direction  until  the  maximum  toward 
the  coast  is  reached.     Prices  likewise  increase  in  areas  of  deficient 
production,   the  highest  price  at  the  time  of   the   study   by  the 
Department  of  Agriculture  being  $1.15  in  certain  portions  of  the 
southeastern  States.     The  lowest  prices  are  in  the  surplus  pro- 
ducing areas  farthest  from  European  markets,  or  in  those  most 
unfavorably  placed  in  the  channels  of  distribution.     The  territory 
west    of    the    Mississij^pi,    embracing    the    surplus    wheat    areas, 
produces  some  550  out  of  the  total  800  million  bushels,  or  about 
69  per  cent,  though  it  has  but  38  per  cent  of  the   farm  lands 
and  20  per  cent  of  the  total  population.     The  west  north  central 
States   constitute   the   great    surplus    wheat    area,    growing    51.8 
per  cent  of  the  national  wheat,  or  416  out  of  800  million  bushels, 
with  only  12  per  cent  of  the  national  population  and  17  per  cent 
of  the  land  area.     North  Dakota  with   160  bushels  per  capita, 
and  Kansas  with  58  bushels  per  capita,  contribute  about  60  per 
cent   of   the   wheat   grown   in   the   seven    States   of    this    section, 
which   supplies  not  only  the  greater  part  of  the  domestic  defi- 
ciencies east  of  the  Rockies,  but  also  most  of  the  export  wheat. 
Deducting  the  Pacific  wheat  which  normally  enters  into  a  distinct 
trade   westward,   this  division    furnishes   nearly  80  per   cent   of 
the   gross    surplus   of   the   United    States.     The   national    wheat 
surplus,  that  is  the  exports,  constituted  during  recent  years  from 
11  to  37  per  cent  of  the  production.     The  Department  of  Agricul- 


264 


ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  THE 


ture  states  "it  is  the  price  received  for  this  surplus  which  broadly 
stated  tends  to  regulate  the  farm  prices  of  the  entire  crop." 

The  accompanying  map  from  the  report  of  the  Department  of 
Agriculture  shows  the  gradual  elevation  in  the  farm  prices  of 
wheat  toward  the  seaboard,  with  other  changes  due  to  transporta- 
tion and  production  conditions.  In  this  progression,  a  prepon- 
derant factor  is  cost  of  transportation,  other  items  of  distributive 
expense  being  usually  in  fractions  of  one  cent  per  bushel.  There 
is  a  definite  proportion  between  prices  prevailing  at  the  different 
markets,  domestic  and  foreign,  which  is  measured  largely  by  the 
diflference  in  freight  charges.  From  the  accompanying  map  it 
will  be  seen  that  wnth  wheat  at  $1.00  per  bushel  in  New  York, 
the  price  in  Montana  was  70  cents  and  as  low  as  65  cents  in  eastern 
Idaho,  while  in  the  areas  of  greatest  surplus  production  the 
average  price  w^as  80  cents. 

Effect  on  F.\rm  Prices  of  Whe.\t  of  Nearness  to  ok  Remoteness  from 
Gr.^in  Markets 

Figures  represent  farm  prices  of  wheat.     The  territory  from  which  each  market  or  group  of 
markets  receives  most  of  its  wheat  is  outlined  on  the  map  by  an  etched  border. 


Fann  prices  per  busbeL    Average  of  1910-1914  to  show  nonnal  geograpbic  variation. 


c 


GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL 


265 


Since  the  investigation  by  the  Department  of  AgricuUure, 
there  has  been  a  large  increase  in  the  transportation  costs.  The 
price  differences  on  July  1,  1918,  are  shown  by  the  following  table  : 


Wheat  Prices  at  Imported  Markets,  Jtily  1,  1918. 

Government  Prices 

Wheat  prices  established  by  presidential  proclamation  of  February  21,  1918, 
and  the  prices  established  July  1,  1918,  due  to  new  freight  rates,  are  shown 
below  for  important  terminals: 


Terminal 


New  price, 
July  1,  1918 


Old  price 


Increase 


New  York 

Philadelphia . . . 

Baltimore 

Newport  News, 

Chicago 

New  Orleans .  . 

Galveston 

St.  Louis 

Duluth 

Minneapolis.  .  . 
Kansas  City . . . 

Omaha 

San  Francisco . 

Portland 

Seattle 


$2.39M 
2.39 
2.38M 
2.38M 
2.26 
2.28 
2.28 
2.24 
2.223/2 
2.211^ 
2.18 
2.18 
2.20 
2.20 
2.20 


J2.28 
2.27 
2.27 


2.17 
2.15 
2.15 
2.10 
2.05 
2.05 


$0.11M 
0.12 

O.llM 

0.11% 

0.06 

0.08 

0.08 

0.06 

0.05M 

0.041^ 

0.03 

0.03 

0.10 

0.15 

0.15 


The  prices  are  those  at  which  the  Grain  Corporation  was  prepared  to  buy 
wheat  at  the  above  markets,  for  No.  1  northern  spring.  No.  1  hard  winter. 
No.  1  red  winter.  No.  1  durum.  No.  1  hard  white,  in  store  in  some  public 
elevators  approved  for  storage. 


266 


ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  THE 


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1 

GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL  267 

In  the  recent  past  market  conditions  have  been  so  abnormal  that 
it  would  be  futile  to  attempt  an  analysis  based  on  new  data. 
The  impracticability  of  moving  the  grain,  due  to  the  lack  of  cars 
and  congestion  at  Atlantic  terminals,  has  had  the  effect  of 
creating  unusual  price  relations.  When  conditions  again  become 
normal,  however,  there  will  be  an  average  difference  of  18  to  20 
cents  between  the  Chicago  and  the  New  York  price.  There  is 
clearly  an  opportunity  for  an  important  saving  between  lake 
ports  and  Liverpool.  Grain  is  now  carried  from  these  ports  to 
Buffalo  by  lake  at  a  cost  of  about  4  cents  a  bushel,  and  those 
engaged  in  the  transportation  of  this  commodity  state  that  it 
can  be  carried  to  Montreal  for  7  cents  a  bushel.  When  normal 
conditions  return,  it  will  be  carried  to  Buffalo  for  about  2  cents 
per  bushel,  and  a  rate  of  3^4  cents  from  the  head  of  the  lakes 
to  Montreal  via  the  proposed  ship  channel  may  be  confidently 
expected.  Existing  routes  to  north  Atlantic  ports  can  not  meet 
this  rate.  As  pointed  out  by  Julius  H.  Barnes,  the  rate  from 
Montreal  is  the  same  as  from  New  York,  and  the  difference  in 
insurance  charges  amounts  to  only  a  small  fraction  of  a  cent 
per  bushel.  Whether  the  ocean  carrier  takes  the  grain  direct 
from  upper  lake  ports  to  Liverpool,  or  the  grain  is  transshipped 
to  ocean  carrier  at  Montreal  or  some  lower  point  on  the  St. 
Lawrence,  at  a  cost  of  about  1  cent  per  bushel,  there  is  an  assured 
saving  of  8  to  10  cents  a  bushel  on  all  the  grain  produced  within 
the  area  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway. 

The  ci'^idcncc  shozn's  that  the  proposed  improveuient  of  the 
St.  Lazvrencc  River  betzvcen  Lake  Ontario  and  Montreal  will 
afford  an  annual  saving  on  grain  approximately  equal  to  the  full 
cost  of  the  improvement. 


Chapter  XXIV 
OTHER  COMMODITY  MOVEMENTS 

Among  the  important  commodities  which  will  be  received 
by  way  of  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  Ship  Channel  are  the 
following:  Pulpwood,  sulphur,  china  clay,  coffee,  cocoa,  sugar, 
fruits  and  nuts,  rubber,  fertilizer  material,  lumber,  hides,  as- 
phaltum,  gums,  extracts  for  tanning,  sago  and  tapioca,  fibers 
and  textile  grasses,  flaxseed,  seeds  for  planting,  spices,  vege- 
j  table  oils,  granite,  and  a  multitude  of  other  articles  now  imported 
j  from  all  points  of  the  world.  Among  the  outbound  commodi- 
ties will  be  grain,  iron  and  steel,  coal,  agricultural  implements, 
automobiles  and  vehicles,  salt,  copper,  meat,  and  dairy  products. 
Other  important  outbound  freight  will  include  linseed  oil, 
rubber  goods,  leather,  furniture,  paper,  live  stock,  and  countless 
manufactured  articles  which  are  produced  in  great  abundance 
at  the  many  important   industrial  cities  of  the   Great   Lakes. 

Inbound 

Pulpwood, — The  paper  industry  is  one  wliich  has  developed 
with  rapid  strides  within  recent  years.  The  following  table, 
taken  from  a  bulletin  on  "Pulpwood  consumption  and  wood- 
pulp  production  in  1917,"'  by  the  U.  S.  Department  of  Agriculture, 
shows  that  the  consvuuption  of  pulpwood  has  increased  frcmi 
1,986.310  cords  in  1899  to  5.480,075  cords  in  1917: 

Annual  consumption  oj  pulp-ivood  and  total  cost  for  specified  years. 

Consumption 

Year  (Cords)  Total    cost 

1899 1,986,310  §9,837,516 

1905 3,192,123       17,735,665 

1906 ^,661,176       26,411,887 

1907 ^,962,660       32,360,276 

1908 3,346,953       28,047,473 

1909 4,001,607       34,477,540 

1910 4,094,306  

1911 4,328,052  

1914 4,470,763       39,408,453 

1916 5,228,558  *45, 785,682 

1917 5,480,075  60,815,057 

*  Not  including  cost  of  slabs  and  other  mill  waste  in  Louisiana,  Massachu- 
setts, North  Carolina,  and  Virginia. 

While  this  industry  is  still  in  its  infancy,  a  serious  shortage 
of  material  has  already  developed  and  forestry  experts  are  now 
devoting  attention  to  the  question  of  insuring  an  adequate  future 
supply.  The  woods  chiefly  used,  in  the  order  of  their  importance, 
are  spruce,   hemlock,   poplar  and   balsam   fir.      Pulpwood   in   the 

268 


GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL  269 

hscal  year  1919  took  fourth  rank,  and  wood-pulp  tenth  rank 
among  our  imports.  The  following  shows  the  amounts  imported 
during  the  five  fiscal  years  ending  June  30,  1919: 

Pulp-wood  Cords 

1915 :  ..  .  985,686 

1916 979,010 

1917 1,016,814 

1918 1,172,033 

1919 1,390,334 

Wood-pulp  Tons 

1915 587,922 

1916 507,048 

1917 699,475 

1918 504,108 

1919 475,372 

These  figures  show  the  magnitude  of  the  present  movement 
of  pulpwood  and  wood-pulp  into  the  United  States.  Practically 
all  of  the  pulpwood  came  from  Canada,  with  a  small  amount 
from  Newfoundland  and  Labrador.  There  are  immense  quanti- 
ties of  pulpwood  available  in  Nova  Scotia,  New  Brunswick  and 
Newfoundland  which  are  not  now  available  for  consumption 
in  the  paper  mills  of  the  Lake  region  because  of  the  transporta- 
tion barriers.  With  the  changing  conditions  in  the  pulpwood 
supply,  necessitating  the  future  purchase  of  wood  from  distant 
points,  it  is  manifest  that  cheap  transportation  of  this  material 
to  the  mills  of  the  Great  Lakes  region  will  be  essential  if  these 
industries  are  to  continue.  This  material  can  not  be  shipped 
long  distances  by  rail,  nor  can  it  stand  the  cost  of  transfer  that 
would  be  required  by  any  other  than  a  direct  ocean  route. 

The  State  of  Wisconsin  ranks  third,  Minnesota  sixth,  and 
Michigan  seventh  in  the  consumption  of  pulpwood.  The  State 
of  Wisconsin  in  1917  had  more  paper  mills  than  any  other  State 
except  New  York.  In  that  year  the  State  of  Wisconsin  consumed 
805,490  cords  of  pulpwood.  the  State  of  Minnesota  205,026  cords, 
and  the  State  of  Michigan  187,117  cords.  The  mills  in  the 
territory  surrounding  the  city  of  Kalamazoo  which  make  the 
finer  grades  of  paper,  call  for  a  thousand  tons  per  day  or  300.000 
tons  per  year.  These  industries  were  established  in  their  present 
location  because  of  the  availability  of  suitable  woods  in  the 
vicinity,,  but  these  sources  of  supply  have  now  become  exhausted 
and  it  is  necessary  to  seek  other  sources.  It  is  clear  that  the 
provision  of  a  deep  waterway  permitting  full  ship  loads  of 
pulpwood  from  both   foreign  and  domestic  sources  to  reach  the 


270  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  THE 

great  paper  indusitries  of  Erie,  Pa.,  the  Fox  River  Valley  of 
Wisconsin,  Detroit,  Port  Huron  and  Kalamazoo,  Mich.,  would 
be  of  great  benefit  to  these  establishments  and  solve  the  serious 
problem  now  confronting  them  as  to  the  future  procurement  of 
raw  material. 

While  present  imports  of  pulpwood  are  almost  entirely  from 
Canada,  there  has  recently  developed  a  substantial  movement 
of  wood-pulp  from  Norway,  Sweden  and  Finland,  amounting  at 
present  to  approximately  100,000  tons  per  annum.  Next  year 
there  will  be  brought  in  from  Sweden  to  Menominee  alone 
about  15,000  tons.  The  rate  from  the  seaboard  to  consuming 
j)oints  in  the  Lake  States  is  about  $9  a  ton.  Estimates  show 
that  it  could  be  brought  from  Sweden  to  destination  by  ocean 
carrier  at  a  rate  not  exceeding  the  present  rail  rate  from  the 
Atlantic  seaboard,  resulting  in  a  very  material  saving.  The 
total  probable  movement  of  wood-pulp  and  pulpwood  into  the 
Great  Lakes  over  the  improved  St.  Lawrence  River  may  be 
conservatively  placed  at  500.000  tons  per  annum. 

Sulphur. — Sulphur  is  another  commodity  used  in  the  paper 
industry.  The  domestic  supply  from  Louisiana  and  Texas  mines 
is  ample  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  Lake  States.  It  is  a 
product  of  low  value  and  can  not  stand  the  expense  of  rail  ship- 
ment over  long  distances.  The  producing  companies  have  their 
own  fleets  of  vessels  in  which  they  ship  sulphur  to  all  parts  of 
the  world,  and  these  vessels  would  operate  on  the  St.  Lawrence 
if  the  requisite  channel  facilities  were  available.  The  quantity 
of  sulphur  which  would  be  brought  in  has  been  roughly  estimated 
by  a  representative  of  the  Union  Sulphur  Company  at  150,000 
tons  per  annum. 

China  clay  or  kaolin. — A  large  amount  of  china  clay  is  used 
in  the  paper  and  pottery  industries  of  the  Lake  States.  Prac- 
tically all  of  this  material  comes  from  Great  Britain,  as  will  be 
seen  from  the  following  statistics : 


GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL 


271 


Fiscal  years 


Total  imports 


From  United  Kingdom 


Tons 


Value 


Tons 


Value 


1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 


230,634 
235,438 
263,697 
238,802 
229,200 
229,093 
206,129 
194,225 
146,416 
218,165 


?1,563,752 
1,528,257 
1,750,058 
1,577,747 
1,498,071 
1,377,106 
1,207,760 
1,322,603 
1,438,031 
2,484,287 


230,266 
233,822 
262,614 
236,554 
227,830 
228,907 
204,431 
189,138 
143,202 
209,664 


$1,558,109 
1,515,769 
1,737,562 
1,561,858 
1,478,905 
1,375,171 
1,196,064 
1,287,194 
1,411,449 
2,411,580 


Practically  all  of  this  clay  is  now  received  through  Atlantic 
ports  between  Portland,  Me.,  and  Baltimore,  Md.,  from  which 
ports  it  is  forwarded  to  points  of  consumption  throughout  the 
country.  These  consuming  points  are  located  largely  within  the 
area  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes.  Under  date  of  November  15, 
1920,  Consul  General  Robert  P.  Skinner,  of  London,  reports  as 
follows : 

In  view  of  the  recent  amalgamation  of  English  clay  firms  and  plans 
to  increase  production,  there  is  believed  to  be  an  opportunity  for  American 
shipping  to  transport  cargoes  of  china  clay  to  the  United  States  from 
Plymouth  and  the  neighboring  ports  of  Avonmouth,  Fowey,  Penzance,  and 
Falmouth.  It  often  happens  that  American  ships,  having  brought  large 
cargoes  to  the  United  Kingdom,  are  forced  to  return  to  the  United  States 
in  ballast,  and  opportunities  for  obtaining  cargoes  of  this  character  at 
regular  intervals  would  seem  to  warrant  investigation  by  American 
shipping  interests  involved. 

In  addition  to  the  large  quantities  of  china  clay  used  in  the 
paper  industry,  this  material  is  also  extensively  used  in  the 
manufacture  of  spark  plugs  and  in  the  pottery  industry.  Toledo, 
Ohio,  is  the  seat  of  the  greatest  spark  plug  industry  in  the  world, 
consuming  vast  quantities  of  these  English  earths  and  clays. 
The  State  of  Ohio  also  has  a  tremendous  pottery  industr\-  engaged 
in  the  making  of  china  ware  for  domestic  use  and  of  sanitary 
pottery,  and  the  potteries  in  Michigan  utilize  kaolin  as  a  finish 
for  their  products.  Those  who  are  engaged  in  business  requiring 
the  use  of  this  material  claim  that  it  can  be  brought  from  English 
sources  of  supply  as  distressed  cargo,  taking  a  very  low  rate. 
The  report  of  Consul  General  Skinner  quoted  above  confirms 
this  view,  and  it-may  be  confidently  anticipated  that  fully  150,000 


272  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  THE     - 

tons  per  annum  will  be  imported  directly  from  Great  Britain  to 
points  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway. 
Moreover,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  this  china  clay  is  a  low 
priced  product  which  can  not  stand  high  transportation  costs, 
and  that  with  the  provision  of  a  direct  ocean  route  to  the  con- 
suming areas  the  domestic  market  for  this  product  will  be  greatly 
increased.  Since  the  paper  industry  is  one  of  those  which  will 
be  greatly  benefited  by  the  combination  of  cheap  power  and 
cheap  cost  of  transporting  raw  materials,  it  is  certain  that  a 
large  increase  in  our  imports  of  china  clay  will  follow  the  opening 
of  the  Great  Lakes  to  ocean  vessels. 

Coffee. — The  total  imports  of  coffee  into  the  L'nited  States 
in  the  calendar  year  1919  amounted  to  1,3,^3,564.067  lbs.,  or 
666,782  tons.  This  coffee  is  now  imported  principally  through 
New  York  and  New  Orleans,  from  which  ports  it  is  distributed 
by  rail  throughout  the  United  States.  Of  the  total,  787,312,293 
lbs.  came  from  Brazil,  150,483,853  lbs.  from  Colombia,  109,777,831 
lbs.,  from  Venezuela,  with  lesser  quantities  from  other  countries. 
The  population  of  the  territory  considered  tributary  to  the 
waterway  for  commerce  with  South  America  is  approximately 
30,000,000,  or  28.5  per  cent  of  the  total  population  of  the  United 
States.  On  this  basis,  190,000  tons  of  coffee  would  be  affected 
by  the  improvement.  The  saving  would  be  such  as  to  indicate 
the  ad  visibility  of  shipping  all  of  this  directly  by  the  deep 
waterway. 

In  the  past,  several  important  Lake  cities,  including  Toledo, 
Chicago  and  Duluth,  have  been  at  a  great  disadvantage  in  the 
coffee  roasting  business,  as  compared  with  New  Orleans  and 
New  York.  At  Toledo  it  took  second  rank  among  manufactures 
in  1914,  and  the  business  is  one  that  would  develop  to  considerable 
proportions  if  the  present  handicap  in  the  transportation  situation 
were  removed. 

Cocoa  or  cacao. — The  total  importation  of  crude  cocoa  into 
the  United  States  in  1919  amounted  to  391,397,309  lbs.,  or  195,698 
tons.  This  cacao  was  received  principally  from  Africa,  South 
and  Central  America,  and  the  West  Indies,  the  principal  sources 
in  the  order  of  importance  being  l>ritish  West  Africa.  Brazil, 
Ecuador,  the  Dominican  Republic,  and  Trinidad.  The  total 
amount  now  consumed  in  the  area  economically  tributary  to  the 
f ireat  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway  is  aj)proxiniately  55,000  tons. 

Sugar. — Sugar  constitutes  the  most  iiuportant  item  in  the 
import  trade  of  the  Uniterl  States.     The  total  quantity  of  cane 


GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL  273 

sugar  imported  in  1919  amounted  to  7,019,690,475  lbs.,  or  3,509,- 
845  tons.  Of  this  total,  6,686,141,983  lbs.  came  from  Cuba. 
It  is  estimated  by  the  Detroit  Board  of  Commerce  that  41  per 
cent,  or  1,439,000  tons,  was  used  in  the  States  tributary  to  the 
Great  Lakes.  Based  on  a  uniform  per  capita  consumption,  the 
amount  that  it  would  apparently  be  economical  to  import  by 
way  of  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway  would  be  about 
25  per  cent,  or  877,000  tons.  In  the  case  of  sugar,  however,  there 
are  other  considerations  than  the  amount  which  is  now  consumed 
in  this  territory.  The  evidence  contained  in  the  record  of  hear- 
ings before  the  International  Joint  Commission  shows  that  the 
refining  of  beet  sugar  is  now  an  important  industry  of  the  upper 
Lake  States,  and  that  these  refineries  are  at  present  able  to 
operate  only  two  or  three  months  each  year.  Because  of  the 
short  operating  season,  the  overhead  expense  is  tremendous. 
Every  beet  sugar  factory,  however,  is  capable  without  any  changes 
in  its  machinery  to  refine  cane  sugars,  and  the  interests  now 
identified  with  the  refining  of  beet  sugar  are  looking  forward 
to  the  opportunity  of  importing  Cuban  raw  sugars  directly  by 
water,  thus  enabling  them  to  run  their  plants  at  least  ten  months 
in  the  year  and  placing  their  industry  upon  a  sound  economic 
basis.  In  a  case  of  this  kind  the  quantity  of  imports  would  not 
be  restricted  to  the  consumption  of  the  area  immediately  tributary 
to  the  waterway,  and  the  total  importations  could  reasonably 
be  expected  to  equal  the  capacity  of  the  refineries.  Having  this 
fact  in  mind,  the  total  importation  by  way  of  the  St.  Lawrence 
may  easily  reach  1,000,000  tons  a  year.  The  return  cargoes 
would  consist  of  corn,  oats,  cement,  iron  and  steel,  coal  and 
manufactured  articles. 

Fruits  and  nuts.  In  1919  we  imported  approximately  544,- 
000,000  lbs.  of  nuts,  or  272,000  tons.  The  weight  of  fruits 
imported  is  not  given  in  the  statistics,  but  was  apparently  about 
1,500,000  tons.  There  were  36,993,095  bunches  of  bananas  alone. 
There  are  very  large  shipments  of  bananas  from  Gulf  ports  and 
Atlantic  ports  to  the  Great  Lakes  districts.  About  75  carloads 
of  bananas  are  used  in  the  State  of  Michigan  each  week,  or 
3,900  cars  per  year.  Importers  at  Detroit  say  that  the  opening 
of  the  St.  Lawrence  waterway  will  enable  them  to  import  these 
bananas  directly  from  Cuba  and  Central  America,  and  that  by 
reason  of  the  ability  to  obtain  them  economically  the  consump- 
tion would  be  increased  at  least  100  per  cent.  Ships  bringing 
tropical    fruits    are   equipped    with    refrigeration,    and    if    these 


274  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  THE 

vessels  could  proceed  directly  to  Lake  ports  a  great  saving  of 
cost  would  result.  The  present  consumption  is  sufficient  to  take 
care  of  full  cargo  shipments  to  the  important  Lake  cities.  Ref- 
erence is  particularly  made  to  the  testimony  of  Mr,  F.  S.  Keiser, 
Traffic  Manager  of  the  Duluth  Commercial  Club,  relative  to  the 
magnitude  of  the  movement  of  tropical  fruits  to  Lake  ports,  page 
2665  of  the  record,  in  which  it  is  stated  that  bananas  run  through 
Cairo  from  New  Orleans  in  train  lots  of  thirty  cars  each,  possibly 
an  average  of  three  to  five  trains  every  twenty-four  hours  the 
year  round.  The  total  tonnage  of  fruits  and  nuts  now  shipped 
into  the  area  to  which  they  could  be  economically  supplied  by 
way  of  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway,  is  approxi- 
mately 500,000  tons. 

Rubber.  The  total  amount  of  unmanufactured  rubber  im- 
ported in  1919  amounted  to  576,708,524  lbs.,  or  288,354  tons.  Of 
this  total,  267,295,344  lbs.  came  from  Straits  Settlements,  57,- 
432,831  lbs.  from  other  British  East  Indies,  61,260,330  lbs.  from 
Dutch  East  Indies,  60,159,954  lbs.  from  England  (reshipped), 
58,845,384  lbs.  from  Brazil,  with  lesser  quantities  from  other 
countries.  This  rubber  was  received  largely  at  the  port  of  New 
York,  the  total  for  this  port  being  about  380,000,000  lbs.  Fully  50 
per  cent  of  the  total  imports,  or  approximately  144,000  tons, 
goes  to  the  rubber  manufacturing  industries  at  Detroit,  Chicago 
and  Akron,  where  70  per  cent  of  the  automobile  tires  of  the 
country  are  produced.  This  is  equivalent  to  about  60  ship  loads 
of  the  average  vessels  used  in  the  South  American  and  East 
Indian  trade.  In  the  past  great  difficulty  has  been  experienced 
in  obtaining  the  prompt  shipment  of  rubber  from  the  Atlantic 
seaboard  to  the  factories  on  the  Great  Lakes,  and  it  is  certain 
that  a  large  part,  if  not  all,  of  the  crude  rubber  used  on  the  Lakes 
would  be  received  by  way  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  since  the  rate 
to  Cleveland  or  Detroit  would  be  little  if  any  more  than  the  rate 
to  New  York,  while  the  cost  of  the  rail  haul  and  transfer  would 
be  saved.  The  total  saving  on  this  commodity  would  amount  to 
approximately  $10  a  ton,  or  a  total  of  about  $1,400,000  annually. 
This  estimate  is  based  entirely  upon  present  consumption,  which 
will  be  largely  exceeded  in  the  future. 

Fertilizer  materials, — One  of  the  important  needs  of  the  great 
territory  interested  in  the  improvement  of  the  St.  Lawrence  is  an 
abundance  of  cheap  fertilizer.  The  fertilizer  industry  is  now 
centered  chiefly  along  the  south  Atlantic  coast  at  a  distance  of 
a  thousanrl  miles  or  more  from  the  chief  agricultural  center  of 


GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAVVREiVCE  SHIP  CHANNEL  275 

the  country.  The  total  amount  of  nitrate  of  soda  imported  in 
1919  was  407,459  tons,  which  was  less  than  one-fourth  the  amount 
imported  in  1918.  Practically  all  of  this  nitrate  comes  from 
Chile,  and  as  shown  elsewhere  in  this  report  most  of  the  vessels 
which  carr\-  it  have  a  draft  of  less  than  25  feet.  The  potash  has 
heretofore  come  principally  from  Germany,  but  this  trade  was 
practically  extinguished  by  the  war.  Other  fertilizer  materials 
imported  in  1919  amounted  to  264,000  tons,  making  a  total  of 
approximately  670.000  tons  of  fertilizer  imported.  The  amount 
of  phosphate  rock  used  annually  ranges  between  2,000,000  and 
3,000,000  tons.  This  comes  largely  from  Florida,  the  production 
of  this  State  being  about  1,500,000  tons  annually.  The  phosphate 
of  Florida  is  shipped  in  vessels  of  the  size  and  draft  suitable 
for  the  navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence  waterway.  At  the  Toledo 
hearing  on  June  10,  1920,  it  was  brought  out  that  the  cost  of 
fertilizer  is  now  prohibitive  throughout  much  of  the  Northwest. 
Having  in  mind  the  feasibility  of  establishing  factories  for  the 
manufacture  of  calcium  cyanamid  or  lime  nitrogen  at  points  on 
the  Great  Lakes  to  be  served  by  the  electrical  power  of  the  St. 
Lawrence,  and  the  opportunity  of  obtaining  other  raw  materials 
ill  full  cargoes  by  water,  it  is  regarded  as  certain  that  the  manu- 
facture of  fertilizer  would  develop  into  an  industry  of  consider- 
able importance. 

Lumber. — At  the  present  time  lumber  is  shipped  from  the 
Pacific  Coast  through  the  Panama  Canal  to  the  Atlantic  seaboard, 
and  frequently  is  forwarded  inland  by  rail  as  far  as  I'ittsburgh. 
Bufifalo  and  Erie.  As  pointed  out  by  Mr.  John  A.  Russell, 
vice-president  of  the  Detroit  Board  of  Commerce,  it  would  be 
more  economical  to  bring  lumber  through  the  St.  Lawrence 
to  Detroit,  as  the  average  water  haul  from  New  York  to  Detroit 
would  be  less  than  the  rail  rate  to  the  points  named.  The  same 
argument  applies  to  lumber  from  the  Southern  States  and  to  the 
tropical  hardwoods  of  Central  America.  The  situation  with 
respect  to  lumber  for  use  in  the  important  furniture  industries 
of  Michigan  is  quite  similar  to  that  of  the  paper  mills,  in  that 
the  native  supplies  of  raw  material  which  originally  influenced 
the  establishment  of  the  plants  have  been  largely  exhausted. 
The  opening  of  the  St.  Lawrence  would  permit  lumber  vessels, 
which  ordinarily  do  not  draw  over  20  feet,  to  proceed  to  any 
port  on  the  Great  Lakes.  It  would  place  on  a  firmer  basis  all 
the  industries  now  consuming  lumber  and  would  at  the  same 
time  open  the  doors  for  the  exportation  of  certain  varieties  of 


276  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  THE 

low-grade  lumber  of  the  lake  regions  which  is  unsuitable  for 
use  in  the  industries  of  this  region. 

Hides. — In  1919  we  imported  744,836,035  lbs.  of  hides,  or 
372,418  tons,  principally  from  South  America,  India  and  South 
Africa.  Hides  from  Argentina  come  mostly  via  European  ports, 
whither  they  are  sent  as  distressed  cargo.  Hides  from  Australia 
come  chiefly  by  way  of  Vancouver  and  the  Canadian  Pacific 
Railway.  The  State  of  Michigan  alone  imports  between  1,000.000 
and  2,000,000  skins  annually,  weighing  8  to  20  pounds  each, 
while  the  States  of  Illinois,  Ohio  and  Wisconsin  also  use  large 
numbers.  It  costs  83  cents  a  hundred  pounds  to  bring  hides 
from  Glasgow  to  Montreal  or  New  York.  The  handling  charge 
in  New  York  is  2  cents  a  skin.  It  costs  43  cents  a  hundred 
pounds  to  bring  hides  from  the  seaboard  to  the  lakes  by  rail. 
Hides  can  be  brought  from  Glasgow  to  lake  ports  through  the 
proposed  waterway  at  not  exceeding  $1  a  hundred,  or  $20  a 
ton,  making  a  saving  of  about  33  cents  a  hundred,  or  $6.60  a 
ton.  On  Australian  hides,  the  freight  from  \'ancouver  alone  is 
$2.79  a  hundred,  or  over  $55  a  ton,  which  is  sufficient  to  pay  the 
entire  cost  by  water  direct  to  lake  ports.  The  total  imports 
of  hides  into  the  region  of  the  Great  Lakes  may  be  placed  at 
approximately  100,000  tons  annually,  on  which  a  saving  of  $660,- 
000  in  freight  charges  may  be  expected. 

Other  inbound  freight. — Among  the  other  articles  which  are 
used  in  large  quantities  upon  the  Great  Lakes  and  which  will 
use  the  proposed  waterway  are  the  following,  the  figures  given 
being  the  amounts  imported  into  the  country  in  1919: 

Asphaltvim  from  'JVinidad,  Venezuela,  and  other  countries.  94,329  tons 

Chicle,  shellac  and  other  gums,  largely  from  British  Hon- 
duras,   Colombia,    Mexico,    India,    British    East    Indies, 

New  Zealand 80,995,969  lbs. 

Extracts  for  tanning,  largely  from  Argentina  and  Paraguay.  150,600,000  lbs. 

Sago  and   tapioca,  largely  from   Dutch   East   Indies  and 

British  Straits  Settlements 99,274,913  lbs. 

Fibers  and  textile  grasses,  largely  from  Mexico 327,279  tons 

Flaxseed,  largely  from  Argentina 14,036,184  bu. 

Other  seeds  for  planting,  approximately 50,000,000  lbs. 

Spices,  largely  from  the  East  Indies,  China,  and  Jamaica.  .  56,441,836  lbs. 

Vegetable  oils,  approximately " 900,000,000  lbs. 

Granite  from  New  England 500,000  tons 

Outbound 

Iron  and  steel. — Tlu'  total  production  of  iron  ore  in  the  United 
States  in  1916  amounted  to  77,870,553  long  tons,  valued  at  $181,- 
902,277,  of  which  62,932,500  long  tons,  or  70,484,434  short  tons. 


GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL  277 

equal  to  80  per  cent  of  the  entire  production  of  the  country,  was 
moved  on  the  Great  Lakes.  The  total  ore  of  the  country  was 
smelted  into  39,126,324  long  tons  of  pig  iron,  valued  at  $663,- 
478.118.  In  1914,  the  latest  year  for  which  statistics  of  manu- 
factures are  available,  the  value  of  iron  and  steel  manufactures 
amounted  to  $1,365,380,206,  and  the  present  annual  value  is 
fully  double  this  amount.  Exports  of  iron  and  steel,  including 
certain  classes  of  machineri^,  amounted  to  $1,241,960,102  in  1917. 
and  $968,520,154  in  1919.  The  statistics  show  that  the  greater 
part  of  the  steel  manufactures  of  the  United  States  are  concen- 
trated in  portions  of  the  States  of  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  IlUnois 
and  Indiana,  within  the  territory  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes- 
St.  Lawrence  waterway.  A  number  of  plants  engaged  in  the 
manufacture  of  refined  iron  and  steel  articles  are  located  in 
New  England,  and  large  quantities  of  pig  iron  are  now  shipped 
by  rail  to  these  localities.  All  of  the  pig  iron  for  use  at  points 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  Atlantic  Coast  could  be  brought  by  vessel 
from  the  Great  Lakes  at  a  considerable  saving.  Moreover,  there 
are  a  number  of  important  steel  plants  along  the  Atlantic  Coast 
which  now  consume  considerable  quantities  of  iron  ore.  One 
company  has  large  iron  ore  holdings  in  Cuba,  but  requires  the 
Lake  ore  for  use  in  connection  with  the  Cuban  ore.  As  much 
as  3,000.000  tons  of  Lake  ore  is  now  carried  by  rail  annually 
to  the  Atlantic  Coast. 

The  opening  of  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway  for 
ocean  vessels  will  give  iron  and  steel  industries  a  choice  of  two 
desirable  expedients:  first,  they  can  locate  upon  the  Atlantic 
Coast  and  bring  ore  by  vessel  directly  to  their  plants,  at  a  large 
saving  in  the  present  cost  of  transporting  ore  or  of  obtaining 
pig  iron  by  rail ;  second,  they  can  locate  directly  upon  the  Great 
Lakes,  where  they  can  obtain  their  ore  from  Lake  Superior 
mines,  limestone  from  Lake  Huron,  and  their  coal  by  short  haul 
from  neighboring  bituminous  districts.  With  the  opening  of 
the  Great  Lakes  to  ocean  vessels,  there  will  be  a  movement  of 
not  less  than  5,000,000  tons  of  iron  ore  per  annum  to  the  Atlantic 
Coast,  and  the  shipment  of  pig  iron  and  manufactured  iron  and 
steel,  both  for  export  and  domestic  use,  should  speedily  develop 
to  considerable  proportions.  This  view  is  supported  by  the 
analysis  made  by  the  Committee  on  Canals  of  the  State  of  New^ 
York  when  considering  the  traffic  that  would  move  between  the 
Great  Lakes  and  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  Exports  of  iron  and 
steel  manufactures  in  1918  through  Atlantic  Coast  ports,  between 


278  ECOXOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  THE 

Porlland,  Me.,  and  Norfolk,  \'a.,  over  channels  improved  by  the 
Government,  amounted  to  4,065.795  tons,  of  which  fully  50  per 
cent  originated  in  the  area  which  winild  hnd  it  economical  to 
use  the  Great  Lakes  route. 

Agricultural  implements. — The  value  of  agricultural  imple- 
ments manufactured  in  the  United  States  in  1914  aniounted  to 
$164,087,000.  Illinois  took  first  rank  with  $65,338,000.  Wisconsin 
second  rank  with  $20,119,000.  and  Ohio  third  rank  with  $17,485.- 
000;  while  Indiana,  Michigan,  Minnesota  and  Iowa  were  among 
the  other  States  where  this  industry  is  chiefly  centered.  There 
is  an  increasing  demand  for  American  agricultural  implements 
abroad,  and  the  value  of  such  exports  in  1919  amounted  to 
$41,195,494.  The  market  for  these  implements  is  well  distributed 
throughout  the  entire  world,  and  in  1919  the  exports  went  to  88 
countries.  The  transfer  of  machinery  of  all  kinds  is  expensive 
and  involves  risk  of  breakage.  Direct  shipment  from  Lake 
ports  would  reduce  this  risk  and  alford  a  large  saving  in  trans- 
portation costs. 

Automobiles  and  vehicles. — The  statistics  show  that  the  auto- 
mobile industry  is  largely  concentrated  upon  the  Great  Lakes, 
the  value  of  products  of  this  industry  tor  th?  State  of  Michigan 
exceeding  that  of  the  entire  balance  of  the  countr\-.  American 
automobiles  are  increasing  in  popularity  abroad,  and  there  is 
every  reason  to  contemplate  an  expanding  market  in  the  future. 
They  now  go  to  all  parts  of  the  world,  and  the  total  exportation 
is  much  greater  than  the  official  figures  show,  because  there  ha'^ 
been  a  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  American  manufacturers  to 
supplv  certain  foreign  markets  from  Canadian  factories,  and 
this  is  also  true  of  automobile  tires.  The  reason  for  shipping 
from  Canada  rather  than  the  United  States  is  due  to  the  im- 
practicability of  getting  prompt  shipment  through  Atlantic  jiorts. 
and  with  the  opening  of  the  St.  Lawrence  to  ocean  vessels  ship- 
ments would  be  made  directly  from  the  American  jilants. 

More  important,  however,  than  the  foreign  trade  is  the  do- 
mestic trade  along  the  Atlantic  Coast.  The  delay  in  deliveries  of 
automobiles  by  rail  during  the  last  few  years  has  been  most 
exasperating  to  manufacturers,  and  as  a  result  automobiles  have 
been  driven  thousands  of  miles  in  order  to  effect  delivery.  One 
of  the  most  important  automobile  industries  of  the  country  is 
now  contemplating  the  erection  of  a  mnnber  of  warehouses  on 
tJie  .Atlantic  Coast,  particularly  to  enable  more  expeditious  de- 
liveries to  be  made  in  that  territorv.     'I'hc  large  cost  of  these  ware- 


GREAT  LAKIiS-ST.  LAW  KEKCE  Sliil'  CIIANMiL  279 

houses  would  be  rendered  unnecessary  if  the  way  were  opened 
for  coastwise  dehvery  by  vessel. 

Coal. — From  a  study  of  the  present  movement  of  coal,  it  might 
be  assumed  that  this  commodity  is  not  interested  in  the  Great 
Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway.  It  must  be  remembered,  how- 
ever, that  coal  is  a  commodity  which  is  frequently  used  to  buy 
other  business,  and  it  is  due  to  her  enormous  coal  reserves 
that  Great  Britain  has  been  able  to  extend  profitable  trade  to  all 
parts  of  the  world.  This  commodity  is  extensively  used  to 
provide  cargoes  to  many  countries  which  are  unable  to  absorb 
a  sufficient  amount  of  manufactures  to  balance  their  exports  of 
raw  materials.  A  study  of  the  statistics  shows  that  we  now 
export  large  quantities  of  coal  to  Mexico,  Cuba,  Argentina,  Brazil, 
Uruguay,  and  other  countries  of  South  and  Central  America  and 
the  West  Indies,  as  well  as  to  Mediterranean  and  Scandinavian 
countries.  Where  full  cargoes  are  brought  in  from  these  coun- 
tries, coal  will  help  to  make  up  the  return  cargo.  While  the 
Great  Lakes  district  consumes  large  quantities  of  raw  materials 
from  Cuba,  Mexico  and  South  America,  the  exports  to  those 
regions,  while  important,  would  be  of  smaller  volume.  By 
reason  of  the  short  haul  from  the  coal  fields  to  Lake  Erie  and 
Lake  Michigan,  however,  coal  will  be  extensively  used  for  bottom 
cargo  to  make  up  the  deficiency. 

New  England  now  uses  large  quantities  of  coal  for  industrial 
purposes,  which  coal  has  in  the  past  been  a  serious  burden  to 
the  rail  lines  serving  that  territory,  and  much  difficulty  has  been 
experienced  in  obtaining  the  requisite  supply.  Upon  completion 
of  the  St.  Lawrence  waterway,  a  route  will  be  provided  by  which 
this  coal  can  be  shipped  by  vessel  to  New  England  ports.  The 
return  cargoes  from  New  England  will  consist  of  hardware, 
manufactured  goods  of  all  kinds,  and  large  quantities  of  granite 
which  is  now  extensively  used  in  building  operations  of  the  Lake 
cities  and  is  brought  by  rail  from  the  New  England  district.  The 
total  movement  of  granite  into  the  Great  Lakes  region  will 
amount  to  not  less  than  500,000  tons  annually,  while  the  outbound 
movement  of  coal  to  foreign  and  domestic  destinations  will  reach 
a  total  of  fully  5,000,000  tons. 

Salt. — Large  quantities  of  salt  are  used  in  connection  with  the 
fishing  industries  of  the  New  England  coast.  In  the  past  this 
commodity  has  been  brought  in  chiefly  from  England,  Spain, 
and  the  British  West  Indies.  The  State  of  Michigan  ranks 
first  in  the  production  of  salt  in  the  L^nited  States,  with  a  total 


280  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  THE 

of  2,250,939  tons  in  1917,  and  it  is  reasonably  certain  that  salt 
will  constitute  one  of  the  items  of  coastwise  traffic  between  the 
Great  Lakes  and  the  Atlantic  Coast. 

Copper. — The  total  production  of  copper  in  the  United  States 
from  domestic  ores  amounted  to  1,927,850,548  lbs.  in  1916.  Of 
this  total,  273,692,525  lbs.  came  from  Michigan,  352,928.373  lbs. 
from  Montana,  240,275,222  lbs.  from  Utah,  and  8,624,081  lbs. 
from  Colorado,  making  a  total  for  these  four  States  of  875,- 
520,201  lbs.,  or  46  per  cent  of  the  total  production  of  the  country. 
Of  this  production,  practically  all  the  copper  of  Michigan  and 
Montana,  and  part  of  that  of  Colorado  and  Utah,  would  use 
the  Great  Lakes  route.  The  Anaconda  Copper  Company,  which 
has  a  monthly  production  of  13,000  tons,  now  ships  large  quan- 
tities to  the  Atlantic  Coast  by  way  of  the  Panama  Canal,  and  is 
prepared  to  avail  itself  of  the  cheaper  transportation  afforded 
by  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence  waterway.  Copper  would  con- 
stitute one  of  the  important  commodities  in  the  coastwise  trade 
between  the  Great  Lakes  and  New  England  ports.  Our  total 
exports  of  copper  in  1919  amounted  to  516,627,775  lbs.,  or 
258,000  tons,  which  was  less  than  half  the  exports  in  1917.  The 
exports  for  1920  are  unofficially  estimated  at  611,000,000  lbs. 
Of  the  total  average  annual  exports,  200,000,000  lbs.,  or  100,000 
tons,  would  be  shipped  by  way  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River,  while 
an  equal  or  greater  amount  would  use  this  route  to  reach  do- 
mestic markets  along  the  Atlantic  seaboard. 

While  our  country  is  blessed  with  large  resources  of  copper, 
the  situation  with  respect  to  this  material  is  analogous  in  some 
respects  to  the  situation  in  regard  to  grain,  in  that  the  chief 
sources  of  production  are  situated  in  the  interior  of  the  country, 
involving  long  and  expensive  hauls  to  the  seaboard.  As  in  the 
case  of  grain,  our  copper  comes  into  competition  with  countries 
which  can  produce  more  cheaply  than  we,  and  it  is  important 
that  we  seek  every  means  of  reducing  the  cost  of  placing  this 
product  on  the  market.  It  is  reported  that  copper  from  the  fields 
of  the  Congo  Basin  can  be  placed  in  London  at  a  cost  of  7  cents 
a  pound.  The  provision  of  a  more  economical  outlet  for  our 
copi)cr  is  of  national  rather  than  local  interest. 

Meat  and  dairy  products. — The  total  value  of  products  of  the 
slaughtering  and  meat  packing  industries  in  1914  amounted  to 
$1,651,965,000.  of  which  Illinois  produced  $485,362,000.  Other 
States  in  the  territory  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes  which  showed 
a  large  jiroduction  include  Kansas,  Missouri,  Iowa.  Ohio,  Indiana, 


GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL  281 

Minnesota  and  Wisconsin.  In  the  manufacture  of  butter  Wis- 
consin took  first  rank,  with  Minnesota  second  and  Iowa  third; 
while  in  the  manufacture  of  cheese  Wisconsin  took  first  rank, 
with  New  York  second  and  Michigan  third.  IlHnois,  Wisconsin 
and  Michigan  ranked  second,  third  and  fourth,  respectively,  in 
the  manufacture  of  condensed  milk  and  milk  products  other  than 
butter  and  cheese.  The  total  exports  of  meat  and  dairy  products 
in  1919  exceeded  4,000.000,000  pounds,  or  2,000,000  tons,  and  of 
this  total,  1,500,000  tons  came  from  the  territory  tributary  to 
the  Great  Lakes.  In  the  shipment  of  all  commodities  requiring 
refrigeration  in  transit,  there  is  a  great  advantage  and  saving  in 
making  direct  shipment  from  point  of  origin  to  destination.  In 
the  past,  large  losses  have  resulted  from  deterioration  of  products 
of  this  kind  in  transit.  Including  the  coastwise  movement  to 
the  Atlantic  seaboard,  the  total  outbound  shipments  of  meat 
and  dairy  products  by  way  of  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence 
ship  channel  will  amount  to  1,000,000  tons  annually.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that  the  waterway  will  be  used  for  these  shipments, 
because  it  will  afford  a  substantial  saving  over  present  routes, 
and  such  saving  is  necessary  to  permit  our  exporters  to  success- 
fully meet  the  competition  of  Argentina,  Australia,  and  other 
meat  producing  countries. 

Other  outbound  freight. — Included  among  the  many  articles 
which  will  contribute  to  the  make-up  of  general  merchandise 
shipped  abroad  and  to  Atlantic  Coast  points,  are  linseed  oil, 
rubber  goods,  leather,  furniture,  paper,  live  stock,  and  countless 
manufactured  articles  which  are  produced  in  great  abundance 
at  the  many  important  industrial  cities  of  this  region. 


Chapter  XXV 

SHIPBUILDING  ON  THE  GREAT  LAKES. 

A  depth  of  25  feet  in  the  St.  Lawrence  waterway  will  be 
sufficient  for  the  passage  without  cargo  of  the  larger  types  of 
commercial  vessels.  The  low  cost  of  the  raw  materials  required 
for  steel  manufacture,  and  other  factors  affecting  production 
costs,  justify  the  belief  that  the  conditions  on  the  Great  Lakes 
are  peculiarly  favorable  for  successful  competition  in  the  ship- 
building trade  of  the  world,  and  the  benefits  to  be  afforded  this 
industry  by  the  proposed  improvement  of  the  St.  Lawrence 
River  may  easily  amount  to  millions  of  dollars  annually. 

The  possibilities  of  shipbuilding  on  the  Great  Lakes  have 
always  been  recognized,  but  the  same  physical  obstacles  which 
have  limited  traffic  to  the  confines  of  the  lakes  themselves,  have 
likewise  limited  commercial  shipbuilding.  As  a  result  of  the 
war,  however,  construction  of  large  vessels  on  the  Great  Lakes 
has  taken  on  new  importance.  Prior  to  1917,  the  Great  Lakes 
could  boast  of  only  four  ships  of  8,000  tons  gross  register.  In 
1917  alone,  14  bulk  freighters  were  constructed,  with  a  gross 
tonnage  of  98,615  and  a  carrying  capacity  of  147,000  tons.  Many 
lake  vessels  were  taken  by  the  L'nited  States  and  Canadian  Gov- 
ernments for  ocean  service,  and  delivered  by  way  of  the  St. 
Lawrence  River.  Vessels  more  than  261  feet  in  length  were  cut 
into  two  parts  for  passage  through  the  W'elland  Canal  and  St. 
Lawrence  River.  The  majority  of  vessels  taken  over  by  the 
United  States  were  package  freighters,  although  a  number  of 
bulk  freighters  were  taken. 

During  the  year  1918,  there  were  thirteen  yards  on  the  Great 
Lakes  engaged  in  constructing  vessels  for  the  United  Stales 
Government,  and  the  dimensions  of  the  vessels  built  were  gen- 
erally the  maximum  that  could  be  passed  through  the  present 
W'elland  Canal.  The  Great  Lakes  Engineering  Works  built  and 
delivered  34  vessels,  the  majority  of  which  were  originally  ordered 
by  private  firms,  but  subsequently  requisitioned  by  the  United 
States.  Thirty  of  these  vessels  have  tine  machinery  amidships 
with  two  large  hatches  forward  and  two  aft,  and  are  typical  of 
the  smaller  type  of  ocean-going  general  cargo  vessels.  The  last 
four  have  their  machinery  aft.  with  a  depth  of  27^/^  feet  (not 
draft),  and  were  originally  designed  as  colliers  for  use  on  the 
Atlantic  Coast.  One  of  these  steamers,  the  Craicl  Keys,  is  worthy 
of   special    reference,   inasmuch    as    this    vessel    was    completely 

282 


CiKEAT  LAKES-ST.   LAWKE.XCE  SHIP  CHANNEL  283 

built  and  delivered  in  29  working  days.  For  this  achievement 
the  Great  Lakes  Engineering  Works  was  officially  awarded  the 
world  record  by  the  United  States  Shipping  Board.  The  Amer- 
ican Shipbuilding  Company  has  delivered  94  ships  of  the  standard 
ocean-going  type,  and  other  yards  have  constructed  standard 
vessels  for  salt-water  use. 

The  yards  of  the  Great  Lakes  are  well  equipped  for  the  con- 
struction of  vessels  of  all  types,  but  their  contracts  have  been 
largely  limited  to  vessels  which  can  be  passed  through  the  canals. 
A  few  larger  ones  have  been  constructed  and  sent  through  in 
sections.  The  depth  now  proposed  for  the  St.  Lawrence  water- 
way is  sufficient  for  the  passage,  without  cargo,  of  the  larger 
type  of  commercial  vessels,  and  if  the  locks  be  given  sufficient 
width  and  length  to  accommodate  such  vessels  the  activities 
of  the  ship  yards  of  the  Great  Lakes  can  and  will  be  extended  to 
include  the  construction  of  large  ocean-going  freight  and  pas- 
senger vessels. 

Consideration  of  the  factors  of  cost  justifies  the  belief  that 
the  conditions  on  the  Great  Lakes  are  peculiarly  favorable  for 
successful  competition  in  the  shipbuilding  trade  of  the  world. 
The  business  is  one  which  will  assume  great  magnitude  in  the 
future,  and  the  benefits  to  be  afforded  by  the  advancement  of 
this  industry  on  the  Great  Lakes  may  easily  amount  to  millions 
of  dollars  annually. 


Chapter  XXVI 

WATER  POWER. 

It  is  estimated  that  the  improvement  of  the  St.  Lawrence 
River  will  develop  4,000,000  H.  P.,  which  will  be  worth  about 
$15  per  H.  P.,  or  $60,000,000,  and  will  save  from  25,000,000  to 
50,000,000  tons  of  coal  annually.  To  haul  this  coal  from  the  mine 
to  the  factory  would  require  one  trip  of  500,000  to  1,000,000  cars. 
The  products  of  factories  of  the  United  States  in  1914  were 
worth  in  excess  of  $1,000  per  primary  H.  P.  used  in  such  indus- 
tries. If  the  power  of  the  St.  Lawrence  were  all  used  for  manu- 
facturing, the  value  of  the  raw  materials,  based  on  averages  for 
the  country,  would  be  $2,600,000,000,  and  of  the  finished  products 
$4,400,000,000.  At  a  value  of  $200  per  ton,  the  products  would 
amount  to  22,000,000  tons  annually,  while  the  raw  materials 
would  equal  or  exceed  this  tonnage.  While  all  the  power  will  not 
be  devoted  to  manufacturing,  a  large  amount  of  it  will  be. 
The  industries  which  will  be  established  to  utilize  this  power  will 
in  themselves  create  an  enormous  tonnage  for  movement  on 
the  waterway. 

The  opening  of  the  Great  Lakes  to  ocean  vessels  is  required 
in  the  interest  of  the  commerce  of  the  United  States,  and  the 
cost  is  fully  justified  for  this  purpose.  The  fact  that  the  improve- 
ment will  incidentally  harness  and  make  available  for  mankind 
a  water  power  of  great  magnitude,  however,  can  not  be  ignored, 
particularly  as  this  water  power  will  not  only  afford  a  revenue 
sufficient  to  pay  the  entire  cost,  but  will  make  possible  a  vast 
industrial  development  which  will  add  materially  to  the  future 
commerce  of  the  new  ocean  route.  As  the  subject  will  be  thor- 
oughly considered  in  the  report  of  the  engineers,  it  will  be  re- 
ferred to  only  briefly  in  this  report. 

The  question  of  waterpower  development  is  of  paramount 
importance  to  both  the  United  States  and  Canada.  In  consider- 
ing the  future  requirements  of  industry,  insufficient  considera- 
tion has  been  given  to  our  power  resources,  and  it  is  here  that 
a  shortage  is  to  be  feared  rather  than  in  the  supply  of  raw 
materials  of  manufacture.  The  lack  of  a  sufficient  power  re- 
serve was  especially  manifest  during  the  war,  when  the  combined 
facilities  of  hydroelectric,  steam,  and  mechanical  water  power 
proved  inadequate  to  meet  production  necessities  in  some  of  the 
more  important  industrial  districts.  In  fact,  the  situation  became 
so  serious  that  it  was  not  only  necessary  to  curtail  power  to  pro- 
ducers of  nonessentials,  Init  to  adopt  strict  measures  for  the 
conservation  of  power  at  establishments  engaged  upon  important 

284 


GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL  285 

Government  work.  While  it  is  generally  possible  to  augment 
the  output  of  raw  materials  within  a  reasonable  space  of  time, 
in  order  to  meet  increased  requirements  of  manufacture,  it  is 
not  feasible  to  materially  increase  the  supply  of  power  without 
the  long  delay  required  for  the  construction  and  equipment  of 
new  plants.  It  is  understood  that  but  little  was  accomplished 
during  the  war  toward  increasing  the  power  supply,  owing  to 
the  impracticability  of  establishing  the  plant  and  machinery  re- 
quired, and  that  had  the  war  continued  much  longer  the  country 
would  have  been  face  to  face  with  a  power  shortage  so  serious 
as  to  materially  afifect  the  war  program.  As  a  measure  of  future 
protection,  as  well  as  to  provide  for  the  growing  needs  of  indus- 
try, the  important  power  resources  of  the  country  should  be  de- 
veloped to  the  point  where  they  may  be  quickly  brought  into  use 
when  required. 

It  is  estimated  that  from  6  to  15  tons  of  coal  are  required 
for  the  development  of  one  horsepower  year,  the  former  figure 
being  for  the  most  efficient  plants,  while  the  latter  figure  repre- 
sents more  nearly  the  average.  The  present  annual  production 
of  coal  in  the  United  States  is  more  than  500,000,000  tons,  and 
of  this  it  is  estimated  that  about  350,000,000  tons  are  consumed 
in  the  production  of  steam  power.  Our  deposits  of  anthracite  and 
bituminous  coal  are  gradually  being  exhausted,  and  while  the 
latter  will  last  for  many  years  to  come,  the  eventual  exhaustion  of 
the  supply  is  inevitable,  and  it  is  none  too  soon  to  adopt  measures 
for  its  conservation. 

It  is  estimated  that  the  improvement  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River 
will  develop  4,000,000  horsepower,  of  which  approximately  2,000,- 
000  horsepower  will  be  in  the  international  section.  The  value 
of  this  power  at  the  switchboard  will  be  at  least  $15  a  horse- 
power, or  $60,000,000  a  year,  and  it  will  save  from  25  to  50 
million  tons  of  coal  annually,  valued  at  $100,000,000  to  $200.- 
000,000.  To  haul  this  coal  from  the  mine  to  the  factory  would 
require  one  trip  of  500,000  to  1,000,000  cars.  In  1914,  there  was 
22,547,574  primary  horsepower  used  in  manufacturing  in  the 
United  States,  and  the  value  of  the  products  was  $24,246,434,724, 
or  more  than  $1,000  per  horsepower.  Based  on  the  figures  of 
the  1914  census,  the  horsepower  of  the  St.  Lawrence  would 
afford  employment  to  about  1,500,000  people.  If  the  power  were 
all  used  for  manufacturing,  the  value  of  the  raw  materials  would 
be  $2,600,000,000,  and  of  the  finished  products  $4,400,000,000. 
At  a  value  of  $200  a  ton,  the  products  would  give  a  total  com- 


286  i;reat  lakes-st.  lawkence  ship  channel 

nierce  amounting  to  22,000,000  tons  annually,  while  the  raw  ma- 
terials would  equal  or  exceed  this  tonnage.  While  all  of  this 
power  will  not  be  devoted  to  manufacturing,  it  is  certain  that 
much  of  it  will  be,  and  that  this  development  will  create  a  com- 
merce of  large  proportions.  The  combination  of  cheap  power, 
cheap  transportation  of  raw  products,  and  a  direct  ocean  route 
to  the  world's  markets,  will  not  fail  to  attract  the  enterprising 
American  and  Canadian  manufacturer  seeking  an  opportunity  to 
improve  his  position  in  commerce.  The  paper  and  metallurgical 
industries  will  be  among  those  which  will  recognize  the  peculiar 
advantages  of  the  situation. 


CONCLUSIONS. 

The  study  of  the  economic  aspects  of  the  Great  I.akes-St. 
Lawrence  waterway  leads  to  the  following  conclusions  : 

1.  A  channel  25  feet  deep  at  low  water  in  the  St.  Lawrence 
River  between  Montreal  and  Lake  Ontario  will  enable  the 
greater  proportion  of  vessels  engaged  in  foreign  trade,  and  prac- 
tically all  vessels  engaged  in  general  coastwise  trade,  to  enter 
the  Great  Lakes.  The  figures  show  that  the  ocean  freight  vessel 
of  average  tonnage  has  a  loaded  draft  of  about  21  feet. 

2.  At  our  principal  ocean  ports,  scarcely  1  per  cent  of  the 
vessels  utilize  the  full  available  depth,  while  vessels  on  the  Great 
Lakes  customarily  take  advantage  of  every  foot.  A  channel  25 
feet  deep  at  low  water  into  the  Great  Lakes  could  be  used  by 
nearly  all  vessels  now  calling  at  the  30-foot  harbors  of  the 
Atlantic,  Gulf  and  Pacific  Coasts. 

3.  The  study  of  vessels  passing  through  the  Panama  Canal 
discloses  the  fact  that  the  vessels  operating  on  this  route  between 
the  important  ports  of  the  world  have  an  average  draft  of  21 
feet.  The  greater  proportion  of  them  could  have  delivered  their 
cargoes  to  lake  ports  on  a  25-foot  channel,  and  nearly  all  of 
them  on  a  30-foot  channel.  Only  3.3  per  cent  of  the  vessels  pass- 
ing through  the  Suez  Canal  since  1912  have  had  drafts  as  great 
as  27  feet.  At  New  York,  which  is  used  by  the  largest  vessels 
in  the  world,  only  4  per  cent  drew  30  feet  or  more  during  the 
first  six  months  of  1914. 

4.  A  channel  30  feet  deep  will  accommodate  99  per  cent  of 
the  vessels  customarily  engaged  in  world  trade. 

5.  Vessels  of  moderate  size  and  draft  are  now  in  use  on  all 
the  world  trade  routes  and  are  the  most  suitable  for  use  in  devel- 
oping the  maritime  trade  of  the  Great  Lakes.  Most  of  them 
can  be  accommodated  on  a  depth  of  25  feet,  and  all  of  them  on 
a  depth  of  30  feet. 

6.  Every  increase  of  navigation  facilities  on  the  Great  Lakes 
has  brought  benefits  amounting  to  many  times  its  cost,  and  if 
the  opening  of  these  waters  to  ocean  vessels  should  lead  to  further 
expenditures  for  channels  and  terminal  facilities,  the  outlay  must 
be  regarded  as  a  high-grade  investment  which  will  return  abundant 
dividends  to  the  public. 

7.  The  assumption  that  the  restricted  sections  of  the  St.  Law- 
rence route  will  involve  delays  which  will  render  the  use  of 
ocean  vessels  unprofitable  is  not  supported  by  a  study  of  the 
navigation  conditions  on  this  and  other  routes,  nor  by  the  prac- 
tices with  reference  to  vessel  rates. 

287 


288  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  THE 

8.  The  rapid  rise  of  the  port  of  Montreal  to  a  position  second 
only  to  New  York  in  the  exportation  of  grain  from  the  American 
continent  is  alone  abundant  proof  that  the  navigation  of  the  St. 
Lawrence  under  conditions  similar  to  those  now  prevailing 
between  Montreal  and  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  presents  no  difficulties 
of  sufficient  importance  to  prevent  the  full  realization  of  the 
purposes  for  which  the  extension  of  this  navigation  is  desired. 

9.  The  European  analogies  show  that  the  St.  Lawrence  water- 
way gives  prospect  of  greater  usefulness  than  many  foreign  deep- 
water  routes  which  are  in   successful   use   at  the  present  time. 

10.  It  is  a  recognized  rule  of  transportation  that  where  there 
is  a  productive  interior,  ships  will  proceed  as  far  inland  as  physi- 
cally practicable,  and  there  are  many  precedents  to  show  that 
ocean  vessels  will  enter  the  Great  Lakes.  Moreover,  there  will 
be  a  large  amount  of  incoming  and  outgoing  freight  in  full 
cargoes,  for  which  vessels  will  be  chartered  or  owned  by  the  com- 
panies interested. 

11.  A  wrong  impression  exists  regarding  return  loads  at  our 
ocean  ports.  At  a  number  of  successful  ports  the  exports  are 
many  times  the  imports.  At  Galveston  the  ratio  is  about  12  to  1 ; 
at  Los  Angeles  20  to  1 ;  at  Portland,  Oreg.,  40  to  1  ;  and  at  New- 
port News  70  to  1.  Moreover,  in  some  cases  the  imports  do  not 
proceed  in  any  quantity  from  the  countries  to  which  the  exports 
are  destined.  The  consuming  ability  of  the  territory  tributary 
to  the  Great  Lakes,  and  the  importance  of  the  manufacturing 
industries  which  now  import  large  quantities  of  raw  materials 
from  abroad,  insure  a  greater  proportion  of  return  cargo  than  is 
obtainable  at  many  of  our  successful  ocean  ports. 

12.  In  the  great  interior  section  of  the  L^nited  States  contiguous 
to  the  Great  Lakes  is  centered  a  large  share  of  the  surplus  agri- 
cultural and  mineral  production  of  the  country,  and  the  manu- 
factured goods  of  this  area  go  to  every  country  in  the  world. 
It  is  essential  to  the  future  prosperity  of  the  nation  that  means 
be  provided  for  placing  these  surplus  products  in  foreign  markets 
at  low  cost.  The  present  rail  haul  of  1,000  to  1,500  miles,  with 
the  attendant  cost  and  delay  of  transfer  at  Atlantic  ports,  is 
an  unwarrantable  handicap  again,st  our  foreign  trade,  and  seri- 
ously limits  our  ability  to  meet  competition  abroad.  The  opening 
of  the  Great  Lakes  to  ocean  vessels  will  remove  the  handicap. 

13.  The  railroads  of  the  country  are  inadequate  ti>  handle  the 
traffic,  whenever  there  is  any  traffic  to  handle.  During  the 
])eriods  of  business  depression  they  do  fairly  well,  but  they  are 
unable  to  carry  the  freight  during  the  crop  moving  periods  and 
at  times  when  commodities  are  in  demand.  The  transportation 
shortage  is  resi^onsible  for  the  loss  of  billions  of  dollars  annually. 


GREAT  I.AKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL  289 

More  cars  mean  more  congestion.  The  real  need  is  more  routes, 
more  outlets,  and  better  terminals.  The  Great  Lakes-St.  Law- 
rence waterway  will  have  an  important  effect  in  relieving  the 
transportation  congestion,  and  will  more  than  save  its  cost  every 
year  by  eliminating  losses  due  to  inability  of  the  railroads  to 
move  the  traffic. 

14.  The  cost  of  getting  freight  through  the  terminals  of  the 
Atlantic  Coast  frequently  equals  the  cost  of  the  rail  haul  from 
points  as  far  west  as  Chicago.  The  extent  to  which  these  terminal 
charges  burden  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  is  not  generally 
appreciated.  More  and  better  terminal  facilities  must  be  pro- 
vided, but  of  greater  importance  to  commerce  will  be  the  open- 
ing of  a  deep  water  route  to  the  heart  of  the  country  which 
will  eliminate  a  large  proportion  of  the  transfers. 

15.  Estimates  formerly  made  regarding  the  cost  of  barge 
navigation  have  not  been  sustained  by  actual  experience.  The 
traffic  on  the  Barge  Canal  is  not  unlike  that  on  other  shallow 
waterways,  and  consists  chiefly  of  low-priced  products.  Its 
capacity  is  no  more  than  will  be  required  for  transporting  the 
local  traffic  originating  on  its  banks.  Instead  of  avoiding  a  trans- 
fer, it  introduces  an  additional  transfer,  which  renders  it  unsuit- 
able as  an  outlet  for  the  general  commerce  of  the  Great  Lakes 
region. 

16.  Study  of  the  cost  of  transportation  by  ocean  vessels  shows 
that  the  additional  cost  of  running  to  upper  lake  ports,  as  com- 
pared with  Atlantic  ports,  is  only  a  fraction  of  the  amount  which 
will  be  saved  by  elimination  of  rail  hauls  and  transfers. 

17.  Comparison  of  distances  and  costs  of  transportation  from 
all  parts  of  the  world  to  the  areas  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes, 
both  by  existing  routes  and  by  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Lawrence 
waterway,  shows  that  the  latter  route  will  eft"ect  important  sav- 
ings, amounting  to  as  much  as  $10  a  ton  on  some  commodities. 
The  territory  tributary  for  commerce  with  the  United  Kingdom 
and  western  Europe  has  a  population  of  about  41.000,000,  and 
the  area  tributary  for  commerce  with  South  ^A-merica  a  popula- 
tion of  about  30,000,000.  The  area  tributary  for  coastwise  traffic 
is  smaller,  but  includes  all  of  'the  important  manufacturing  dis- 
tricts adjacent  to  the  Great  Lakes,  and  this  statement  is  also 
applicable  to  the  area  tributary  for  traffic  with  Central  .\merica 
and  the  West  Indies. 

18.  The  statistics  show  that  the  centers  of  production  of  many 
of  the  most  important  tonnage  producing  commodities  are  within 
the  territory  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes.  In  this  territory  are 
produced   75   per  cent   of   the  wheat,  65   per  cent   of   the   corn, 


290  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  THE 

100  per  cent  of  the  flax,  85  per  cent  of  the  iron.  40  per  cent  of 
the  copper,  74  per  cent  of  the  zinc,  and  46  per  cent  of  the  lead. 
The  important  manufacturing  industries  of  this  territory  include 
agricultural  implements,  automobiles  and  accessories,  rubber 
manufactures,  meat  packing,  iron  and  steel,  paper,  furniture,  and 
many  others. 

19.  The  present  commerce  of  the  Great  Lakes  furnishes  no 
basis  for  estimating  the  commerce  of  the  Great  Lakes-St.  Law- 
rence waterway.  The  package  freight,  which  has  been  referred 
to  as  being  the  only  part  interested  in  reaching  tidewater,  con- 
sists largely  of  local  and  interlake  freight  which  is  not  uiterested 
in  reaching  the  seaboard.  Practically  all  of  the  grain  and  some 
iron  ore,  pig  iron  and  coal  will  use  the  deep  waterway.  The 
general  freight  interested  in  the  waterway  is  the  enormous  ton- 
nage which  now  moves  entirely  by  rail  between  the  Great  Lakes 
region  and  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  The  total  volume  of  this  move- 
ment is  now  about  250,000,000  tons  annually. 

20.  Tlie  saving  on  grain  will  amount  to  from  8  to  10  cents  a 
bushel,  and  this  saving  will  afl:'ect  not  only  the  grain  which  actually 
moves  for  export,  but  practically  all  that  produced  within  the 
area  tributary  to  the  Great  Lakes.  This  saving  will  amount 
annually  to  approximately  the  entire  cost  of  the  improvement 
required  to  admit  ocean  vessels  into  the  Lakes.  In  view  of  the 
importance  of  having  available  at  all  times  a  route  which  will 
enable  the  producers  of  the  great  Northwest  to  market  their 
products  expeditiously  and  economically  at  the  moment  of 
greatest  demand,  the  opening  of  this  deep  water  route  is  regarded 
as  of  national  importance  and  fully  justified  for  this  purpose  alone. 

21.  The  principal  commodities  which  will  be  brought  into  the 
Lakes  over  the  deep  waterway  will  be  pulpwood,  wood-pulp, 
sulphur,  china  clay,  cofifee,  cocoa,  sugar,  fruits  and  nuts,  rubber, 
fertilizer  materials,  lumber,  hides,  canned  goods,  asphaltum, 
gums,  tanning  extracts,  sago  and  tapioca,  fibers  and  textile 
grasses,  flaxseed,  seed  for  planting,  spices,  vegetable  oils,  granite 
and  hardware.  The  principal  commodities  which  will  be  shipped 
outward  will  be  grain,  iron  ore,  iron  and  steel,  coal,  agricultural 
implements,  automobiles  and  vehicles,  salt,  copper,  meat  and 
dairy  products,  and  the  countless  manufactures  of  the  industrial 
centers  of  the  Great  Lakes.  Within  a  short  period  after  comple- 
tion of  the  deep  waterway,  the  commerce  should  amount  to  ap- 
proximately 20,000,000  tons,  with  continued  growth  in  the  future. 

22.  The  Great  Lakes  are  regarded  as  a  most  advantageous 
location  for  shipbuilding,  due  to  the  availability  of  an  abundance 
of  iron  ore  and  other  essentials  of  steel  manufacture.     The  pro- 


GREAT  LAKES-ST.  LAWRENCE  SHIP  CHANNEL  291 

posed  enlargement  of  the  channels  affording  access  to  the  Great 
Lakes  will  permit  the  shipyards  on  the  Lakes  to  construct  vessels 
of  all  sizes  and  types,  except  the  very  few  express  liners,  and 
will  be  of  great  value  to  this  industry. 

23.  The  waterpower  development  will  not  only  afford  a  revenue 
which  will  maintain  the  improvement  and  amortize  the  full  cost 
within  a  reasonable  period,  but  it  will  be  the  direct  means  of  creat- 
ing a  vast  industrial  development  which  in  itself  will  provide  a 
large  traffic  on  the  waterway  consisting  of  the  raw  materials  so 
abundantly  provided  by  nature  in  the  region  of  the  Great  Lakes, 
and  of  the  finished  products  which  will  be  transported  direct  by 
ocean  vessel  to  foreign  and  domestic  markets. 

24.  No  greater  opportunity  for  the  successful  development  of 
commerce  has  ever  been  offered  to  mankind.  The  advantages 
can  not  be  regarded  as  of  local  importance  only.  They  combine 
to  afford  more  favorable  opportunity  for  expanding  our  trade 
with  the  world,  and  hence  must  be  regarded  as  of  interest  to  every 
citizen  of  the  land.  It  seems  clear  that  the  time  has  come  when 
we  can  no  longer  safely  delay  the  opening  of  the  Great  Lakes  to 
the  commerce  of  the  world.  It  has  been  forcibly  stated  by  Senator 
Lenroot,  and  we  now  repeat  in  his  language : 

The  Wfest  demands  the  St.  Lawrence  outlet  to  the  sea,  and  because 
its  demands  are  so  just,  so  necessary  for  the  future,  not  alone  for  the 
West,  but  of  the  entire  nation,  no  opposition  from  any  source  shall  prevail 
against  it,  and  this  great  project  which  is  more  important  to  the  prosperity 
of  this  country  than  the  Panama  Canal,  shall  in  a  few  years  be  an 
accomplished  fact.  Upon  the  broad  bosom  of  our  Great  Lakes,  and  in 
the  harbors  of  our  great  cities,  there  shall  fly  the  flags  of  every  nation 
from  the  mastheads  of  ships  coming  from  every  part  of  the  world,  but  with 
the  upbuilding  of  our  merchant  marine  there  shall  always  be  one  flag 
more  numerous  than  any  other,  the  flag  of  the  United  States  of 
America. 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIbHAHY  i-auili 


AA    001  118  642   6 


